Bryant v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bryant v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission
[2008] FCA 1424

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by wrongly conceiving the reviewable decision – whether Tribunal erred in finding other possible causes for the applicant’s symptoms – whether Tribunal applied an incorrect construction of the term minor interference – where Tribunal wrongly considered whether impairment resulted from service life rather than the degree of permanent impairment resulting from the accepted injury – where Tribunal erred in finding that other factors could account for symptoms without evidentiary support - where Tribunal incorrectly applied a global approach to the term minor interference with activities of daily living – where appeal allowed

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43, 44
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 14, 16, 19, 21, 24, 24(5), 27, 28, 60(2), 62, 64

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 considered
Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321 considered
Bramwell v Repatriation Commission (1998) 158 ALR 623 considered
Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535 followed
Comcare v Amorebieta (1996) 66 FCR 83 considered
Comcare v Emery (1993) 32 ALD 147 considered
Comcare v Fiedler (2001) 115 FCR 328 considered
Comcare v Tiscay (1992) 32 FCR 181 considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swift and Ors (1989) 18 ALD 679 considered
Grant v Repatriation Commission (1999) 57 ALD 1 considered
Jordan v Australian Postal Corporation (2007) 99 ALD 303 considered
Lees v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 84 considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Betkhoshabeh (1999) 55 ALD 609 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 considered
O'Rourke and Comcare [1997] AATA 304 considered
Parker v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2007) 96 ALD 624 considered
Price Street Professional Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 243 ALR 728 considered
Riddle v Telstra Corporation Limited (2006) 149 FCR 348 considered
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Murphy (1998) 52 ALD 268 considered
Telstra Corporation Limited v Hannaford (2006) 151 FCR 253 followed
TNT Skypak International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175 considered
Whittaker v Comcare (1998) 86 FCR 532 considered

CHRISTOPHER BRYANT v MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION

QUD 274 OF 2007

LOGAN J
17 SEPTEMBER 2008
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 274 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY DR K S LEVY RFD, SENIOR MEMBER AND DR J B MORLEY RFD, MEMBER

BETWEEN:

CHRISTOPHER BRYANT
Appellant

AND:

MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 SEPTEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The decision of the Tribunal is set aside.

3.The matter is remitted to the Tribunal to be heard again in accordance with the Administrative Appeals…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1424
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bryant v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission involves a dispute regarding the compensation claim of Mr. Bryant for muscle tension headaches allegedly caused by his service in the Defence Force. The matter was reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and subsequently appealed to a higher court. The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions concerning compensation, the deference owed to the AAT's factual findings, and the application of the correct legal standards in assessing the degree of permanent impairment.

The court examined the composition and expertise of the Tribunal, noting that it comprised members with significant medical and Defence Force experience, which underscored the deference owed to their factual findings. However, the court scrutinized whether the Tribunal properly applied the law in reaching its decisions, particularly in assessing the medical evidence, determining the permanence of Mr. Bryant's condition, and evaluating the degree of whole person impairment. The court highlighted that while deference is given to the Tribunal's factual findings, it must still ensure the Tribunal applied the correct legal standards.

In its reasoning, the court referred to Telstra Corporation Limited v Hannaford, which established that the AAT has the authority to make subsequent findings of fact that may alter the original decision, provided the initial decision remains in effect. The court concluded that the AAT was empowered to make such findings in this case, thereby allowing for adjustments in compensation based on evolving circumstances and medical diagnoses. The court found that the Tribunal did not misapply the statutory provisions but rather made factual findings that were open to it. The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration in line with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), with an allowance for the introduction of additional evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The decision of the Tribunal is set aside.

3. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal to be heard again in accordance with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

4. On that rehearing, each party is permitted to introduce further evidence.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LOGAN J
It will be necessary later in these reasons to consider what the scope of the reviewable decision was.THE TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS AND REASONS FOR DECISION Some features of the constitution of the Tribunal for the purpose of these particular review proceedings should be noted. The Tribunal was not constituted only by laypersons so far as medical knowledge was concerned. Though the presiding member is a member of the Bar, his title “Doctor” is referable to his holding an earned doctorate in psychology. The other member of the Tribunal is a specialist neurologist. As the post-nominal “RFD” (Reserve Force Decoration) of each attests, each tribunal member also has served efficiently for a lengthy period in the Defence Force Reserves. That the Tribunal was able to bring to the task of the external merits review of this type of decision a multi-disciplinary membership of this kind with experience of Defence Force service and conditions was an advantage, but it did not absolve the Tribunal from making the correct or preferable decision in respect of that under review according to law. What the composition of the Tribunal undoubtedly underscores though is the deference to be afforded by this Court to the Tribunal’s findings of fact, made within jurisdiction, which the character of an appeal on a question of law counsels in any event. There were two principal sources of expert medical evidence concerning Mr Bryant’s accepted muscle tension type headaches condition before the Tribunal, Dr J Rowe, an occupational physician and Dr K Lethlean, a neurologist. Dr Rowe had examined and reported upon Mr Bryant at the request of his solicitors while Dr Lethlean had done so at the request of the Commission. Each of these gentlemen gave oral evidence in the course of the Tribunal proceedings. The Tribunal’s reasons evince a thorough rehearsal not only of their evidence but also of salient features, as the Tribunal saw them, of the other medical evidence as well as Mr Bryant’s own evidence and that of an officer who had, for a short time, been his supervisor during his latter period of Defence Force service. The Tribunal came to give particular weight to the opinions expressed by Dr Lethlean. Rightly, it is no part of Mr Bryant’s case on the appeal that a question of law is to be found in the mere preference of one body of medical evidence over another for reasons which are fully exposed. Rather, the nature of the challenge made to the Tribunal’s decision is that the Tribunal directed itself to the answering of perceived controversies in respect of subjects which it is said were, for it, givens, misconstrued Table 13.1 of the Approved Guide, failed to appreciate by what evidence the conditions in that table might be satisfied and decided the degree of permanent impairment unreasonably, i.e. acted on speculative rather than reasonably probative material. The nature of the challenge made to the Tribunal’s decision is such that it is relevant to note that the Tribunal came to assess the medical evidence before it under three headings:(a)the cause and relationship to service of Mr Bryant’s headaches;(b)whether Mr Bryant’s headache condition is permanent; and(c)Mr Bryant’s whole person impairment from his headache condition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LOGAN J

The Commission further submitted that, even if O’Rourke v Comcare were the source of an incorrect test to apply to the term “minor interference”, the Tribunal’s reasons do not disclose that it applied such a narrow conception. In support of this, the Commission pointed to the Tribunal’s reasons at [49] as showing that the Tribunal did consider whether there was a de minumus interference. The Commission submitted that, whilst the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence that the 10% impairment was met, this was not because the interference was considered too minor. The Commission finally submitted, in regard to the acceptance of Dr Lethlean’s opinion over that of Dr Rowe, that this was a matter of the weight afforded to evidence and did not give rise to any errors of law.CONSIDERATIONJurisdiction In Telstra Corporation Limited v Hannaford (2006) 151 FCR 253, after an exhaustive review of earlier authority, Conti J, with the agreement of Heerey and Dowsett JJ, reached (at 273-274, [57] - [59]) the following conclusions:57In my opinion, it should be concluded, upon the correct construction of the SRC Act, and in particular of the provisions thereof upon which I have focused attention in these reasons, that the AAT is empowered to make subsequent findings of fact in relation to the circumstances the subject of decision-making under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, and also under ss 21 and 27 of the SRC Act, where the determination of the first instance decision-maker (here of course Telstra) made under the auspices of s 14 of the SRC Act remains in operation in the sense that it has not been the subject of any inconsistent outcome in the context of a subsequent review by the AAT. The statutory scheme allows for progressive and evolving decision-making giving effect to the provisions of ongoing review of relief or entitlements in the nature of course of workers compensation, being review which allows for adjustment or change in the light of events and circumstances which may subsequently happen. The statutory scheme hence reflects a flexible scope for adjustment by way of decisions in the nature of awards to be made subsequently to the determination of s 14 liability, whether that determination be made in isolation, or in the context of decision-making concerning consequential relief that may be required in the light of evolving circumstances. It is therefore a scheme which allows progressively for ongoing relief, and is thus not comparable of course with the process of curial resolution of the traditional common law entitlement of an injured employee for damages as a consequence of the negligent conduct of an employer. The opening words of s 14(1) ‘[s]ubject to this Part...’ are consistent with the flexibility inherent in the ensuing codification of the various facets of compensation envisaged.58The first instance decisions of this Court in Power, Hill and Riddle, which I have reviewed, each reflect in my opinion correctly the operation of the statutory scheme, and in particular its provision for ongoing adjustment designed to accommodate changing circumstances inclusive for instance (as here involved) of changing medical diagnosis. The approach to statutory construction and operation evident in those first instance authorities is not at odds with the approach to statutory construction and operation adopted by the Full Court in Lees subsequently to Power and Hill and prior to Riddle. 59I would therefore conclude, contrary to the decision of the primary judge, that the AAT below was duly empowered, upon the true construction of the SRC Act and in the events which happened:(i)to make findings of fact that effectively undercut the necessary findings of fact made in the initial or original decision of Telstra under s 14 of the SRC Act to accept liability in respect of Mr Hannaford’s claim for compensation; and(ii)to do so in circumstances where the AAT was undertaking its review of whether any compensation should be payable or further payable, for instance under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, and/or under ss 21 and 27 of the SRC Act; and(iii)to do so in the circumstances further where Telstra’s s 14 decision remained in force to the extent that it had not been actually reversed, and had not been the subject of any adverse review per se by the AAT.In short, it matters not, upon the true construction of the SRC Act, that there has never been any reconsideration of the determination of Telstra of 8 May 2002 whereby liability under s 14 thereof for Mr Hannaford’s claim originally made on 1 May 2002 had been accepted.(Emphasis added; citations for cases referred to in the passage quoted omitted)