BPK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BPK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 625

Appeal from: BPK15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 3241
File number: NSD 1692 of 2015
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 2 June 2016
Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 27 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: N Maddocks, DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1692 of 2015
BETWEEN:

BPK15

First Appellant

BPM15

Second Appellant

BPN15

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal): see BPK15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 3241 (BPK15).  The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the appellants Protection (Class XA) visas (the Visas).

  2. The appellants, who are a husband and wife and their son born in China, arrived in Australia from China on 15 June 2013 on visitors’ visas as members of a tour group.  On 26 June 2013 the appellants absconded from their tour group and on 27 June 2013 they applied for the Visas.  Since their arrival in Australia, the first and second named appellants, the husband and wife respectively, have had a second child who is not a party to the proceedings. 

  3. The first named appellant (who I will refer to as the appellant) set out her claims in a statement annexed to her protection visa application.  She claims that she has been persecuted in China because of her and her husband’s desire to have a second child, which they have been trying to do for several years.  Her first child has been sick since he was born with unexplained bleeding and other problems and for “the stability and future” of their family they wished to have another child.  The appellant claims that she has been pregnant twice, in 2010 and 2012, but on both occasions officials in the local government…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BPK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 625
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in BPK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was brought before the court by the appellants, who sought to challenge the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant them visas. The dispute centred on the appellants' claims for protection, particularly in relation to their religious beliefs and experiences in China, which they argued warranted their acceptance for visas under Australian immigration law.

The court was required to determine whether the decision of the primary judge in the Federal Circuit Court was affected by apprehended bias. The appellants argued that the primary judge's dismissal of their grounds was cursory and suggested bias. The legal issue, therefore, was whether the appellants had demonstrated that a fair-minded and appropriately informed lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring a fair, impartial, and independent mind to the determination of the case on its merits.

In assessing the claim of apprehended bias, the court applied the principles established in previous cases, noting that the appellants needed to distinctly make and clearly prove their allegation. The court found that the primary judge had considered each of the appellants' grounds in detail and made findings accordingly. The appellants had not identified any specific matter that would lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and found that the primary judge's decision was not affected by bias.

The court further ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. This ruling underscores the high threshold for establishing bias in judicial proceedings and reaffirms the importance of a fair and impartial consideration of each party's case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 29 June 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellants the Visas.THE DELEGATE’S DECISION The delegate refused to grant the appellants the Visas. The delegate found that the appellant was a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and set out her claims for protection referring to her older son’s medical condition, her and her husband’s desire to have a second child, that she had become pregnant twice and on those occasions had been forced to undergo an abortion, which she found traumatic, and that her new found Christian faith had helped her through these times and she now believes that abortion is murder. The delegate found that there were a number of inconsistencies between the appellant’s evidence and that of her husband. Those inconsistencies related to their level of commitment to Christianity, claims concerning the husband’s work on Sunday and basic details about what occurred on the day of the second termination and the time when the medical certificate from the Yi He Hospital came into the possession of the couple. The delegate concluded that the protection claims had been concocted and that the medical certificate provided to support the claim of the appellant’s termination of her pregnancy had been fabricated. The delegate also concluded that the appellant and her husband had joined a Christian church in Sydney for the purpose of enhancing their protection claims and disregarded that conduct under s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL The Tribunal had the following documents before it which were provided by the appellant or her agent:·various media articles, apparently downloaded from the internet;·two notarial certificates in Chinese, with translations, in relation to the appellant and her husband setting out personal details including date of birth, residential address, names and status of parents and that they have no criminal record;·a marriage certificate;·a certificate dated 6 July 2013 from the head teacher of a kindergarten stating that the third appellant was a student there and that he suffered a spontaneous nose bleed about once a week;·a “doctor certificate” dated 12 August 2012 for the appellant from a doctor at Yi He Hospital, Tianhe district, Guangzhou which included “Treatment and suggestion: Terminate pregnancy and rest for 7 days”;·baptism certificates for the appellant and her husband issued by the Bread of Life Christian Church, Sydney and a document from that church dated 26-27 October 2013 setting out times and places of church activities and services;·several medical documents relating to the appellant’s pregnancy with an estimated due date of 7 June 2014;·a document from the senior pastor of the Bread of Life Christian Church, Sydney dated 5 October 2014 certifying that the appellant had attended the church for more than a year and had been baptised there;·a document in Chinese with the English words: “This Certificate is awarded to (name in Chinese) in recognition of valuable contributed to” which appeared to be dated 20.4.2014; and·two supporting statements: one from Ruan Wenying dated 3 July 2013 from Zhaoqing City, Guangdong province and who has known the appellant for eleven years; and one from Mo Ling dated 5 July 2013 from Zhongshan City, Guangdong province and who has known the appellant for fifteen years.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants did not file any written submissions in support of their notice of appeal. The appellant appeared at the hearing on behalf of all of the appellants. She made oral submissions which are considered below.CONSIDERATION By their first ground of appeal the appellants allege that the decision of the primary judge is affected by apprehended bias. The basis of the allegation of apprehended bias is that the primary judge rejected the appellants’ grounds in what is described as a cursory fashion or as a mere formality. In ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30 a Full Court of this Court (Allsop CJ, Kenny and Griffiths JJ) noted at [35] that the test for apprehended bias is relatively well settled: whether a fair minded and appropriately informed lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring a fair, impartial and independent mind to the determination of the matter on its merits. At [36] the Full Court set out other relevant principles to determining whether a decision is affected by apprehended bias as follows:36 Other relevant principles are:(a)at least the following two steps are involved in a case involving an allegation of apprehended bias:(i)there must be an identification of what it has said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and(ii)there must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from a course of deciding a case on its merits (Ebner at [8] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ);(b)an allegation of bias against a judge on the basis of prejudgment is a serious matter not the least because it carries with it the suggestion that the judge has failed to honour his or her judicial oath as such might be questioned by the fair-minded observer. As is also the case where such an allegation is made against an administrative officer, the allegation must be “distinctly made and clearly proved” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 (Jia Legeng) at [69] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J); and(c)as noted above, the test assumes that the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer is to be attributed with appropriate knowledge of relevant matters so as to be in a position to make a reasonably informed assessment of the likelihood of apprehended bias (see, for example, Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [13] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow and Hayne JJ and at [53] per Kirby J; British American Tobacco at [47]-[48] per French CJ and at [144] per Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ and Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20 at [23] per Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ and at [57] per Gageler J). A claim of bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved. That has not occurred here. There is no evidence of bias on the part of the primary judge. The appellants have not identified what it is they say would lead the primary judge to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits and, if identified, the connection between that matter and the feared deviation from a course of deciding the case on its merits. The primary judge considered each of the grounds raised by the appellants in their amended application and made findings having done so. The allegation of bias on the part of the primary judge is not made out.