BTP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BTP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 585

Appeal from: BTP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1681
File number: SAD 225 of 2017
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 30 April 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the primary judge erred in finding the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) did not commit jurisdictional error because it had considered and addressed the appellant’s claim to be an apostate – whether the primary judge erred in finding the AAT did not commit jurisdictional error because it had asked itself the right question of what the appellant would do in the event he returned to Iran – whether the primary judge erred in not finding the AAT committed jurisdictional error by failing to ask why the appellant may act in a certain manner when he returns to Iran  – whether the primary judge erred in finding the AAT did not commit jurisdictional error in considering whether, in light of the severity and nature of the penalty for being an apostate, there was any prospect of the appellant being found to be an apostate irrespective of his conduct – appeal dismissed, with costs
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 40.02, 40.43; Schedule 3, item 15.1(d)

Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; 216 CLR 473

Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 29; 79 ALJR 1142

Avetmiss Easy Pty Ltd v Australian Skills Qualifications Authority (No 2) [2014] FCA 444; 315 ALR 131

DSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 154

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126; 128 FCR 553

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Saizeriya Co Ltd v Peregrine Management Group Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1174

SZRIF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1161

Date of hearing: 27 April 2018
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S D Ower SC and Ms E Rutherford
Solicitor for the Appellant: Camatta Lempens Pty Ltd Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr P d’Assumpcao of the Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Responded filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

SAD 225 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BTP16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 APRIL 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed. 

Note:    Entry…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 585
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, an Iranian citizen who arrived in Australia as an irregular maritime arrival in 2013, sought a protection visa. After his application was refused by the Minister’s delegate and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), the appellant pursued judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The appeal in the High Court focused on whether the primary judge correctly assessed the AAT's consideration of the appellant's claims, particularly regarding his apostasy and religious beliefs. The court was tasked with determining if the AAT erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims and whether the FCCA judge's findings were correct.

The central legal issues revolved around the AAT's handling of the appellant's claims, specifically whether it had considered and appropriately addressed his claims of being an apostate and his fear of persecution based on his religious beliefs. The court examined if the AAT asked the right questions regarding the appellant's potential actions and beliefs upon returning to Iran. Additionally, the court scrutinised whether the AAT erred in considering the severity and nature of the penalties for apostasy in Iran, and if this influenced the likelihood of the appellant being found an apostate regardless of his conduct.

The High Court found that the primary judge correctly determined that the AAT had not committed jurisdictional error. The AAT had indeed considered the appellant's claims about his apostasy and religious persecution, and the primary judge's findings that the AAT asked the right questions and considered relevant country information were upheld. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was not irrational or illogical and that the appellant's claims were adequately considered. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and direct the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed. This decision underscored the importance of the AAT's thorough consideration of all aspects of an applicant's claims, particularly in matters of religious persecution and apostasy, while also affirming the correctness of the FCCA's assessment of the AAT's jurisdiction and decision-making process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs.Summary of background facts Drawing largely on the primary judge’s reasons for judgment, the background facts can be summarised as follows. The appellant is an Iranian citizen. He arrived in Australia on 1 April 2013 as an irregular maritime arrival. He lodged a protection visa application on 2 August 2013. His application was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 15 October 2014. He sought a review in the then Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)). He was represented by a migration agent and assisted by an interpreter in the AAT. The AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision on 14 June 2016. The appellant then sought a judicial review of the AAT’s decision in the FCCA. The appellant advanced various grounds for his claim to be entitled to a protection visa. As will shortly emerge, the appellant’s claims changed and developed during the different stages of decision-making. His primary claim concerned an adulterous relationship which he said he had had with a married woman whose husband was a senior official in Iran’s security and intelligence service. Another claim related to his fear of persecution were he removed to Iran on general religious grounds because of the appellant’s non-observance and rejection of the Islamic faith. The appellant raised this more general ground relating to his religious faith for the first time in his entry interview. He said then that people born in Iran were “condemned to be Muslim” and had no freedom to explore other religions. He said that he had once been detained by the police in Iran for no apparent reason and had been beaten and accused of breaking Shia law. The appellant’s claims relating to religion were developed more extensively in the course of the AAT proceeding, as is reflected in the following matters:(a)In his statutory declaration dated 29 July 2013 in support of his protection visa application, the appellant claimed that he had left Iran because of his relationship with a married woman and that he “also left for religious reasons”. He stated that he was born into a Muslim family, that his parents were very strict Muslims and that he had no other option but to follow and accept the faith. He said that he was forced to attend Mosque at school and pray regularly and that, even when he was working, he was compelled to undertake religious activities such as fasting and religious prayers. He said that he began to distance himself from Islam when he was about 20 years old and that the Iranian government is very oppressive when it comes to religion. He said that this pressure made him form a negative view on Islam. He said that there were regular conflicts with his family about his views when he did not practise Islam or undertake fasting. He said that when he worked for Mazda in Iran he did not undertake religious activities and spoke to colleagues about his views, which he believed was passed on to security and that he believed that they were monitoring his activities. He described the incident relating to someone breaking the lock on his cabinet at work and the refusal by company officials to check the security cameras. He added that he was considered an infidel if he did not follow the Islamic faith and that his “problems arose because of the Iranian societies’ (sic) attitude towards religion and my family’s attitudes”.(b)In the delegate’s reasons for decision, it is specifically noted at [2] that during the appellant’s entry interview, the appellant had repeatedly stated that general insecurity was the reason for his relocation to Australia and that he said that his principal reason for departing Iran was “the opportunity to leave”. The delegate then noted that new claims were put forward in the appellant’s statutory declaration dated 29 July 2013, whose contents were set out in full in the delegate’s decision record. (c)The delegate did not directly address the appellant’s claims on the topic of religion but concluded that, considering “all evidence presented by the applicant and in view of the discussion above”, the delegate was of the opinion that the appellant had fabricated his claims to advance his claims for a protection visa and that “he is a thoroughly unreliable witness”.(d)In the written submissions dated 12 December 2014 by the appellant’s migration agent in the AAT proceeding, the following matters were raised:·the appellant is of the Shi’a Muslim faith although he has stated that he does not practice any religion;·the appellant was a man who does not practice any religion but had been brought up by a strict Shi’a family and he was at risk from the authorities “because of his desertion of the true faith”;·apostasy is “a secular and religious crime” and that it is enough that the person rejects Islam;·the appellant “has committed the form of apostasy known as murtad fitri – being born into an Islamic family but later rejecting that faith”. The religious offence of forsaking Islam is a crime of apostasy under Iranian law and the appellant is at risk because his lack of religious observance could be reported to local religious and civic authorities such as the Basij;·it was submitted that there is “ample evidence to show that our client’s situation entitles him to recognition as a refugee on the grounds of religious-based persecution, on two grounds of adultery and apostasy” as well as entitlement to complementary protection;·emphasis was placed on the fact that the delegate did not mention that the appellant was a non-believer in Islam and does not participate in any religious observances and that his profile on return would be sufficient for his details to be brought to the local Basij, which “will be sufficient to identify him as an apostate”;·it was again stated that country information indicated that penalties for apostasy can include imprisonment; and·given “past threats and actions against Iranian apostates and against those found guilty of adultery”, the appellant may be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For similar reasons, the AAT was not satisfied that the appellant had established any basis for complementary protection. The FCCA’s reasons for judgment summarised The three grounds of judicial review raised and pressed below may be summarised as follows:(a)The AAT committed jurisdictional error by failing to ask itself the correct question when considering the appellant’s claim of past harm or well-founded fear of future harm on the basis of his religion. The appellant claimed that the AAT had failed to take into account the extent to which his anti-Islam views had crystallised while he was in the West, as well as his resolution to speak out against Islam on behalf of Muslims and non-Muslims.(b)The AAT committed jurisdictional error by asking itself the wrong question in taking the view that the appellant’s claimed fear of future persecution on religious grounds was determined by the past conduct of Iranian authorities.(c)The AAT fell into jurisdictional error in failing to ask itself the question of whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his actual or imputed political beliefs in Iran. The primary judge gave detailed reasons for rejecting each of these three grounds of judicial review. Those reasons may be summarised as follows. As to the first ground of review summarised above, the primary judge found that, by reference to the AAT’s reasons for decision, it had given consideration to the appellant’s claims of past and future harm based on religious grounds, and concluded that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his actual or imputed religious beliefs. The primary judge held that the AAT relied on country information in arriving at its findings, which were not unreasonable in the relevant legal sense, nor irrational or illogical. The primary judge also held that the appellant was not denied natural justice by reason of an alleged failure of the AAT to consider his actual claims, because those claims were in fact considered. The primary judge dealt with the next two grounds of judicial review together. At [23], the primary judge described these grounds as raising an error of the kind identified in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; 216 CLR 473 (S395). The primary judge found, however, that the AAT did not simply focus on how the appellant could avoid persecution. Rather, his Honour concluded that the AAT had made a positive finding that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution based on his actual or imputed political beliefs, matters which themselves were the subject of specific findings by the AAT regarding the appellant’s past behaviour and by reference to the country information referred to above. Thus the primary judge concluded that, having regard to the AAT’s findings as to how the appellant had lived in Iran in the past and his “lack of avowed intentions to live differently in the future” if returned to Iran, he would live there as he had done previously.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established