Bridges v MIMIA

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[2004] HCATrans 408

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry         
  Perth  No P48 of 2004

B e t w e e n -

RONALD HENRY BRIDGES

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

Summons

McHUGH J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON MONDAY, 25 OCTOBER 2004, AT 4.30 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR R.H. BRIDGES appeared in person. 

MR M.T. RITTER:   May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent.   (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, Mr Bridges. 

MR BRIDGES:   May it please your Honour, I would like Mr De Alwis to speak on my behalf.

HIS HONOUR:   On what basis?

MR BRIDGES:   Because I do not understand the law myself and ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   He is not on the roll, is he?  He has been suspended from practice.

MR BRIDGES:   I wish to use amicus curiae.

HIS HONOUR:   Well, we usually only allow a friend of the Court to give assistance to the Court when the Court will obtain some advantage from the arguments.  Having read what has been prepared by the gentleman in question, I cannot see that I am going to get any assistance from him.

MR BRIDGES:   Well, I cannot speak for myself.

HIS HONOUR:   Mr Bridges, this application borders on hopeless.  You have a decision of the Full Court of this Court in which I dissented and in which the Court held that a person such as yourself can be deported.  Now, no single judge sitting here can act otherwise than in accordance with that decision.  It is the law of the land.  Now, you may be successful in getting leave to appeal and if you do then an application for bail or to be released can be made, but sitting as a single judge I am bound by the decision in Shaw’s Case.  I was one of the dissenters in Shaw’s Case, but I am bound by it and this application seems to me hopeless.

Your prospects of getting leave to appeal against the judgment of Justice Heydon are practically non‑existent, but even if you had a good chance of getting leave to appeal against his Honour’s decision, I would not have the power or I should not exercise any power I have to release you, because the law is clear that you can be deported as it stands.

Now, I have read the submissions that have been written on your behalf and there is just nothing that can be done to have you released from custody.  Is there anything further you want to say in the matter?

MR BRIDGES:   I do not know how to answer that, your Honour.  I have never spoken in a court for myself before.

HIS HONOUR:   I appreciate that, but the point is that you are imprisoned, in detention under a power conferred by an Act of Parliament, and you have to say that that Act cannot…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCATrans 408
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Mr. Bridges against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The dispute arose from Mr. Bridges's challenge to a decision made by the Minister, which had been affirmed by the Full Federal Court.

The central legal issue before McHugh J was whether Mr. Bridges should be granted leave to appeal to the High Court. This required consideration of whether the case involved a question of law that was of public importance, or whether it was otherwise in the interests of the administration of justice that the High Court should hear the appeal.

McHugh J considered the nature of the legal questions raised by Mr. Bridges and concluded that they did not meet the threshold for granting leave to appeal to the High Court. His Honour found that the issues were not of sufficient public importance, nor was it otherwise in the interests of the administration of justice to grant leave.

Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ronald Henry Bridges, a British subject who migrated to Australia in 1982, was convicted in 1996 of sexually abusing his adopted daughter between 1985 and 1994. He served a 10-year prison sentence and upon his release, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ordered his deportation under section 201 of the Migration Act. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed this deportation order in August 2000, and subsequent appeals in the Federal Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court were dismissed. Despite two special leave applications to the High Court being deemed abandoned, Bridges continued to pursue legal avenues to prevent his deportation. In May 2004, Justice Heydon dismissed his application for prerogative writs, holding that sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act validly applied to him. Bridges then sought release from detention and a stay of deportation pending a special leave application to appeal Heydon J's decision. The hearing in the High Court in October 2004 resulted in the dismissal of his application, with the Court finding that his detention and impending deportation were in accordance with the law, as affirmed by previous court decisions.

Ronald Henry Bridges, a British subject who migrated to Australia in 1982, was convicted in 1996 of six counts of sexual abuse of his adopted daughter, resulting in a 10-year imprisonment sentence. Following his release from prison, a deportation order was made against him in October 1999 under section 201 of the Migration Act, which was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in August 2000. An appeal in the Federal Court was dismissed by Justice Marshall in April 2001, and subsequently by the Full Court of the Federal Court later that year. In December 2002, Mr Bridges applied for prerogative writs against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, seeking to challenge the deportation order and his detention. This application was dismissed by Justice Heydon in May 2004, who held that the deportation order was valid and that there was no prospect of overruling the decision in Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Mr Bridges subsequently filed a summons in this Court seeking release from detention and to stay the deportation order pending an application for special leave to appeal. The application was heard by Justice McHugh, who dismissed it on the basis that it did not raise any serious question to be tried, as the matter had been comprehensively dealt with by prior decisions of the Federal Court and this Court, and the applicant had no real prospects of obtaining leave to appeal. The Court dismissed the application with costs and certified for counsel.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Migration Act permit the detention and deportation of British subjects who have been residents in Australia since 1982?
2. Are sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act constitutionally valid in their application to the applicant?
3. Does the applicant have a legal right to be released from immigration detention pending the outcome of his application for leave to appeal against the decision of Justice Heydon?
4. Is the continued detention of the applicant, despite his health issues, unlawful or unconstitutional?
5. Is there a procedural flaw in the application for release that needs to be addressed, specifically whether the application should have been directed to the Minister or the officer in charge of the Perth Immigration Detention Centre?

Held
1. Does the Migration Act permit the detention and deportation of British subjects who have been residents in Australia since 1982?
The court concluded that the Migration Act does permit the detention and deportation of the applicant, and dismissed this contention.

2. Are sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act constitutionally valid in their application to the applicant?
The court concluded that sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act are constitutionally valid in their application to the applicant, in line with the decision in Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

3. Does the applicant have a legal right to be released from immigration detention pending the outcome of his application for leave to appeal against the decision of Justice Heydon?
The court concluded that the applicant does not have a legal right to be released from immigration detention pending the outcome of his application for leave to appeal, and dismissed this contention.

4. Is the continued detention of the applicant, despite his health issues, unlawful or unconstitutional?
The court concluded that the continued detention of the applicant, despite his health issues, is not unlawful or unconstitutional, and dismissed this contention.

5. Is there a procedural flaw in the application for release that needs to be addressed, specifically whether the application should have been directed to the Minister or the officer in charge of the Perth Immigration Detention Centre?
The court noted that there might be a procedural issue with the application being directed to the Minister rather than the officer in charge of the detention centre, but did not consider it necessary to address this issue as the application was dismissed on other grounds.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant, Ronald Henry Bridges, sought orders to be released from immigration detention and to prevent his deportation pending the outcome of his application for leave to appeal against the decision of Justice Heydon. The central legal issues addressed by the court were whether the Migration Act permits the detention and deportation of British subjects who have been residents in Australia since 1982, the constitutional validity of sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act in their application to the applicant, the applicant's right to be released from immigration detention pending the appeal, the legality of continued detention given his health issues, and whether the application for release should have been directed to the Minister or the officer in charge of the detention centre.

The court began by addressing whether the Migration Act permits the detention and deportation of British subjects who have been residents in Australia since 1982. The court found that the applicant, despite being a British subject who had resided in Australia since 1982, was subject to the Migration Act's provisions for deportation. This conclusion was based on the Full Court's decision in Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which held that the federal government has the constitutional power to deport British subjects who have not been residents in Australia since 1901. The applicant's argument that the meaning of "alien" in section 51(xix) of the Constitution had changed was rejected as Shaw was a recent and clear decision of the High Court, with no prospect of being overruled.

The court also considered the constitutional validity of sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act as applied to the applicant. The court upheld these sections' validity, reaffirming Shaw's holding that the federal government has the power to legislate for the deportation of British subjects who have not been residents in Australia since 1901. The applicant's submissions challenging Shaw were dismissed as they had been previously raised and rejected.

Regarding the applicant's right to be released from immigration detention pending the outcome of his appeal, the court noted that the applicant was detained under section 253 of the Migration Act, which allows for the detention of non-citizens pending deportation. The court found that the applicant's health issues did not render his detention unlawful or unconstitutional. The court emphasized that the applicant was being detained under a power conferred by an Act of Parliament, and unless that Act could not constitutionally apply to him, his detention was lawful.

The court also briefly addressed the procedural issue of whether the application for release should have been directed to the Minister or the officer in charge of the Perth Immigration Detention Centre. However, this issue did not affect the outcome as the application was dismissed on other grounds.

The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that the Migration Act permits the detention and deportation of British subjects who have been residents in Australia since 1982, and sections 200 and 201 of the Migration Act are constitutionally valid in their application to such individuals. The court adhered to the Full Court's decision in Shaw and rejected the applicant's arguments that his detention was unlawful or unconstitutional. The court also confirmed that a single judge is bound by the decisions of the Full Court and cannot order the release of a detainee unless there is a clear constitutional or legal basis to do so.