Buick v LEEDAL Pty Ltd and Fitzroy River Lodge Pty Ltd
[2001] WADC 56
•12 MARCH 2001
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: BUICK -v- LEEDAL PTY LTD & FITZROY RIVER LODGE PTY LTD [2001] WADC 56
CORAM: MULLER DCJ
HEARD: 26-28 FEBRUARY 2001
DELIVERED : 12 MARCH 2001
FILE NO/S: CIV 446 of 1998
BETWEEN: JAMES ANDREW BUICK
Plaintiff
AND
LEEDAL PTY LTD & FITZROY RIVER LODGE PTY LTD
Defendants
Catchwords:
Liability - Negligence of employer - Employee engaged as security guard injured as a consequence of an assault outside hotel premises - Whether employee acting in course of employment or in disobedience of employer's instructions - Contributory negligence
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Judgment for the plaintiff on issue of liability
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr I L K Marshall
Defendants: Mr M W Odes QC
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: S C Nigam & Co
Defendants: Basile Hawkins
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Hamilton v Nuroof (WA) Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 18
McLean v Tedman & Anor (1984) 155 CLR 306
Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 176 ALR 411
Sheen v Fields Pty Ltd (1984) ATR 80‑301
Taouk v Alexandrou (1989) ATR 80‑287
Turner v State of WA (1982) 56 ALJR 839
Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) CLR 316
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
MULLER DCJ: In this action the plaintiff has claimed damages for injuries he suffered on 13 September 1993 when he was allegedly assaulted while working as a security person for the defendants at the Crossing Inn Hotel at Fitzroy Crossing. The plaintiff claims his injuries were caused by the defendants' breach of a term of the contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendants and/or in breach of the statutory duties imposed on the defendants by the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1984 and/or the negligence of the defendants. The defendants denied liability and the trial was confined to that issue. The only cause of action relied upon by the plaintiff at trial was the alleged negligence of the defendant.
Issues at trial
In par 11 of the Statement of Claim the plaintiff particularised the negligence of the defendants in the following manner:
"11.Further, the injuries referred to in paragraph 7 hereof were occasioned to the Plaintiff by reason of the negligence and/or breach of the duties owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendants, their servants or agents.
Particulars of negligence
The Defendants, their servants or agents:‑
(a)Failed to take all reasonable precautions for the safety of the Plaintiff in that:‑
(i)with the knowledge that there was frequent violence and fighting by patrons in the Hotel, failed to employ adequate security staff;
(ii)with the knowledge that the Plaintiff had been drinking alcohol on his night off instructed him to resume his duties as a hotel security officer;
(iii)failed to ban troublesome patrons from the Hotel.
(b)Exposed the Plaintiff to risk of damage or injury of which they knew or ought to have known that:‑
(i)with the knowledge that there was frequent violence and fighting by patrons in the Hotel, failed to employ adequate security staff;
(ii)failed to ban troublesome patrons from the Hotel.
(c)Failed to provide a safe system of work for the Plaintiff in that:-
(i)failed to warn the Plaintiff of the potential danger when dealing with known troublesome patrons of the Hotel;
(ii)failed to ban known troublesome patrons from the Hotel to minimise the incidents of violence;
(iii)failed to employ adequate security staff to control the troublesome patrons of the Hotel without the risk of injury to the Plaintiff."
In their amended Defence the defendants alleged that the plaintiff was not acting in the course of his employment at the time he sustained his injuries or alternatively, in the event of a finding that he was on duty and/or acting in the course of his employment with the defendants at the relevant time, that he acted contrary to express instructions given to him by the defendants not to leave the licensed precincts of the hotel at any time while on duty.
At the conclusion of the evidence two main issues arose for decision. The first was the question whether the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of care and acted in breach of that duty. This issue turns upon the question of whether the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment. The second issue was whether the plaintiff had been given instructions by the defendants not to leave the licensed premises while on duty, and, if he did, whether he disobeyed those instructions and relieved the defendants of all liability.
Evidence of the plaintiff
The plaintiff, who was born on 5 October 1947 and is now aged 53, is currently unemployed and in receipt of a disability pension. He had numerous jobs, including prior experience in the security industry, before the incident in which he was injured. In June 1993 he went to Fitzroy Crossing and was employed as a yardman and security person at the Crossing Inn Hotel on 24 June 1993. His duties required him to live on the premises and to work between 6.30 am‑12.30 pm as a yardman. His security duties were limited to the hours between 8.00‑11.00 pm. As a security person he was required to check on the age of patrons, enforce dress requirements and maintain acceptable standards of behaviour on the hotel premises. The Crossing Inn Hotel comprised three bars: the pool room bar, the public bar and the garden bar. The plaintiff claimed that when he was employed he was told by the general manager of the hotel, Jeffrey Neil Amundsen, that he was responsible for security in both the pool room and garden bars. He was expressly told not to enter the public bar. He claimed the general manager showed him a diagram of the hotel premises and said his area of responsibility included the hotel surrounds and, in particular, the car park. He also claimed he was instructed by the general manager that in the event of violence breaking out he was to separate the combatants, restrain one or more and escort them out of the licensed premises through the garden bar, down a flight of steps leading from the garden bar to a pathway and along the pathway to the car park area where a public telephone was located.
On Friday 10 September 1993 the plaintiff was performing security duties at the hotel. He claimed that a regular patron at the hotel named Keith Bedford approached him and complained of having been assaulted by a female. He went on to say that Keith Bedford challenged him to a fight and he responded by telling Bedford to leave and talk to him again on the following Monday. This was not the first time that Bedford had created problems for the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that Keith Bedford and his brothers regularly came to the hotel at or about closing time and often became troublesome.
Following this incident on 10 September 1993 the plaintiff claimed that he told the general manager, Jeffrey Amundsen, and the bar supervisor, Janice Spratt, of the confrontation but was told by both of them not to worry about the incident.
Monday 13 September 1993 was the plaintiff's rostered day off. He drank at the hotel both before and after lunch and continued drinking in the evening. At approximately 8.00 pm the general manger, Jeffrey Amundsen, who had been on duty in the bar area, told the plaintiff he felt unwell and allegedly asked the plaintiff to take charge of security. The plaintiff claimed he told Amundsen that he had had a few drinks. He went on to say that Amundsen responded by saying he would be alright. The plaintiff alleged he also reminded Amundsen of the threat made by Keith Bedford. Amundsen, he claimed, simply repeated that he would be alright. Having been told to take over the role of security person the plaintiff claimed he immediately stopped drinking alcohol and began drinking water.
At about 8.30 pm two regular patrons named Stewart and Timothy Bedford entered the licensed premises and became involved in an argument over the use of pool cues. Janice Spratt, the bar manager, intervened and resolved the problem. Shortly after Keith Bedford arrived at the hotel. The plaintiff claimed Bedford approached him in the garden bar and asked him whether he remembered the conversation they had had the previous Friday night. After a further brief conversation he claimed Bedford asked him whether he was ready to fight. Realising that Bedford wanted to fight him the plaintiff claimed he put his hand on his would be assailant's shoulder, led him out of the garden bar, down a flight of steps and along a pathway leading to the car park and the public telephone. He said he asked Bedford to go home but, without warning, was punched in the face. He claimed he tried to walk back to the bar area but was caught from behind by Bedford and fell down. A struggle ensued during which he got the better of Bedford and forced him onto his back. It was at this point that a large group of people began assaulting him in the car park. Without going into any great detail it appears that he was severely assaulted by being kicked, punched and hit in the head or face with a rock or hard object. The police were called and he was subsequently taken to hospital in an ambulance.
Jason James Meotti, a friend of the plaintiff who had previously worked with him in Perth and toured Australia with him, was also employed as a yardman and security person at the Crossing Inn Hotel at the time of the alleged incident. While he was not working on the night of the alleged assault he asserted that, like the plaintiff, the general manager had shown him a diagram of the hotel premises and had emphasised that he was responsible for the security in both the licensed area and the hotel surrounds including the car park and the area where the public telephone was located. Meotti also claimed the general manager told him to escort unruly patrons to the beer garden steps but, if they continued to misbehave, to remove them to the car park in the area of the public telephone. He also confirmed the plaintiff's evidence that the Bedfords were constant troublemakers who were often aggressive and violent.
Madeline Hemsley, who was the bar attendant on duty on the night of 13 September 1993, confirmed that incidents of violence or unruly behaviour occurred frequently at the Crossing Inn Hotel both immediately outside and within the hotel premises. She said that on occasions she had personally called the police to attend at the hotel in order to resolve such problems. Like the plaintiff and Jason Meotti, she claimed to be familiar with the Bedford family whom she said attended the hotel regularly and had caused a few fights in the past.
While she was not personally responsible for security in the licensed premises Madeline Hemsley said she had often been on duty and seen the security personnel separate patrons who were fighting and escort them through the beer garden, down the flight of steps and along the pathway leading to the area where the public telephone was located.
On the night of Monday 13 September 1993 she saw the plaintiff, who was off duty, drinking in the bar. At about 8.00 pm she saw the general manager, Jeffrey Amundsen, speak to the plaintiff and then leave. She noticed at this point that the plaintiff stopped drinking alcohol and began drinking water. Shortly after this she said she saw Stewart and Tim Bedford who asked her if they could use a pool cue belonging to another patron. She said she refused their request and approached the plaintiff to explain the problem. She said she saw both Janice Spratt and the plaintiff speak to the Bedfords. Following this she saw the plaintiff moving around the pool bar. Not long afterwards she saw Keith Bedford arrive and exchange words with the plaintiff. She was unable to hear what they said although she was certain they did not raise their voices or become abusive. She said she noticed nothing unruly about Keith Bedford's behaviour and, after speaking together for approximately five minutes, she said Bedford followed the plaintiff out of the bar. She said she did not see the plaintiff put his hand on Bedford's shoulder.
Evidence of the defendants
Janice Spratt, who was employed at the Crossing Inn between December 1988‑April 1996, was the bar manager at the time of the incident involving the plaintiff on 13 September 1993. In her capacity as bar manager she was also responsible for security within the licensed premises. While she had not been a party to any instructions given to the plaintiff and other security personnel by the general manager, Jeffrey Amundsen, she said she had been specifically told by Amundsen not to leave the beer garden area and only to escort unruly patrons to the end of the beer garden where the steps were located. She said she had never been told to escort patrons to the area of the public telephone and that Amundsen had told her the area was not well lit and was considered unsafe.
On the night of 13 September 1993 she said the hotel was very quiet. Amundsen told her he felt unwell and left the hotel at approximately 8.30 pm. At that time she said she had seen the plaintiff, who was off duty, drinking with friends in the garden bar. She said she never saw Amundsen speak to the plaintiff and she personally did not ask the plaintiff to take over the role of security person. At about 9.15 pm Keith Bedford entered with his younger brother and, referring to the plaintiff by his nickname, called him over. She said she saw the plaintiff and Keith Bedford talking and, while not able to hear what they said, she confirmed that they spoke in normal tones before walking out together through the beer garden entrance towards the area of the car park. Later, when she realised that something unusual was happening in the area of the car park, she left the hotel and went to investigate.
Jeffrey Neil Amundsen, the general manager of the Crossing Inn Hotel, said security personnel, including the plaintiff, were on duty between Thursday and Saturday of each week and also when special functions were held on the licensed premises. He claimed no security staff were engaged on other days of the week, including Mondays, because the hotel was usually very quiet on these occasions. He said he engaged the plaintiff as a yardman/security person and instructed him on his duties. He said he specifically told the plaintiff to talk to unruly patrons and, if necessary, escort the patron to the entrance to the beer garden where the steps were located. He was adamant that he told the plaintiff on more than one occasion not to escort an unruly patron beyond the beer garden entrance because this marked the boundary of the licensed premises. He said he also told the plaintiff not to take anyone to the public telephone or go beyond the licensed area because the car park was not well illuminated and was considered dangerous.
On the night of 13 September 1993 Amundsen was on duty at the bar and noticed the plaintiff drinking with customers. He said he left the bar between 7.00‑7.30 pm when he felt unwell. He said he left Janice Spratt, the bar manager, in charge of the licensed premises. He was adamant he did not ask the plaintiff to come on duty and take charge of security that night.
Whether plaintiff's injuries sustained in course of employment
In considering whether the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty of care and acted in beach of such duty I must decide whether the plaintiff was assaulted in the course of his employment. It is common cause that the plaintiff was not on duty on 13 September 1993. It was his rostered day off and he took advantage of the opportunity to drink both before and after lunch and later in the evening with friends on the hotel premises. The critical question is whether he was instructed by Jeffrey Amundsen to resume his duties as a security officer when Amundsen felt unwell and left the licensed premises. The answer to this question essentially rests on my findings as to the credibility of Jeffrey Amundsen on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other.
Before considering the issue of credibility, however, I propose to examine the other factors which I consider to be relevant to this question. It is common cause that security personnel were not normally required to work on Monday nights because the hotel was not usually busy on those evenings. Monday 13 September 1993 was no exception. According to Janice Spratt, who was in charge of the bar that night, there were approximately only four males and two females in the garden bar between 8.00‑8.30 pm. There were no customers in the other bars until after 9.15 pm when the Bedfords arrived. The night was so quiet she considered closing the bar early at 9.30 pm instead of 10.00 pm. Given the few customers in attendance and the expectation that, like most Monday nights, it would remain quiet, it does seem improbable that Jeffrey Amundsen would have asked the plaintiff to assume security duties in his place. Such a request or direction seems even more improbable when it is considered that Amundsen knew the plaintiff had been drinking, if not earlier in the day, at least during the course of that evening. If, as the plaintiff has alleged, he was expressly asked to resume duty, it is surprising that Amundsen did not tell Janice Spratt, who was left in charge of the licensed premises, what he had done.
The evidence of the plaintiff on this crucial issue could be said to stand on its own. But for one very significant factor, which I shall turn to later, his assertion that he was asked to resume duty stands uncorroborated. I was not particularly impressed with the plaintiff as a witness. I found him to be dogmatic and over‑assertive. He admitted on one occasion that his memory of events, particularly when giving evidence at the preliminary hearing, had been poor. Most significantly of all, however, his evidence as to the confrontation he had with Keith Bedford on the night of Monday 13 September 1993 differed substantially from his account of the same episode in the preliminary hearing held at Fitzroy Crossing on 1 March 1994. I have already outlined his evidence at the trial. In that evidence he unequivocally portrayed Keith Bedford as the aggressor who wanted to pick a fight with him. What he said at the preliminary hearing, however, was, in my view, substantially different. It is clear from what he told the Magistrate that, after an exchange of pleasantries with Keith Bedford, he asked Bedford whether he remembered what they had spoken about on the previous Friday night. He went on to tell the Magistrate that after Bedford replied in the affirmative he, the plaintiff, asked Bedford whether he still wished to continue that conversation. When Bedford allegedly replied in the affirmative the plaintiff told the Magistrate that they walked out of the garden bar, down the pathway and into the car park adjacent to the public telephone where the incident began. What he said to the Magistrate could, in my view, be construed as tantamount to an invitation to Bedford to take up where they had left off on the previous Friday night and continue the fight. Given this construction, what he said to the Magistrate was materially inconsistent with his evidence in this trial and must reflect adversely on his credibility. There may, however, be another interpretation open. Rather than being inconsistent with his current testimony it may simply be explained by an intent on the plaintiff's part to forestall any possibility of further trouble on the licensed premised by enquiring of Keith Bedford whether he was still of the same mind as he had been on the previous Friday evening. The affirmative response he then got could explain why he acted as he did by asking the customer to leave the licensed premises with him.
Apart from one significant exception, which I will turn to shortly, I had no reservations about the credibility of the witness Jeffrey Amundsen. While his evidence and attitude was criticised by counsel for the plaintiff as being overly defensive, I found him to be methodical and deliberate and his answers both thoughtful and reasoned. Unlike the plaintiff he was not dogmatic and was prepared to make concessions in areas where his memory failed him, as, for example, as to what sketch or plan he showed the plaintiff at the time he engaged him and whether the plaintiff had spoken to him about the incident involving Keith Bedford on the previous Friday night.
If there was no other factor involved I would unhesitatingly have accepted the evidence of Amundsen in preference to that of the plaintiff on this critical issue of whether the plaintiff was asked to work on the night in question. There is one factor, however, which I believe is so significant that it carries the probabilities in favour of the plaintiff's assertions. Immediately following the assault the plaintiff was seen by a medical practitioner and a claim for Workers' Compensation was made. The claim form was completed by an unknown person who, according to Amundsen, might have been the office manager at the time, and was signed by the plaintiff. His signature was witnessed by Janice Spratt who, in evidence, said she knew the application was intended to compensate the plaintiff for injuries sustained in the course of his employment. I believe that Spratt's signature on the form is significant. It suggests the employer was prepared to acknowledge that the plaintiff's injuries occurred while he was on duty. The matter, however, does not end there. On 23 September 1993, only 10 days after the assault, Jeffrey Amundsen signed a Supplementary Claim Form expressly recommending that the plaintiff's claim for compensation be accepted by the insurer. When questioned on this issue he said he had discussed the matter with a director of the defendant company and it had been agreed that the form should be signed and the plaintiff's application supported. Following the completion of the documentation he said the plaintiff continued to be paid by the defendants who were indemnified by the insurance company.
This conduct on the part of the employer was, in my view, an unequivocal acknowledgment that the plaintiff was on duty when he was injured. It cannot be anything else. It is true the employer may have had other motives in supporting the plaintiff's application but, if it did, those motives were not explored in evidence. Standing on its own this evidence may not raise a more probable inference of the plaintiff having been on duty at the relevant time. When added to the sworn evidence of the plaintiff, however, it becomes powerful corroboration of his assertion that he was asked to take over security duties on the night in question and that he was injured in the course of his employment. Senior counsel for the defendants endeavoured to explain the defendants' conduct by saying it was the wrong thing to do and was simply a sensitive area in the defendants' case which ought to be weighed against and considered in the light of all the other probabilities. I do not believe it can be explained away in this fashion. Amundsen had the opportunity to explain why he had recommended acceptance of a claim but failed to do so. Given the absence of any plausible explanation as to why the plaintiff's claim was supported by his employer I can only reach the conclusion, for the reasons I have already explained, that the plaintiff has proved on the balance of probabilities that he was asked to resume duty on the night of 13 September 1993 and was injured in the course of his employment.
Alleged disobedience of employer's instructions
Senior counsel for the defendants submitted that, even if the plaintiff was found to be on duty at the time, he had disobeyed express instructions not to escort unruly patrons beyond the licensed area and, by disobeying those instructions, the employer could not be said to have breached the duty of care (Taouk v Alexandrou (1989) ATR 80‑287) or, by so disobeying, the plaintiff was acting outside the scope of his employment in that the employer did not know, or could not reasonably have known, that the employee would do the work in a way which was inherently dangerous (Sheen v Fields Pty Ltd (1984) ATR 80‑301).
There was a clear conflict of evidence on this issue. Whereas Amundsen said he had unequivocally told both the plaintiff and Meotti not to escort unruly patrons beyond the licensed area, and Janice Spratt said she had received the same directions from Amundsen, the plaintiff and Meotti said just the opposite. I agree with the submission by senior counsel for the defendants that the evidence of Meotti must be looked at carefully. He was a close friend of the plaintiff's, had travelled around Australia with him and had commenced work at or about the same time at the Crossing Inn Hotel as the plaintiff had. He admitted he had discussed the case several times with the plaintiff and, as was emphasised by Mr Odes QC, his evidence was uncannily similar to that of the plaintiff on all material issues. The plaintiff's case on this issue, however, did not end with the evidence of the plaintiff and Meotti. Madeline Hemsley, whose evidence I have referred to earlier, said that in her experience security staff intervened in fights, separated the combatants and then walked them through the beer garden to the area where the public telephone was located so that a taxi could be called. While I was not particularly impressed by her demeanour I am unable to say the same about Alfonse Martin, the chef employed at the Crossing Inn, who, during the time the plaintiff was employed at the hotel, said he had seen the plaintiff talk to unruly customers and then take them to the car park where the public telephone was and wait there until a taxi arrived. Given this body of evidence I believe the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that it was accepted practice at the time for the security person to escort an unruly customer beyond the licensed area if the situation warranted it. The plaintiff may have been told at the outset of his employment not to follow that practice. If he was told that at the outset it seems likely the instruction was never enforced. Apart from Janice Spratt three other hotel employees who worked at the hotel during the relevant period had seen patrons escorted by security staff to the area of the car park. Senior counsel for the defendants referred to the decision in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 176 ALR 411 as authority for the proposition that the defendants had no duty to protect the plaintiff against the criminal conduct of a group of persons who attacked him in the car park. Where, as in this case, a special relationship of employer and employee has been found to exist, the position is different. Even if the plaintiff had initially been instructed not to go beyond the licensed area, that instruction was, on the evidence, not followed up by the defendants. The practice of escorting unruly patrons to the area of the car park appears to have been quite common. There is no evidence to suggest anything was done to prevent this. As was said in McLean v Tedman & Anor (1984) 155 CLR 306 at 313:
"The employer's obligation is not merely to provide a safe system of work; it is an obligation to establish, maintain and enforce such a system…And in deciding whether an employer has discharged his common law obligation to his employees the Court must take account of the power of the employer to prescribe, warn, command and enforce obedience to his commands."
There was no evidence this was done in this case. All the evidence points to the contrary.
I am satisfied to the required standard that the plaintiff was not instructed never to go beyond the licensed area in carrying out his duties.
Contributory negligence
I am not satisfied there is any evidence from which I could conclude that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable precautions against a foreseeable risk of injury to himself. If his evidence is accepted, and I have explained why I believe I must accept it, he was not acting outside the scope of his instructions and was simply escorting from the licensed premises a customer whom he believed might provoke a confrontation. In taking that customer to the area of the car park he could not reasonably have foreseen that he would be set upon by 15 to 20 other persons of whom only a few came from the hotel premises.
In my view the defendants have not succeeded in establishing contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Conclusions
I am satisfied on the evidence that Keith Bedford and his brothers were known for their troublesome behaviour at the hotel. Janice Spratt, who obviously had extensive bar experience at the time, said that nine times out of ten Keith Bedford and his associates were likely to misbehave. While neither Amundsen nor Spratt could recall being told by the plaintiff of the incident involving Keith Bedford on the previous Friday night, or his threat to return on Monday and take up where he had left off, neither witness was able to deny that such a conversation occurred. The Bedfords were regular patrons of the hotel and their attendance on any night of the week ought to have been anticipated. Amundsen admitted in evidence that, before leaving the bar to go home, he saw Keith Bedford come into the hotel and walk towards the pool bar. He said he saw the plaintiff speak to Bedford. He did not remain but left the premises. The duty of an employer is to take reasonable care to avoid exposing its employees to unnecessary risk of injury. Hamilton v Nuroof (WA) Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 18 at 25. The employer's duty is not an absolute one; for liability to be established the evidence must show that the defendant unreasonably failed to take steps, reasonably open to it in all the circumstances, which would have protected the plaintiff from the dangers of his task without unduly impeding its accomplishment. Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) CLR 316 at 319. Where the evidence does establish an unreasonable failure by the employer to protect the employee from foreseeable danger, the employee cannot succeed unless he or she satisfies the Court that if precautions had been taken the injury would probably have been avoided. Turner v State of WA (1982) 56 ALJR 839. While I do not believe the plaintiff's return to duty after consuming alcohol had any causal connection with the injuries he later sustained, or that his employer was necessarily negligent in failing to ban Keith Bedford, I do find that, given the anticipated presence of Keith Bedford and his behaviour on the preceding Friday night and in the past, the defendants ought to have engaged an additional person or persons on security duties that Monday night. In my view the defendants ought reasonably to have foreseen the danger of a fight erupting and unreasonably failed to protect the plaintiff from injury by employing one or more security persons to assist the plaintiff by providing the necessary back‑up and deterrence in numbers.
In my view the defendants have been shown to the required standard to have breached their duty of care towards the plaintiff and that such breach caused the plaintiff's injuries.
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