BW Offshore Ltd v Anzon Australia Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

B W Offshore Ltd v Anzon Australia Limited (ABN 46 406 771) [2009] FCA 1133

B W OFFSHORE LTD v ANZON AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ABN 46 406 771), BEACH PETROLEUM LIMITED (ABN 20 007 617 969), CIECO EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 107 688 148) and SOJITZ ENERGY AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 129 690 740)

VID 113 of 2009

RYAN J
7 OCTOBER 2009
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 113 of 2009

BETWEEN:

B W OFFSHORE LTD
Applicant

AND:

ANZON AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ABN 46 107 406 771)
First Respondent

BEACH PETROLEUM LIMITED (ABN 20 007 617 969)
Second Respondent

CIECO EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 107 688 148)
Third Respondent

SOJITZ ENERGY AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 129 690 740)
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 OCTOBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant provide, by 13 November 2009, in a form acceptable to the District Registrar of the Court, the amount of AUD$550,000 by way of security for the costs of the respondents up to and including the first day of trial.

2.The applicant’s notice on motion dated 7 May 2009 be refused.

3.The costs of and incidental to each of the motions herein be costs in the cause.

4.Each party have liberty to apply on not less than 48 hours’ notice in writing to each other party.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 113 of 2009

BETWEEN:

B W OFFSHORE LTD
Applicant

AND:

ANZON AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ABN 46 107 406 771)
First Respondent

BEACH PETROLEUM LIMITED (ABN 20 007 617 969)
Second Respondent

CIECO EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD (ACN 107 688 148)
Third Respondent

SOJITZ ENERGY AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 129 690 740)
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

7 OCTOBER 2009

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Before the Court are two motions on notice in this matter. The first, dated 24 April 2009, is the respondents’ motion that the applicant provide $800,000, or such other amount as the Court may determine, as security for the costs of the respondents and a stay of the proceedings until that security is provided. It is convenient to refer to that motion as the “Security for Costs Motion”. The second, dated 7 May 2009, is the applicant’s motion for an order under O 29 r 2 of the Rules of this Court for the question of liability to be heard and determined separately from the quantification of the parties’ competing claims for damages. For convenience, I shall refer to that motion as the “Split Trial Motion”. These motions were heard together on 28 May 2009, and the issues which they raise overlap to some extent. It is therefore convenient, before addressing each motion…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1133
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

BW Offshore Ltd and Anzon Australia Limited were involved in a legal dispute which was brought before the court. The nature of the dispute involved the interpretation and application of the Rules of the Court, specifically Order 29 Rule 2(a), which deals with the discretionary power of the Court to make an order for a split trial. The court was tasked with determining whether it was just and convenient to make such an order in this particular case.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Court should exercise its discretion to make an order for a split trial, and if so, under what circumstances. The court needed to consider the principles governing the exercise of the power conferred by Order 29 Rule 2(a) of the Rules of the Court, as well as the factors supporting or opposing the making of such an order.

The court examined the principles and factors governing the making of an order for a split trial, including the need for the determination of the question to be based on concrete and established or agreed facts, and the potential for the separate determination of the question to contribute to the saving of time and cost or the settlement of the litigation. The court also considered the potential overlap between evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial, and the possibility of prolonging the litigation. Ultimately, the court determined that it was not just and convenient to make an order for a split trial in this case.

The court made an order that the applicant provide a specified amount of security for the costs of the respondents up to and including the first day of trial, and that the applicant's notice on motion be refused. The court also awarded costs of and incidental to each of the motions to the respective parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant provide, by 13 November 2009, in a form acceptable to the District Registrar of the Court, the amount of AUD$550,000 by way of security for the costs of the respondents up to and including the first day of trial.

2. The applicant’s notice on motion dated 7 May 2009 be refused.

3. The costs of and incidental to each of the motions herein be costs in the cause.

4. Each party have liberty to apply on not less than 48 hours’ notice in writing to each other party.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J
This Court’s power to make an order for a split trial is discretionary, and is conferred in these terms by in O 29 r 2(a) of the Rules of the Court: Order for decision2. The Court may make orders for -(a)the decision of any question separately from any other question, whether before, at or after any trial or further trial in the proceedings; … The principles governing the exercise of the power conferred by O 29 r 2(a) have been conveniently set out by Branson J in Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 217 ALR 495 (“Reading Australia”) at 498-9, where her Honour said, at [8]: The principles that govern the circumstances in which an order will be made under O29 r2 are relatively well established. They may be summarised as follows: (a) the term "question" in O29 r1 includes any question or issue of fact or law in a proceeding. The distinction in the rule between an "issue" and a "question" is the distinction between that which, when resolved, will result in an adjudication in favour of one party or the other, being an "issue", and less decisive matters of dispute being "questions" (Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society (1993) 113 ALR 643 at 647);(b) a question can be the subject of an order for a separate decision under O29 r2 even though a decision on such a question will not determine any of the parties' rights (Landsal Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society at 647);(c) however, the judicial determination of a question under O29 r2 must involve a conclusive or final decision based on concrete and established or agreed facts for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties (Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9 at [45]);(d) where the preliminary question is one of mixed fact and law, it is necessary that the question can be precisely formulated and that all of the facts that are on any fairly arguable view relevant to the determination of the question are ascertainable either as facts assumed to be correct for the purposes of the preliminary determination, or as agreed facts or as facts to be judicially determined (Jacobson v Ross [1995] 1 VR 337 at 341, referring to Nissan v Attorney-General [1970] AC 179 at 242-243 per Lord Pearson; Bass v Perpetual Trustee at [53]);(e) care must be taken in utilising the procedure provided for in O29 r 1 to avoid the determination of issues not "ripe" for separate and preliminary determination. An issue may not be "ripe" for separate and preliminary determination in this sense where it is simply one of two or more alternative ways in which an applicant frames its case and determination of the issue would leave significant other issues unresolved (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O'Neill per Kirby P at 606);(f) factors which tend to support the making of an order under O29 r2 include that the separate determination of the question may -(i) contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the action; or(ii) contribute to the settlement of the litigation (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O'Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 601 per Kirby P at 607);(g) factors which tell against the making of an order under O29 r2 include that the separate determination of the question may - (i) give rise to significant contested factual issues both at the time of the hearing of the preliminary question and at the time of trial (GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] FCA 934;(ii) result in significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial - possibly involving the calling of the same witnesses at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding (GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth; Arnold v Attorney-General for Victoria [1995] FCA 727). This factor will be of particular significance if the Court may be required to form a view as to the credibility of witnesses who may give evidence at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding; or(iii) prolong rather than shorten the litigation (GMB Research & Development Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth).[9]Ultimately the issue for the Court to determine when consideration is being given to the making of an order under O29 r2 is whether it is "just and convenient" for the order to be made (Arnold v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria). There are classes of proceedings in which it is commonly recognised that it is just and convenient for an order under O29 r2 to be made. One such class is proceedings concerning intellectual property rights where an applicant can not be compelled to make an election as between damages and an account of profits at least until all of the evidence has been received so that, if an order has not been made separating the determination of the issues of liability and relief, the parties will have to call evidence to deal with both damages and an account of profits (Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 230). Another class is proceedings in which an application in the nature of a demurrer is appropriately made. An application of this kind assumes the truth of the pleaded facts. In a case in which it is clear that the pleadings contain all of the relevant facts but one party contends that the pleading does not disclose a cause of action, or a defence or a matter of reply, as the case may be, an application in the nature of a demurrer will have obvious utility (Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd at [50]).”See also, for example, Waste Recycling and Processing Corporation v United Resource Management Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1140 and Owners, Strata Plan 50946 v Multiplex Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1308. It is rarely possible, however, as Branson J recognised in Reading Australia, at 500, for issues going respectively to liability and quantum of damages to be confined in completely separate compartments. Presumably, it was a recognition of that feature of civil litigation which led Kirby and Callinan JJ, in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1, to caution, at 55:“Both Mason P and Fitzgerald JA were critical of the course of limiting the issues to be tried that the primary judge adopted. In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [(1999) 198 CLR 180] attention was drawn to difficulties that can be caused when that course is adopted. In light of the experience in this case, what was there said should be restated with emphasis. The attractions of trials of issues rather than of cases in their totality, are often more chimerical than real. Common experience demonstrates that savings in time and expense are often illusory, particularly when the parties have, as here, had the necessity of making full preparation and the factual matters relevant to one issue are relevant to others, and they all overlap.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN J

Full text does not contain this section.