Burrows v Macpherson and Kelley Lawyer (Sydney) NSW
Link copied
CaseCopied
66 min read
Full text
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Burrows v Macpherson and Kelley Lawyer (Sydney) NSW [2022] FedCFamC2G 1048
File number(s):
SYG 874 of 2022
Judgment of:
JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
Date of judgment:
16 December 2022
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – application to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether applicant applied to set aside bankruptcy notice before the time for complying with its requirements expired – assuming application to set aside bankruptcy notice was made before the time for complying with its requirements expired, whether the time for complying with the bankruptcy notice should be extended pending the determination of an application to set aside on the ground of fraud the judgment debt on the basis of which the bankruptcy notice was issued – whether judgment debtor has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt – whether reason has been shown for questioning whether behind the judgment debt there is, in truth and reality, a debt due to the creditor – whether amount demanded in the bankruptcy notice overstated the amount of the judgment debt – application dismissed.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Burrows v Macpherson and Kelley Lawyer (Sydney) NSW and more:
The case of Burrows v Macpherson and Kelley Lawyer (Sydney) NSW involves an application by Ms Burrows to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers (Sydney) Pty Ltd (MKL). Ms Burrows seeks to avoid the payment of $130,000 in costs ordered by the District Court of New South Wales in a previous proceeding. The legal issues revolve around whether Ms Burrows can rely on various grounds to set aside the bankruptcy notice, including the existence of proceedings to set aside the underlying judgment, the presence of a counterclaim exceeding the judgment debt, the nature of the debt claimed, and the accuracy of the debt amount.
The court examined the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy notice, the District Court proceeding, and the subsequent Supreme Court and Federal Court proceedings. It assessed the merits of Ms Burrows' claims in these other proceedings and their relevance to the current application. The court also considered MKL's submissions that the bankruptcy notice was valid, the District Court Costs Order was correctly made, and Ms Burrows' application was untimely.
After careful consideration, the court found that Ms Burrows' claims in the Supreme Court and Federal Court proceedings did not provide a valid basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court also determined that the District Court Costs Order was valid and that Ms Burrows had not shown any fraud or misrepresentation that would justify setting aside the judgment. Consequently, the court dismissed Ms Burrows' application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The final orders reflect this decision, confirming that Ms Burrows remains liable to pay the $130,000 as ordered by the District Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Whether I should grant the applicant leave to rely on the ASR (and, therefore, the Additional Documents) largely turns on whether there would be any utility in permitting Ms Burrows to rely on the ASR. backgroundFamily Court proceeding In around 2011 Ms Burrows retained MKL to provide professional legal services in connection with a parenting proceeding in the Family Court (Family Court proceeding). Ms Di Condio, a lawyer who was then employed by MKL, had carriage of the matter on behalf of Ms Burrows. MKL was incorporated on 11 October 2007;[3] and its main business address was in New South Wales.[4] On 1 February 2008 MKL’s main name was changed to “Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers (Sydney) Pty Ltd”; and on 30 August 2010 the business name “MACPHERSON & KELLEY LAWYERS” was added.[5] It is open to infer, and I find, that at the time Ms Burrows engaged MKL to provide legal services, MKL was an “incorporated legal practice” within the meaning of s 134(1) of the (now repealed) Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (LP Act), which traded using the name “Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers”. [3] Exhibit JDS-1, page 636[4] Exhibit JDS-1, page 646[5] Exhibit JDS-1, page 646 That inference is confirmed by an email an officer of the Law Society of New South Wales sent to Mr Lavada, a lawyer employed by MKLG, on 25 July 2022 in which it was confirmed that “the Registry records show that Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers (Sydney) Pty Ltd, Law Practice Number 19720, was an incorporated legal practice registered with the Law Society of New South Wales, from 1 February 2008 to 30 June 2015”.[6] That MKL was an incorporated legal practice is also confirmed by a document which includes a heading “Notice of Termination of Provision of Legal Services under s.139(1)” of the LP Act dated 14 July 2015 (139 Notice). [7] The notice relates to “Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers (Sydney) Pty Ltd”, that is, MKL, and states that MKL intends to cease to engage in legal practice as an incorporated legal practice in New South Wales on 30 June 2015; and it also states that another law practice, “M & K Lawyers Group Pty Ltd” (that is, MKLG), has taken over the business of MKL.[8][6] Affidavit Z Burrows 21.10.2022, [4]; annexure “ZB-2”, page 6. (The annexure note on annexure ZB2 incorrectly records it is annexed to an affidavit of 20 June 2022.)[7] Affidavit Z Burrows 21.10.2022, [4]; annexure “ZB-2”, page 8. (The annexure note on annexure ZB2 incorrectly records it is annexed to an affidavit of 20 June 2022.)[8] Affidavit Z Burrows 21.10.2022, [4]; annexure “ZB-2”, page 9. (The annexure note on annexure ZB2 incorrectly records it is annexed to an affidavit of 20 June 2022.) The Family Court proceeding was listed for hearing on 4 October 2011. On 30 September 2011 Ms Burrows and the father of their child agreed to consent to the Family Court making parenting orders; but they did not agree about costs. On 4 October 2011 the matter came before a Registrar of the Family Court who, after hearing argument on the question of costs, made parenting orders in terms of the parties’ agreement, but also made an order that the father pay Ms Burrows’ costs on a party/party basis, as agreed or as assessed (Family Court Costs Order).[9][9] Zali Burrows v Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers (Sydney) Pty Ltd NSWDC [2019], 20.12.2019, at [14]-[18]
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Ms Burrows claims she was placed under pressure, and felt compelled, to approach the Family Court and obtain the Family Court Consent Orders when she not required to do so; and, for that reason, Craig ADCJ manifested bias.[89] The matters to which the ASR refers are incapable of supporting a finding of actual or reasonably apprehended bias; and to the extent it is capable of supporting such finding, there is no evidence Ms Burrows applied to Craig DCJ to disqualify himself.[89] ASR, [72]-[78]Applicant’s evidence relevant to going behind the underlying judgment This part of the ASR identifies material Ms Burrows alleges falls “within the special circumstances category to have the underlying judgment debt investigate to go behind the judgment”.[90] ASR does not articulate how these matters constitute a reason for questioning the basis on which the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court Costs Order. As I have already noted, the Court of Appeal held that MKL and MKLG are separate entities, and that something more than control by one of MKL or MKLG of the other must be established before MKL and MKLG are considered the same entity. The ASR does not submit that the material it refers to shows something more than MKL or MKLG having control over the other.[90] ASR, [80]-[85]Lump sum $130,000 costs agreed The only point this part of the ASR appears to intend to make is that the evidence Mr Frawley gave in an affidavit about the “trading history of the two entities” is correct.[91] The ASR does not articulate the connection between this and the grounds on which Ms Burrows relies to set aside the bankruptcy notice[91] ASR, [89]Letter of offer to Ms Di Condi and role of Gregory Peach The ASR refers to the letter dated 13 May 2015 from Macpherson + Kelley Lawyers Pty Ltd to Ms Di Condio, to which I have referred above, and references in the transcript of the hearing on 26 February 2020 before Craig ADCJ.[92] The ASR does not articulate the connection between the matters to which it refers and the grounds on which Ms Burrows relies to set aside the bankruptcy notice.Costs hearing, Applicant unable to appear, adjournment not granted, did not agree to $130k lump sum costs; and offer of compromise[92] ASR, [91]-[94] This part of the ASR does not articulate the connection between the matters to which it refers and the grounds on which Ms Burrows relies to set aside the bankruptcy notice.[93][93] ASR, [95]-[105]Discharge of the Family Court costs order This part of the ASR does not articulate the connection between the matters to which it refers and the grounds on which Ms Burrows relies to set aside the bankruptcy notice.[94][94] ASR, [106]-[116]Registrar Campbell’s orders have been omitted from the correspondence and chronology in those pages The ASR appears to make submissions in support of the matters that are the subject of the claims Ms Burrows makes in the Federal Court proceeding. For reasons I have given, Ms Burrows does not have any counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the Judgment Debt, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that she could not have set up in the District Court proceeding. Here, the ASR does not submit that the material to which it refers identifies matters that show something beyond the existence of control by one of MKL or MKLG over the other.The Respondent claims 2 entities
Decision
Reasons for decision
The applicant, Ms Burrows, applies to set aside a bankruptcy notice that was issued on 20 April 2022 on the application of the respondent, Macpherson & Kelley Lawyers (Sydney) Pty Ltd (MKL). The bankruptcy notice demands that Ms Burrows pay $130,000 to MKL (Judgment Debt). That represents the amount of costs the District Court of New South Wales (District Court), on 28 February 2020, ordered Ms Burrows pay to MKL (District Court Costs Order) in a proceeding Ms Burrows brought in the District Court (District Court proceeding) against MKL, as first defendant, and against Ms Di Condio, as second defendant. Ms Burrows relies on four grounds. (a)First, “there are proceedings to set aside the underlying judgment”. That may be taken to be a reference to the proceeding (Supreme Court proceeding) Ms Burrows commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Supreme Court) on 20 October 2022 to set aside, on the ground of fraud, the orders made in the District Court proceeding (including the District Court Costs Order), and the orders (Court of Appeal orders) made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court New South Wales (Court of Appeal) dismissing an application to appeal against the orders made in the District Court proceeding.(b)Second, Ms Burrows claims she has a counter claim or set off that exceeds the amount of the Judgment Debt. That is a reference to the claims Ms Burrows makes in a proceeding she commenced in the Federal Court of Australia (Federal Court proceeding).(c)Third, Ms Burrows claims the Judgement Debt is not based on a true debt because MKL undertook the legal work by which it defended itself in the District Court proceeding; and, for that reason, MKL incurred no liability for the legal work that was performed to defend itself for which it is entitled to be indemnified by an order for costs.[1](d)Fourth, Ms Burrows claims the bankruptcy notice overstates the debt she might otherwise owe because the bankruptcy notice does not take into account $50 held in a trust account.[1] Relying on Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow [2019] HCA 29 MKL disputes each of the grounds on which Ms Burrows relies. MKL submits there is no substance in the claims Ms Burrows makes in the Federal Court and in the Supreme Court proceedings. MKL also submits that findings have been made in the District Court proceeding and in the Court of Appeal that MKL retained an incorporated legal practice, M & K Lawyers Group Pty Ltd (MKLG), to provide professional legal services in the District Court proceeding, and MKL incurred costs when retaining MKLG in relation to which it was entitled to be indemnified by an order for costs. MKL also submits that the bankruptcy notice was served on Ms Burrows on 24 May 2022, but she failed to apply to set aside the bankruptcy notice before the time for compliance with its requirements had expired and, for this reason, the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Ms Burrows’ application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. To be in a position to consider and determine the grounds on which the parties rely, it will be necessary to set out the circumstances in which MKL applied for the issue of the bankruptcy notice, and the claims Ms Burrows makes in the Federal Court and in the Supreme Court proceedings. Before I undertake these tasks, it will be necessary to refer to what occurred at and after the hearing on 21 October 2022 of Ms Burrows’ application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.the hearing to set aside the bankruptcy notice