BYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2017] FCA 1217

Appeal from: BYK16 v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 191
File number: NSD 270 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 16 August 2017
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 418, 424AA, 424A, 425
Cases cited:

BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 61

BXB15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 77

BYK16 v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 191

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141

SZBYR vMinister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609

Date of hearing: 16 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms AB Douglas-Baker
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

NSD 270 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BYK16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse the appellant constitutional writ relief from the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 27 June 2016 to affirm the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa:  BYK16 v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 191.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived as an unauthorised maritime arrival at Christmas Island on 13 August 2012.  In his first statement, providing biodata to the Minister’s Department, in response to the question why he was seeking Australia’s protection, being given one sentence in which to do so, he said:  “I have economic problems.”   Subsequently in June 2013, after another biodata interview and an entry interview with Departmental officials, he made some claims for protection. 

  3. Throughout the process leading to the Tribunal’s decision he disclosed that he was of the Catholic faith, and provided to the Department letters written by two different priests at his parish church in Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013.  The first letter, dated 12 October 2012, was from a priest at the church.  He wrote, “To whom it may concern” and certified that the appellant was a parishioner, giving his dates of birth and baptism.  That letter noted that the appellant had migrated recently to Australia, and asked “please be kind enough to see to his request…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant contested the decision of the delegate to refuse his application for a protection visa, contending that the Secretary's failure to present the June 2013 letter to the Tribunal was significant and relevant to the assessment of his claims grounded in his Catholic faith. The appellant's claims were that he would face persecution in Sri Lanka due to his association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and his Tamil ethnicity, as well as past instances of police harassment. The delegate concluded that the appellant's claims were not credible and were only made after he had already arrived in Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the omission of the June 2013 letter was material and whether the Tribunal had committed any jurisdictional error by failing to consider the appellant's claims related to his Catholic faith. The court assessed whether the letter could have influenced the outcome of the Tribunal's decision and whether the appellant's claims based on his religious beliefs were adequately presented. The court examined the content of the letter, the appellant's previous opportunities to present his claims, and the representation he had during the Tribunal proceedings.

The court found that the June 2013 letter did not contain any information about difficulties in practicing the Catholic faith in Sri Lanka or any past persecution related to the appellant's religion. It concluded that the appellant had multiple opportunities to present his claims regarding his religious beliefs but failed to do so explicitly. The court referenced a previous decision which emphasized that a claim not expressly advanced cannot easily be considered as one that the Tribunal failed to consider. The court also noted that the appellant was represented by a solicitor migration agent who made detailed submissions on his behalf, and that the substance of the June 2013 letter was similar to an earlier letter from the appellant's church that was already before the Tribunal.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs. The court's reasoning was that the appellant's claims based on his religious beliefs were not substantiated by the material before the Tribunal, and the omission of the June 2013 letter did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant relied in his appeal on the omission of the Secretary to put the June 2013 letter before the Tribunal, arguing that it was material and relevant to the assessment of his claims to a protection visa by reason of his Catholic faith.The delegate’s decision The delegate interviewed the appellant. On 27 March 2014, she decided to refuse his application for a protection visa. She found that, during his biodata and entry interviews in August and September 2012 and January 2013, he had told the Department that he had come to Australia in order to find a job. She made allowance for the fact that those interviews had occurred in stressful circumstances for the appellant, and that he had been asked to keep his answers brief, but she doubted the credibility of his substantive claims for protection that he had begun to advance only from 21 June 2013. In his written statements dated 21 June 2013, the appellant claimed that he feared persecution were he to be returned to Sri Lanka because:·the authorities suspected him of being involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE);·he would be arrested by reason of that suspicion;·his uncle had been a member of the LTTE between 1995 until 2005, when his uncle left Sri Lanka. He claimed that his uncle lived in Italy;·when he was 16 years old, he had been arrested by the police on four separate occasions and had been unable to finish school. He claimed that he travelled to Qatar in order to avoid arrest and stayed there for about a year and a half before returning to Sri Lanka because his mother was ill;·shortly after his return, one of his friends had been shot dead by the police because he had been a Tamil and that subsequently, he, the appellant, had travelled to another city in Sri Lanka without the knowledge of his parents where he stayed for two years. He claimed that while he was away from his home, a group of unknown individuals inquired about his whereabouts on three occasions and that his father had reported that to the police;·in early 2012, he had been travelling from his home village to local markets and had been stopped by the police because he was not wearing a helmet, that they then identified him as a person of interest and detained him at the police station. He claimed that the police subsequently released him following a recommendation from his village head;·following that incident, his parents had sent him to the Maldives to visit his brother on a visitor’s visa for the month of May 2012 and that when he returned to Sri Lanka he had lived in constant fear because he was under police suspicion;·he came to know of an opportunity to travel to Australia and departed Sri Lanka illegally by boat on 26 July 2012. On 5 September 2013, the appellant made a statutory declaration in support of his protection visa application, in which he made substantially the same claims as in his 21 June 2013 statements as well as the following claims:·he and his family had been harassed at roadblocks, arrested, detained and beaten by the Sri Lankan police on many occasions because they were related to a former member of the LTTE;·if he were to return to Sri Lanka, he feared being abducted or killed;·his father had made arrangements for his travel to Australia;·he was unable to relocate to any other part of Sri Lanka to avoid harm because the harm he claimed to fear had been perpetrated by agents of the government.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

He also argued that the Tribunal had arrived at its decision that he was able to pay the fine of 50,000 rupees unilaterally, he did not have that amount of money and no one in his family in Sri Lanka did either. He claimed that he had been denied procedural fairness because, before the Tribunal found that he would be fined 50,000 rupees, it should have asked him whether he was able to pay that sum.Consideration In my opinion, the June 2013 letter was not relevant to the appellant’s claims to protection. While it added information that he was a good Catholic in the priest’s parish, an active member of the church and came from a good Catholic background, the letter said nothing about any difficulties that attended the practise of the Catholic religion in the area of the village or at the church, or anything about any difficulties which the appellant may have had in that regard. Moreover, it is important to appreciate that the appellant had multiple opportunities, before the Tribunal made its decision, in which to put forward a claim that, by reason of his religious faith or Catholicism, he feared persecution or significant harm were he to return to Sri Lanka, or that he had suffered any instances of harm or persecution in the past as a result of that faith. While he mentioned to it that there had been incidents during the course of the civil war, the Tribunal dealt with that claim and made the finding to which I have referred above, namely that, following the cessation of the war, there was no real chance that the appellant would suffer serious or significant harm by reason of his religion, including by going to or leaving church. The appellant had the benefit of two separate migration agents who were able to discuss his claims with him, including the solicitor migration agent who added significant information and claims in submissions that she made to the Tribunal and who represented and assisted him in the hearing in the Tribunal. The circumstances in which the appellant claimed to have experienced Sinhalese beating him or his family because they were Tamils in his village, even on the way to church, arose in the context of, not his religion, but, his being of Tamil ethnicity. I am of opinion that there was nothing before the Tribunal amounting to a matter that it ought to have considered, but failed to consider, or any other form of jurisdictional error in relation to the appellant’s religious beliefs or the June 2013 letter. In NABE 144 FCR at 22 [68], Black CJ, French and Selway JJ noted that, although some kind of claim could have been made on material before the Tribunal, “it did not represent, in any way, ‘a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying on upon established facts’”. They said that a judgment that the Tribunal has failed to consider a claim not expressly advanced is not lightly to be made. Such a claim must emerge clearly from the materials before the Tribunal. In my opinion, the new argument that the appellant now seeks to raise based on the June 2013 letter did not arise, even remotely, on the basis of the material before the Tribunal or would have if the June 2013 letter were before it. That is the more so when he was represented by a solicitor migration agent who made detailed new claims and submissions for him during the Tribunal’s processes and because of the similarity between the substance of the June 2013 letter and the earlier letter from the appellant’s church, dated 12 October 2012, that was included at all times in the material before the delegate and the Tribunal.