mark or label would injure them in their business as printers and stationers, and they contended that the Commonwealth Parlia- ment had no power to enact Part VII. of the Trade Marks Act 1905. They asked for a declaration that the defendant Associa- tion and the defendant Barker were not entitled to register the mark or label, and for an injunction against its registration.
Neither the defendant Association nor the defendant Barker delivered a defence. But the Registrar by his defence, inter alia, alleged that after action brought, viz., on or about the 1st March 1907, the application for registration of the mark or label had been withdrawn.
Upon motion for judgment, Barton J. directed that the question of law, whether the Commonwealth Parliament had power to enact Part VII. of the Trade Marks Act 1905, should be referred to the Full Court.
The question now came on for argument. Mitchell K.C. (with him Glynn and Starke), for the plaintiffs. [GRIFFITH C.J.-The application for registration having been withdrawn, the plaintiffs have now nothing of which to complain. This Court will not decide abstract questions of constitutional law, or give an opinion as to the validity of a Commonwealth Statute which cannot be followed up by an effective order.
ISAACS J.-The plaintiff must show that he has personally suffered or may personally suffer an injury before he can have the constitutionality of a law tested: Turpin v. Lemon 1; Tyler V. Judges of Court of Registration 2.]
The plaintiffs are entitled under Part I., Order III., r. 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1903 to a declaratory order.
[HIGGINS J.-Under that rule you must show that the action is properly brought.]
Under an almost identical English rule, Order XXV., r. 5, it has been held that, where no substantive relief can be given at the time, a declaratory order will be made: London Association of Shipowners and Brokers v. London and India Docks Joint Committee 3.
1187 U.S., 51, at p. 60.
2179 U.S., 405.
3(1892) 3 Ch., 242.