IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1998] QCA 250 SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Appeal No. 11629 of 1997 Brisbane [Burman v. Burman & Anor] BETWEEN: JAMES EDWARD BURMAN
(Respondent) Appellant
AND:
KEVIN JAMES BURMAN and ALLAN JOHN BURMAN
(Applicants) Respondents McPherson J.A.
Pincus J.A.Helman J.
Judgment delivered 1 September 1998
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; each concurring as to the orders made.
APPEAL ALLOWED TO THE EXTENT OF CORRECTING THE ORDER BY REPLACING “cl.3(9)” WITH “cl.3(q)”. APPEAL OTHERWISE DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
CATCHWORDS:
WILL, PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION - Construction and interpretation - Testatrix added codicil after death of son leaving residue of estate to “such of my sons as shall survive me” - Whether class gift preserved for son’s children under s.33 Succession Act - Whether any beneficial disposition of property - Words could be construed as essential element rather than condition or requirement.
Succession Act 1981 (Qld.) s.33; Re King [1953] V.L.R. 648;
Bassett v. Hall [1994] 1 V.R. 432.Counsel: Mr P. Keane Q.C., with him Mr M. Amerena, for the appellant
Mr D. Mullins for the respondentsSolicitors: MacDonnells for the appellant
Mullins & Mullins for the respondentsHearing Date: 21 August 1998 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 11629 of 1997
Brisbane
Before McPherson J.A.
Pincus J.A.
Helman J.[Burman v. Burman & Anor]
BETWEEN:
JAMES EDWARD BURMAN
(Respondent) Appellant
AND:
KEVIN JAMES BURMAN and ALLAN JOHN BURMAN
(Applicants) Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A.
Judgment delivered 1 September 1998
1 The testatrix Mrs Burman had three sons named Neville, Kevin and Allan. In 1988 she
made a will by cl.3(p) of which, after appointing executors and trustees and directing payment
of a number of pecuniary legacies, she left the residue of her estate to “such of my sons as shall
survive me”, adding, however, that should her son Neville predecease her leaving his wife
surviving the testatrix, then his wife should take the share which Neville would have taken had
he survived.
2 Neville died on 6 July 1989, consequentially upon which the testatrix on 17 November 1989 executed a codicil. It effected two changes in the dispositions made by the original will. The first was to revoke cl.3(p) and to substitute a new clause similarly numbered providing for
the payment to Mrs Neville Burman of a pecuniary legacy of $6,000.00. The second was to
add to the will a further clause numbered 3(q). It directed the executors to pay and transfer the
residue of her estate to “such of my sons as shall survive me and if more than one as tenants in
common in equal shares”. There was a separate proviso in that subclause for a gift over to a
named charity in the event of Kevin predeceasing the testatrix, and a similar proviso in the event
of Allan doing the same.
3 At his death, Neville himself had seven children who or…
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- AGLC
- Burman v Burman [1998] QCA 250
- Case
- [1998] QCA 250
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the construction and interpretation of the codicil in question. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the words "such of my sons as shall survive me" created a class gift that was preserved for Paul's children under section 33 of the Succession Act or whether they imposed a condition or requirement that could not be satisfied due to Paul's predeceasement. Another aspect of the dispute was whether the codicil constituted a beneficial disposition of property to Paul's children.
The court held that the codicil created a class gift that was preserved for Paul's children. The court reasoned that the words "such of my sons as shall survive me" were not intended to be a condition or requirement, but rather an essential element of the gift. As Paul was deceased, his children were still considered part of the class of sons, and thus entitled to inherit the residue of the estate. The court found that the words could be construed as an essential element rather than a condition, and therefore the gift was preserved for Paul's children. The court also found that the codicil did constitute a beneficial disposition of property to Paul's children.
The final orders of the court were that Paul's children were entitled to inherit the residue of the estate under the terms of the codicil. The executors of the estate were directed to distribute the residue of the estate to Paul's children in equal shares.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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