FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BUF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2050
Appeal from: BUF15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2017] FCCA 2092 File number: NSD 1643 of 2017 Judge: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 19 December 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa application – adverse credibility findings by Tribunal – grounds for judicial review amounting to disagreement on merits – primary judge concluding Tribunal’s findings open to be made on the material before it – no appealable error Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 474 Cases cited: BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095
BUF15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2017] FCCA 2092
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1
Date of hearing: 8 June 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Burnett Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 1643 of 2017 BETWEEN: BUF15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. He arrived in Australia in May 2013 on a Visitor (Class FA) Visitor subclass 600 visa issued under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Later that year, he applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. A delegate of the now-titled Minister for Home Affairs refused the application. The delegate’s decision was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision was dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC): BUF15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor(No 2) [2017] FCCA 2092. This is an appeal from the judgment of the FCC.
For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
Visa Criteria
To be eligible for the grant of the visa, it was necessary that the Minister be satisfied that (among other things) the appellant fulfilled either the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act (Refugee Criterion) or the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (Complementary Protection Criterion).
The Refugee Criterion requires that the visa applicant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 2050
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the primary judge was correct in dismissing the appeal. The Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were supported by the evidence and were open to be made. The primary judge correctly identified that the Tribunal's conclusion that BUF15 did not meet the visa criteria was not an error of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that it was open to the Tribunal to assess the credibility of BUF15's evidence before considering corroborative material. The court also noted that while the Tribunal should consider corroborative evidence, it was not necessarily irrational to reject such evidence if the principal witness's story was considered inherently implausible. The court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's approach to the documentary evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
To the extent that it is argued on this appeal that the primary judge failed to detect a breach of procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal, the argument will not be entertained. The grounds for judicial review raised before the primary judge did not allege jurisdictional error of that kind. The allegation that the Tribunal failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness is not properly articulated in any event.Consideration The complaint in the first paragraph should be rejected. The primary judge was correct to identify no jurisdictional error affecting the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant had not converted from Sunni to Shia Islam. The primary judge properly identified that the Tribunal was entitled to evaluate the genuineness of the appellant’s claimed conversion, including by critically questioning the appellant’s knowledge of doctrines of the Shia faith: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577 at [7] - [I0] (per Jacobson J). The complaint in the second paragraph is expressed in terms alleging a breach of procedural fairness. It is otherwise to the effect that the Tribunal failed to “consider” certain matters. The matters referred to were in fact considered by the Tribunal. This complaint is properly to be regarded as an expression of disagreement with the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant did not satisfy the Refugee Criterion or the Complimentary Protection Criterion. On the facts as found by the Tribunal, those conclusions were open to be drawn. The primary judge did not err in rejecting grounds of review asserting the contrary. The third paragraph complains of the Tribunal’s rejection of certain documentary evidence upon which the appellant had relied in support of his claims. This allegation was not raised on the originating application before the primary judge, although it may have been raised in submissions concerning the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings. The primary judge detected no jurisdictional error of the kind alleged: at [37]. Her Honour did not give reasons for so concluding. For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error in the manner in which it dealt with the documents upon which the appellant relied to corroborate his claims. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1, Gleeson CJ said (at [12]):… It is not necessarily irrational, or illogical, for a finder of fact, who is convinced that a principal witness is fabricating a story, which is considered to be inherently implausible, to reject corroborative evidence, even though there is no separate or independent ground for its rejection, apart from the reasons given for disbelieving the principal witness. To similar effect, in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485 North and Lander JJ said (at [33]) that it was open to the Tribunal to assess the credit of the respondent, before turning to consider what weight should be given to the corroborative material in light of that assessment. Their Honours continued:37Several further observations should be made concerning the type of situation addressed in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59. The case does not relieve the RRT from giving consideration to corroborative evidence. It concerns only the timing of that consideration. The case establishes that the RRT does not act irrationally, and thereby fall into jurisdictional error, by first making an assessment of the applicant’s credit and then giving attention to the corroborative evidence.38The RRT would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 does not sanction a practice of disregarding corroborative evidence. It still requires that the corroborative evidence be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence. Consequently, the observation concerning the dicta of McHugh and Gummow JJ at [49] in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 made in SZDGC 105 ALD 25 at [23] is probably misdirected. Those observations addressed the situation where the corroborative evidence was disregarded.39On the other hand, it should be remembered that McHugh and Gummow JJ questioned whether the separate consideration of corroborative evidence was a preferable practice. The RRT should normally assess all the evidence together. Otherwise, it might be thought that the corroborative evidence is treated as a lesser category of evidence and that the RRT has not paid sufficient regard to it.