Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

[2017] FCA 1194

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal:  Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 3) [2017] FCA 383
File number: NSD 690 of 2017
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 14 August 2017
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 31A
Cases cited:

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225

Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 3) [2017] FCA 383

Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 1159

Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] TASSC 60

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337

Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40

Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235

Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529

Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516

Mickovski v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd (2012) 36 VR 456

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087

Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118

TJ (on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People) v State of Western Australia [2016] FCA 553

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378

Date of hearing: 14 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr PE King
Solicitor for the Applicant: Spencer & Co Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Jackson SC
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Simmons Wolfhagen
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr M Wise
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Arslan Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 690 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SUSAN BURGE

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LIMITED

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. On 13 April 2017, the primary judge delivered his reserved reasons for exercising the Court’s power under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to dismiss summarily, and its inherent power to dismiss as an abuse of process, proceedings brought by Susan Burge against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Financial Ombudsman Service Limited:  Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 3) [2017] FCA 383. His Honour gave comprehensive reasons for that decision.

    The necessity for an extension of time and leave to appeal

  2. Ms Burge came to represent herself at some point after his Honour had heard argument on…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1194
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the applicant, Ms Burge, sought to appeal the decision of the primary judge who had previously dismissed her application for an injunction. The primary judge's decision had refused Ms Burge's request to restrain the Commonwealth Bank from exercising its power of sale over a property she had mortgaged. The applicant's application for leave to appeal and an extension of time was dismissed by the court.

The central legal issues in this case involved the interpretation of the terms of reference governing the Financial Ombudsman Service (the Service) and the tripartite contract that forms when a customer lodges a complaint against a financial institution. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Service's decision-making process was binding on Ms Burge, particularly in light of her acceptance of the Service's determination with the condition "under duress" noted. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the application for leave to appeal was justified and whether the applicant had suffered substantial injustice warranting such leave.

The court ruled that the Service's decision-making process was not bound by legal rules of evidence, and that Ms Burge's acceptance of the Service's determination with the caveat "under duress" did not constitute a valid acceptance under the terms of reference. The court further held that the application for leave to appeal was not warranted as the decision in question was not attended with sufficient doubt and no substantial injustice would result from the refusal of leave. Consequently, the applicant's application for leave to appeal and an extension of time was dismissed, and she was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application for extension of time and leave to appeal and to direct Ms Burge to pay the respondents' costs in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In addition, the criteria for granting leave to appeal are that the applicant must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and that substantial injustice would result from a refusal of leave: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ.Background The proceeding originally came before the primary judge in September 2016, when Ms Burge sought an injunction restraining the Bank from exercising its power of sale by auctioning, on 23 September 2016, the last of three properties she had mortgaged to it. His Honour was not persuaded to grant relief to Ms Burge on that occasion: Burge v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2016] FCA 1159. The parties have had a long history of disputation that is not necessary or appropriate to traverse in detail in these reasons. Relevantly, Ms Burge applied to the Service for it to consider her complaints about the way in which the Bank had dealt with her and her former husband in relation to its lending to them on the security of three properties, including one from which she conducted a business with her former husband. In about August 2014, the Service arrived at its determination of Ms Burge’s complaint. It sent that determination to Ms Burge for her to determine whether or not she wished to accept it. Under the terms of reference, to which, among others, the Bank and other financial institutions are party with the Service, the Service is not bound by any legal rules of evidence, but must decide a dispute and whether a remedy should be provided to a customer of the financial institution by determining what, in its opinion, is fair in all the circumstances. In reaching its determinations, the Service must have regard to legal principles, applicable industry codes or guidance as to practice, good industry practice and previous relevant decisions of the Service or a predecessor scheme, although in the latter cases, the Service was not bound by those. His Honour held, in accordance with the decision in Mickovski v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd (2012) 36 VR 456 at 467 [34]-[36], that when a customer applies to the Service with a complaint about the way in which a financial institution, bound by the Service’s terms of reference, dealt with the customer, a tripartite contract comes into existence. Buchanan and Nettle JJA and Beach AJA held that each of the financial institution, the Service and customer promised to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the terms of reference and be bound by the Service’s decision, subject to the customer, within 30 days of receiving the determination, having the right, in accordance with cl 8.7(b) of the terms of reference, not to accept the decision as binding. After Ms Burge received the determination, she returned the form of acceptance, on 12 September 2014, signed but adding the words “under duress” in brackets against her signature. On 16 September 2014, the Service responded to the transmission of her acceptance in those terms, saying that it would only accept a standard form release that had not been altered in any way, namely one that simply had been signed and dated by her. The letter said that by adding the words “under duress” next to her signature, she had failed to accept the final determination. The Service gave her the option, if she wished, to accept it by sending an unqualified signed form of acceptance of the determination (the acceptance) by no later than 19 September 2014, failing which the Service would assume that she intended to reject the final determination. The consequence of that course would be that she would be left to her rights to take proceedings to seek relief in the Courts about the conduct of the Bank of which she complained.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established