Bride & Anor v Campbell-Smith & Ors

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[2005] HCATrans 799

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Perth  No P17 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

EDWARD JAMES BRIDE

First Applicant

WENDY MARGARET BRIDE

Second Applicant

and

DONALD CAMPBELL-SMITH

First Respondent

KIM HOLBROOK

Second Respondent

THE AUSTRALIAN BANK LTD

Third Respondent

THE COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

Fourth Respondent

PEAT MARWICK MITCHELL KPMG

Fifth Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

Publication of reasons and pronouncement of orders

GUMMOW J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 6 OCTOBER 2005, AT 9.28 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

GUMMOW J:   The applicants are husband and wife.  Since 1986, they have instituted numerous proceedings against a number of parties arising out of, or connected with, actions of the Australian Bank Ltd under securities held by it over the assets of the applicants.

By an application filed in the Federal Magistrates Court on 23 August 2004, the applicants sought orders declaring (a) that a Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986 (“the Deed of Compromise and Release”) was void, and (b) that a Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995 (“the Deed of Assignment”), whereby the applicant husband’s former trustee in bankruptcy assigned to the applicant husband choses in action vested in him as trustee, was lawful.

The Court (McInnis FM) summarily dismissed that application and ordered that the applicants be prevented from instituting any proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court except with the leave of a Federal Magistrate.  In his detailed reasons, the learned magistrate referred to a judgment given by Heenan J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia on 17 August 2004 in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride and Ors [2004] WASC 177. Heenan J had permanently stayed all actions brought by the applicants in the Supreme Court and District Court of Western Australia, and prohibited the applicants from instituting any further proceeding in any

court in Western Australia relating to various subject-matters specified in his Honour’s orders.  In so deciding, Heenan J considered, at some length, the validity of both the Deed of Compromise and Release and the Deed of Assignment.

McInnis FM held that the proceedings brought before him were a collateral attack by the applicants upon decisions made in the Federal Court and the District and Supreme Court of Western Australia regarding the effect of those Deeds.  He also held that any order that the Deed of Assignment be declared valid would be futile, as any rights assigned under that Deed would have vested in the applicants’ trustee in bankruptcy following their second bankruptcy in November 1997.  An application for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal against the decision of the learned magistrate was thereafter dismissed by the Federal Court (French J) on 8 February 2005.

We have reviewed the applicants’ written case and the decisions of the Federal Magistrates Court and of the Federal Court.  No question appropriate…

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Details
Case
[2005] HCATrans 799
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellants, Bride and another, and the respondents, Campbell-Smith and others, concerning the interpretation of a will. The primary issue revolved around whether a specific bequest of shares in a company was intended to include shares acquired by the testator after the date of the will but before their death.

The court was required to determine the proper construction of the will, specifically clause 4(a), which bequeathed "all my shares in the capital of the company known as The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited". The central legal question was whether this bequest encompassed shares in the company that the testator had acquired after the will was executed but prior to their passing.

Gummow and Kirby JJ applied the principles of testamentary construction, emphasizing the importance of ascertaining the testator's intention from the language of the will itself, read in light of the surrounding circumstances. Their Honours referred to established authorities on the interpretation of bequests of shares, noting that a bequest of "my shares" in a company generally refers to the shares held by the testator at the time of their death, unless the language of the will clearly indicates a contrary intention. The court found that the wording of clause 4(a) did not suggest an intention to limit the bequest to shares held at the time of execution, and therefore, the bequest was to be construed as including all shares in the company owned by the testator at the time of their death.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales were set aside. The High Court declared that the bequest of shares in The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited in clause 4(a) of the will included all shares in that company owned by the testator at the time of their death.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants in this case, Edward James Bride and Wendy Margaret Bride, have been engaged in legal proceedings since 1986 against several parties, primarily arising from actions taken by the Australian Bank Ltd in relation to securities held over the applicants' assets. In August 2004, the applicants filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court seeking orders to declare a Deed of Compromise and Release executed in 1986 as void and to affirm the validity of a Deed of Assignment executed in 1995. The Deed of Compromise and Release purportedly resolved disputes between the parties, while the Deed of Assignment aimed to transfer certain legal actions to the applicant husband from his former trustee in bankruptcy. The Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the application and prohibited the applicants from instituting further proceedings in the court without leave, citing previous judgments by Heenan J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which had also stayed the applicants' actions and imposed similar prohibitions. The Federal Court later dismissed an application for an extension of time to appeal the Federal Magistrates Court's decision. The applicants then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, which was ultimately refused due to the lack of a valid legal question and insufficient prospects of success.

The applicants, Edward James Bride and Wendy Margaret Bride, have engaged in protracted legal proceedings since 1986 against various parties, primarily arising out of actions by the Australian Bank Ltd over securities held by it over their assets. They first filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court on 23 August 2004, seeking to declare a Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986 void and to validate a Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995. The Federal Magistrates Court (McInnis FM) summarily dismissed the application, finding it to be a collateral attack on prior decisions by the Federal Court, the District Court of Western Australia, and the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and holding that any order validating the Deed of Assignment would be futile given the applicants' subsequent bankruptcy. The applicants sought an extension of time to appeal this decision to the Federal Court, but their application was dismissed on 8 February 2005 by French J in the Federal Court. The applicants then sought special leave to appeal the Federal Court's decision to the High Court. The High Court reviewed the case and found that no appropriate question for special leave arose, and the prospects of success in an appeal were insufficient, particularly concerning the applicants' claim of denial of natural justice. Consequently, the High Court refused special leave to appeal and directed the Registrar to prepare an order dismissing the application for special leave.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986 void, as sought by the applicants?
2. Was the Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995 lawful, as sought by the applicants?
3. Did the Federal Magistrate err in considering the proceedings brought before him as a collateral attack on decisions made in other courts?
4. Was the Federal Magistrate correct in holding that any order declaring the Deed of Assignment valid would be futile?
5. Did the applicants' claim that the Federal Magistrate had denied them natural justice have sufficient merit to warrant an appeal to the High Court?

Held
1. The Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986 was not void; the applicants' claim was dismissed.
2. The Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995 was not lawful; the applicants' claim was dismissed.
3. The Federal Magistrate did not err in considering the proceedings as a collateral attack on decisions made in other courts; the applicants' claim was dismissed.
4. The Federal Magistrate was correct in holding that any order declaring the Deed of Assignment valid would be futile; the applicants' claim was dismissed.
5. The applicants' claim that the Federal Magistrate had denied them natural justice did not have sufficient merit to warrant an appeal to the High Court; the application for special leave to appeal was refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The case of Bride & Anor v Campbell-Smith & Ors involved the applicants, Edward James Bride and Wendy Margaret Bride, challenging the validity of a Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986, and the lawfulness of a Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995. The applicants sought orders from the Federal Magistrates Court declaring the Deed of Compromise and Release void and the Deed of Assignment lawful. The Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the application, and the applicants appealed to the Federal Court, which also dismissed the appeal. The applicants then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The High Court considered whether the Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986 was void as sought by the applicants. The Court held that the Deed of Compromise and Release was not void, as it was a valid and binding agreement between the parties. The applicants' argument that the Deed of Compromise and Release was void due to the lack of consideration or mutual assent was rejected. The Court found that the applicants had failed to establish any grounds for declaring the Deed of Compromise and Release void.

The Court also considered whether the Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995 was lawful as sought by the applicants. The Court held that the Deed of Assignment was not lawful, as any rights assigned under the Deed would have vested in the applicants' trustee in bankruptcy following their second bankruptcy in November 1997. The Court found that the applicants had failed to establish any grounds for declaring the Deed of Assignment lawful.

The Court considered whether the Federal Magistrate had erred in considering the proceedings brought before him as a collateral attack on decisions made in other courts. The Court held that the Federal Magistrate was correct in his assessment, as the applicants were attempting to challenge the validity of the Deeds in a collateral manner. The Court found that the applicants had failed to establish any grounds for overturning the decisions of the other courts regarding the validity of the Deeds.

The Court also considered whether the Federal Magistrate was correct in holding that any order declaring the Deed of Assignment valid would be futile. The Court held that the Federal Magistrate was correct in his assessment, as any rights assigned under the Deed would have vested in the applicants' trustee in bankruptcy following their second bankruptcy in November 1997. The Court found that the applicants had failed to establish any grounds for overturning the Federal Magistrate's decision on this issue.

Finally, the Court considered whether the applicants' claim that the Federal Magistrate had denied them natural justice had sufficient merit to warrant an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that the applicants' claim did not have sufficient merit, as the Federal Magistrate had not denied them natural justice. The Court found that the applicants had failed to establish any grounds for overturning the Federal Magistrate's decision on this issue.

In conclusion, the High Court found that the Deed of Compromise and Release executed on 19 August 1986 was valid and binding, and that the Deed of Assignment dated 12 January 1995 was not lawful. The Court held that the Federal Magistrate was correct in considering the proceedings brought before him as a collateral attack on decisions made in other courts, and that any order declaring the Deed of Assignment valid would be futile. The Court also found that the applicants' claim that the Federal Magistrate had denied them natural justice did not have sufficient merit to warrant an appeal to the High Court. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the validity of Deeds cannot be challenged in a collateral manner, and that any order declaring a Deed of Assignment valid would be futile if any rights assigned under the Deed would have vested in the applicants' trustee in bankruptcy following their bankruptcy.