BSF15 v Minister for Immigration
[2016] FCCA 987
•27 April 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BSF15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 987 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – interlocutory dismissal of show cause application – no arguable case of jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 48A, 424A, 424AA, 425, 425A |
| Cases cited: SZLLY v Minister for Immigration (2009) 107 ALD 352 |
| Applicant: | BSF15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2320 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 27 April 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 27 April 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr A Keevers of Sparke Helmore |
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
Pursuant to rule 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), the application filed on 30 July 2015 is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application in the sum of $3,416 in accordance with rule 44.15(1) and item 2 of Division 1 of Part 3 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2320 of 2015
| BSF15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application to review a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The decision was made on 30 July 2015. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant is from Fujian province in China and made claims based upon her asserted Catholic faith. Background facts relating to the applicant’s claims and the decision of the Tribunal on them are set out in the Minister’s outline of submissions filed on 20 April 2016.
The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. She arrived in Australia on 7 May 2008 as the holder of student guardian (Temporary) (Class TU) visa and a passport issued in her own name.[1] On 16 December 2009, the applicant lodged with the Department an application for a protection visa.[2] That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 19 March 2010, and the decision of that delegate affirmed by a differently constituted Tribunal on 22 July 2010.[3] The applicant then unsuccessfully sought review of the first Tribunal’s decision in this Court, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia.[4]
[1] Court Book (CB) 14, 177.
[2] CB 12.
[3] CB 75, 90.
[4] CB 177.
On 25 October 2013, following the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia’s decision in SZGIZ,[5] the applicant made a second application for a protection visa.[6] On 2 May 2014, the delegate refused the grant of a protection visa.[7]
[5] The relevant effect of SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235 was that s.48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did not prevent an applicant making a further protection visa application for assessment under the criterion in s.36(2)(aa).
[6] CB 137.
[7] CB 172.
On 5 June 2014, the applicant lodged with the Tribunal an application for review of the delegate’s decision.[8] On 3 February 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting her to appear at a hearing before the Tribunal on 23 April 2015.[9] On 23 April 2015, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter and was accompanied by a witness, Ms Liu.[10] That hearing was adjourned, and on 28 April 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting her to appear before the Tribunal at the resumption of the hearing on 2 June 2015.[11] The applicant attended the hearing on 2 June 2015 with the assistance of an interpreter and was again accompanied by a witness, Ms Liu.[12] On 30 July 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.
[8] CB 195.
[9] CB 203.
[10] CB 207.
[11] CB 234.
[12] CB 237.
On 24 August 2015, the applicant filed her application to show cause in this Court.
Applicant’s claims
In her first application for a protection visa, the applicant claimed to fear harm on the basis that she had breached China’s family planning laws.[13] However, the applicant abandoned this claim before the delegate.[14]
[13] CB 49-60.
[14] CB 180.
In her second protection application, the applicant claimed to fear harm on the basis of her Catholic faith and her involvement in an underground church in China.[15] The applicant claimed that in 2012, she asked a friend to take church materials with her to China, but that friend was caught by the authorities and punished.[16] The applicant also claimed that her computer had been “attacked” by hackers because of her “incessant efforts to propagate the Pope’s voice.”[17]
[15] CB 152.
[16] CB 153.
[17] Ibid.
Finally, the applicant claimed that on Easter Eve 2013, some “fellow followers” in China were arrested by the local government for preaching the gospel, the congregation “dismissed by force” and the venue closed by the police.[18]
[18] Ibid.
Tribunal decision
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had attended Mass on a regular basis in Australia.[19] However, the Tribunal noted the “difficulty” in eliciting detail from the applicant in respect of her claims, finding her evidence to the Tribunal to be “vague”, “imprecise” and “lacking in detail.”[20] The Tribunal also referred to the inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims between her first and second protection visa applications.[21] The Tribunal found the applicant not to be a credible witness.[22]
[19] CB 255 at [40].
[20] CB 255-57 at [39], [42], [43].
[21] CB 253 at [32].
[22] CB257 at [44].
On the basis of the applicant’s difficulty in answering questions about her involvement in the underground church in China, and on the basis of her limited knowledge of the Catholic faith, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had been involved in any meaningful way in the underground Church in China and was not satisfied that the applicant was a Catholic prior to her arrival in Australia in 2008.[23]
[23] CB 255 at [41].
On the basis of the applicant’s “vague and inconsistent” evidence and its findings in respect of the applicant’s credibility, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had given religious material to a friend to transport to China, that the friend had been detained, or that her computer had been hacked.[24]
[24] CB 257 at [45].
Having considered the applicant’s claims both individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant faced a real chance of suffering significant harm on the basis of her religious beliefs and affirmed the decision under review.[25]
[25] CB 258-259 at [47]- [51].
The present proceedings
These proceedings began with a show cause application filed on 24 August 2015. The applicant is incorrectly described in that application as BSA15. The issue was raised and apparently resolved before a registrar. The applicant continues to rely upon that application. She has not taken up the opportunity afforded her by orders made by the registrar to file and serve an amended application or additional evidence.
The grounds in the application are in narrative form, both described as orders sought and grounds. The grounds are categorised in the Minister’s submissions at [13] and I agree with that categorisation. The application is supported by an affidavit filed with it which I received as a submission.
I have before me as evidence the Court book filed on 29 October 2015.
The applicant was at a disadvantage at today’s hearing. She was, at times, distressed and apparently depressed. She told me that she is afraid of returning to China. That seems to be the cause of her disturbed state of mind. She was not in a position to make any legal submissions in support of her application. The Minister’s submissions were read to her by the interpreter and the Minister’s solicitor went through those submissions orally, addressing one by one the grounds of review.
I explained what I saw as the legal position to the applicant. I found it necessary to adjourn the hearing at one stage, given the applicant’s distress. I have concerns about her capacity to participate effectively in today’s hearing, but I do not consider that any adjournment would be productive. That is because the application, in my opinion, fails to raise an arguable case of error, and that position would not be altered by providing the applicant with further time.
The Minister’s submissions deal comprehensively with the applicant’s grounds of review. I agree with those submissions.
Ground One
Ground One contends that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s explanation regarding her level of knowledge of Catholicism due to her “poor education background of illiteracy and lack of ability for expression.”
The Tribunal was clearly aware of and took into account the applicant’s lack of education and limited language skills. In particular, the Tribunal referred to the applicant’s language difficulties:
a)at [33]: “This was based on the applicant’s language difficulties and was seen to be relevant in the context of the [first] Tribunal’s concerns about the applicant’s evidence in relation to her claim[ed] practice of Catholicism.”;
b)at [34]: “The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s limited knowledge of Catholicism and her limited language skills which would impact on her capacity to spread the Gospel.”;
c)at [40]: “On the evidence before the Tribunal the applicant has had a very limited education… The Tribunal’s overall assessment of the applicant’s religious knowledge based on the evidence was that it was at a basic level consistent with someone who had only become involved in the Catholic Church in the last several years and with her limited language skills and a poor education was struggling to develop her knowledge of Catholicism.”;
d)at [43]: “The Tribunal also considers that the applicant’s vague evidence about these issues is consistent with her basic knowledge of Catholicism and her inability to be able to understand written materials in relation to church issues.”
In the circumstances, the assertion in Ground One that the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s poor education and illiteracy cannot be sustained. To the extent that the applicant contends that she “can not accept” the Tribunal’s decision, this is in substance no more than disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings, inviting impermissible merits review.[26]
[26] Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
Ground Two
Ground Two is in two separate parts. The first part is an explanation for the applicant’s failure to mention her Catholic faith in her initial protection application. Taken at its highest, the explanation invites impermissible merits review.[27]
[27] Wu Shan Liang (supra).
The second part of Ground Two is a contention that it was “unfair” for the Tribunal to test and challenge the applicant “not by my understanding and experience of faith but by asking the procedure of election of Pop[e] which of out my reach to the details.” This part of the ground is read as a contention that the Tribunal fell into error by assuming the role of arbiter of religious doctrine. A Tribunal may fall into error if it assumes the role of “arbiter of religion”, by making an adverse finding in respect of an applicant on the basis that the applicant has failed to demonstrate a specific level of doctrinal knowledge, in accordance with an arbitrary minimum expected standard imposed by the Tribunal, to justify being regarded as a member of that religion.[28] However, the Tribunal is entitled to conclude, after exploring the matter without any preconception as to what knowledge a believer will demonstrates, that a particular applicant’s lack of knowledge indicates that they are not a genuine adherent of a religion.[29]
[28] Minister for Immigration v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108 at [31], [37] per Kenny J.
[29] SZLSP (supra) at [37].
In the present case, the applicant’s claim to fear religious persecution was articulated with two distinct facets: first, that the applicant had been involved in an underground Catholic Church in China from 2006, and secondly that she began attending a Catholic Church in Australia following her arrival and was baptised in 2011.[30] The Tribunal decision record reveals that the Tribunal asked the applicant a number of questions regarding her knowledge of the Catholic religion, including about the role of the Pope in Catholicism,[31] concluding at [40] and [41] as follows:
On the evidence before the Tribunal the applicant has a very limited education. This appears to impact on her capacity to understand church ceremonies and written materials published by the church… the Tribunal’s overall assessment of the applicant’s religious knowledge based on the evidence was at a basic level consistent with someone who had only become involved in the Catholic Church in the last several years and with her limited language skills and a poor education was struggling to develop her knowledge of Catholicism.
The Tribunal believes that the applicant struggled in answering Tribunal questions about her underground church activities in China… The evidence indicates that the applicant may have had an interest in the underground Catholic Church in China but the evidence does not support or indicate that the applicant was actually involved in any meaningful way in underground church activities in China. In those circumstances the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant was a Catholic when she came to Australia in 2008. Therefore the Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s claims that she would be at risk if she returned to China on the basis that she had engaged in underground church activities in China. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to this aspect is supported by the applicant’s failure to nominate a religion in her first protection visa application or to nominate religion as being a basis for her to fear harm in her initial statement in support of that application.
[30] CB 152, 247 at [14]-[15], 250 at [23].
[31] at [24].
The Tribunal was entitled to explore with the applicant her level of knowledge of the Catholic religion in order to assess the genuineness of her claim.[32] This was not a case in which the Tribunal assessed the applicant’s level of doctrinal knowledge against an arbitrary standard and proceeded to reach a conclusion that the applicant was not a genuine adherent of Catholicism. Rather, the Tribunal’s findings were that the applicant’s level of knowledge of church activities in China was not commensurate with her claimed level of involvement in the underground Catholic Church – in particular, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was involved in “any meaningful way” in the underground church, concluding that it could not be satisfied that the applicant was a Catholic at the time she came to Australia. This finding was based on a legitimate exploration of the applicant’s claims and was open to the Tribunal on the evidence and materials before it.
[32] SBCC v Minister for Immigration [2006] FCAFC 129 at [47] (French, Lander and Besanko JJ).
Ground Three
Ground Three contains three separate contentions: first, that the Tribunal’s decision shows an “unclear reason” why and how the applicant’s “statements and explanations given is unacceptable and irrelevant”; secondly, that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the applicant’s commitment to her Catholic faith; and thirdly, that the Tribunal ignored the evidence given by the applicant’s witness, Ms Liu.
The first contention in Ground Three appears to be a complaint that the Tribunal’s reasons for not accepting the applicant’s claims and evidence were not apparent on the face of the Tribunal’s decision record. The Tribunal clearly set out the basis for not accepting the applicant’s claims, including:
a)the “vague” and “imprecise” nature of her evidence;[33]
b)the inconsistency between the claims raised in her initial protection application, which made no mention of professed Catholic beliefs, and the claims raised in her present application;[34]
c)the delay in her bringing her first application for a protection visa, which the Tribunal considered was inconsistent with her claim to fear harm;[35] and
d)the applicant’s overall lack of credibility.[36]
[33] CB 250, 253, 256 at [26], [33], [42], [43].
[34] CB 253 at [32].
[35] CB 253 at [32].
[36] CB 254, 256-7 at [34], [44].
The Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant, nor is the Tribunal required to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out.[37] Further, credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal.[38] The Tribunal’s reasons for not accepting the applicant’s evidence are cogent and transparent, and its findings were open to it for the reasons it gave.
[37] Randhawa v Minister for Immigration (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J; Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration (1994) 34 ALD 347, 348 per Heerey J.
[38] Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J.
The second contention in Ground Three may be read in two separate ways. The first is a complaint that the Tribunal did not properly consider the applicant’s past commitment to Catholicism both in China and Australia, and the second that the Tribunal did not properly consider the applicant’s future risk of harm in China on the basis of her faith.
In respect of the first aspect of this contention, while the Tribunal did accept that the applicant had attended Mass on a “very regular” basis, having considered the applicant’s “vague” evidence regarding her claimed past involvement in the underground church and her apparently limited knowledge of Catholicism, the Tribunal found that the evidence did not support the applicant’s claim to have been involved in an underground Church in China in any meaningful way, concluding that the applicant was not a Catholic when she came to Australia in 2008.[39] That finding was open to the Tribunal on the evidence and materials before it and for the reasons it gave.
[39] CB 255-256 at [40]-[42].
In respect of the applicant’s future risk of harm, the Tribunal did not accept on the evidence before it that the applicant had sent religious materials to a friend in China or that the friend’s computer had been “hacked”, nor did the Tribunal accept that the applicant had been involved in preaching or promotion of the gospel while in Australia.[40] The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claim that she would involve herself in the underground church were she to return to China. However, it found on the basis of its anterior findings in regards to her lack of involvement in the underground church prior to her departure from China, its findings about her involvement in the Catholic Church while in Australia and the country information before it, that the applicant would not face a real risk of suffering significant harm in China were she to become involved in the underground church.[41] Those findings were also open to the Tribunal on the evidence and materials before it and for the reasons it gave.
[40] CB 256-257 at [43], [45].
[41] CB 258 at [47].
In respect of the applicant’s contention that the Tribunal did not consider the evidence of her witness, Ms Liu, the Tribunal set out in its decision the evidence received from Ms Liu at the hearing at [19] and [20] of its decision record and further referred to Ms Liu’s evidence in its consideration of the applicant’s claims at [40] and [43]. In those circumstances, there is nothing on the face of the Tribunal’s decision record to suggest that it did not consider Ms Liu’s evidence.
For these reasons, Ground Three cannot be made out.
Ground Four
Ground Four raises two separate contentions. The first contention is that the Tribunal did not give “fair consideration” to the applicant’s explanation for her Catholic faith and the inconsistent information in her applications for a protection visa. The second contention is read as a complaint that the applicant was denied a “real and meaningful” opportunity to participate in the Tribunal hearing because of “poor memory caused by facial distortions.”
In respect of the first contention, the Tribunal clearly gave consideration to the inconsistent information given in the applicant’s applications for a protection visa in relation to the applicant’s claimed Catholic faith, putting that information to her pursuant to s.424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) and noting her responses[42].
[42] at [35].
In respect of the second contention, the applicant has provided a number of medical certificates attached to her application for judicial review which indicate that she has suffered from Bell’s Palsy. Two of the medical certificates post-date the Tribunal’s decision, and there is nothing to suggest that the report dated 17 July 2014 was provided to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has an obligation to give the applicant a “real and meaningful” invitation to appear before it.[43] It is for the Tribunal to evaluate (at least initially) the ability of an applicant to participate in the hearing; the fact that the Tribunal was aware of the potential health difficulties faced by the applicant[44] and continued with the hearing is indicative that the applicant was not denied the opportunity to participate in the hearing.[45] On the evidence before the Court this is not a case in which the integrity of the Tribunal hearing pursuant to s.425 of the Migration Act was subverted by want of an appreciation on the part of the Tribunal that the applicant’s presentation of her case might have been adversely affected by an impaired state of mind.[46]
[43] Minister for Immigration v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [37]; SZLLY v Minister for Immigration (2009) 107 ALD 352 per Perram J; Minister for Immigration v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 365 at [212] per Graham J.
[44] referring to them at [27], [29] and [35].
[45] SZQBN v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCA 686 at [47]-[49] per Flick J.
[46] Minister for Immigration v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41, (2012) 183 FCR 575 at [37] per Keane CJ (Emmett J agreeing at [49]).
In any event, the medical certificates attached to the applicant’s application for judicial review are insufficient to establish that the applicant was unable to give evidence, present arguments and answer questions, and in these circumstances any suggestion that she was denied a “real and meaningful” opportunity to participate in the hearing is rejected.[47]
[47] SZNVW (supra); Minister for Immigration v SZNCR [2011] FCA 369 at [30]-[33].
Ground Five
Ground Five contends that the Tribunal “failed to take any positive action” which they were obliged to undertake according to the “hearing code.”
Insofar as this ground may be read as a contention that the Tribunal should have made an independent investigation of the applicant’s claims, there is no obligation on the part of the Tribunal to do so.[48] Further, this is not a case in which there was an failure by the Tribunal to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which might be easily ascertained, nor is any such failure particularised by the applicant.[49]
[48] Minister for Immigration v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43] per Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gleeson CJ agreeing); Minister for Immigration v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 at [20] per Black CJ, Sundberg and Bennett JJ in joint judgment.
[49] Minister for Immigration v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15; [2009] HCA 39 at [25] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
To the extent that the ground may be understood as a complaint that the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness in accordance with the requirements of Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act, such a complaint cannot be made out. The applicant was invited on 3 February 2015 to appear before the Tribunal on 23 April 2015 at a hearing, pursuant to s.425 of the Migration Act.[50] That invitation complied with s.425A of the Migration Act. The hearing was adjourned, and on 28 April 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting her to attend the resumed hearing on 2 June 2015.[51] That invitation also complied with the requirements of s.425A of the Migration Act.
[50] CB 201.
[51] CB 234.
During the course of the hearing, the Tribunal referred to information before it which may be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review, and put this information to the applicant pursuant to s.424AA of the Migration Act.[52] The Tribunal asked the applicant whether she required further time to comment on or respond to the information, and at her request was given until 16 June 2015.[53] The applicant provided a written response to the information given under s.424AA of the Migration Act on 16 June 2015, which was referred to by the Tribunal in its decision record.[54]
[52] CB 253 at [32]-[33].
[53] CB 253-4 at [33].
[54] CB 240-242, 254 at [35].
There is nothing on the face of the Tribunal’s decision record or in evidence before the Court to suggest that the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness, nor is any failure particularised by the applicant. Ground Five cannot succeed.
Ground Six
Ground Six contends that the Tribunal failed to give the applicant a chance to comment on the “outstanding questions [of] the hearing” and expresses disappointment with the “impression and attitude of the member” who conducted her review. To the extent that the applicant could be read as contending that the Tribunal did not comply with s.424AA of the Migration Act, the Minister repeats the submissions in respect of Ground Five. To the extent that the applicant contends that the Tribunal should have put the information to her in accordance with s.424A of the Migration Act, the provisions of ss.424AA and 424A are intended to operate in a “coherent and complementary” fashion, and in circumstances in which the Tribunal complied with s.424AA of the Migration Act, there was no obligation to put the same information to the applicant pursuant to s.424A of the Migration Act.[55]
[55] SZMCD v Minister for Immigration [2009] FCAFC 46; (2009) 174 FCR 415 at [2] per Moore J, at [80] per Tracey and Foster JJ.
To the extent that the Ground Six could be read as a contention of apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal, a claim of bias is a serious claim which must be firmly and distinctly made and clearly proven.[56] The mere fact that the Tribunal made adverse findings in respect of the applicant does not give rise to an inference of bias or, by itself, suggest that the Tribunal approached its task other than with a mind open to persuasion.[57]
[56] Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507, 531.
[57] SCAA v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668 at [38].
Finally, to the extent that the applicant contends that the decision of the Tribunal was “improper, imprudent and reckless,” in the absence of further particulars the contention is little more than an emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings.[58]
[58] Minister for Immigration v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164, 165.
Grounds Seven, Eight and Nine
Grounds Seven, Eight and Nine simply restate the applicant’s claims for protection. The applicant’s contentions, such as they are, do little more than invite impermissible merits review.[59]
[59] Wu Shan Liang (supra).
The applicant, it appears, may have genuinely adopted the Catholic faith in Australia.
She is, in the circumstances, afraid of returning to China. The Tribunal considered her claims and found that she did not face a real risk of harm. Given the fact that the Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error, it is necessary that her application be dismissed. If she wishes to further agitate her claims for protection, she has the opportunity to raise those claims with the Minister. That is beyond the scope of this proceeding.
I will order that the application be dismissed, pursuant to rule 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (Federal Circuit Court Rules)
In consequence of the dismissal of the application, the Minister seeks an order for costs in accordance with the Court’s scale. The applicant did not wish to be heard on costs.
I will order that the applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application in the sum of $3,416 in accordance with rule 44.15(1) and item 2 of Division 1 of Part 3 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver
Associate:
Date: 29 April 2016
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Immigration
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Procedural Fairness
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Natural Justice
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Jurisdiction
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