| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
VALUATION, COMPENSATION AND PLANNING LIST
S ECI 2019 05788
| BRIGHTON FORESHORE ASSOCIATION INC | Applicant |
| v | |
| BAYSIDE CITY COUNCIL (and others according to the attached schedule) | Respondents |
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JUDGE: | Kennedy JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 27 November 2020, 30 November 2020 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 2 February 2021 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Brighton Foreshore Association Inc v Bayside City Council |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VSC 26 |
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Appeal on question of law – Application to challenge decision of VCAT granting planning permit for use of land as life saving club, function room, and café – Whether VCAT obliged to take into account provisions in An Act to vest land in the Mayor Councillors and Burgesses of the Borough of Brighton for purposes of Public Recreation 1877 (Vic) (‘Vesting Act’) – Whether obligation arises by reason of s 61(4) Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) – Whether Vesting Act was otherwise a mandatory consideration – Whether VCAT correctly applied Vesting Act in any event – Whether open to find land is used for ‘public resort or recreation’ – Randwick Corporation v Rutledge (1959) 102 CLR 54, applied – Whether open to find restricted use is ancillary or incidental to public use of land - Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) ss 1, 3(1) (definition of ‘registered restrictive covenant’), 60(1)(f), 60(1A)(j), 61(4), 84B(1), 84B(2)(k) – Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 106 – Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic) s 3(1) (definition of ‘restriction’) – Local Government Act 1874 (Vic) s 483 – Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) s 148.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr S Moloney with Mr A Berger | Verduci Lawyers |
| For the First Respondent | Mr S Morris QC with Mr H Hassan | Maddocks |
HER HONOUR:
The applicant seeks leave to appeal on a question of law pursuant to s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) against a decision made by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) on 19 November 2019.
There were a number of grounds which were raised in a large variety of ways. However, the crucial question which arose was whether the Tribunal was obliged to, but did not, comply with alleged limitations on its powers under the Brighton Land Vesting Act 1877 (Vic) (‘the Vesting Act’).[1]
[1]An Act to vest land in the Mayor Councillors and Burgesses of the Borough of Brighton for the purposes of Public Recreation (31 October 1877) (Act No. 577 of 1877).
In terms of whether the Tribunal was obliged to take the Vesting Act into account, this arose in two ways:
(a) whether the Tribunal erred in respect of its finding that the Vesting Act and a Registrar’s caveat were each not a ‘registered restrictive covenant’ such that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 61(4) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987
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- Case
- [2021] VSC 26
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered whether VCAT was obliged to take into account the Vesting Act in deciding the planning permit. The Court found that VCAT was not obliged to consider the Vesting Act under s 61(4) of the Planning and Environment Act. The Court further found that the Vesting Act was not a mandatory consideration for VCAT to take into account. The Court also found that VCAT correctly applied the Vesting Act in any event. The Court found that it was open to VCAT to find that the land was used for ‘public resort or recreation’ under the Vesting Act. The Court found that it was also open to VCAT to find that the restricted use of the land was ancillary or incidental to the public use of the land.
The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi