FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BUCKLEY v TERRIGAL GROSVENOR LODGE (ERINA) PTY LTD | [2014] FCCA 1098 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Evidence – admissibility of evidence – call for documents – Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.48, 64, 69, 102, 103, 104 Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ss.94A-1, 96-1 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.340, 361, 365, 545, 546 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), ss.3, 42 |
| Applicant: | SHANE MARK BUCKLEY |
| Respondent: | TERRIGAL GROSVENOR LODGE (ERINA) PTY LTD |
| File Number: | SYG 1553 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 May 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 28 May 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms K Edwards |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | TDP Lawyers Wyong |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms C Ronalds SC |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | DC Balog & Associates |
ORDERS
The applicant’s request pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) is granted.
The respondent’s requests pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) are granted.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1553 of 2012
| SHANE MARK BUCKLEY |
Applicant
And
| TERRIGAL GROSVENOR LODGE (ERINA) PTY LTD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 18 July 2012 Mr Shane Mark Buckley (“the applicant”) commenced proceedings in this Court pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the FWA”) alleging dismissal from employment in contravention of a “general protection”.
In particular the applicant alleged that his employer, Terrigal Grosvenor Lodge (Erina) Pty Ltd (“the respondent”) had contravened s.340 of the FWA by taking “adverse action”, being the alleged actions by the respondent preventing the applicant exercising his workplace rights both under his Employment Agreement and the “Aged Care Complaints Scheme” in accordance with the “Complaints Principles” created under s.94A-1 and s.96-1 of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) (“the ACA”) (as it was at the relevant time).
Prior to commencing these proceedings the applicant had made an application to Fair Work Australia pursuant to s.365 of the FWA. A certificate was issued by a Commissioner of Fair Work Australia on 10 July 2012 certifying that a reasonable satisfaction…
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- Case
- [2014] FCCA 1098
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine several outstanding issues prior to the resumption of the final hearing. These included the admissibility of affidavit evidence from both parties, the applicant's request for production of documents from the NSW Local Court (Gosford) pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), the respondent's similar requests for documents from the NSW Local Court (Gosford) and the NSW Supreme Court, the respondent's application to file further evidence, and the respondent's call for specific documents related to the applicant's complaint to the Aged Care Complaints Scheme.
The court applied Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) to the requests for production of documents held by other courts. It distinguished between the process for obtaining such documents and the admissibility of any evidence derived from them. The court granted the applicant's request to inspect and copy the NSW Local Court (Gosford) documents, finding that specific utility would be produced by the inspection, even if the ultimate admissibility of any evidence was a separate consideration. Similarly, the court granted the respondent's requests for access to documents from the NSW Local Court (Gosford) and NSW Supreme Court, finding that these documents were relevant to the substantive proceedings and that the applicant's argument of a "fishing expedition" was not accepted. The court also noted that the respondent's own conduct in raising issues late in the proceedings appeared to protract the proceedings, contrary to section 42 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth).
The court ordered that the applicant's request pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) be granted. The court also ordered that the respondent's requests pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) be granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The applicant’s request pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) is granted.
2.
The respondent’s requests pursuant to Rule 15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) are granted.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY
SYG 1553 of 2012
SHANE MARK BUCKLEY
Applicant
And
TERRIGAL GROSVENOR LODGE (ERINA) PTY LTD
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1.
On 18 July 2012 Mr Shane Mark Buckley (“the applicant”) commenced proceedings in this Court pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the FWA”) alleging dismissal from employment in contravention of a “general protection”.
2.
In particular the applicant alleged that his employer, Terrigal Grosvenor Lodge (Erina) Pty Ltd (“the respondent”) had contravened s.340 of the FWA by taking “adverse action”, being the alleged actions by the respondent preventing the applicant exercising his workplace rights both under his Employment Agreement and the “Aged Care Complaints Scheme” in accordance with the “Complaints Principles” created under s.94A-1 and s.96-1 of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) (“the ACA”) (as it was at the relevant time).
3.
Prior to commencing these proceedings the applicant had made an application to Fair Work Australia pursuant to s.365 of the FWA. A certificate was issued by a Commissioner of Fair Work Australia on 10 July 2012 certifying that a reasonable satisfaction had been reached that attempts at resolution of the dispute between the parties had been, or were likely to be, unsuccessful.
The Applicant’s Claim
4.
The applicant’s claim before the Court, as set out in his amended Statement of Claim (“ASOC”) filed on 9 November 2012, asserts that the applicant had been employed by the respondent as the Deputy Director of Nursing at the Matthew John Nursing Home in Erina, NSW (“the nursing home”) from 1 March 2012 to 25 May 2012. He had been employed on a probationary period of six months and his employment was terminated about three months into that period. A copy of the written notice of dismissal of employment was issued on
25 May 2012 by the Managing Director of the respondent,
Ms Veronica Klumper-Peters.
5.
The applicant seeks “special compensation” from the employer in the amount of $1,512.00 per week from 1 June 2012 to date and continuing for lost wages, and general damages in the amount of $15,000.00 for “humiliation and upset”. Further the applicant claims that breach of s.340 of the FWA is subject to the maximum penalty of 300 penalty points, and seeks any penalty order to be paid as a “moiety” to the applicant under ss.545 and 546(3)(a) of the FWA in addition.
Background before the Court
6.
This matter has had a long and protracted history before the Court. It appears to previously have been in the dockets of, at least, two other Judges (or Federal Magistrates as they then were) of the Court for some 21 months. A final hearing commenced before another Judge of this Court on 8 April 2014.
7.
During the second day of that hearing, scheduled for three days, the previous Judge withdrew from hearing the matter, and the matter was transferred to my docket.
8.
The parties, both represented by counsel, attended directions before the Court on 30 April 2014 at 9.15am. Ms K Edwards of counsel appeared for the applicant. Ms C Ronalds of Senior Counsel appeared for the respondent.
9.
A number of matters are of note. First, given the lengthy history of these proceedings, and the transfer of the matter to my docket after the commencement of the final hearing, I made clear to the parties that the focus in the directions was to determine what could be “salvaged” from the proceedings to date, and how the matter could be brought back to a final hearing as expeditiously, and reasonably, as possible.
10.
Second, the parties indicated that they wished to “resume” the final hearing at the earliest available opportunity. While I considered that it would be preferable, and of some advantage to the Court in commencing the final hearing afresh, I was persuaded that the hearing should resume, in essence, part heard. Ultimately, I was mindful of the length of the proceedings to date, the inconvenience to the witnesses who had already given their evidence and been cross-examined, and the preference of both parties to proceed in this way.
11.
Third, and in this light, I sought and subsequently obtained from the parties their written agreement to proceed in this fashion. The agreement was filed on 9 May 2014 and is in the following terms:
“1. The parties agree that the evidence of Mr Raymond Garner and Ms Leonie Edgar, including all rulings made on the admissibility of that evidence (in brief, under cross-examination and in re-examination), found at:
(a) Mr Garner – transcript of 8 April 2014 from page 15 line 33 to page 71 line 46,
(b) Ms Edgar – transcript of 8 April 2014 from page 72 line 35 to page 86 line 47.
2. All documents admitted into evidence and given exhibit numbers to be evidence in the proceedings continued before [Judge] Nicholls. A list of those exhibits and relevant references to the transcript is set out below.
3. The parties also agree that the document marked for identification ought to be noted by the Court in the proceedings continued before [Judge] Nicholls (transcript reference provided below).
APPLICANT’S EXHIBITS
Number
Description
Transcript Reference
A1
Email string and 21 pages of attachments from Kathy Mulligan to Shane Buckley dated 10 April 2012
8 April 2014
Page 44 line 13
A2
Terrigal Grosvenor Lodge Enterprise Agreement 2010
9 April 2014
Page 2 line 45
A3
Letter from John Fitzpatrick, Direct 2U to David Balog, DC Balog dated 1 April 2014 (5 pages)
9 April 2014
Page 16 line 11
A4
Letter from David Balog, DC Balog & Associates to John Fitzpatrick, Direct2U, dated 3 April 2014
9 April 2014
Page 16 Line 14
RESPONDENT’S EXHIBITS
R1
3 page document headed Matthew John Aged Care – Record of Interview – Registered Nurse (RN) – Management Position
8 April 2014
MFI1 – Page 22 line 41
R1 – page 82 line 28
R2
Email string from Raymond Garner to Leonie Edgar and Letitia Quirk dated 13 and 14 February 2012 (2 pages)
8 April 2014
Page 27 line 19
MFI/R3
Email string from Veronica [Klumper]-Peters to Shane Buckley and others (with handwriting) dated 19 March 2012 (1 page)
8 April 2014
Page 47 line 1
R4
Not attributed
R5
Bundle of documents (22 pages) relating to Applicant’s alleged job description, quality issues and audits.
9 April 2014
Page 23
lines 20 – 26
R6
Bundle of documents (38 pages) relating to investigations done, advice received in relation to the Applicant and the termination of his employment
9 April 2014
Page 23
lines 20 ‑ 29
[I made orders granting the applicant access to the Court’s copy of the Transcript of the hearing on 8 and 9 April 2014 given I was satisfied as to his “financial difficulty”. The respondent indicated it already had a copy of the Transcript.]
12.
Fourth, it became apparent during the course of the directions that, despite the matter having reached, and commenced, a final hearing and proceeding into the second day, a number of outstanding issues remained unresolved.
13.
It must be said that the issues appeared to emerge in a “piecemeal” fashion, even after I advised the parties that given that the matter had reached, and entered into the hearing of evidence in the final hearing, I assumed all threshold issues, matters of “discovery”, and questions of the admissibility of affidavit evidence, had been addressed.
14.
That proved not to be the case. In any event, by the end of the directions on that day I repeatedly made clear to the parties that, given the stage of the proceedings, it was not unreasonable to expect that any outstanding issues would be known to the parties by that time, needed to be identified before the Court immediately, and steps be put in place for their disposition as soon as possible with a view to concluding the hearing of the matter commencing on 3 June 2014.
15.
The outstanding issues were identified, by the end of the directions hearing on 30 April 2014, as follows:
1) The applicant’s objections as to the admissibility of parts of the respondent’s affidavit evidence.
2) The respondent’s objections to the admissibility of parts of the applicant’s affidavit evidence.
3) Pursuant to r.15A.03 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”) the applicant had given notice on 1 April 2014 seeking production from the NSW Local Court (at Gosford) of the transcript of certain criminal proceedings. The respondent objected to the applicant being given permission to inspect this document.
4) The respondent’s application for leave to put on further evidence. The applicant objected.
5) The respondent’s call for documents that commenced a complaint by the applicant to the Age Care Complaints Scheme. (I note that this was subsequently resolved between the parties).
16.
I made orders on that day as follows:
“1. Leave is granted to the parties to file and serve a statement of agreement as to how the matter will proceed by 7 May 2014.
2. Leave is granted to the parties to file and serve written submissions on the following matters:
(a) Provision under Subpoena of NSW Local Court documents.
(b) Respondent’s application to file further evidence by way of affidavit.
(c) Respective objections to admission of evidence in affidavits filed in these proceedings.
(d) The respondent’s call for certain documents.
by 7 May 2014.
3. Leave is granted to the parties to file and serve written submissions in reply on 14 May 2014.
4. Liberty is granted to the parties to apply to the Court on three clear days’ notice.”
17.
It is of note, again, that at the directions on 30 April 2014, on a number of occasions, I sought from the parties a definitive list of all outstanding issues. Both parties stated there was nothing further to that set out above. Given what is set out immediately below, I note that the respondent’s counsel, with instructing solicitor present, made clear to the Court in answer to the Court’s direction to check whether there were any additional issues, that there were not.
18.
At some point after the directions hearing on 30 April 2014, the respondent’s solicitors approached the Registry of this Court seeking to inspect certain NSW Local Court (Gosford) Coronial documents. On 7 May 2014 the respondent made a similar approach in relation to certain NSW Supreme Court documents. The applicant objected and the matter came before me for further direction on 15 May 2014.
19.
This judgment seeks to deal with all the outstanding issues, as ultimately identified by the parties such that the final hearing of this matter may proceed without hindrance. Therefore I have dealt with the issues raised on 30 April 2014, the subsequent issues raised in the submissions, and the application made by the respondent for other documents. These issues are set out below as follows:
1) Issue 1 – Agreement as to Progress of the Case
2) Issue 2 – Applicant Request for Access to Local Court (Gosford) Documents
3) Issue 3 – Respondent’s Request for Access to Local Court (Gosford) and NSW Supreme Court Documents
4) Issue 4 – Respondent’s Call for Other Documents
5) Issue 5 – Application by the Respondent to File Further Evidence
6) Issue 6 – “Outstanding” Objections to the Affidavit Evidence of Mr Buckley and Ms Klumpers-Peters
7) Issue 7 – How The Matter Will Proceed
8) Issue 8 – Applications for Costs
Issue 1 – Agreement as to Progress of the Case
20.
As set out above (at [11]) the parties have complied with order 1 made on 30 April 2014 and the Court notes the matters agreed between the parties.
Issue 2 – Applicant Request for Access to Local Court (Gosford) Documents
21.
As background to the various applications now for access to a number of NSW Supreme Court and Local Court documents, I note that on 23 November 2012 an order was made, amongst others, concerning the production of documents, which granted leave to the parties to request the issue of more than 5 Subpoenas (with reference to r.15A.05(1) of the Rules). Importantly, for current purposes, the Court’s order was that all subpoenas and notices to produce were to be made returnable before a Registrar of this Court at a time before the final hearing of this matter.
22.
It was plain even at that time (over 18 months ago) that the proper conduct of these proceedings required applications, or calls for documents, and their resolution, to be made at a time prior to the commencement of the final hearing.
23.
The parties are now in dispute, relevantly, over the “production” of three sets of documents (see [15] and [18]). All are Court documents and therefore under the Rules are not susceptible to production by subpoena. The relevant process is provided for in r.15A.03 of the Rules:
“15A.03 Documents and things in possession of another court
(1) The court must not issue a subpoena requiring the production of a document or thing in the possession of the Court or another court.
(2) A party who seeks production of a document or thing in the possession of another court must give to a Registrar a written notice setting out:
(a) the name and address of the court having possession of the document; and
(b) a description of the document to be produced; and
(c) the date when the document is to be produced; and
(d) the reason for seeking production.
(3) On receiving a notice under subrule (2), a Registrar may ask the other court, in writing, to send the document to the filing registry by a specified date.
(4) A party may apply for permission to inspect and copy a document produced to the court.”
24.
Notwithstanding the distinction between production by subpoena and the process provided for in this Rule, although the Court’s orders were expressed with specific reference to the latter, the Court’s intention that production, and any dispute over production, of all documents should be finalised before the final hearing would in my view have been tolerably clear to both parties.
25.
On 19 March 2014 the applicant issued a subpoena seeking access to documents held by the NSW Local Court (Gosford). This was withdrawn on 1 April 2014, and by letter of the same date the applicant made a written application to the Registrar seeking access to NSW Local Court (Gosford) documents concerning criminal proceedings in that Court involving Ms Klumper-Peters, the managing director of the respondent. When the applicant called for these at the final hearing the respondent objected, and it appears it was not resolved at that time.
26.
Through his submissions, the applicant appears to have some knowledge of the contents of these documents, including the finding and sentencing of Ms Klumper-Peters for “offences involving fraudulent conduct” (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [16]). His position is that there is not a basis at law to refuse the applicant access to these documents (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [15]).
27.
The applicant argues that the “relevance” of these documents to the current matter is as follows. Ms Klumper-Peters is giving evidence to this Court in these proceedings. The respondent bears the burden of persuading the Court as to her relevant intentions at the time of terminating the applicant’s employment. The applicant says that his employment was terminated because he had made a complaint about how she managed the respondent’s aged care facilities, and not for reasons to do with the performance of his duties (see Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500; [2012] HCA 32 at [44] – [45] per French CJ and Crennan J).
28.
The applicant’s argument in the substantive issues before this Court is said, in relevant part, to be that in making the decision to terminate his employment, and in her attendant conduct, Ms Klumper-Peters was proceeding in her own interests as a director of the respondent company, or even in the interests of the respondent, rather than the interests of the residents of the aged care facility as required by relevant legislation (relevantly, the ACA).
29.
For current purposes, the applicant argues that the contents of the Local Court (Gosford) documents are relevant to these proceedings for essentially two reasons. First, the nature of the Local Court’s finding against Ms Klumper-Peters, which the applicant believes is revealed in the Local Court (Gosford) documents, shows that she was guilty of acts in the same nature as those the applicant was concerned about while employed by the respondent, and were the subject of his complaint. Second, that the documents reveal her alleged propensity to lie where financial benefit may accrue to the respondent.
30.
In summary, the applicant foreshadowed at least two uses to which the information in the documents, if consistent with his expectations, may be used by him in these proceedings.
31.
A number of points are said to arise from this. First, the relevance of the “tendency” evidence is said to be revealed from the documents attached to her evidence in these proceedings, particularly as to the reason for the termination of the employment (see in this context Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 particularly at [74] – [76] per Sackville J).
32.
Second, the possibility of “substantial effect” on the assessment of
Ms Klumper-Peters credibility. This is put in acknowledgement of the exceptions to the “credibility rule” in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Evidence Act”) (with specific reference to ss.102 and 103 of the Evidence Act).
33.
The respondent is correct to point out that the applicant’s written notice to the Registrar, made pursuant to r.15A.03 of the Rules, did not comply with r.15A.03(2)(d) of the Rules, in that no reason for seeking access to the documents was provided.
34.
However, the fact remains that despite this omission the Registrar did write to the Local Court (Gosford) and the relevant document (which according to the respondent is a transcript of the proceedings presumably involving Ms Klumper-Peters) was provided to the Registry.
35.
Rule 15A.03(2)(d) of the Rules, is in my view, directed to the exercise of the discretion of the Registrar whether, on receipt of the relevant notice, to write to the “other Court” requesting the document. Despite noting the deficiency, the respondent does not appear to press the matter further or to argue that this omission is a reason for not granting the permission the applicant seeks. Nor, importantly, does the respondent press any miscarriage of the exercise of the Registrar’s discretion here.
36.
The respondent argues that the content of the Local Court (Gosford) transcript could have “absolutely no relevance to the reasons for termination of the Applicant’s employment” (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [12]). This is said to be because the transcript relates to matters of the administration of the nursing home in 2008, while the applicant’s period of employment was March to May 2012. In short, the respondent’s argument is that the contents of the Local Court (Gosford) transcript have no temporal, or factual, basis for any of the matters pleaded by the applicant (with specific reference to his ASOC). In addition, the respondent says that the matter is currently on appeal (see respondent’s written submissions of 14 May 2014 at [12]).
37.
Further, the respondent submits that “the only reason” the applicant seeks access is in an attempt to impugn the credibility during
cross-examination of Ms Klumper-Peters (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [13]). The respondent relies on, essentially, arguments as to why the material in the Local Court (Gosford) transcript is not admissible (with specific reliance on s.102 of the Evidence Act and with reference to ss.103 and 104 of the Evidence Act).
38.
Some care needs to be taken in the resolution of this dispute as to the exact nature of what the Court is being asked to do at this time. The issue currently before the Court is whether the applicant, pursuant to r.15A.03(4) of the Rules, should be given permission to inspect and copy the Local Court (Gosford) documents that have been produced to the Registry of the Court.
39.
A distinction needs to be drawn between this and the admissibility of any evidence that the applicant may subsequently seek to proffer, or tender, and rely upon. The applicant has made no such attempt at present in relation to the Local Court (Gosford) documents.
40.
I am satisfied on the submissions before me that the applicant should be given permission to inspect and copy the documents pursuant to r.15A.03(4) of the Rules. I am persuaded by the applicant’s submissions to the extent that they apply to the question of permission to inspect, and not necessarily by the subsequent admissibility of any evidence sought to be proffered.
41.
While the applicant has signalled his intention as to how he may seek to rely on the contents of the documents, or the use he may seek to make of it, both in an evidentiary context, and in pursuit of his case generally, I do not comprehend that he has made any attempt to date to put the document, or any part of it, before the Court in any evidentiary context. In fact, the applicant makes specific note of the distinction between the seeking and granting of permission to access documents and the tender and admissibility of any “evidence” that may subsequently be found in them (see for example applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [18]).
42.
The respondent’s arguments that go to the question of admissibility of any evidence under the Evidence Act presumably to be derived from the document, are, in my view and on their face, sound, and have some strength. But, whether any subsequent attempt by the applicant to seek to proffer any evidence arising from the document, or even the document in its entirety, will obviously be determined by the exact nature of what is offered and its relevance to a fact, or facts, in issue. The Court is not in a position to make specific findings in the absence of any such requests by the applicant, and any specificity as to what is being sought to be adduced.
43.
In the current circumstances, the granting of permission is the “first” step in this process. What the applicant may seek to do, if anything, must await the applicant’s election. As the respondent notes in its submissions (of 8 May 2014 at [21]), if the applicant’s counsel “did seek to cross-examine on such material, then there would be objections”. The resolution of any such objections, dependent on the applicant’s election as the respondent recognises, must await that attempt, if indeed such attempt is made.
44.
I note the respondent’s argument that the exercise of the matter at r.15A.03(4) of the Rules is at the Court’s discretion, and that the Court should act judicially (see respondent’s written submissions of 14 May 2014 at [7] – [9]). The exercise of that discretion is generally explained above.
45.
I should also note that in granting the permission the applicant seeks, I did not rely on the applicant’s argument that he should be granted such permission because the information was known to the respondent’s witness (Ms Klumper-Peters) and is information already within her knowledge. I agree with the respondent that the exercise of the discretion is not assisted by such argument in the current circumstances.
46.
Further, the applicant submits that r.15A.03 of the Rules is in similar terms to r.24.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the FC Rules”) and r.24.13 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Family Law Rules”). That is, the applicant, in essence, submits all three deal with the permission to inspect and copy Court records. Although, as the respondent submits, “they are not identical”.
47.
The applicant’s reliance on Oates & Q and Anor [2010] FamCAFC 202 (“Oates”) must be seen, as the respondent submits, in light of its relevance to r.24.13 of the Family Law Rules. I agree with the respondent that that rule deals with access to documents held by the Family Court Registry by certain specified persons as listed in that Rule. That is, a category of persons whom the Rule provides have “a proper interest in the case”.
48.
Regard to the circumstances of Oates provides some focus. There a solicitor who was in a relationship with a man involved in Family Court proceedings was given access to documents held by the Family Court, in those proceedings, because the man’s former wife had made a “professional complaint” that the solicitor had given false evidence in the proceedings.
49.
What is immediately apparent is that the circumstances in Oates involved access to the Court’s own documents, by a person who had been a witness in those proceedings, and who was said to have an interest in the documents because of a matter arising from those proceedings. These differences are of such a nature that what was said in Oates, in my respectful view, does not directly assist in the current matter.
50.
The applicant is on stronger ground, however, with his submission that r.15A.03 of the Rules, while appearing in the same part of the Rules (Part 15 of the Rules) as matters relating to subpoenas, should be seen as standing apart and separate. I agree if for no other reason than the existence of r.15A.03 of the Rules, of itself, is in recognition of it being inappropriate for one Court to “subpoena” the documents held by another Court. To the extent therefore that the respondent’s arguments derive from the circumstances pertaining to subpoenas they do not assist with the exercise of the Court’s discretion pursuant to r.15A.03(4) of the Rules. Further, that distinction, in my respectful view, is also made clear in Graham v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [2013] FCA 1213 per McKerracher J (“Graham”).
51.
Graham of assistance to the current matter. That case involved r.24.24 of the FC Rules. That rule, as the respondent submits, is not in identical terms to r.15A.03 of the Rules. However it is, as the applicant submits, “similar” particularly as to its scheme. It addresses, albeit in part, access to documents in custody of a Court other than the Federal Court, as is the case here. It requires a written communication to the Registrar of that Court identifying the documents, as is required here.
52.
Further, it requires the Registrar to write to the other Court, which is in part different to Rule 15A.03 of the Rules, as r.24.24 “requires” the Registrar to write to the other Court. In this Court’s Rules this is discretionary. However, the mode of communication is the same. Some care must be taken, however, given what the Court in Graham (as in Oates) saw as the special nature in terms of privacy of the documents in Family Law proceedings. This is not necessarily the case here.
53.
What is respectfully, and relevantly, drawn from Graham is that “some specific utility would be produced by the inspection” (see Graham at [11]). In part the respondent’s submissions are directed in a general and broad sense to the matter of “utility”.
54.
The argument that the information in the documents is inadmissible in an evidentiary context has been dealt with above. The respondent’s submissions on the lack of connection, and therefore lack of assistance to the Court or utility of the information in Local Court (Gosford) documents which is said to be about a completely different factual scenario is also answered by what is set out generally above.
55.
Further, I do not agree with the respondent, on the submissions before me, that the applicant’s request for access to the documents is for the “sole” purpose of discrediting Ms Klumper-Peters. It is plainly “a” purpose as the applicant openly submits, however not the “sole” purpose. I am persuaded that some specific utility would be produced by the inspection.
56.
That utility is to allow the applicant to properly consider the efficacy of what he describes as the “tendency evidence”. On his submissions, that appears to be an important plank in the applicant’s response to the evidence of Ms Klumper-Peters. It is, in my view, appropriate that he be given the opportunity to consider this. This does not mean, of course, as set out above, that any information available to the applicant would be admissible into evidence. But that is a different argument for another (albeit imminent) day.
57.
I cannot help but note that in submissions on this issue the respondent referred to s.42 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (“the FCCA Act”). It is in the following terms:
“In proceedings before it, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia must proceed without undue formality and must endeavour to ensure that the proceedings are not protracted.”
58.
What must immediately be said is that this appeared in submissions made by the respondent in circumstances where some of the “issues” raised by the respondent were put forward after the Court was told on 30 April 2014 that there were no other issues for consideration (see [17] – [18] above). As stated above, the respondent’s solicitors then went to the Court’s registry with another issue, and even later a further issue arose.
59.
While the respondent’s submissions were put in relation to the issue above, they should also be instructive to the respondent, and it must be said its solicitors, in revealing their own conduct in relation to the access of documents now sought by the respondent. The manner, and timing, of their requests being raised, at the time that they were raised, without satisfactory explanation can only be seen as protracting the proceedings.
Issues 3 – Respondent’s Request for Access to NSW Local Court (Gosford) and NSW Supreme Court Documents
60.
The documents the respondent now seeks are the transcript of findings made by a Coronial inquiry (NSW Local Court (Gosford)), where the applicant’s work practices were said to be the subject of negative comment by the Coroner, and access to documents in proceedings before the NSW Supreme Court brought by the applicant in circumstances where it is said his employment was terminated at the initiative of a former employer.
61.
Both matters are to be treated as being made pursuant to r.15A.03 of the Rules. What is generally set out above in relation to the applicant’s request pursuant to r.15A.03 of the Rules applies here and does not need to be repeated.
62.
A number of points specific to the requests in relation to these documents need to be made.
63.
First, the respondent has attempted to provide some explanation as to why no mention was made of either of those two documents on 30 April 2014 in circumstances where I made it clear that the timely resumption of the hearing required everything to be “put on the table” at that time. That there was an intention to call for at least one of the documents during the hearing still does not explain why no mention of it was made as would have been expected given the circumstances. I do not find its submissions helpful in this regard.
64.
Second, however, there is some substance in the respondent’s position that the applicant has adopted a “contradictory position” (see respondent’s written submissions on additional issues of 14 May 2014 at [5]) in relation to the applicant’s view of the application of “the case law” as a basis for allowing his request, but not the respondent’s request.
65.
In this regard, matters of the ultimate admissibility of any “evidence” the respondent may seek to extract from these documents are, as the respondent says, not immediately relevant to the disposition of the consideration of r.15A.03 of the Rules, as I have set out above in relation to the applicants’ request for documents. I note further in this regard, the guidance provided, as the respondent submits, by the NSW Supreme Court in Al-Shennag v Statewide Roads Pty Limited & Anor [2009] NSWSC 210 (see respondent’s written submissions on additional issues of 14 May 2014 at [11] – [13]).
66.
Third, to the extent that the respondent relies on the proposition that the applicant has now changed his case, as a part of the reasons for seeking access to the documents now, and not at an earlier time, that submission must be rejected for the reasons set out below. Essentially, I do not accept that the applicant has changed his case in the way the respondent claims.
67.
Fourth, I note the respondent’s submission that attempts were made by the respondent’s solicitors to obtain “any employments documents of the applicant between 2007 and 2010”, and documents associated with the Supreme Court matter as early as 19 March 2014, and the Supreme Court documents earlier by subpoena (see respondent’s written submissions on additional issues of 14 May 2014 at [17] and
[18] – [24]).
68.
Fifth, it is important to note that the dates referred to by the respondent when it says it attempted to obtain these documents are all before 7 April 2014, when the respondent says the applicant’s counsel “changed” the applicant’s case. This appears to contradict the respondent’s submission now that it seeks these documents at this “late” stage because the applicant changed his case. A proposition which in any event, as set out below, I do not accept.
69.
Sixth, the failure to mention these issues at the directions on 30 April 2014 stands against the respondent. Whatever had occurred in the past, that was the occasion to have acted in a clear and direct fashion. By not pressing it at the directions on 30 April 2014 it was open to infer that the respondent no longer sought to access the documents, or that there were no documents to be sought.
70.
Nonetheless, I am of the view that the respondent should be granted the access it seeks. I apply that part of the reasoning in relation to the applicant’s request as is relevant to the respondent’s request.
71.
Further, I agree with one important and relevant aspect of the respondent’s submissions here. That is, that the documents, if they contain information as the respondent expects, are relevant to the issues for disposition in the substantive proceedings (see respondent’s written submissions on additional issues of 14 May 2014 at [22] – [23]). The applicant’s argument that this is a “fishing expedition” is not accepted, essentially for the same reasons that I did not see his request in that light.
72.
The respondent provides some commentary in its submissions (see respondent’s written submissions on additional issues of 14 May 2014 at [24]) as to the “requirement” that parties to litigation should
co-operate with each other. To the extent that that can be done without compromising their respective positions, then it is in the interests of the administration of justice and consistent with s.3 and s.42 of the FCCA Act, that it also apply that worthy sentiment to its own conduct in this case.
Issue 4 ‑ Documents Called for By Respondent
73.
At the directions on 30 April 2014 the respondent indicated that it had called for certain documents relating to the applicant’s complaint to the Aged Care Complaints Scheme. The position appeared to have been that the applicant had not provided the documents, although the applicant’s counsel indicated that that would be done.
74.
I nonetheless made the appropriate order (order 2(d) of 30 April 2014). It appears the matter has now been resolved (see applicant’s written submissions of 14 May 2014 at [16]).
Issue 5 – Respondent’s Application to File Further Evidence
75.
The respondent sought leave to file, at this late stage, further evidence in the form of an affidavit to be made by Ms Klumper-Peters. A “proposed” affidavit was provided with the respondent’s submissions on 8 May 2014.
76.
I subsequently made orders, by consent, granting leave for this to occur. I note that while two bundles of documents, said to be annexures to the affidavit were filed in the Registry on 8 May 2014, to date no affidavit, as foreshadowed, from Ms Klumper-Peters has been filed.
77.
In his submissions, the applicant, presumably working from the “proposed” draft, has listed his objections to the evidence. The respondent has not responded to these objections in its written submissions, beyond stating the “necessity of filing the further evidence.
A Further Issue Arising From Issue 5
78.
A further issue that emerged in submissions in relation to this fifth issue requires some attention. The respondent says that the reason it needed to put on the further affidavit evidence of Ms Klumper-Peters at this time was that the applicant has raised “two new claims”, and
Ms Klumper-Peters’ evidence was required to address these.
79.
The “new matters” or “alterations” to the applicant’s case were both said to have been raised at the hearing by the applicant’s counsel.
80.
The first is described by the respondent as the “no bona fides” claim. The applicant’s counsel stated (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [29] quoting the transcript of the hearing on 8 April 2014 at page 6, line 47 to page 7, line 2):
“the fact that he wasn’t afforded procedural fairness we say shows that the acts were not taken for bona fide purposes related to performance.”
81.
The respondent says this was not pleaded by the applicant. While the respondent’s submissions assert that there “should not be a fundamental change” in the case in the circumstances in which this matter was raised, nonetheless, the respondent has endeavoured to meet this “new claim” with the exhibits R5 and R6 (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [30] – [31]).
82.
The second “significant new claim” is described by the respondent as “the punishment claim” (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [35]). That is, how the applicant claimed to have been treated by the respondent. This also was said to have been articulated for the first time by the applicant’s counsel at the hearing (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [35] and the reference there to the Transcript of 8 April 2014 at page 7
lines 28 ‑ 31).
83.
The exact position of the parties was not clear in certain respects. The respondent says that the applicant should not be permitted to amend his claims given that the amendments were “significant” and the circumstances in which the new claims were first made (that is at the opening of the hearing).
84.
However, the submissions do not expressly say that the applicant should not be permitted to pursue these “new claims”. In this regard the respondent seeks, in the event that the applicant presses these new claims, that he be ordered to file a further ASOC (see respondent’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [38]).
85.
I therefore take the view that the respondent’s attempt to put the additional evidence of Ms Klumper-Peters before the Court is predicated either on the basis that the applicant would be granted such leave or, in a sense, “protectively” should leave be so granted.
86.
It is important to note that the applicant does not seek to file any further ASOC. In any event, this would be inconsistent with his position that there were no new claims raised by his counsel at the beginning of the hearing, but rather that what was said fell within the ambit of the ASOC filed on 9 November 2012.
87.
The applicant further asserts that the respondent’s claim that the applicant has “substantially” attempted to change his case is said in an attempt to put on further evidence that it should have put on at an earlier time (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [35]). The applicant states that the respondent should be limited to the oral submissions made at the hearing (with reference to the Transcript of 9 April 2014 at page 4 line 12).
88.
The applicant on his own submission, however, agreed to “allow” (through the consent orders made on 8 May 2014) the respondent to file further evidence, albeit limited to what the applicant says had been agreed between the parties on 30 April 2014 and 1 May 2014. Namely, a “narrative from Ms [Klumper]-Peters of the documents already before the Court in Exhibits R5 and R6…” and “a further email” to be provided to the applicant (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [37]).
89.
The applicant’s submissions then present in some detail what are said to be exchanges between the applicant’s and respondent’s solicitors (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [38] – [45]). The thrust of the applicant’s reference here is that the respondent has attempted to enlarge the range and scope of evidence which it wishes Ms Klumper-Peters to give and including the further documents to be provided annexed to that evidence (see in particular applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [39] – [40]).
90.
The applicant’s position can be understood as follows. He agrees to the filing of evidence from Ms Klumper-Peters to the extent that such evidence only provide “narrative evidence about Exhibits R5 and R6” (already before the Court) (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [45]).
91.
The applicant then says that he “would object to the admission” of the further documents which the respondent has sought to put forward, and further evidence in relation to those documents (see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [45]). It is not entirely clear whether the applicant’s position is that the respondent should not be given leave to file further evidence, or that he would object to the material (documents) which the respondent expects Ms Klumper-Peters can put before the Court, and her evidence in relation to these documents (leave would be required given the matter has proceeded to a final hearing).
92.
Having regard to the entirety of the applicant’s submissions (and in particular see applicant’s written submissions of 8 May 2014 at [51]) I formed the view that the applicant opposes leave being granted to the respondent to file the evidence of Ms Klumper-Peters. That is, other than that which can be said to be the “narrative” relating to Exhibits R5 and R6.
For the Parties to Consider
93.
Before proceeding to consideration of the questions that emerge here (see below at [103]). I should note the following. At [70] of its written submission of 14 May 2014 the respondent says:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi