Burns v Romeo
[2018] SASC 34
•22 March 2018
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
BURNS v ROMEO
[2018] SASC 34
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Nicholson
22 March 2018
EXTRADITION - SERVICE AND EXECUTION OF PROCESS ACT - EXECUTION OF WARRANTS - ORDER FOR RETURN
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - WARRANTS
PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - JURISDICTION AND GENERALLY
The accused was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued out of the Northern Territory and presented before a Magistrate. The Magistrate made an order pursuant to section 83(8)(a) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) that the accused be remanded on bail with a condition that he appear in the Darwin Local Court on an assigned hearing date.
An application in the criminal jurisdiction for review of that decision, under section 86 of that Act, was made by the police officer to whom the warrant had been issued. He sought an order that the accused be extradited to the Northern Territory in custody (section 83(8)(b)). In addition an application in the civil jurisdiction (in the nature of habeas corpus) alleging unlawful detention was made by the accused. Both applications were challenged as to competency.
Held:
1. The application for review under section 86 is competent.
2. On review, the warrant issued out of the Northern Territory is invalid.
3. Accordingly, the accused is entitled to be released from custody unconditionally pursuant to section 83(10) of the Service and Execution of Process Act.
4. As a further consequence, the unlawful detention application lacks utility; its competency does not need to be considered and it should stand dismissed.
Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) s 82, s 83, s 86; Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) s 5, s 8; Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 14, s 16, s 21A; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 198; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 7, s 36; Police Administration Act (NT) s 121, referred to.
Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 5 of 1999) [2000] SASC 51, (2000) 76 SASR 356; R v Conley (1979) 21 SASR 166; Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 936; Malaysian Declaration Case [2011] HCA 32, (2011) 244 CLR 144; Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69, considered.
BURNS v ROMEO
[2018] SASC 34Criminal: Application; Civil: Application
NICHOLSON J.
Introduction
Giuseppe Bruno Romeo is the respondent to a purported application filed in the criminal jurisdiction of the Court and also the plaintiff in an application filed in the civil jurisdiction of the Court. The resolution of each application turns, in part or in whole, on the one fundamental issue. As a consequence, I heard argument on both applications at the same time. For convenience only, I will refer to Mr Romeo throughout these reasons as the accused. I have referred to the first mentioned application as a “purported” application because, as a result of the procedural history to this matter, the accused maintains that no such application to which he is required to respond has in fact been filed. I will need to return to this issue in some little detail. However, for the present, I will deal with this purported application as if it is competently before the Court.
On 7 March 2018, the accused was arrested by members of the South Australia Police upon a purported warrant issued out of the Northern Territory. The warrant was issued to Detective Acting Sergeant Darren Burns, a member of the Northern Territory Police Force (Detective Burns).[1] The warrant records that it was issued on the basis that the issuer was of the opinion that there were reasonable grounds for his belief that the accused had committed two nominated offences, contrary to section 5 and section 8, respectively of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT). I have used the term “purported” warrant because fundamental to both the accused’s application and his defence to the application brought against him is the contention that the warrant relied upon as authorising the arrest is invalid. Notwithstanding this challenge, I will hereafter refer to the purported warrant relied on by the police as “the warrant”.
[1] In accordance with section 82 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) a person named in a warrant issued in one State may be arrested in and by an officer of the police force of another State. For this purpose, a State includes a Territory, see section 5.
Following his arrest, the accused was presented to the Magistrates Court of South Australia in Adelaide. An application was made by South Australian police for the accused to be extradited to appear in the Darwin Local Court on 12 April 2018 at 10am[2] pursuant to the power conferred on the magistrate by subsection 83(8) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) (the SEPA). That subsection provides:
Subject to subsections (10) and (14) and section 84, if the warrant or a copy of the warrant is produced, the magistrate must order:
(a)that the person be remanded on bail on condition that the person appear at such time and place in the place of issue of the warrant as the magistrate specifies; or
(b)that the person be taken, in such custody or otherwise as the magistrate specifies, to a specified place in the place of issue of the warrant.
[2] The accused is alleged to be part of a drug trafficking syndicate, he being the Adelaide connection with various other members of the syndicate operating out of the Northern Territory. Prior to the arrest of the accused, other alleged members of the syndicate were arrested in the Northern Territory and have been remanded in custody to appear in the Darwin Local Court on 12 April 2018.
The accused was represented by counsel who argued that the warrant was invalid and that, as a consequence and in accordance with subsection 83(10), the Magistrate was obliged to order the release of the accused. Subsection 83(10) is in these terms:
The magistrate must order that the person be released if the magistrate is satisfied that the warrant is invalid.
After hearing argument, the Magistrate found that the warrant was valid and proceeded to consider which of the two orders as prescribed by subsection 83(8) was to be made.
After hearing further argument, the Magistrate made an order pursuant to paragraph (a) remanding the accused on bail on various terms, including: the obtaining of a guarantee in the sum of $5,000; the payment into court of a cash surety of $5,000; the surrender of any passport; an obligation to report to an Adelaide suburban police station each Monday and Friday; and an obligation to be present at the Darwin Local Court on 12 April 2018 at 10am or at any other time when called on.
The prosecution then indicated the intention to seek a bail review pursuant to section 14 of the Bail Act 1985 and as such the release of the accused on bail was deferred in accordance with the terms of section 16. This was misconceived because, as is now common ground between the parties, the only power to review a Magistrate’s decision made under section 83(8) of the SEPA is that following an application brought in accordance with section 86 of that Act (but leaving aside the possibility of judicial review proceedings, the availability of which in the present circumstances is challenged by the Crown).
The matter first came before me very late on the afternoon of Friday 9 March 2018 on extremely short notice to the Court and to the parties. Under section 16 of the Bail Act, the prosecution has only 72 hours within which a Crown review is to be completed, failing which the person who has been granted bail will be released, unless that time is extended by the Court. The 72 hour period in this case was to expire part way through the ensuing long weekend. I heard briefly from the parties and made an order extending time.
By the time the matter had resumed on the next working day (Tuesday 13 March) it had become apparent to me that a Crown review under the Bail Act was not the appropriate vehicle. Rather, an order pursuant to section 83(8) of the SEPA was to be reviewed in accordance with the procedure laid down in the SEPA and in particular section 86. Further, the various relevant authorities dealing with the SEPA, in this context, were to the effect that this was the sole basis for a review leaving no room for a review to be conducted pursuant to the State Bail Act.
I raised this with the parties and after hearing further from them, the solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions made the following oral application or intimation of an application to be made.
I am instructed now to make an application under section 86 by Detective Acting Sergeant Burns for review of the order of the Magistrate. I make that application now orally and I understand that there are procedure requirements that require service of the application.
I proceeded to make the following orders.
(i)Pursuant to section 86(6) of the Service and Execution of Process Act and pending the review of the order made by [the Magistrate] that the Director of Public Prosecutions is instructed to make, the order made by [the Magistrate] on Friday 9 March 2018 is stayed until further order.
(ii)The respondent is to be remanded in custody pending the determination of the review that has been foreshadowed.
(iii)The order made … on Friday 9 March 2018 pursuant to section 16(2) of the Bail Act extending the time for the hearing of the application for a review of bail is revoked.
I then adjourned the matter for further hearing to Thursday 15 March 2018.
As a consequence of the events just briefly summarised, I have before me the two applications earlier referred to. The first application is brought in the Court’s criminal jurisdiction (SCCRM 73 of 2018) by Detective Burns, who is the Northern Territory police officer to whom the warrant was directed and who was purportedly authorised by the warrant to arrest the accused, the respondent to this application. The application seeks, pursuant to section 86 of the SEPA, a review of the decision made by the Magistrate pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 83(8). This is the application the competence of which is under challenge by the accused.
The application for review seeks, inter alia, an order that the Magistrate’s order pursuant to paragraph (a) be revoked and, in lieu, an order pursuant to paragraph (b). The effect of such an order would be that the accused would be remanded into the custody of the Northern Territory police to be brought before the Darwin Local Court on 12 April 2018.
In response to this application (on the assumption it is competent), the accused contends that the warrant relied on was invalid and for this reason alone he should be released in accordance with subsection 83(10). In addition, or in the alternative, the accused contends that, even if the warrant was valid such that the Magistrate was obliged to make an order under either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection 83(8), the correct order was made by the Magistrate on the facts and this Court should confirm it and dismiss Detective Burns’ application for review.
After some procedural toing and froing involved in getting the matters ready for argument, the Crown Solicitor represented Detective Burns and pressed, on his behalf, the application for the section 86 review of the Magistrate’s order.
The second application is an application brought by the accused in the civil jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to rule 198 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SCCIV 297 of 2018). I will refer to it as the “unlawful detention” application. It is in the nature of an application for habeas corpus and seeks the following orders.
1.An order in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of … the Magistrates Court of South Australia made on Friday 9 March 2018 which remanded the plaintiff in custody;
2.An order terminating the detention of the plaintiff in the Adelaide Remand Centre or such other place as the plaintiff is remanded at the date of this order;
3.A declaration that the arrest was, and subsequent detention of the plaintiff on and from Friday 9 March 2018 until his release from custody is, unlawful;
4.An order that the [State of South Australia] pay the plaintiff’s costs of this application.
The defendants to the application are the State of South Australia and the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The Magistrates Court has indicated a submitting appearance and the substantive defence to the application has been conducted by the Crown Solicitor on behalf of the State of South Australia.
Also central to the success of the accused’s unlawful detention application is the contention that the arrest and therefore the detention were unlawful on the basis that the warrant said to authorise the same was invalid.
A preliminary point pressed by the Crown is that this application, for judicial review of the Magistrate’s decision and seeking an order in the nature of habeas corpus, is not competent. The Crown submits that the only basis on which the Magistrate’s decision and orders can be challenged is that under section 86 of the SEPA; section 86 covers the field in this respect and, as such, there is no utility to the accused’s application.
A number of affidavits, canvassing the documentary materials that were before the Magistrate together with other materials in the nature of evidence and submission, were read in support of the parties’ cases. I received this material on the basis that the parties would make submissions as to admissibility, relevance and weight. The parties did not object to me having reference to all of the affidavit evidence that has been filed when considering each of the parties’ applications.
The accused read and relied upon two affidavits of the accused’s solicitor, Jon Lister, each sworn 14 March 2018. Counsel for the accused also read and relied upon affidavits of Caterina Sergi, Caterina Romeo and Nazzarena Romeo, the accused’s sister and daughters respectively, sworn 19 March 2018.
Detective Burns and the State of South Australia read or relied on affidavits of: Sarah Foley, sworn 9 March 2018 and 13 March 2018; Detective Brevet Sergeant Ben Shepherdson and Detective Brevet Sergeant William McCaffrey, each sworn 9 March 2018; Michelle Louise Sutcliffe, sworn 16 March 2018; Brevet Sergeant Lisa Olive, sworn 14 March 2018; Detective Burns, sworn 14 March 2018; Detective Brevet Sergeant Scott Howe, sworn 15 March 2018; Detective Brevet Sergeant Randall Bone, sworn 15 March 2018; and Detective Brevet Sergeant Lee Clarke, sworn 15 March 2018.
In addition, I have had the benefit of detailed written and oral submissions by the parties. A number of relevant factual matters are not in dispute. To the extent that any matters of fact stated in these reasons are not common ground, I will endeavour to qualify the matter stated to the extent necessary and, where necessary, make a finding.
The matter was argued before me on 19 March 2018. In the written submissions prepared for, and in oral submissions during, the hearing on 19 March 2018, the parties canvassed many difficult questions. There is some urgency about this matter, given that a fundamental issue is whether or not the accused should remain in custody. As such, I have not, in the time available, been able to deal with all of the questions raised by the applications or all of counsel’s contentions. Nor have I been able to prepare reasons for those conclusions that I have arrived at that are as comprehensive or lucid as I otherwise would have preferred.
It is not necessary for me to determine the competency of the habeas corpus application. This is because, for the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that Detective Burns’ application is competent but that the warrant is invalid. As such, the accused is entitled to be released in accordance with subsection 86(10).
Only if I had found the warrant to be valid (which is not the case) would I have been permitted to proceed to review the Magistrate’s bail order and decide whether or not an order for extradition in custody should be made in lieu.
However, had I found Detective Burns’ application to be incompetent, there would be no power to review under the SEPA. Notionally, the Magistrate’s order for release on bail would stand. As I have indicated, the parties are in dispute whether, in these circumstances, the accused’s unlawful detention application or some other process of judicial review of the Magistrate’s order would lie.
The competency of the application to review under section 86
Subsections (1) to (4) of section 86 of the SEPA are in these terms.
(1)If an order has been made under section 83, the apprehended person or a person to whom the warrant was directed may apply to the Supreme Court of the State in which the order was made for review of the order.
(2)The application must be made within 7 days after the making of the order.
(3)The respondent is to be:
(a) if the application is made by the apprehended person—the Commissioner of the police force of the State in which the person was apprehended; or
(b) if the application is made by a person to whom the warrant was directed—the apprehended person.
(4)Service of the notice of application on the respondent must be effected in the same way as service of a notice of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State in a criminal proceeding.
It is common ground that, in the circumstances of this case, a competent application sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to conduct the review had to be brought in the Supreme Court by the person to whom the warrant was directed, in this case Detective Burns, and within seven days of the making of the order by the Magistrate that is sought to be reviewed. It is common ground that the seven day period expired on (but including) Friday 16 March 2018.[3] It is the accused’s contention that at no time has an application for review been brought by Detective Burns and that it is now too late to do so and has been since the expiry of the seven day period on Friday 16 March 2018.
[3] See section 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).
Detective Burns, in endeavouring to bring an application for review pursuant to section 86 of the SEPA found himself in somewhat of a procedural imbroglio. As a consequence, counsels’ arguments, which are only briefly summarised below, assumed a high level of technicality and detail but also, with respect, addressed a problem that in all the circumstances had somewhat of an air of unreality about it. At all court hearings, including the initial hearing before the Magistrate, the accused was present either in person or by video link and was represented by counsel. At all times, the accused and counsel are to be taken to have understood that the principal matter to be determined was whether or not the accused should be extradited to the Northern Territory and if so what form that order for extradition should take. Further, at all times, at least from the time of the second hearing before me, that is, the one on Tuesday 13 March 2018, the accused and his advisors were aware that any application for review was to be one made pursuant to the SEPA and one to be made by the person to whom the warrant was issued, that is, Detective Burns, in accordance with subsection 86(1) of that Act.
It will be helpful at this stage to expand upon the chronology earlier given.
(i)On Friday 9 March 2018, by written application filed in this Court, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions sought a review of the bail decision of the Magistrate made on 9 March 2018 pursuant to the Bail Act 1985.
(ii)On Tuesday 13 March 2018, an oral application was made by a solicitor employed at the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in the terms earlier set out. At that point, counsel for the accused, in effect, indicated opposition to the Court receiving such an oral application and submitted that a formal application was required. The solicitor for the DPP indicated that an application would be filed within 24 hours.
(iii)The next document of significance is one headed “Originating Application for Review of Bail Decision on Extradition”. This document is dated 13 March 2018, was prepared in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, was emailed to the accused’s representatives and to the Court on 14 March 2018 and was filed, as I understand it, on Thursday 15 March 2018.
The front sheet of this document records that it is “Filed by (or on behalf of): [the DPP]”. In addition, the action heading on the front sheet, records the parties as “The Director of Public Prosecutions” being the applicant and “Giuseppe Bruno Romeo” being the respondent.
However, the substantive part of the document records the following:
Application
The Director of Public Prosecutions, on instruction of Detective Acting Sergeant Darren Burns, applies for the following orders:
1. A review under section 86 … of the bail decision set out below made under section 83 …;
2. That the order of [the Magistrate] remanding the defendant on bail … be revoked; and
3. That an order be made pursuant to section 83(8)(b) … that the defendant be remanded in custody … [in order to be brought before the Darwin Local Court].
(iv)The matter came before me again on Thursday 15 March 2018. At that hearing an issue that the application referred to in (iii) above on one view may have been filed or brought by the wrong party was debated at some length. Counsel for the Director acknowledged the possibility of ambiguity with respect to the moving party in that application. After some discussion with respect to alternative methods of proceeding, the matter was left on the basis that the Director, or indeed, Detective Burns, would take such steps as thought appropriate to either rectify or clarify the position.
(v)On Friday 16 March 2018, a further application was filed, this time by the Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia representing Detective Burns. That application had the following material characteristics.
Detective Burns was recorded in the action heading on the front sheet as the “(proposed substituted) applicant” and the front sheet recorded that the application was “Filed on behalf of the applicant, Darren James Arthur Burns, by the Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia”.
The substantive part of the application itself was in these terms.
Application
The applicant, Mr Darren James Arthur Burns, seeks the following orders:
1. That the name of the applicant be corrected to read Darren James Arthur Burns.
Grounds
The grounds relied upon by the applicant are as follows:
1. The named party on the originating application for review filed on 13 March 2018 is the Director of Public Prosecution.
2. The application was made on behalf of Detective Acting Sergeant Darren Burns.
3. The correction of the named party on the Court record is a matter of a formal correction.
The first application for review (that filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to the Bail Act) is plainly incompetent.
However, the Crown relied on the oral application (see (ii) above) standing alone as being competent within section 86(1) of the SEPA and as being sufficient to invoke the Courts jurisdiction to review. It also relied on the written “Originating Application”, (iii) above, together with the application to amend (or correct) in (v) above, in the alternative.
The accused challenges the competency of the oral application on a number of grounds but principally on the basis that subsection 86(2), when properly construed and in particular bearing in mind that subsection 86(4) imposes a requirement of service, requires a written application as a jurisdictional precondition. Second, it is contended that the oral application is of no effect and non-complying because the solicitor who made it, in her capacity as an employee of and representing the Director of Public Prosecutions, had no lawful authority to act for and to make such an application on behalf of Detective Burns.
As to the first contention (the requirement of writing as a jurisdictional precondition), I do not need to finally decide that question because I am satisfied that the two written applications (those in (iii) and (v)) constitute compliance with subsections 86(1) and (2).
In my view, it is clear that the solicitor, when making the oral application on 13 March 2018, conveyed her instructions as received from Detective Burns to act as his legal representative or agent to make the oral application. She made an oral application in court. As often will be the case, particularly where, as here, strict compliance with a procedural obligation is insisted upon, the making of the oral application in court was followed up with a formal written application. That application was, effectively, in the same terms as the oral application. The Director of Public Prosecutions made the written application on instructions received from Detective Burns, that is, as his representative or agent. It was solely on this basis that the Director made the application for review.
I take the view that I have one application before me, the written Originating Application which superseded the oral application and that this application was “made” within the time prescribed by subsection 86(2).[4]
[4] As it happens, it was also served within that period of time although section 86(4) makes neither service nor service within any particular time a jurisdictional precondition.
The debate between the parties with respect to this application (that in (iii) above) was over whether it was properly to be seen as an application by Detective Burns or by someone else. If the former, then the application filed on Friday 16 March 2018 (the last day of the seven day period) and being the application referred to in (v) above, is merely one of form to correct and make clear the name of the party who in fact had made the earlier written application.
The accused challenges this as a matter of construction of the document itself. However, to my mind, of primary significance is the operative provision in the substantive part of the application which states “the Director of Public Prosecutions on instructions of Detective Acting Sergeant Darren Burns, applies for the following orders” (my emphasis). This, read literally and in its ordinary and natural sense records that it is not the Director of Public Prosecutions that is making an application on its own behalf but the Director making an application as agent for and on behalf of its principal, the true applicant, Detective Burns.
This construction is supported by the terms of the application alone but also when it considered in its overarching context which embraces: the terms of section 86(2) known to the parties, the terms of the prefiguring oral application, and the nature of the discussion in court on 13 March 2018 between bench and all counsel as to the fact that only Detective Burns could bring such an application and that the Director of Public Prosecutions could not bring such an application.
On the question of construction, that is, the question of who was the applicant as indicated in the written Originating Application set out in (iii) above, and notwithstanding the form of the action heading, I reject the accused’s contention that it was the Director of Public Prosecutions. I am satisfied that it was Detective Burns.
In addition, the accused contends that the Director of Public Prosecutions and, a fortiori, the employed solicitor who appeared on 13 March 2018, had no power to act as representative of or agent for Detective Burns for this purpose. The Court’s attention was drawn to both section 7 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) and section 21A of the Bail Act 1995 which were said by the accused to set out and circumscribe the legislative remit of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in South Australia. It was submitted that, on a proper construction of the powers and authorities available to the Director of Public Prosecutions by legislation in this State, power to act as an agent for another person, in particular Detective Burns, in order to bring on such a person’s behalf an application under the SEPA does not exist. I do not need to express a view on this issue but will assume for the sake of argument that the accused is correct in this respect.
The question before the Court is whether or not as a matter of fact and law an application conforming to the jurisdictional preconditions or requirements of subsections 86(1) and (2) has been made to the Court. If so, the Court’s jurisdiction has been invoked. There is no challenge to the facts expressly and impliedly asserted by the making of the oral and written applications that Detective Burns gave instructions authorising the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to bring an application on his behalf and that the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions accepted those instructions. As I have found, as a matter of construction, the Director of Public Prosecutions did in fact bring an application on behalf of Detective Burns as principal. The fact that the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions stepped outside the powers available to it under legislation (if, in fact, it did so) cannot deny what has in fact occurred. An application was made by Detective Burns as principal and as the moving party in substance if not entirely in form
I am satisfied, that as at 19 March 2018, at the latest, and therefore within the time period required by subsection 86(2) an application for review under section 86 had been made by Detective Burns. This occurred either by way of the Original Application filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions or by way of that application in combination with the application to substitute filed on 16 March 2018 by the Crown Solicitor.
In order to correct and make clear on the record, I will allow the latter application and order that the name of the applicant on the front sheet of the Originating Application, as referred to in (iii) above, be corrected to read “Darren James Arthur Burns”. That order will be made nunc pro tunc to the date of the filing of the Originating Application.
Some aspects of the applicable law relevant to a review
Section 83 of the SEPA provides as follows.
83 Procedure after apprehension
(1)As soon as practicable after being apprehended, the person is to be taken before a magistrate of the State in which the person was apprehended.
(2)The warrant or a copy of the warrant must be produced to the magistrate if it is available.
(3)If the warrant or a copy of the warrant is not produced, the magistrate may:
(a) order that the person be released; or
(b) adjourn the proceeding for such reasonable time as the magistrate specifies and remand the person on bail or in such custody as the magistrate specifies.
(4)If the warrant or a copy of the warrant is not produced when the proceeding resumes, the magistrate may:
(a) order that the person be released; or
(b) if reasonable cause is shown, adjourn the proceeding for such further reasonable time as the magistrate specifies and remand the person on bail or in such custody as the magistrate specifies.
(5)The total time of the adjournments referred to in paragraphs (3)(b) and (4)(b) must not exceed 5 days.
(6)The magistrate may resume the proceeding at any time before the end of a period of adjournment if the warrant or a copy of the warrant becomes available.
(7)If the warrant or a copy of the warrant is not produced when the proceeding resumes after the further adjournment, the magistrate must order that the person be released.
(8)Subject to subsections (10) and (14) and section 84, if the warrant or a copy of the warrant is produced, the magistrate must order:
(a) that the person be remanded on bail on condition that the person appear at such time and place in the place of issue of the warrant as the magistrate specifies; or
(b) that the person be taken, in such custody or otherwise as the magistrate specifies, to a specified place in the place of issue of the warrant.
(9)The order may be subject to other specified conditions.
(10)The magistrate must order that the person be released if the magistrate is satisfied that the warrant is invalid.
(11)The magistrate may suspend an order made under paragraph (8)(b) for a specified period.
(12)On suspending the order, the magistrate must order that the person be remanded:
(a) on bail; or
(b) in such custody as the magistrate specifies;
until the end of that period.
(13)An order of a magistrate under this section may be executed according to its tenor.
(14)For the purposes of a proceeding under this section:
(a) the magistrate may adjourn the proceeding and remand the person on bail, or in such custody as the magistrate specifies, for the adjournment; and
(b) the magistrate is not bound by the rules of evidence; and
(c) it is not necessary that a magistrate before whom the proceeding was previously conducted continue to conduct the proceeding.
(15)Nothing in this section affects the operation of Part IC of the Crimes Act 1914.
The power invested in the Supreme Court to review an order made by a magistrate pursuant to either paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 83(8) is set out in section 86 which is in the following terms.
86 Review
(1)If an order has been made under section 83, the apprehended person or a person to whom the warrant was directed may apply to the Supreme Court of the State in which the order was made for review of the order.
(2)The application must be made within 7 days after the making of the order.
(3)The respondent is to be:
(a) if the application is made by the apprehended person—the Commissioner of the police force of the State in which the person was apprehended; or
(b) if the application is made by a person to whom the warrant was directed—the apprehended person.
(4)Service of the notice of application on the respondent must be effected in the same way as service of a notice of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State in a criminal proceeding.
(5)If, under the order, the apprehended person is remanded on bail, notice of the application must be served in the same way on any person providing surety for the granting of the bail.
(6)The Supreme Court may, pending its review:
(a) stay the execution of the order; and
(b) order the person to be remanded on bail or in such custody as the Supreme Court specifies.
(7)The review is to be by way of rehearing.
(8)The Supreme Court may confirm, vary or revoke the order.
(9)If the order is revoked, the Supreme Court may make a new order.
(10)The Supreme Court may suspend an order for a specified period if it is an order of a kind that a magistrate may suspend under section 83.
(11)The order as confirmed or varied, or the new order, may be executed according to its tenor.
(12)If the order as confirmed or varied, or the new order, is an order that is similar to an order mentioned in paragraph 83(8)(a):
(a) the Supreme Court must cause an instrument of the type mentioned in subsection 85(1) to be prepared; and
(b) subject to subsection (13), subsections 85(2), (3) and (4) apply.
(13)For the purposes of paragraph (12)(b):
(a) the reference in paragraph 85(2)(a) to a magistrate is taken to be omitted; and
(b) the reference in subsection 85(4) to a magistrate is a reference to the Supreme Court.
(14)For the purposes of a review under this section, the Supreme Court of a State is not bound by the rules of evidence.
The following propositions find support in earlier, single Judge, decisions.[5] In any event, I am satisfied that the propositions that follow are supported by and are in accordance with the relevant legislative provisions.
(i)A review under section 86 of a decision by a magistrate is to be by way of rehearing but the only considerations relevant to such a review are those which the magistrate was required to take into account when making the order under section 83.
(ii)On the review by way of rehearing, the Court can receive further evidence and must exercise any discretionary judgment afresh.
(iii)Subsection 83(8) imposes a duty upon a magistrate, but subject to subsection 83(10), to make one of the two orders identified in paragraphs (a) and (b) upon production of a warrant or a copy of a warrant.
(iv)Subsection 83(10) provides that the magistrate must order the release of a person if satisfied that the warrant is invalid.
(v)The weight of authority is to the effect that where a warrant is found to be valid a magistrate must make one of the two orders specified upon production of the warrant and that broader questions of abuse of process or a stay of proceedings are to be left to the courts of the state in which the warrant was issued. In other words, the weight of authority is to the effect that there is no room for rejecting an application for extradition on wider grounds, that is, grounds other than invalidity of the warrant, either by the magistrate or upon reconsideration by a Supreme Court upon review.
(vi)The legislature has elected to make the exercise of the power under section 83 depend upon the production of a warrant or a copy of a warrant. It is the fact of the issue of the warrant that conditions the exercise of the power to order extradition and not the conclusiveness of the facts upon which the warrant was issued. Again, such a matter is to be dealt with by the body which issued the warrant, upon its return.
[5] See, for example, Killick v The Commissioner of Police NSW (2014) NSWSC 781 (Simpson J), Rodgers (aka Rougder) v Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police & Anor [2012] VSC 305 (Pagone J), Berichon v Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police [2007] VSC 143 (Mandie J), Loveridge v Commissioner of Police for South Australia [2004] SASC 195 (White J) and Ratledge v Commissioner of Police for South Australia [2004] SASC 368 (White J).
In any event, it is unnecessary to resolve such dispute as there may be on the authorities as to whether a magistrate (and the Supreme Court on review) can rely on other grounds for setting aside a warrant in addition to its invalidity such as abuse of process (see (v) above). Abuse of process has not been relied upon by the accused. The sole basis for seeking to have the warrant set aside is its asserted invalidity.
The question of validity
At this stage, some further background should be identified. When the matter first came before the Magistrate, on 8 March 2018, counsel for the accused was provided by the police prosecutor with a number of documents including a copy of the warrant said to have been relied upon to authorise the arrest. That document is in these terms.
To: Detective Acting Sergeant Darren BURNS, a member of the Police Force:-
WHEREAS I, Gregory Cavanagh [handwritten], a Justice of the Peace within the meaning of the Justices of the Peace Act, pursuant to Section 121(1) of the Police Administration Act, being satisfied by information on oath placed before me on the 6th day of December 2018, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that:-
Giuseppe ROMEO, born 10 January 1954 (also known as Giuseppe ROMEO, born 11 January 1954)
Did commit the following offence(s) at Darwin in the Northern Territory:
Supply Dangerous Drug Commercial Quantity, contrary to section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT); and
Receiving or possessing tainted property, contrary to section 8 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT).
AUTHORISE YOU, with such assistance, as you think necessary:
*To arrest Giuseppe ROMEO, born 10 January 1954 (also known as Giuseppe ROMEO, born 11 January 1954), and bring him before a Local Court of the Northern Territory to be further dealt with according to law.
Case Number 21810646 refers.
DATED THE 2ND DAY OF March 2018
Signed [handwritten signature]
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
Counsel for the accused drew to the Magistrate’s attention two aspects of this document apparent on its face. First, the Justice of the Peace who signed and issued the warrant expressed himself to have been satisfied by information on oath that had been placed before him on 6 December 2018, notwithstanding that the warrant was dated and apparently issued on 2 March 2018. Second, counsel noted that the warrant did not bear a seal of the court.[6]
[6] The lack of a court seal was not agitated by the accused before me as a basis for finding invalidity. Nor, with respect, would such a contention have succeeded.
At or around this time, the police prosecutor requested and obtained a short adjournment. On the resumption, the police prosecutor informed the Magistrate that the issuer of the warrant had been contacted and was in the process of providing a corrected warrant. The court adjourned for a further period. When the matter resumed, still on 8 March 2018, counsel for the accused was provided with a copy of a different warrant. That warrant was in these terms.
To: Detective Acting Sergeant Darren BURNS, a member of the Police Force:-
WHEREAS I, Judge Greg Cavanagh [typewritten], a Justice of the Peace within the meaning of the Justices of the Peace Act, pursuant to Section 121(1) of the Police Administration Act, being satisfied by Information on oath placed before me on the 2nd day of March 2018, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that:-
Giuseppe ROMEO, born 10 January 1954 (also known as Giuseppe ROMEO, born 11 January 1954)
Did commit the following offence(s) at Darwin in the Northern Territory:
Supply Dangerous Drug Commercial Quantity, contrary to section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT); and
Receiving or possessing tainted property, contrary to section 8 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT).
AUTHORISE YOU, with such assistance, as you think necessary:
*To arrest Giuseppe ROMEO, born 10 January 1954 (also known as Giuseppe ROMEO, born 11 January 1954), and bring him before a Local Court of the Northern Territory to be further dealt with according to law.
Case Number 21810646 refers.
DATED THE 2ND DAY OF March 2018
Signed [handwritten signature]
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
This time the seal of the Local Court of the Northern Territory had been affixed and under the signature was typed or stamped “Local Court Judge”. I will refer to this document, produced on 8 March 2018, as the “second warrant”. The differences between the two forms of warrant are:
(i)In the warrant, the issuer is described as Gregory Cavanagh whereas, in the second warrant, the issuer is described as Judge Greg Cavanagh.
(ii)In the warrant, the information that purportedly satisfied the issuer of the warrant is said to have been placed before him on 6 December 2018 whereas, in the second warrant, it was said to have been placed before him on 2 March 2018 (being the apparent date of issue of the warrant).
(iii)No court seal was affixed to the warrant whereas, on the second warrant, the seal of the Local Court of the Northern Territory was affixed and “Local Court Judge” appeared under the signature.
When the matter resumed after the second adjournment, counsel for the accused was also provided with a document described as “Information for a Warrant to Arrest a Person”. That document, which is before me, takes the form of an affidavit apparently sworn on 2 March 2018 by Detective Burns and witnessed by a Justice of the Peace.
I am satisfied upon my examination of the relevant signatures, and it has not been challenged, that the Justice of the Peace before whom Detective Burns swore his affidavit was the same Justice of the Peace who issued the two warrants referred to above. There is affidavit evidence from Detective Burns, not challenged, to the effect that he swore this affidavit before the Justice of the Peace as witness at the same face to face meeting during which the warrant was issued.
In addition, attached to the Detective Burns affidavit is a document headed “Certificate of Justice” which is also signed by the Justice of the Peace who issued the two warrants. The certificate is in these terms.
Pursuant to Section 121(3) of the Police Administration Act, I certify that the reasonable grounds stated above are the grounds I relied upon to justify issuing a Warrant.
The certificate is not dated. However, in the affidavit sworn by Detective Burns, he deposed to the grounds he maintained should be found to be reasonable and sufficient to permit the issue of the warrant for arrest. The grounds deposed to refer to investigations conducted by the Northern Territory police commencing 22 December 2017 and concluding on 1 March 2018, that is, immediately prior to his swearing of the affidavit on 2 March 2018.
A number of curiosities arise with respect to the form of the second warrant. However, these do not need to be fully explored in the context of these proceedings. The most obvious is that, as is common ground, the second warrant was only created on 8 March 2018 as a result of purported defects with respect to the warrant having been communicated to the issuer on that day. However, as it had been created[7] on 8 March 2018, it would be difficult, to say the least, to find that it was issued on 2 March 2018. Whilst the document does not on its face expressly purport to have been issued on that date, it has been dated 2 March 2018 which ordinarily would imply the date of its creation and its issue.
[7] In the sense of being brought into existence.
It is unnecessary to deal further with the second warrant. It is common ground that the warrant was the only one in existence at the time of the arrest and was that relied on by the police as authorising the arrest. If the warrant was invalid, the arrest was unauthorised and the accused must be released. The second warrant cannot resurrect the validity of the arrest.
The Magistrate heard further submissions with respect to the form of the warrant and ruled that the warrant was valid. In so doing, his Honour found that the date in the chapeau to the warrant of 6 December 2018 was a typographical error, it being clear from the affidavit of Detective Burns, sworn 2 March 2018, that it was this that comprised the “reasonable grounds” in fact relied upon by the issuer of the warrant.
The hearing was further adjourned to the next day. On 9 March 2018, the Magistrate heard further submissions as to whether an order under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection 83(8) should be made and, as earlier indicated, made an order in terms of paragraph (a) releasing the accused on bail.
The question before the Magistrate and now on review of the validity of the warrant falls to be considered according to the proper construction of the power to issue the warrant conferred on the issuing authority. A warrant issued by a subordinate authority must disclose on its face the matters that go to jurisdiction.[8] Such matters are a question of statutory construction.[9] It can be sufficient for the warrant to repeat the words of the section conferring the authority to issue.[10]
[8] Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 5 of 1999) [2000] SASC 51; (2000) 76 SASR 356 at [30] (Mullighan J), [78]-[79] (Lander J) and [142] (Williams J).
[9] Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 5 of 1999) [2000] SASC 51; (2000) 76 SASR 356 at [79] and [142]-[144].
[10] R v Conley (1979) 21 SASR 166 at 169 (King CJ, Sangster and Cox JJ); Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 5 of 1999) [2000] SASC 51; (2000) 76 SASR 356 at [79].
The first step in determining validity is to ascertain the meaning of the requirements imposed by subsection 121 of the Police Administration Act (NT); in particular, the matters that go to jurisdiction to issue.[11] It will then be necessary to determine whether the warrant, on its face, complies. The meaning of a statutory provision is to be ascertained from an examination of its text whilst having regard to its context and purpose.[12] In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[13] Gegeler J observed as follows.
The task of construction begins, as it ends, with the statutory text. But the statutory text from beginning to end is construed in context, and an understanding of context has utility Anif, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text”.
An obvious and overriding aspect of the context in which section 121 sits is that it prescribes the circumstances in which an arrest warrant may be issued so that a citizen can be arrested by a member of the police and have their liberty interfered with, perhaps for a substantial period of time and before any allegations of impropriety are established. As such, the text of the statute is to be construed with exactitude.
[11] I am not aware of any authority that has directly considered this question.
[12] Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355.
[13] (2017) 91 ALJR 936 at 944, [37].
Section 121 is in these terms.
121 Arrest warrants
(1)Where an information on oath is laid before a justice of the peace alleging that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person has committed an offence:
(a) the justice of the peace may, subject to subsection (3), issue a warrant for the arrest of the person and for bringing him before a court specified in the warrant to answer to the information and to be further dealt with according to law; or
(b) the justice of the peace may issue a summons requiring the person to appear before a court to answer to the information.
(2)At any time after a justice of the peace has issued a summons requiring a person to appear before a court to answer to an information under subsection (1) and before the summons has been duly served on the person, a justice of the peace may, subject to subsection (3), issue a warrant for the arrest of the person and for bringing him before a court specified in the warrant to answer to the information and to be further dealt with according to law.
(3)A justice of the peace shall not issue a warrant under subsection (1) or (2) in relation to an information unless:
(a) an affidavit has been furnished to the justice of the peace setting out the grounds on which the issue of the warrant is being sought;
(b) the informant or some other person has furnished to the justice of the peace such further information, if any, as the justice of the peace requires concerning the grounds on which the issue of the warrant is being sought; and
(c) the justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant.
(4)Where an informant furnishes information to a justice of the peace for the purposes of subsection (3)(b), he shall furnish the information on oath.
(5)Where a justice of the peace issues a warrant under subsection (1), he shall state on the affidavit furnished to him in accordance with subsection (3) which of the grounds, if any, specified in that affidavit he has relied on to justify the issue of the warrant and particulars of any other grounds relied on by him to justify the issue of the warrant.
(6)Nothing in this section affects the application of section 19A of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 of the Commonwealth.
(7)A member may, at any time before a warrant issued under subsection (1) is executed, make application to a justice of the peace to withdraw the warrant.
(8)Where a warrant issued under subsection (1) has been executed the person arrested shall be charged with the offence specified in the warrant.
The requirements prescribed by section 121(1) before a warrant may be issued are expressed in relatively straightforward terms. They are:
(i)an information on oath to be laid;
(ii)before a Justice of the Peace;
(ii)alleging that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person has committed an offence.
In these circumstances, the Justice of the Peace may issue a warrant for the arrest of the person.[14] However, the power to do so is expressly qualified in subsection 121(1)(a) as being “subject to subsection (3)”.
[14] See subsection 121(1)(a).
In the alternative, the Justice of the Peace may issue a summons requiring the person to appear. This power is not expressed to be subject to subsection (3) or any other matters.
The warrant in this case discloses on its face that the person who issued the warrant (Gregory Cavanagh) holds the office of Justice of the Peace within the meaning of the Justices of the Peace Act. I do not understand this to be in issue.
Subsection 3 sets out matters of proscription. Paragraph (a) of subsection (3) requires, in effect, that a mere allegation of reasonable grounds (see (iii) above) will not be sufficient but will need to be supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds said to be reasonable and on which the warrant is being sought. A consideration of paragraph (b) does not arise in the present case. Paragraph (c) imposes a requirement that the Justice of the Peace shall not issue a warrant unless satisfied, on the affidavit material provided, that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant.
Subsection (5) imposes, inter alia, a requirement on the Justice of the Peace who issues a warrant to state on the affidavit, furnished in accordance with subsection (3), the grounds specified in that affidavit that he has, in fact, relied on. The document identified earlier in these reasons as “Certificate of Justice” signed by the Justice of the Peace in question and attached to the document “Information for a Warrant to Arrest a Person”, being the affidavit sworn by Detective Burns on 2 March 2018 and purporting to set out the reasonable grounds relied upon, on its face satisfies the requirement under subsection (5). In any event, the requirement under subsection (5) only arises where a Justice of the Peace issues a warrant. As such, it cannot constitute a jurisdictional fact or precondition.
The accused has challenged the validity of the warrant on a number of bases. Only two need to be dealt with in any detail.
The first is the fact of the Justice of the Peace having recorded, incorrectly, 6 December 2018 as the date upon which information on oath was placed before him. As at the date the warrant was issued (2 March 2018), the 6 December date was yet to arrive by some nine months. On any analysis, it was plainly incorrect. It is simply not possible for the Magistrate to have received information on that date.
However, all of the material before the Magistrate and the Court, in particular, the affidavit being the information on oath sworn on 2 March 2018 and relied upon by Detective Burns as recorded in the Certificate of Justice signed by the Justice of the Peace, leads to the overwhelming implication that it was this information that was before the Justice of the Peace at the time he issued the warrant.
Section 121 requires only that the Justice of the Peace has before him or her information on oath alleging (and particularising) the reasonable grounds relied upon by the informant. That is, in fact, what occurred. There is no requirement under section 121 that the Justice of the Peace identify on the warrant itself by date or otherwise the information received and relied upon. Rather, subsection (5) requires the Justice of the Peace to state on the affidavit furnished to him the grounds specified in that affidavit that the Justice of the Peace has relied upon to justify the issue of the warrant. This is what the Justice of the Peace did in this case. The inaccuracy on the face of the warrant in this respect is a matter of form, not substance, and a matter of form that would have no consequences of any significance to the accused.
In other words, whilst it is a jurisdictional requirement to state on the face of the warrant that the Justice of the Peace had before him or her (as a fact) certain information on oath it is not a requirement that this information be dated on the face of the warrant. Whether or not the information was adequate (including as to its contemporaneity or otherwise) and to which subsection 121(5) is directed may be open to question in proceedings to set aside the warrant in the jurisdiction of its issue but does not go to the question of validity on its face.
It follows, that I am not satisfied that there has been any breach of or failure to comply with the requirements of section 121, in this respect, when issuing the warrant.
The accused’s second challenge to validity is in my view of more substance. The complaint here relied on the obligation imposed in subsection 121(3). It is in mandatory terms. A Justice of the Peace shall not issue a warrant under subsection 121(1) unless he or she is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant. Subsection 121(1)(a) is expressed to be subject to subsection (3). It is as if the mandatory requirement in subsection (3) has been incorporated in and forms part of subsection (1)(a).
The precise language used is important. Once the jurisdictional facts provided for in subsection (1) are established, the Justice of the Peace has a choice. He or she may issue a warrant for immediate arrest or may issue a summons to appear. They are very different; one is potentially much more serious for the person concerned as the present case demonstrates. An evaluative judgment according to the circumstances before the Justice of the Peace is called for. Further, before electing for a warrant, the Justice of the Peace must, as a fact, have reached a state of satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant.
Whilst the warrant in this case complied on its face with the subsection 121(1) requirements it did not record the Justice of the Peace’s state of satisfaction (if reached) that there were reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant (as opposed, at least by implication, to the alternative of issuing a summons).
The question still remains whether subsection 121(3)(c) does provide for a jurisdictional fact which must be recorded on the warrant. The warrant in this case was issued by a subordinate authority. Lander J had this to say in Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 5 of 1999).[15]
It must be remembered that this case concerns a warrant issued by a subordinate authority. Historically a distinction has been drawn between warrants issued by subordinate authorities and inferior courts and warrants issued by superior courts. It has been said that in respect of subordinate authorities and inferior courts it is necessary that the warrant disclose jurisdiction on the face of it. On the other hand it has been said no such obligation lies in respect of a warrant issued by a superior court. The distinction may have arisen because a presumption of regularity arises in respect of warrants issued by superior courts. Whether there should be any such distinction where in all cases the issuing officer is exercising an administrative function does not need to be decided in this matter.
There is no doubt that a warrant issued under this section must disclose jurisdiction. Because the legislation does not prescribe the matters which must be included then regard must be had to the legislation itself to determine what information should be included to make the warrant valid. A search warrant which is excessively general will be invalid. A warrant must have the degree of particularity demanded by the legislation. It is sufficient, in my opinion, for a warrant issued under this section to repeat the words of the section itself.
[citations omitted]
[15] [2000] SASC 51; (2000) 76 CLR 356 at [78]-[79].
Section 121 does not prescribe the considerations that the Justice of the Peace must take into account but it does insist upon compliance with the matters set out in subsection 121(1) and upon reaching the state of satisfaction set out in subsection 121(3)(c). The existence of such a state of satisfaction (as opposed to any basis for it) is a jurisdictional fact.[16] In the Malaysian Declaration Case,[17] French CJ observed.
The decision-maker’s assessment or evaluation may be an element of the criterion or it may be the criterion itself. Where a power is expressly conditioned upon the formation of a state of mind by the decision-maker, be it an opinion, belief, state of satisfaction or suspicion, the existence of the state of mind itself will constitute a jurisdictional fact.
[citations omitted]
In my view, subsection 121(3)(c) constituted a jurisdictional fact that had to be disclosed on the face of the warrant. In this respect not only was the Justice of the Peace required to reach a state of satisfaction in accordance with subsection 121(1) but he was also required to reach the different state of satisfaction as required by subsection 121(3)(c).
[16] See the discussion in the Malaysian Declaration Case [2011] HCA 32; (2011) 244 CLR 144 at [56]-[58] (French CJ) and [107]-[109] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
[17] [2011] HCA 32; (2011) 244 CLR 144 at [57].
The expression of only the section 121(1) jurisdictional facts on the face of the warrant will not ordinarily, and does not in this case, give rise to an inference that the Justice of the Peace failed to satisfy himself of the jurisdictional fact in subsection 121(3)(c).[18] Nevertheless, on my construction of section 121, the requisite state of satisfaction under subsection 121(3)(c) remained a jurisdictional fact (whether or not properly arrived at by the Justice of the Peace) necessary to be recorded on the face of the warrant.
[18] Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69.
Conclusion
I am satisfied that the warrant is invalid. As such, there is no occasion to review the Magistrate’s order pursuant to subsection 83(8)(a) for the accused to be released on bail. Rather, the accused is to be unconditionally released pursuant to subsection 83(10). It follows that there is no utility to the accused’s unlawful detention application, the competency and merits of which do not need to be further considered.
I note that the original application for review of bail under the Bail Act has been withdrawn by the Crown Solicitor acting on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions for this purpose.
I make the following declaration and orders:
In the criminal action number 73 of 2018:
1.An order that the Originating Application filed on behalf of Detective Burns is amended to record his name as the party making the application. That amendment is to operate nunc pro tunc to the date of filing of the Originating Application.
2.A declaration that the warrant is invalid.
3.An order that the accused is to be unconditionally released.
4.An order revoking the Magistrate’s order on 9 March 2018 remanding the accused on bail.
In the criminal action number 72 of 2018:
5.An order that the Director of Public Prosecutions’ application for a review under the Bail Act of the Magistrate’s order on 9 March 2018 remanding the accused on bail stands dismissed.
In the civil action number 297 of 2018:
6.An order that the accused’s unlawful detention application filed in the civil jurisdiction of this Court stands dismissed.
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