Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal (No 2) [2011] FCA 731

Citation: Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal (No 2) [2011] FCA 731
Parties: BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) v PANKAJ OSWAL, RADHIKA OSWAL and COMICAL ALI MILITANT VEGETARIAN PTY LTD
File number: WAD 66 of 2011
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 28 June 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal – Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 20 r 5 – application to strike out amended statement of claim – Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 11 r 16 – whether the pleadings are ‘embarrassing’ – whether the amended statement of claim discloses reasonable cause of action - whether there is ‘no real question to be tried’

EQUITY –– ingredients of claims of ‘volunteer liability’, ‘knowing receipt’, and knowing involvement – whether ‘receipt’ can extend to traceable proceeds of trust property

Legislation: Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16, O 20 r 5
Cases cited: Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253
Bartlett v Swan Television & Radio Broadcasters Pty Ltd [1995] ATPR 41-434
Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244
Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal [2011] FCA 424
Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways(NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Global Brand Marketing Inc v Cube Footwear Pty Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 44
Heperu Pty Ltd v Belle (2009) 76 NSWLR 230
Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Pty Ltd (2008) 252 ALR 41
Lyons v Kern Konstructions (Townsville) Pty Ltd (1983) 70 FLR 135
Re PFS Wholesale Mortgage Corporation Pty Ltd (2006) 57 ACSR 553
Pharm-a-Care Laboratories Pty Limited v Commonwealth (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 494
Quince v Varga (2008) 1 ASTLR 242
Date of hearing: 13 June 2011
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 75
Counsel for the Applicant: K de Kerloy with S Dundas
Solicitor for the Applicant: Freehills
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: KJ Williams
Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Jones Day

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 66 of 2011

BETWEEN:

BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED)
Applicant

AND:

PANKAJ OSWAL
First Respondent

RADHIKA OSWAL
Second Respondent

COMICAL ALI MILITANT VEGETARIAN PTY LTD
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 JUNE 2011

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended statement of claim identified as Annexure A to the applicant’s submissions in opposition to strike out the application dated 10 June 2011 be struck out.

2.The applicant have leave to file and serve a re-amended statement of claim within 21 days.

3.The applicant pay 50% of the second…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 731
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal (No 2) involved a dispute concerning an application for summary dismissal and a motion to strike out an amended statement of claim. The legal issues revolved around whether the pleadings were embarrassing, whether the amended statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action, and whether there was no real question to be tried. The court was also required to consider the ingredients of claims of 'volunteer liability', 'knowing receipt', and knowing involvement, including whether 'receipt' could extend to traceable proceeds of trust property.

The court held that the pleadings, while not perfect, were not so defective as to warrant summary dismissal. The court emphasised the need for specificity in identifying the dates at which Mrs Oswal acquired knowledge of the breaches leading to the payments she received. It was noted that the remedies at law and in equity should focus upon the value properly attributable to the earlier receipts derived from misappropriated funds and still retained by the volunteer at the relevant time. The court found that there was no basis upon which the action should be dismissed and granted leave to the receivers to re-plead. The parties shared mixed success, with the respondents having 50% of their costs of the motion.

The court struck out the amended statement of claim and granted leave to the applicant to file and serve a re-amended statement of claim within 21 days. The applicant was ordered to pay 50% of the second and third respondents' costs to be taxed if not agreed. The court exercised its discretion under the Federal Court Rules sparingly and with great caution, ensuring that the impugned portions of the statement of claim were not plainly and obviously unarguable before striking them out. The decision underscores the importance of clear and specific pleading in legal actions, particularly when it comes to identifying the dates at which knowledge was acquired.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended statement of claim identified as Annexure A to the applicant’s submissions in opposition to strike out the application dated 10 June 2011 be struck out.

2. The applicant have leave to file and serve a re-amended statement of claim within 21 days.

3. The applicant pay 50% of the second and third respondents’ costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

However, Ms Williams for Mrs Oswal and Comical still makes a good point in my view. It will be necessary and critical to the voluntary receipts claim to identify the dates (or dates by reference to events) at which Mrs Oswal acquired knowledge of the Breaches leading to those payments she received. In Heperu (at [42]) Allsop P (with whom Campbell JA and Handley AJA agreed) said:…It should also be noted that for the purposes of the tracing claim (…) the relevant time to assess the facts is when the party receives notice of the claim or otherwise becomes aware that he or she has property paid for with the misappropriated funds of another. … (emphasis added) The dates of the material knowledge have not been identified and should be. Knowing receipt The passage from Farah Constructions (at [121]) has been cited above (at [34]). The assertion made by Mrs Oswal and Comical is that the first limb of Barnes v Addy principle applies only to receipt of trust property or trust funds in contrast to ‘benefits’ derived from the payment of trust funds. Farah Constructions was concerned with the use of confidential information in the purchase of property (land). The High Court concluded that such information, not being in itself property, was not capable of being traced into the land that was acquired with the benefit of the confidential information. Simply indentifying the different nature of the property in Farah Constructions does not address the significance of the observations by the High Court (at [121]). The Court’s observations were not confined to any specific sort of property but were directed to general principle. In this case, what is allegedly removed from BFPL is property, i.e., cash that is used to improve the value of the Properties. In Farah Constructions, there was no tangible property removed from the company but rather confidential information was used. The Court held (at [120]) that confidential information, not being property, was not capable of being traced into the land that was acquired with the benefit of the information, noting:… the expression “trust property” does not include information, whether confidential or not … But it does not follow under the law as it stands that the information which third parties obtain from a fiduciary is trust property, or that land bought by using that information is trust property… In Heperu two main points relevant to the current debate were clarified. It was reiterated that there was an action at law in money had and received to restore the value of the proprietary benefit retained by a volunteer where the proprietary benefit is traceable in equity from misappropriated funds. In equity, there was also a personal equitable remedy ‘touching the volunteer’s conscience’ available to restore funds derived from misappropriations to the extent, as a volunteer, a volunteer retains the funds or their traceable products but only when there is notice of the claim (at [163]). Secondly, it was emphasised that the remedies at law and in equity should focus upon the value properly attributable to the earlier receipts derived from the misappropriated funds and still retained by the volunteer at the relevant time. If at least some of the payments (into mortgage accounts in that case) were referable to funds being the proceeds of misappropriated cheques, the funds could be traced in equity into the property (at [124]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, this response is partly correct but, as already indicated, the dates at which the knowledge was held by Mrs Oswal should either be identified or described. It should not be left open to implication, as contended for by the Receivers in argument, that she had the requisite knowledge ‘at all material times'. It may not necessarily be the case that the Receivers can identify in each instance precisely when the knowledge of the payments being made occurred. Nevertheless, it does appear to me that this is an important ingredient of the cause of action which should be pleaded either by reference to specific dates or, alternatively, by reference to specific events so that the time at which actual knowledge accrued is identified. CONCLUSION Two significant amendments to the pleading are required in my view. They are the dates of knowledge or the dates at which knowledge should have accrued and identification of whether it is reliance on actual, not constructive, knowledge for the accessorial plea. There is no basis upon which the action should be dismissed. I give leave to the Receivers to re-plead. The parties have shared mixed success. In addition to the deficiencies identified above (in [72]), the complaints about the composite ‘rolled up’ pleading were well made and the consequential amendment to the ASC was desirable. Beyond that, however, Mrs Oswal and Comical have not persuaded me as to the claimed defects. I consider it appropriate therefore that Mrs Oswal and Comical have 50% of their costs of the motion. The following orders will be made:1.The amended statement of claim identified as Annexure A to the applicant’s submissions in opposition to strike out the application dated 10 June 2011 will be struck out.2.The applicant do have leave to file and serve a re-amended statement of claim within 21 days.3.The applicant pay 50% of the second and third respondents’ costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mrs Oswal and Comical say that:(a)the pleading of receipt of ‘benefit’ in para 45 and the pleading of receipt or obtaining the 2R Payments in para 46 are contradictory and cannot be allowed; and(b)the allegations of aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring and/or being knowingly concerned (paras 54 and 65) are serious allegations. There is a total absence of pleading of material facts to support them. They should not be permitted.CONSIDERATIONGeneral matters The General Steel principles are clear. The power to strike out is discretionary and should be applied sparingly and exercised with ‘great caution’. It must be plain and obvious that the impugned portions of a statement of claim are unarguable before they will be struck out. An order for summary dismissal would be made only where it is clear that there is no real question to be tried or that it is hopeless or bound to fail or so clearly untenable that it should not be permitted to go to trial. In Global Brand Marketing Inc v Cube Footwear Pty Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 44 Goldberg J said (at [22]): 22 Before the statement of claim can be struck out on the basis that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action, the Court must be satisfied that the causes of action are unarguable, or are so untenable that they cannot possible succeed or are manifestly groundless in the sense explained by the High Court in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW); (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129. Recently, in Spotwire Pty Limited v Visa International Services Inc; (2003) ATPR 41-949, Bennett J summarised the manner in which the test in General Steel has been applied (at 47,410, par [10]):"Such an order would only be made where it is clear that there is no real question to be tried (SmithKlein Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chipman [2002] FCA 674; Douglas v Tickner (1994) 49 FCR 507) or that it is hopeless and bound to fail (Orchard v Comrie (1998) 80 IR 76) or clearly untenable (Faessler v Neale (1994) 29 IPR 1) or hopeless to the extent that it should not be permitted to go to trial (Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche (2003) ATPR 41-946; [2003] FCAFC 153 per Carr J). It must be plain and obvious that the impugned portions of a statement of claim are unarguable (Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corp (1995) 55 FCR 194) or it must be very clear that there is no issue deserving of a hearing (Anderson v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1995] FCA 787). However, proceedings will not be dismissed summarily merely on the ground that it appears, at the hearing of the motion, that the claim may fail (Australia Building Industries Pty Ltd v Stramit Corp Ltd [1997] FCA 1318)." In my view, broadly speaking (and as a starting point only), as the submissions for Mrs Oswal and Comical illustrate, the ASC defines the issues with sufficient clarity to enable the respondents to understand the case that is sought to be made against them. Mrs Oswal and Comical understand the three bases of the pleading that they received as volunteers, further or alternatively, knowingly received and further or alternatively, knowing involvement in the Breaches.