FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BPW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 414
Appeal from: BPW16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1395 File number: QUD 338 of 2017 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 28 March 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (class XA) visa – appellant cavilling with factual findings – credibility findings matters for the Tribunal – no appellable error Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 424A Cases cited: BPW16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1395
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
Date of hearing: 27 March 2018 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms L Helsdon of Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
QUD 338 of 2017 BETWEEN: BPW16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MARCH 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COLLIER J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in which the primary Judge dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had, in turn, dismissed an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).
In my view the appeal has no merit and should be dismissed.
Background
Material background facts are set out in the decision of the primary Judge (BPW16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1395). In summary, the appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 6 May 2013 and subsequently applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 2 September 2013. A delegate of the Minister refused the grant of the visa on 24 October 2014, and the appellant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision to the Tribunal. It appears that, in total, the Tribunal conducted three separate hearings. The appellant was represented at the Tribunal hearings by a lawyer, with an interpreter also present.
Tribunal hearing
In summary, in the Tribunal, the appellant claimed fear of returning to Bangladesh for the following reasons:
·He was a supporter and member of the Awami League political party, as were his father and brothers. This involved arranging rallies.
·The appellant had been involved with the Bangladesh Student League (
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 414
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal issues surrounding the Tribunal's evaluation of the appellant's credibility and the weight given to his documentary and testimonial evidence. The Tribunal had concluded that BPW16's claims were not credible, primarily due to inconsistencies and lack of detail in his accounts. The court found that the Tribunal had appropriately exercised its discretion in assessing the credibility of the appellant's evidence. The court held that the Tribunal's decision not to accept certain claims was not unreasonable, and that the Tribunal's findings on the credibility of BPW16's evidence were matters within its jurisdiction. The appellant's arguments primarily challenged the factual findings of the Tribunal, which the court held were not subject to appeal. The court found no appellable error in the Tribunal's reasoning or its adherence to procedural fairness.
Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs. This decision underscored the principle that credibility assessments and factual findings made by the Tribunal are generally not subject to review by higher courts, except in cases of clear error or procedural unfairness.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By way of oral submissions, the appellant contended as follows:·He sought to submit additional social media/video evidence referable to events following the Tribunal decision.·He was given inadequate time at the Tribunal hearing, and wanted to say many things, but was not given an opportunity to do so.·He thought that at one point during the Tribunal hearings his lawyer, who was on the telephone, was out of contact for approximately 20 to 25 minutes.·He has medical issues with his hand and sought a fresh opportunity to re-state his case to the Tribunal.Consideration Examining both sets of the grounds of appeal and the submissions of the parties I now make the following findings. Insofar as the appellant seeks to raise arguments not advanced below he requires leave of the Court to do so. An important factor for the Court to take into account in determining whether to grant leave is whether the proposed grounds have merit. In my view none of the grounds of appeal on which the appellant seeks to rely are meritorious. Grounds of appeal 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the appellant’s notice of appeal have no merit because they merely cavil with the decision of the primary Judge and the factual findings of the Tribunal, and ultimately identify no appellable error. Ground of appeal 3 clearly relates to the issue raised below concerning the Tribunal’s alleged failure to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act. This issue was addressed comprehensively by his Honour, and I can identify no error in his Honour’s reasoning. In relation to the second set of grounds of appeal:·Although in grounds 1 and 2 the appellant claims that the Tribunal had acted unreasonably, he simply cavils with the factual findings of the Tribunal. The refusal of the Tribunal to accept the evidence or submissions of the appellant does not mean that the Tribunal has acted unreasonably.·In grounds 3 and 4 the appellant merely cavils with the Tribunal’s factual findings.·In ground 5 the appellant appears to accuse the Tribunal of bad faith in respect of questions the Tribunal member asked the appellant concerning Bangladesh politics. However, given that the appellant claimed protection on the basis of his alleged political affiliations and activities, it can scarcely be said that questions of the Tribunal relating to politics were irrelevant.·In ground 6 the appellant claims that the Tribunal hearing was conducted in a manner which was procedurally unfair. However I note that this issue was not raised before the primary Judge, and in any event appears based simply on the fact that the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s arguments. The refusal of the Tribunal to accept the evidence or submissions of the appellant does not mean that the Tribunal has acted without procedural fairness.·In grounds 6 and 7 the appellant claims that he is a member of a social group, namely those who have a political affiliation with the Awami League. As Gleeson CJ explained in S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473 at [31]: In a case like the present, defining the particular social group and the type of harm feared is fundamental in determining whether a member of that group has a well-founded fear of persecution. Only by defining the group and its characteristics or attributes, actual or imputed, can a tribunal of fact determine whether the harm feared is well-founded and is causally related to the particular social group … While I doubt that being a supporter of a political party means membership of a “social group” with other supporters, in any event I consider the appellant’s claims add nothing to his claims before the Tribunal relating to his political opinion. Those claims concerning his political opinion were dealt with, in detail, by the Tribunal. ·In ground 8 the appellant merely cavils with the Tribunal’s factual findings·In ground 9 the appellant claims bias on the part of the Tribunal, in addition to failure by the Tribunal to take into account relevant considerations. The appellant’s claims concerning bias lack merit – they are unparticularised, and appear to merely constitute a complaint about the Tribunal’s disinclination to accept the appellant’s evidence and submissions. I also consider that the appellant’s claim that the Tribunal ignored “all other independent information” is not substantiated.·In ground 10 the appellant claims that the Tribunal failed to apply the “correct test” in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. In my view the Tribunal did apply the correct test, and this ground has no merit.·Ground 11 constitutes a broad claim that the Tribunal failed to apply the rules of procedural fairness. This claim lacks merit.·Grounds 12, 13, 14 and 15 are mere assertions and do not identify appellable errors.·The appellant’s claim in ground 16 that he sought an adjournment “at the middle of hearing”, which was refused, has not been raised prior to this appeal. There is no material before the Court to substantiate this allegation.·Ground 17 raises the issue of the obligation of the Tribunal to verify the authenticity of documentation before it. I note, however, that:othe appellant was represented before the Tribunal, and to that extent was in a position to provide evidence;othere were matters other than the documentary evidence which cast doubt on the appellant’s claims, including unexplained provision of material late in the process and inconsistencies in the evidence; andoin light of inconsistencies in the evidence, there was nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons to indicate that any further inquiry by the Tribunal would have yielded a useful result.·Ground 18 simply sets out the order sought by the appellant.