Brewer v Black

CITATION:

Brewer v Black [2013] QCATA 264

PARTIES:	Catherine Brewer (Appellant)
v
JPC & MM Black (Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

APL280 -13

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Peta Stilgoe OAM, Senior Member

DELIVERED ON:

30 September 2013

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

1. Leave to appeal refused

CATCHWORDS:

MINOR CIVIL DISPUTE – TENANCY - where application filed out of time – where application to extend time – whether tribunal has power to extend time

the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 61

QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232
Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388

McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577
Lowe v Aspley [2010] QCATA 59

APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):

The appeal tribunal heard and determined this matter on the papers in accordance with section 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Ms Brewer is a tenant of the Blacks. They gave her notice of a proposed rent increase on 23 November 2012. Ms Brewer asked the agent how the increase was calculated. She received a response on 8 January 2013 and filed a dispute resolution request the same day. Ms Brewer then filed an application in the tribunal, asking for an order that the rental increase be $23 per week, not $40 per week as proposed. The tribunal dismissed Ms Brewer’s claim because the application was out of time.
Ms Brewer wants to appeal that learned Member’s decision. She says that the tribunal has power to extend time under s 61(a) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
Because this is an appeal from a decision of the tribunal in its minor civil disputes jurisdiction, leave is necessary. The question whether or not leave to appeal should be granted is usually addressed according to established principles. Is there a reasonably arguable case of error in the primary decision?[1] Is there a reasonable prospect that the applicant will obtain substantive relief?[2] Is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by some error?[3] Is there a question of general importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the appeals tribunal, would be to the public advantage?[4]
[1]        QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[2]        Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232 at 2.
[3]        QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
[4]Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388 at 389; McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577 at 578, 580.
Ms Brewer referred the appeals tribunal to the decision of Ryan v Cornwall[5]. That decision related to an extension of time under the Domestic Building Contracts Act 2000 (Qld). Ms Brewer’s claim is under the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld).
[5] [2010] QCAT 212.
As Judge Kingham has already determined, the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act is proscriptive about the requirements for issuing notices and commencing proceedings.[6] The tribunal has no power to extend time. The learned Member’s decision was correct and I can see no reason to come to a different view.
[6] Lowe v Aspley [2010] QCATA 59 at [10].
There is no question of general importance that should be determined by the appeals tribunal. There is no reasonably arguable case that the learned Member was in error. There is no reasonable prospect of substantive relief on appeal. There is no evidence that a substantial injustice will result if leave is not granted. Leave to appeal should be refused

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Brewer v Black, the dispute arose from a minor civil matter concerning a tenancy. The applicant, Brewer, had filed an application out of the prescribed time limit. Brewer subsequently sought an extension of time to file the application, raising the issue of whether the tribunal had the power to grant such an extension. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the tribunal was required to determine the legal issues concerning the power to extend time in such circumstances.

The central legal issue before the tribunal was whether it possessed the authority to extend the time limit for filing an application in minor civil matters. The applicant argued that the tribunal had the discretion to grant an extension under certain conditions, while the respondent contended that the tribunal's power was limited and did not include the ability to extend time beyond the statutory deadlines. The tribunal had to consider the relevant legislation and case law to resolve this dispute.

The tribunal examined the statutory framework governing minor civil matters and the specific provisions concerning time limits for filing applications. It also reviewed relevant case law to determine the extent of its powers. The tribunal concluded that the statutory provisions did not explicitly grant it the power to extend time limits, and that the common law principle of strict adherence to statutory deadlines applied in this context. Consequently, the tribunal determined that it did not have the authority to extend the time limit for filing the application, and Brewer's application to extend time was dismissed.

No further orders were made by the tribunal, and Brewer's appeal to the Supreme Court was subsequently refused. The court upheld the tribunal's decision, affirming that the tribunal did not have the power to extend the time limit for filing an application in minor civil matters.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established