FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BRO20 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1323
File number(s): SYG 946 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 5 December 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) – whether the IAA failed to apply correctly s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in the manner contended by the applicant – whether the IAA failed to consider a claim or an integer of a claim – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36 & 473DD Cases cited: Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 109; (2020) 278 FCR 627
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593
BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44; (2019) 269 FCR 94
Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352
CLS15 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2017] FCA 577; (2017) 72 AAR 502
EEM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 180; (2018) 265 FCR 527
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457; (1987) 14 ALD 291
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 96 ALJR 497
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 49 Date of hearing: 8 October 2024 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: (Direct Access) Mr S Kikkert Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kay Hoyle SC Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 946 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BRO20
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
5 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LAING:
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) (as it was). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (protection visa).
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Iran, who applied for a protection visa on 1 May…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1323
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the applicant’s claims and found that the IAA had not erred in its application of s 473DD. The court determined that the applicant's claim of arrest was not a new claim but rather a restatement of his previous claim of being taken by the Basij and detained. The court also found that the claim about the Sepah offering a deal to his brother was not new but rather an elaboration on the circumstances of his brother’s death, which had already been considered by the Delegate. Regarding the trauma of losing his brother, the court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated how this new information, even if accepted, would have materially impacted the IAA’s decision.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review. The IAA’s decision was upheld as it was found to be legally sound and properly considered all relevant information. The court ordered that the application be dismissed, and no further orders were made.
Orders
Orders of the court
SYG 946 of 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:
BRO20
Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
5 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LAING:
1.
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) (as it was). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (protection visa).
BACKGROUND
2.
The applicant is a citizen of Iran, who applied for a protection visa on 1 May 2017.
3.
On 25 February 2019, the Delegate refused the application. The decision was referred to the IAA for review.
4.
On 1 April 2020, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.
THE IAA’S DECISION
5.
The IAA observed that it had received submissions, a statutory declaration and supporting documentation, which included some new information. The IAA did not accept that the requirements of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) were met in relation to the following:
(1) an extract purportedly from a 2017 US Department of State Human Rights report (at [6]);
(2) a claim by the applicant in an updated statement that he had started attending an identified Church (Church) in November 2019 and converted to Christianity in the same month (at [7]);
(3) reference to an assertion purportedly made by an identified Doctor that trauma resets personality and changes behaviour (at [7]);
(4) a claim by the applicant that he believed the Basij wanted to recruit him because his parents were well known in the community and the Basij wanted to leverage this to expand their power and network in different local areas (at [9]); and
(5) a screenshot of the applicant’s volunteering profile on the internet, statement that he had been shortlisted for an award and statement that he would not have been involved in these types of activities but for his Christian conversion (at [10]).
6.
The IAA accepted that s 473DD of the Act was met in relation to copies of letters from members of the Church that supported the applicant’s claim of being a genuine Christian convert (at [8]).
7.
The IAA accepted that:
(1) the applicant was from Tehran where he has family, and that if he were to return, he would likely return there (at [14]);
(2) one of the applicant’s roles during military service was as claimed (at [14]);
(3) the applicant may be identifiable as an asylum seeker who has lived in a western country for a number of years (at [14]);
(4) the applicant may have been harassed by the Basij on one occasion due to his clothing (at [18]);
(5) friends and neighbours might have asked the applicant if he were interested in joining the Basij (at [18]);
(6) the applicant was baptised 12 days after his first attendance at the Church in Australia (at [23]);
(7) the applicant attended bible studies classes and Church services regularly since November 2019 (at [23]); and
(8) the applicant’s brother passed away in the manner indicated on his death certificate (at [26]).
8.
The IAA did not accept that:
(1) the applicant had to cease particular work or leave any jobs due to harassment (at [14] and [18]);
(2) the applicant was pressured and harassed to join the Basij or that he was taken by the Basij to their base and forced to sign an undertaking to join them (at [18]);
(3) the applicant had left Iran illegally, that he was wanted by the Basij or anyone else when he left, or that his family ‘faced problems’ after his departure (at [19]);
(4) the applicant faced a real chance of harm on account of his past experiences in Iran or his clothing, hairstyle or behaviour (at [21]);
(5) the applicant was a genuine and committed Christian convert (at [24]);
(6) the applicant’s brother was harassed, mistreated and killed by the authorities because he was critical of the regime or had an adverse profile (at [27]);
(7) the applicant’s family was monitored or harassed in connection with his brother (at [27]); or
(8) the applicant did not return to Iran after his brother’s death because of a fear for his safety (at [27]).
9.
The IAA found that the applicant had engaged in Christian activities in Australia solely for the purposes of strengthening his claims for protection. The Tribunal therefore disregarded this conduct for the purposes of s 36(2)(a) of the Act (at [24]). In relation to complementary protection, the IAA did not accept that the applicant would continue to engage in such behaviour in Iran. Having regard to country information and the applicant’s profile, the IAA was not satisfied that there was a real risk the applicant would suffer harm on account of his Christian activities and Facebook posts while in Australia, his views on Islam, or for being a non-practising Muslim (at [34]).
10.
The IAA considered that if the applicant were to return to Iran, it would be on a voluntary basis. Based upon country information and the applicant’s profile, the IAA was not satisfied that there was a real chance he would suffer harm on account of being a returning asylum seeker from a Western country where he had lived for a number of years (at [28]).
11.
The IAA concluded that the applicant was unable to meet the criteria under ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act for the grant of the visa. Accordingly, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision (at [30]-[36]).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
12.
The applicant commenced the current proceedings through an application filed on 21 April 2020. The applicant ultimately relied upon an amended application filed on 9 September 2020, containing the following grounds:
1. The second respondent (Authority) materially failed in the discharge of its exact function according to law.
Particulars
The Authority failed to form a state of satisfaction under section 473DD of the Act in respect of whether it should have considered “new information” contained in the applicant’s statutory declaration dated 24 March 2020.
2. Further or in the alternative, the Authority failed to consider a claim or integer of a claim made by the applicant.
Particulars
The applicant claimed that the process of voluntary return required him to provide information and documentation which would bring him to the adverse attention of the authorities.
The applicant also claimed that if forced to return to Iran he would take with him a video recording of his baptism and Persian Bible and would be betraying himself if he declared himself to be Muslim.
Ground 1
13.
Ground 1 contended that the IAA erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act. In submissions, the applicant contended that the error occurred in relation to what were said to be the following new claims raised in his statutory declaration dated 24 March 2020 (Statutory Declaration):
(a) that he had been "arrested and intimidated on different occasions" in Iran (CB 186);
(b) that the Sepah "offered [his] brother a deal" but his brother "refused to cooperate with them", leading up to his arrest and death in custody (CB 187); and
(c) that the trauma of losing his brother was the impetus for him to seek and convert to Christianity so readily in 2019 (CB 188).
14.
At hearing, the applicant’s Counsel confirmed that a forensic decision had been made to challenge only the IAA’s assessment of new information insofar as it related to the three ‘new claims’ identified above. The applicant did not contend that the IAA otherwise erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act.
15.
In support of the ground, the applicant relied upon cases indicating the importance of recognising new information and correctly applying to it the criteria under s 473DD of the Act. Such cases included EEM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 180; (2018) 265 FCR 527 (Barker, Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ) and BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44; (2019) 269 FCR 94 (Rares, Perry and Charlesworth JJ).
The first ‘new claim’
16.
In relation to what was said to have been the first ‘new claim’, the applicant drew attention to the applicant’s Entry Interview (CB 12), in which he had answered “no” to the question “Were you ever arrested or detained by the police or security organisations?” The applicant also relied upon a transcript of his protection visa interview (Transcript), in which he stated that he had decided to leave the country “prior to… being arrested or killed”. The applicant contended, by reference to this material, that the claim he had made to have been arrested was a new one that was required to be assessed according to s 473DD of the Act.
17.
However, I accept the Minister’s submission that the claim advanced by the applicant in relation to his arrest (or detention) appears to have been in substance the same as the claim that had been advanced in this regard before the Delegate. The applicant had claimed to have been harassed by members of the Basij, which was considered by the Delegate (CB 126-128). Before the Delegate, the applicant had identified a specific occasion where he claimed that he had been taken by the Basij to a nearby base, where he was effectively detained whilst they endeavoured to force him to sign an undertaking (CB 127). Although the applicant used the word “arrested” in his subsequent Statuary Declaration, he did not elaborate in any manner suggesting that he was referring to a different incident than his previously claimed instance of detention. The applicant made no claim, for example, in the Statutory Declaration, that the claimed incident of detention or arrest had involved some formal process that had not previously been articulated. He simply used a different word to describe what had happened (i.e. being involuntarily taken by the Basij to their base). The IAA therefore, understandably, appears to have regarded the claimed incident as being one and the same.
18.
I accept that the applicant said “no” at the Entry Interview when asked if he had previously been “arrested or detained”. However, this did not turn on any potential distinction between those two concepts. The applicant’s subsequent claim he had been detained was also inconsistent with this earlier evidence. Although the applicant referred to leaving Iran “prior to being arrested or killed”, this spoke to a claimed fear of arrest at the time he departed the country. It did not answer whether or not he had claimed to have been arrested previously.
19.
Having regard to the above, even if some distinction in the language used by the applicant could be considered “new information”, it is difficult to see how materiality could be demonstrated. The applicant generally submitted that the ‘new claims’ he relied upon were capable of meeting the requirements of s 473DD of the Act and that taking them into account may have “pushed the applicant over the line” regarding acceptance of his claims. However, it is not apparent how the use of the word “arrest” could realistically have achieved this, given that (as found above) the substance of the claim that was relied upon by the applicant did not appear to have changed in any real way. I am therefore not persuaded that materiality, or jurisdictional error, has been demonstrated in relation to the first ‘new claim’ relied upon by the applicant.
The second ‘new claim’
20.
What was said to have been the second ‘new claim’ was that the Sepah "offered [the applicant’s] brother a deal" but his brother "refused to cooperate with them", leading up to his arrest and death in custody (at [8] of the Statutory Declaration) (CB 187).
21.
In support of his contention that this was a new claim, the applicant drew attention to the context in [6] (CB 186), in which he responded to the Delegate’s conclusion that he had provided inconsistent and insufficient information regarding his brother’s death. The applicant submitted that the context, therefore, suggested that he was providing new information in response to the Delegate’s concerns.
22.
Both parties drew attention to what was said in the Delegate’s decision regarding the applicant’s evidence and claims regarding his brother’s death (CB 128-129). This detailed, inter alia, the following claims made at that stage of the process (footnotes omitted):
At the SHEV interview, the applicant was asked to describe the manner and circumstances of his brother’s death. The applicant repeated that while at work his brother used insulting words against the supreme leader in front of two Basij members. He claims that this resulted in his brother’s arrest and subsequent detention. He stated that his brother was released shortly after the initial detention however members of the Sepah continued to detain and release his brother from their custody over a period of time until the applicant and his family were advised of his brother’s death... He stated that his brother was in Sepah custody at time of his death and then transferred to a hospital from where his body was released. He stated that the hospital did not conduct an autopsy because the hospital was threatened by the authorities and therefore declared that his brother died of a heart attack. When asked if any of his brother or any family members were politically involved in Iran, the applicant said “no”. When asked why his brother was targeted in this manner, the applicant repeated that it was because of his brother voicing his opinion against the Iranian government on this one occasion. The applicant did not claim any other incidents involving his brother apart from this particular incident. When further prompted and asked if anything has happened to the applicant’s family since or in the recent past, the applicant stated “they warn my family that don’t look for further information about this issue. Otherwise you will end up in the same situation”. However, the applicant did not claim any form of harm to his family members since this incident… or in the recent past and stated that they are currently living in his home area.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 1 contended that the IAA erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act. In submissions, the applicant contended that the error occurred in relation to what were said to be the following new claims raised in his statutory declaration dated 24 March 2020 (Statutory Declaration):(a)that he had been "arrested and intimidated on different occasions" in Iran (CB 186);(b)that the Sepah "offered [his] brother a deal" but his brother "refused to cooperate with them", leading up to his arrest and death in custody (CB 187); and(c)that the trauma of losing his brother was the impetus for him to seek and convert to Christianity so readily in 2019 (CB 188). At hearing, the applicant’s Counsel confirmed that a forensic decision had been made to challenge only the IAA’s assessment of new information insofar as it related to the three ‘new claims’ identified above. The applicant did not contend that the IAA otherwise erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act. In support of the ground, the applicant relied upon cases indicating the importance of recognising new information and correctly applying to it the criteria under s 473DD of the Act. Such cases included EEM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 180; (2018) 265 FCR 527 (Barker, Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ) and BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44; (2019) 269 FCR 94 (Rares, Perry and Charlesworth JJ).The first ‘new claim’ In relation to what was said to have been the first ‘new claim’, the applicant drew attention to the applicant’s Entry Interview (CB 12), in which he had answered “no” to the question “Were you ever arrested or detained by the police or security organisations?” The applicant also relied upon a transcript of his protection visa interview (Transcript), in which he stated that he had decided to leave the country “prior to… being arrested or killed”. The applicant contended, by reference to this material, that the claim he had made to have been arrested was a new one that was required to be assessed according to s 473DD of the Act. However, I accept the Minister’s submission that the claim advanced by the applicant in relation to his arrest (or detention) appears to have been in substance the same as the claim that had been advanced in this regard before the Delegate. The applicant had claimed to have been harassed by members of the Basij, which was considered by the Delegate (CB 126-128). Before the Delegate, the applicant had identified a specific occasion where he claimed that he had been taken by the Basij to a nearby base, where he was effectively detained whilst they endeavoured to force him to sign an undertaking (CB 127). Although the applicant used the word “arrested” in his subsequent Statuary Declaration, he did not elaborate in any manner suggesting that he was referring to a different incident than his previously claimed instance of detention. The applicant made no claim, for example, in the Statutory Declaration, that the claimed incident of detention or arrest had involved some formal process that had not previously been articulated. He simply used a different word to describe what had happened (i.e. being involuntarily taken by the Basij to their base). The IAA therefore, understandably, appears to have regarded the claimed incident as being one and the same.