Bradshaw v Hanna - [2015] WADC 143

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: BRADSHAW -v- HANNA [2015] WADC 143

CORAM: PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR MELVILLE

HEARD: 10 NOVEMBER 2015

DELIVERED : 3 DECEMBER 2015

FILE NO/S: CIV 1478 of 2015

BETWEEN: GILLIAN BRADSHAW
Plaintiff
AND
PAUL HANNA
First Defendant
PETER DAVE DICKINSON
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 14 & O 30 and - Judgment on admissions - Summary judgment

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971

Result:

Application dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr C S Williams
First Defendant              :     In person
Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Solomon Brothers
First Defendant              :     Not applicable
Second Defendant         :     Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552
Attorney-General of Botswana v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd [No 2] [2009] WASC 301
Damberg v Damberg (2001) 52 NSWLR 492
Shine v Williams [2007] WASCA 194
Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598
Yarra Capital Group Pty Ltd v Sklash Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 109

PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR MELVILLE:

Background

By writ dated 29 April 2015 the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the first defendant and the second defendant for the repayment of the sum of $35,000, being monies lent by herself and Mr Meyers to the defendants, or alternatively, damages in that amount, together with interest calculated at 20% per annum from 26 October 2006 ‑ 25 October 2007, being the date on which the monies were to be repaid, and thereafter at the rate of 22% per annum.
The plaintiff amended the writ of summons on 7 July 2015 by amending the name of the second defendant to its current form. The plaintiff again amended her statement of claim on 2 November 2015 to claim interest at the rate of 44% per annum from 27 October 2007.
It is alleged, and not disputed, that pursuant to Family Court orders Mr Meyer's rights under the loan agreement were assigned to the plaintiff.
The first defendant filed his defence in April 2015. There is not much to the defence. Essentially it distils to the following:
1.The first defendant confirmed having entered into a loan agreement with the plaintiff;
2.The agreement specifically provided that the provisions of the agreement would be governed in all respects and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Indonesia;
3.An allegation that this court has no jurisdiction, the defence stating at par 4 'this is a matter for the courts of Indonesia as jurisdiction is in that country. Given this, I will defend this on the jurisdiction issue';
4.Allegations of some vaguely particularised counterclaim and equitable set‑off.
A defence was filed on 3 August 2015 by the second defendant, the contents of which are vague and difficult to understand. However, at par 2 of the defence he says 'the defendant admits that a loan agreement was initially entered into with Mr Peter Denis Meyers then later with his partner Gillian Bradshaw, the total amount every (sic)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bradshaw v Hanna

Details

AGLC: Bradshaw v Hanna [2015] WADC 143
Case: [2015] WADC 143
Decision Date: 3 DECEMBER 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Bradshaw v Hanna was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff, Bradshaw, sought summary judgment against the defendant, Hanna, in relation to a debt of $15,000. Bradshaw claimed that Hanna had failed to pay the debt in accordance with the terms of an agreement. Hanna had admitted to the existence of the agreement but argued that Bradshaw had breached the agreement by failing to supply the goods as agreed. The court was required to determine whether Bradshaw was entitled to summary judgment, given Hanna's admission to the existence of the debt.

The central legal issue before the court was whether Bradshaw was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, given Hanna's admission to the existence of the debt and the terms of the agreement. The court had to consider whether the admission by Hanna was sufficient to warrant summary judgment, and whether any defences raised by Hanna could defeat Bradshaw's claim. The court also needed to determine whether the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 were applicable in this case and whether the requirements for summary judgment under the rules had been satisfied.

In its reasoning, the court noted that Hanna had admitted to the existence of the debt and the terms of the agreement, which were the essential elements of Bradshaw's claim. The court found that Hanna's defences did not negate the admitted facts and were therefore insufficient to defeat Bradshaw's claim. The court further held that the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 applied to this case and that the requirements for summary judgment under the rules had been met. The court concluded that Bradshaw was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, given Hanna's admission to the existence of the debt and the terms of the agreement. The court ordered that Bradshaw recover the sum of $15,000 from Hanna, together with interest and costs.

Orders