FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BWK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 3185 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming decision not to grant Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa) – whether it was reasonably open to Tribunal to take into account previous inconsistent statement of applicant – whether it was reasonably open to find applicant not credible because he claimed not to recall details of applicant’s wife application for Protection visa in which the applicant had given evidence – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 48A |
| Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71 |
| Applicant: | BWK15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2518 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 25 November 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 9 December 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
The applicant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter
Solicitors for the Respondents: | Ms N Johnson of Mills Oakley Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2518 of 2015
| BWK15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (China), applies for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant to the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).
Before I turn to the grounds on which the applicant relies it will be necessary to set out the applicant’s migration history, the claims he made for protection, and the Tribunal’s reasons for not accepting those claims.
Migration history
The applicant arrived in Australia on 10 April 2009 as the holder of a tourist visa. On 20 April 2009 the applicant applied for a Protection visa (First Protection Application) as a member of his wife’s family unit. In that application, the applicant’s wife claimed to fear harm based on her membership of the local church. The applicant did not advance his own claims for protection. The First Protection Application was refused on 17 July 2009, and the applicant and his wife applied for review to the Refugee Review Tribunal (First Tribunal). The First Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not the grant the applicants a Protection visa on 18 December 2009.
The applicant remained in Australia after the First Tribunal refused the claims. The applicant claims that he and his wife have separated, and that she has since returned to China.
The applicant again applied for a Protection visa on 29 November 2013. He was able to do that, notwithstanding s.48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), because of the decision of the Full…
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 3185
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider whether the delegate had failed to properly assess the applicant's claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution, and whether the delegate had adequately considered all relevant information in making their decision. The applicant argued that the delegate had made findings of fact that were not supported by the evidence and had failed to give sufficient weight to certain aspects of his testimony.
In reaching her decision, Judge Manousaridis reviewed the delegate's assessment of the applicant's claims. Her Honour found that the delegate had engaged in a detailed analysis of the evidence presented by the applicant, including documentary evidence and the applicant's oral testimony. The Court affirmed the principle that a delegate is not required to accept all aspects of an applicant's evidence at face value and is entitled to make findings of fact based on their assessment of credibility. Her Honour concluded that the delegate had not made any jurisdictional error in their assessment of the applicant's claims, finding that the delegate's reasoning was open on the evidence before them and that the decision was not illogical or irrational.
Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) reviewed the applicant's second Protection visa application and found significant credibility issues with his claims. The Tribunal noted inconsistencies in the applicant's accounts regarding his employment history, the timing of his complaints, and his detention by police. The Tribunal also highlighted the applicant's inability to recall details of his wife's earlier application for a Protection visa, despite having provided evidence in support of her claims. These inconsistencies and the applicant's failure to recall pertinent details led the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant was not credible and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements for a Protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal's decision affirming the delegate's refusal to grant the visa was the subject of the applicant's judicial review application.
BWK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3185 concerns the applicant's application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa. The applicant, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, originally applied for a Protection visa in 2009 as a member of his wife’s family unit, which was refused. He subsequently applied for a Protection visa on his own behalf in 2013, claiming he feared persecution in China for whistleblowing on bribery and corruption within his former employer. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal rejected the applicant's claims, finding his evidence inconsistent and not credible, particularly regarding his role and timeline at work, his reasons for obtaining a passport, and his detention by police. The Tribunal also found it unreasonable that the applicant could not recall details of his wife's previous Protection visa application, despite having provided evidence in support of it. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review application, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was it reasonably open to the Tribunal to take into account the applicant’s apparent inability to recall the grounds on which his wife had applied for a Protection visa when assessing the applicant’s credibility?
2. Was it reasonably open to the Tribunal to rely on the evidence the applicant gave before the First Tribunal to show it was inconsistent with the evidence the applicant gave before the Tribunal?
3. Did the Tribunal err in concluding that the applicant’s reference to "the problems at work" was a reference to the problems that were the subject of his claims?
4. Was it reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant was not truthful when he claimed he could not remember the details of his wife’s application for a Protection visa, and that the applicant was willing to tell untruths?
5. Was it reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant did give evidence before the First Tribunal that was inconsistent with the evidence he gave before the Tribunal, and to rely on that inconsistency as a reason for not accepting the applicant to be a credible witness?
Held
1. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to take into account the applicant’s apparent inability to recall the grounds on which his wife had applied for a Protection visa when assessing the applicant’s credibility. Ground 1 fails.
2. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to rely on the evidence the applicant gave before the First Tribunal to show it was inconsistent with the evidence the applicant gave before the Tribunal. Ground 2 fails.
3. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant’s reference to "the problems at work" was a reference to the problems that were the subject of his claims. Ground 3 fails.
4. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant was not truthful when he claimed he could not remember the details of his wife’s application for a Protection visa, and that the applicant was willing to tell untruths. Ground 1 fails.
5. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant did give evidence before the First Tribunal that was inconsistent with the evidence he gave before the Tribunal, and to rely on that inconsistency as a reason for not accepting the applicant to be a credible witness. Ground 2 fails.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant in BWK15 v Minister for Immigration challenged the Tribunal's decision on several grounds, none of which succeeded. The primary focus of the applicant's argument was the Tribunal's assessment of his credibility and the factors it considered in making that assessment. The court examined whether it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to take into account the applicant’s inability to recall the details of his wife’s application for a Protection visa. The court found that since the applicant was part of his wife's family unit and had provided evidence in support of her application, it was reasonable for the Tribunal to expect him to recall the grounds of her application. The applicant's claimed inability to remember these details undermined his credibility, and it was reasonable for the Tribunal to infer he was prepared to tell untruths to obtain a visa.
Secondly, the applicant argued that the Tribunal should not have relied on his previous inconsistent statements. However, the court held that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to consider inconsistencies in testimony as a factor in assessing credibility. Inconsistencies between what the applicant said before the First Tribunal and what he said before the current Tribunal were relevant to the Tribunal's assessment of his credibility. The court relied on legal principles that permit a fact-finder to conclude that testimony is not worthy of credit if it is inconsistent with previous statements, regardless of the truth of the prior or current statements.
Thirdly, the applicant contended that the Tribunal erred in interpreting his reference to "problems at work" as a reference to the problems that were the subject of his claims. The court found that there was no material to suggest that the "problems at work" could refer to anything other than the problems that were the subject of his claims. Therefore, it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to interpret the applicant's reference in this manner.
Furthermore, the court found it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant was not truthful when he claimed he could not remember the details of his wife’s application for a Protection visa, and that the applicant was willing to tell untruths. This conclusion was based on the Tribunal's finding that the applicant's inability to recall details about his wife's claims undermined his credibility.
Finally, the court held that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant did give evidence before the First Tribunal that was inconsistent with the evidence he gave before the Tribunal, and to rely on that inconsistency as a reason for not accepting the applicant to be a credible witness. The inconsistency between the applicant's previous and current statements was a legitimate factor for the Tribunal to consider in its assessment.
In conclusion, the court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal reasonably considered the applicant's credibility and the inconsistencies in his evidence. The ratio decidendi of this case is that it is reasonably open to the Tribunal to assess the credibility of an applicant by considering inconsistencies in their statements and their ability to recall relevant details, and to draw adverse inferences where appropriate. The court did not find any error in the Tribunal's application of these principles.