JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: ROAD TRAFFIC (ADMINISTRATION) REGULATIONS 2014 (WA)
CITATION: BROOKS and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT [2020] WASAT 80
MEMBER: DR B MCGIVERN, MEMBER
HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS
DELIVERED : 24 JULY 2020
FILE NO/S: CC 1965 of 2019
BETWEEN: RICHARD CHARLES GEORGE BROOKS
Applicant
AND
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Respondent
Catchwords:
Authorisation to drive - Alcohol offender - Application for replacement driver's licence document not processed - Alcohol interlock scheme - Notice that any licence will be subject to 'condition I' - Whether a reviewable decision was made - Whether Tribunal has jurisdiction to review - Preliminary issue
Legislation:
Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA), s 8
Road Traffic (Administration) Regulations 2014 (WA), reg 32(1)
Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA), Pt 2
Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA), reg 3, reg 7, reg 31(1), reg 33, reg 34, reg 53B, reg 69A, reg 69D, reg 69E, reg 70, reg 70(a), reg 70(c), reg 72, Pt 5A, Pt 6, Sch 7
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 63(1)(a), s 63(1)(c)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | N/A |
| Respondent | : | N/A |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | N/A |
| Respondent | : | Department Of Transport - Legal And Legislative Services |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Di Virgilio v McCleary [2012] WASC 437
D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid (2005) 214 ALR 92
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 4 ALD 575
O'Connor and Town of Victoria Park [2005] WASAT 161
Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
The Department of Transport (Department) is the licensing authority for the Western Australian driver licensing scheme established under Pt 2 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA).
The Chief Executive Officer of the Department (CEO) has the power to grant to a person a driver's licence under reg 7 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA) (Authorisation to Drive Regulations). In these reasons, unless otherwise specified, all regulation references are references to the Authorisation to Drive Regulations.
The CEO is able to delegate any of the CEO's powers to a person or persons (each a CEO's delegate) under s 8 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA).
In these reasons, unless otherwise specified, the Department, the CEO and the CEO's delegates will be referred to collectively as the respondent.
In very broad terms, Mr Richard Brooks (applicant):
(a)following the cancellation and then expiration of his driver's licence, applied to the respondent for a replacement licence;
(b)was advised by the respondent that, for various reasons, his application could not be processed; and
(c)seeks review by the Tribunal of that (purported) decision under reg 32(1) of the Road Traffic (Administration) Regulations 2014 (WA) (Administration Regulations).
The respondent argues that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the application under reg 32(1) of the…
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- Case
- [2020] WASAT 80
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court primarily revolved around the interpretation of the Authorisation to Drive Regulations, particularly regulation 70 which defines 'reviewable decision'. The respondent argued that the October Letter, which informed the applicant that any licence would be subject to 'condition I', did not constitute a reviewable decision as per regulation 70. The respondent contended that the letter merely communicated procedural requirements and did not signify a final decision regarding the applicant's licence. Conversely, the applicant argued that the October Letter constituted a reviewable decision because it imposed a condition on any future licence that might be granted.
The court examined the text of regulation 70 and concluded that the October Letter did not disclose a decision to refuse a licence or impose a condition when granting a licence. The court found that the letter did not communicate a final decision but rather outlined pre-requisites for a potential licence grant. Additionally, the court determined that the imposition of condition I on a licence, if it were to occur, would be by operation of law rather than a discretionary decision, and thus not a reviewable decision under regulation 70. Consequently, the Tribunal's jurisdiction was not enlivened by the October Letter.
The Tribunal dismissed the application on the basis that the October Letter did not contain a reviewable decision as defined in regulation 70 of the Authorisation to Drive Regulations. The court ruled that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the decision, as no final decision had been made regarding the applicant's licence application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Any contention in this Tribunal that the applicant is not an alcohol offender because the conviction was not properly arrived at is an impermissible collateral attack on a conviction that has not been set aside: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 4 ALD 575 at 580-1; Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251 at 273; D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid (2005) 214 ALR 92 at [77]. Further, it is clear that if and to the extent that there was any decision by the respondent to impose condition I in relation to any licence that may be granted to the applicant (putting aside, for these purposes, the respondent's contention that the absence of discretion precludes the characterisation of such an outcome being a 'decision': see [29(e)] above), then any such decision was not made 'when granting a licence' to the applicant and therefore falls outside the scope of reg 70(c). For completeness, there is also nothing in the October Letter that discloses a decision to refuse the grant of a driver's licence to the applicant (rather, the letter sets out the pre-requisites for any such grant) and so reg 70(a) does not apply. Accordingly, even if the conclusion at [40] is wrong, then in any event:(a)the October Letter does not, for the reasons outlined above, contain or disclose a reviewable decision within the meaning of reg 70; and(b)the Tribunal's review jurisdiction is not enlivened.