IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 211 of 1993
BETWEEN:
JODI-ANNE BROOKS
APPLICANTAND:
THE UPJOHN COMPANY
FIRST RESPONDENTUPJOHN PTY LIMITED
SECOND RESPONDENTMARTIN RICHTER
THIRD RESPONDENTDONALD MAXWELL
FOURTH RESPONDENTJUDGE(S):
O'CONNOR J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 FEBRUARY 1998
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The orders sought by the Fourth Respondent in their Notion of Motion filed on 24 February 1998 not be made.
The Fourth Respondent pay the costs of this motion.
NOTE:SETTLEMENT AND ENTRY OF ORDERS IS DEALT WITH IN ORDER 36 OF THE FEDERAL COURT RULES.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 211 of 1993
BETWEEN:
JODI-ANNE BROOKS
APPLICANTAND:
THE UPJOHN COMPANY
FIRST RESPONDENTUPJOHN PTY LIMITED
SECOND RESPONDENTMARTIN RICHTER
THIRD RESPONDENTDONALD MAXWELL
FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGE(S):
O'CONNOR J
DATE:
25 FEBRUARY 1998
PLACE:
SYDNEY
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this matter the Fourth Respondent, Donald Maxwell has moved the Court for orders that I disqualify myself from hearing this action on the grounds of apprehended bias. No actual bias was alleged.
The facts on which the application is made are not in dispute. They are contained in an affidavit of Donald Allan Ross Munro, solicitor for the Fourth Respondent.
The matter was heard, in open court, on 24 February 1998. Written submissions and a list of authorities were put to me on behalf of the Fourth Respondent. Three affidavits were filed. I have considered all of these in reaching my decision.
The relevant principle I must apply in deciding whether to sit or not to sit on this case is:-
“... a judge should not sit to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it.” (Liversey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-4)
Judges applying this principle including myself in this case consider that this test is not always easy to apply because it may affect people differently.
In Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41, the High Court said there were different categories of disqualification for apprehended bias and described them. The Fourth Respondent submits that this application fits into the third category of disqualification as stated in that decision which is disqualification by association. As was said in that case, this category covers cases:
“... where the apprehension of prejudgment or other bias results from some direct or indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons interested in, or otherwise involved in, the proceedings.” (at 74)
The third category of cases is usually confined to a:
“.. family, financial or professional relationship with one of the parties. The determination of whether there is, by the stated test, a reasonable apprehension of bias depends upon a full understanding of the facts from which it is suggested that such…
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- Case
- [1998] FCA 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to address several key legal issues, including the validity of the plaintiff's claims regarding the harm she suffered and the extent to which the defendant was liable. Additionally, the court needed to consider the procedural aspects of the case, such as the validity of the defendant's motion filed on 24 February 1998. The court's task was to interpret the relevant laws and apply them to the facts of the case to determine whether the plaintiff's claims were substantiated and whether the defendant's procedural applications were justified.
After thorough consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the court concluded that the orders sought by The Upjohn Co in their motion were not warranted. The court found that the defendant had not sufficiently demonstrated the basis for the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims or the validity of their procedural application. Consequently, the court ruled against the defendant, dismissing their motion and ordering them to pay the costs of the motion. The court's decision underscored the importance of substantiating claims and procedural fairness in legal proceedings.
In light of the court's ruling, the final orders specified that the orders sought by The Upjohn Co in their motion were not to be made, and the defendant was directed to pay the costs associated with the motion. This outcome reflects the court's commitment to ensuring that legal disputes are resolved based on the merits of the case and adherence to procedural rules.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The orders sought by the Fourth Respondent in their Notion of Motion filed on 24 February 1998 not be made.
2.
The Fourth Respondent pay the costs of this motion.
NOTE: SETTLEMENT AND ENTRY OF ORDERS IS DEALT WITH IN ORDER 36 OF THE FEDERAL COURT RULES.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi