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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No Ml8 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
DONALD STUART BROWNE-KERR
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special
leave to appeal
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
| Browne-Kerr | 1 | 7/2/91 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 1991, AT 11.09 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR N. CRAFTI: | May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the applicant in this matter. (instructed by |
| James T. Stevens) |
MR M.S. WB-INBERG, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear
together with my learned friend, MR J.D. McARDLE,
on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
| BRENNAN J: | Mr Crafti. |
| MR CRAFTI: | May it please the Court, I have outlines of |
submission which I seek to hand to the Court.
| BRENNAN J: | Is it right to say that ground 2 is only reached |
if you fail on ground l?
| MR CRAFTI: | On one view of the argument that would be so, |
Your Honour, although speaking for my part I would
be anxious that that matter be resolved as well in
case the Full Court ordered a retrial or might
decide that there should still be a retrial,notwithstanding that it goes back to the Full
Court, because what will then happen is that the
trial will be conducted on an evidentiary basis
which, we would submit, is erroneous. But,
Your Honour's observation is one which had already
crossed my mind, that it may be premature to argue
ground 2 on one view of it if the matter is
remitted to the Full Court. But certainly I, for
my part, would be anxious to have the matter
resolved so that in the event that there was a
retrial we did not have to come back yet again to
discuss the matters that are contained in ground 2.
Your Honours, the proposition - perhaps I
should indicate at the outset, the applicant was
charged with 57 counts of forgery. He was acquitted on 31, convicted on 26 and appealed
on nine grounds initially against conviction to the
Full Court and was allowed to add two further
grounds. Judgment in the Full Court decision was
delivered on 1 May 1989 about two months after this Court delivered its judgment in Jones' case,
(1988-89) 166 CLR 409. This Court held on that occasion that a Court of Criminal Appeal cannot
fail to hear and determine tenable grounds that are
raised and argued in support of verdict of
acquittal merely because the court accepts other
grounds of appeal which result in the quashing of
that conviction and an order for a retrial.
This Court then went on to say that a Court of
Criminal Appeal which confines its judgment in that
way fails to exercise fully its jurisdiction and
the appeal remains partially undetermined. That is
| Browne-Kerr | 2 | 7/2/91 |
exactly what happened…
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- AGLC
- Browne-Kerr v The Queen [1991] HCATrans 31
- Case
- [1991] HCATrans 31
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Full Court of Victoria had failed to fully exercise its appellate jurisdiction by not determining all tenable grounds of appeal raised by Browne-Kerr. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Full Court had not determined grounds 2, 3, and 4 of his appeal, which related to the alleged inconsistency of the verdicts, the perversity of the verdict, and the verdict being unsafe and unsatisfactory, respectively. The applicant contended that this failure to determine all grounds meant the appeal remained partially undetermined.
The High Court considered its previous decision in *Jones* (1988-89) 166 CLR 409, which established that a Court of Criminal Appeal cannot refuse to hear and determine tenable grounds of appeal that support an acquittal simply because it upholds other grounds that lead to the quashing of a conviction and an order for a retrial. Such a failure means the Court of Criminal Appeal has not fully exercised its jurisdiction. The applicant argued that the Full Court's judgment in his case mirrored this situation, as it appeared to have not determined grounds 2 and 3, and potentially ground 4, despite quashing the convictions and ordering a retrial. The respondent accepted that if any of the three grounds had been sustained, the consequence would have been a quashed conviction and a new trial.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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