Burton v Leeton Shire Council

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CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER 

Citation:

Burton v Leeton Shire Council [2023] NSWPIC 424

APPLICANT:

Michael Burton

RESPONDENT:

Leeton Shire Council

Member: Brett Batchelor
DATE OF DECISION: 21 August 2023
CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to section 66 as a result of injury to the left knee on three separate dates resulting in the same pathology in the knee; the respondent claimed that the quantum of the compensation should be determined having regard to the first date of injury; the applicant claimed it should be determined having regard to the last date of injury; consideration of Presidential decisions in Department of Juvenile Justice v Edmed, Trustees of The Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta v Barnes, the Court of Appeal decision in Ozcan v MacArthur Disability Services Ltd, and other decisions of members of the Commission; the applicant presented his case on the basis of the one injury occurring on three separate dates causing the one level of whole person impairment assessed by the Medical Assessor; Held – finding that the applicant was entitled to section 66 compensation calculated with reference to the last date of injury pleaded.

determinations made:

The Commission determines:

1.     The applicant sustained injury to his left lower extremity (knee) on 28 January 2014,
19 November 2015, and 18 January 2016.

2. The respondent is to pay the applicant lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 in the sum of $69,520 for 27% whole person impairment as a result of such injury.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

  1. Michael Burton (the applicant/Mr Burton) claims compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) as a result of injury to his left knee on
    28 January 2014, 19 November 2015 and 18 January 2016 arising out of or in the course of his employment with Leeton Shire Council (the respondent).

  2. The applicant was employed by the respondent as a labourer/driver. On 28 January 2014 he stepped into a depression concealed by grass as he was walking and twisted his left knee. There was a further twisting event on or about 19 November 2015 when Mr Burton was climbing in or out of a tractor in wet conditions. A third event occurred on 18 January 2016 when he again twisted his left knee.

  3. The applicant was referred to Dr Mamo, orthopaedic surgeon, and underwent conservative treatment which did not assist his condition. On 20 June 2017 Dr Mamo carried out an arthroscopy on the left knee, which was similarly unhelpful in improving the condition in the  knee, with Mr Burton experiencing ongoing swelling, pain and restriction of movement.

  4. Dr Mamo recommended that the applicant have a full left knee replacement, which he carried out on 9 June 2021. On 28 July 2021 the doctor performed a manipulation under anaesthetic, which was repeated in about early September 2021.

  5. Mr Burton remained off work following…

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Details
Case
[2023] NSWPIC 424
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Burton sought compensation for a left knee injury under the Workers Compensation Act 1987, arguing that the lump sum should be calculated based on the last date of injury, while the Leeton Shire Council contended that it should be calculated based on the first date of injury. The dispute hinged on whether the pathology from the initial injury materially contributed to the condition requiring compensation. The case was brought before the Commission, which had to decide on the appropriate date to determine the quantum of compensation.

The central legal issue was the correct date to reference when calculating the compensation amount for an injury that resulted in the same pathology over multiple incidents. This question required the Commission to interpret relevant case law, particularly the decisions in Department of Juvenile Justice v Edmed, Trustees of The Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Parramatta v Barnes, and Ozcan v MacArthur Disability Services Ltd. The applicant argued that the principles in Edmed and Barnes should apply, allowing for compensation to be based on the most recent injury, whereas the respondent cited Ozcan 2 to support their argument that the first injury date should be used.

The Commission considered the submissions and evidence presented, including the medical assessments and reports. It found that the applicant's argument aligned with the principles in Edmed and Barnes, where the focus was on the existence of the same pathology across multiple incidents, rather than the material contribution of the initial injury to the final condition. The Commission concluded that the applicant was entitled to compensation calculated with reference to the last date of injury.

In light of the findings, the Commission ordered that the lump sum compensation for Burton’s left knee injury be calculated based on the last date of injury, 27% Whole Person Impairment as assessed by the Medical Assessor.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

At [8] – [14] under “Background” in its submissions the respondent refers to what apparently occurred at “…the initial teleconference on 21 February 2021” (in fact now properly referred to as a “preliminary conference”, conducted via the Microsoft Teams platform). For reasons set out hereunder I will not refer to these submissions. The respondent then summarises the factual and medical evidence, including the radiological investigations, the treatment rendered by Dr Mamo, and also by Dr Semananda, the nominated treating doctor. The respondent also refers to the reports of Dr Oates, Dr Rimmer and the Medical Assessor. The respondent submits that the facts and evidence in the current matter support the assertion that the injury on or about 28 January 2014 materially contributed to the applicant’s condition such that the Commission should adopt the approach in Ozcan 2 and Zdanovits in relation to determining the date of injury referable to payment of lump sum compensation. The respondent refers to the facts in Ozcan 1 and Ozcan 2. The respondent notes that the Court of Appeal in Ozcan 2 distinguished the finding in that matter from the decision in Edmed on the basis that Edmed did not address any argument that an injury materially contributed to later injuries and that therefore the later injuries “arose out of” or “resulted from” the first. The respondent then submits that in the current matter “…the medical evidence clearly establishes that the subsequent injuries were consequential injuries giving rise to the same pathology and ultimately requiring a knee replacement”. The respondent submits that, noting the facts and evidence in the current matter and the decision in Ozcan 2, what occurred at the initial teleconference, and the views of Dr Oates, Dr Rimmer and the Medical Assessor, the Commission should make a determination that the 27% WPI assessed by the Medical Assessor is referable to the first incident on 28 January 2014. The applicant repeats his reliance on the decisions of Edmed and Barnes, and specifically disavows reliance on Ozcan 2. It on this “unambiguous basis” that the applicant makes the submissions pertaining to statutory construction referred to in his original submissions. The applicant submits that therefore the respondent’s submissions are irrelevant to the present issue. The applicant submits that the fact that there was a significant (emphasis in submissions) event did not matter. There is no requirement for all of the relevant incidents to have had the same relevance to the impairment. The applicant submits that there will effectively always be an initial incident causative of injury, and then subsequent incident/s also causative of injury when principles in Edmed or Barnes are sought to be applied. One of these events will be more significant than others. That is not what the focus was in Edmed and Barnes. The applicant submits that in Edmed, the focus was upon there being the same pathology, which in the current matter the respondent has conceded there was. In Barnes, the focus was upon the impairment being caused by the three incidents, which in this matter, it has been so caused.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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