BZADW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BZADW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 541

Citation: BZADW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 541
Appeal from: BZADW v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1229
Parties: BZADW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and J BARTLETT IN HIS/HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSOR
File number: QUD 654 of 2013
Judge: DOWSETT J
Date of judgment: 26 May 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – independent protection assessment – judicial review – appeal – whether error in interpretation of definition of refugee – whether error in interpretation of definition of persecution – whether findings of fact open on the evidence – whether relevant considerations not taken into account.  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36(2), 36(2A), 46A, 91R, 91S
Cases cited: Diatlov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 167 ALR 313 discussed
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161 considered
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 cited
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18 discussed
SZOQQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 296 ALR 409 cited
Date of hearing: 29 November 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Boccabella
Solicitor for the Appellant: AJ Torbey & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms AL Wheatley
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 654 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

BZADW
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

J BARTLETT IN HIS/HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSOR
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.the appeal be dismissed; and

2.the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 654 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

BZADW
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

J BARTLETT IN HIS/HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT PROTECTION ASSESSOR
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

26 MAY 2014

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE APPELLANT

  1. The appellant was born in Kuwait.  He is a stateless person.  In Kuwait stateless persons are known as “Bidoon.”  In November 2011, the appellant left Kuwait, using somebody else’s passport.  He arrived at Christmas Island on 19 December 2011 and, on 17 March 2012 requested a Protection Obligations Determination (“POD”), claiming that as he was Bidoon and had left Kuwait illegally he would, if returned, be arrested, detained, and subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment.

  2. The appellant is an “offshore entry person”…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 541
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BZADW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appellant who sought a judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which was based on a recommendation from an Independent Protection Assessor. The appellant challenged the decision on various grounds, including the interpretation of the definitions of 'refugee' and 'persecution', and alleged that certain factual findings were incorrect or that relevant considerations had not been taken into account.

The legal issues in the case revolved around the proper interpretation of the statutory definitions and whether the decision-maker had correctly applied these definitions in light of the evidence presented. The court was also tasked with determining if the factual findings were open on the evidence and if all relevant considerations had been appropriately weighed.

In considering these issues, the Circuit Judge found that the Independent Protection Assessor had correctly interpreted the statutory definitions and had made factual findings that were supported by the evidence. The judge dismissed the appellant's claims regarding the alleged errors in interpretation and the failure to consider relevant factors. The Circuit Judge concluded that the recommendation of the Independent Protection Assessor was made in accordance with the law and that the appeal should be dismissed.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. The orders were made in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the appeal be dismissed; and

2. the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant sought the following relief:1.An order for prohibition directed to the first respondent to restrain his giving effect to the recommendation of the Independent Protection Assessor (the second respondent);2.An order of mandamus directed to the first respondent, to appoint a different Independent Protection Assessor to make a recommendation as to the applicant’s status as a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations, requiring him/her to make that recommendation as to that status according to law.3.A declaration that the recommendation of the Independent Protection Assessor (the second respondent) was not made in accordance with law, by reason of the ground/s of this application;4.An injunction restraining the Minister, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents, from relying upon the recommendation of the Independent Protection Assessor (the second respondent).I have doubts as to the availability of much of this relief. However I need only consider the question of relief if the appeal is otherwise successful.THE DECISION OF THE CIRCUIT JUDGE The Circuit Judge understood the appellant to have submitted that, in some way, the second respondent was “distracted” from a proper discharge of her duties by the examples of serious harm referred to in s 91R(2). His Honour concluded that the second respondent accepted that the appellant had suffered discrimination, or perhaps persecution by virtue of his being Bidoon. However she had also concluded that such discrimination or persecution did not amount to serious harm within the meaning of s 91R. As to the specific complaint concerning the conduct of the appellant’s employer’s friends, the second respondent found that it was a “one off” event. Hence it was not “persistent” for the purposes of s 91R(1)(c). Finally, his Honour demonstrated that the second respondent had clearly understood the non‑exhaustive nature of the examples in s 91R(2). The Circuit Judge then dealt with the appellant’s submission that the second respondent had failed to consider the fact that the appellant had been “constructively dismissed” from his most recent employment in Kuwait. His Honour observed that the second respondent had dealt with the termination of the appellant’s employment on the basis that he had resigned after his employer had told him that it would be better if he resigned. The employer’s statement was brought about by comments made by his friends concerning the appellant’s status as Bidoon and his conduct in that capacity. The Circuit Judge concluded that the conduct of the employer’s friends had not forced the appellant’s resignation. Further, their actions did not prevent him from earning a living in Kuwait. The second respondent pointed out that the appellant had not suggested that, had he not resigned, he would have been dismissed. Although the second respondent did not speak of constructive dismissal, she clearly dealt with circumstances to which the term might accurately be applied.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established