BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited [2003] FCA 520

CONTRACT – interpretation – contract for sale and supply of fuel – pricing provisions – whether ambiguity in provision applicable to new prices following Subsequent Price Negotiation – whether new prices not agreed bind purchaser failing termination – whether ambiguity in provision relating to Clean Fuel Quality Premium – meaning of ‘charged’ and ‘any other customer in Western Australia’ – relevance and admissibility of surrounding circumstances – effect of applicant’s statement on evidence during course of trial

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 87

Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA) s 8
Property Law Act 1969 (WA) ss 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16

The Macquarie Dictionary, Revised 3rd ed., 2001
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993

G McMeel, ‘Prior negotiations and subsequent conduct – The next step forward for contractual interpretation?’, Law Quarterly Review, vol 119, p 272
DW McLauchlan, ‘A contract contradiction’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, vol 30, 1999, p 175
H King, ‘The admissibility of extrinsic evidence as an aid to contract interpretation:  pushing objectivity to absurd limits’, Corporate and Business Law Journal, vol 6(2), 1994, p 187
JW Carter, Carter on Contract, Butterworths looseleaf, 2002
S Charles, ‘Interpretation of ambiguous contracts by reference to subsequent conduct’, Journal of Contract Law, vol 4, 1991, p 16

Mehta & Anor v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) ATPR 41-026 applied
Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189 cited
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 applied
Esso Australia Ltd v Australian Petroleum Agents’ & Distributors’ Association [1999] 3 VR 642 considered
Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 186 ALR 289 followed
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 considered
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2001] 1 AC 251 considered
Ray Brooks Pty Ltd v NSW Grains Board [2002] NSWSC 1049 disapproved
Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 cited
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen (The Diana Prosperity) [1976] 1 WLR 51 cited
LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74 approved
Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 152 considered
Ex parte Dawes; Re Moon (1886) 17 QB 275 followed
Bakker v Chambri Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9234 approved
Glynn v Margetson & Co [1893] AC 351 cited
Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420 cited
Punjab National Bank v De Boinville [1992] 1 WLR 1138 cited
Postle v Sengstock [1994] 2 Qd R 290 cited
Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 cited
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153 applied
Ankar Pty Limited v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549 cited
Coghlan v S H Lock (Australia) Ltd (1987) 70 ALR 1 cited

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 520
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd, the central dispute concerned the interpretation of certain clauses within a contract between the two parties, specifically relating to the price negotiation clause and the charge for a clean fuels quality premium (CFQP). The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiff, BP Australia, sought clarification and enforcement of the contractual terms, while the defendant, Nyran, contested these interpretations and sought to limit the charges for the CFQP.

The legal issues before the court involved the construction of specific clauses within the contract. The primary questions were whether the contract intended to delete certain price negotiation terms and whether the CFQP should be charged under the circumstances described. The court had to determine the admissibility of evidence presented to clarify these contractual terms and whether surrounding circumstances could be considered in interpreting the contract.

The court ultimately concluded that the plain meaning of the contract terms was clear and unambiguous, thus precluding reliance on surrounding circumstances. The court found that the evidence provided by BP did not lead to a different interpretation of the contract and that any alternative methods of charging for the CFQP were permissible under the contract. Consequently, the court dismissed BP's application and allowed Nyran's amended cross-claim in part, ordering that BP repay any excess amounts charged for the CFQP, pay interest on those amounts, and cover Nyran's costs associated with the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

(a) The applicant’s second further amended application be dismissed;

(b) The respondent’s amended cross-claim be allowed in part;

(c) The applicant pay to the respondent any amounts it has recovered from the respondent on account of CFQP in excess of the amounts to which it was entitled having regard to the proper construction of the RFSA;

(d) All necessary accounts and/or inquiries be taken for the purposes of the order in par 6 above;

(e) The applicant pay to the respondent interest pursuant to s 51A of the Federal Court Act 1976 on any amounts referred to in par 6;

(f) The applicant/cross-respondent pay the respondent/cross-claimant’s costs of the application and amended cross-claim.’

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The question then arose of to what extent the evidence which had that far been received would be admissible in relation to the construction questions. The result was that senior counsel for the applicant reduced to writing what was relied upon. That statement (‘the October 24 statement’) read:‘1.EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRICE NEGOTIATION CLAUSE:All evidence which tends to establish the fact when entering into the RSFA the parties intended by the RSFA to delete the underlined words in clause 21.2 of the FSA – “if new prices have not been agreed, then the prices specified in clause 11 will continue to apply”.(Precise evidence to be provided)2.EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OF CLAUSE 81:All evidence which tends to establish the fact known to each party prior to execution of the RSFA that the CFQP would be charged when an amount separately identified and described as a CFQP was imposed or asked for as part of the price of fuel.(Precise evidence to be provided)’The trial proceeded on that basis. In closing submissions, however, senior counsel for the applicant made written and oral submissions concerning the material surrounding circumstances. In the written submission reference was made to the objective framework of facts within which the Deed and RFSA are said to have come into existence. It was submitted that the presumed intention of the applicant and the respondent was as set out in the following six propositions:‘1.The transaction in question was the amendment of the FSA based upon oral discussions, written communications and the execution of the Deed and RFSA.2.The parties to the transaction were two substantial oil companies, the distinction between BP and Gull being that BP is engaged in the refining, wholesaling and retailing of fuel whereas Gull is primarily concerned with the retailing of fuel from service stations located in Perth.3.The primary purposes of the transaction were as follows:(a) to accommodate the consequences of the introduction of regulations altering the specification of fuels from 1 January 2000 and the extension of the term of the FSA from 3 years to 7 years;(b) to amend the Price Negotiations clauses in the FSA by deleting those provisions to the effect that if new prices were not agreed then old prices would continue to apply;(c) to agree to changes to the basis for termination of the fuel supply arrangements;(d) to agree to the terms referable to payment of a clean fuels quality premium to be charged by BP in consequence of the introduction of the regulations.4.The mutual concern of BP and Gull was that Gull should compete on a level playing field with Shell, Caltex, Mobil and BP Marketing in a commercial environment altered by reason of BP’s exit from its refinery exchange arrangements with Shell, Caltex and Mobil, which involved the swapping of fuel in different locations to commercial buy/sell agreements.5.BP’s concern was that the extension of the FSA from 3 to 7 years should not be upon terms whereby it could not alter the base price of fuel; Gull’s concern was that it should not be financially prejudiced by BP imposing an increase in the base price.6.Gull’s awareness post 3 August 2000 of BP’s contention that it could impose an increase in the base price, which awareness continued up to and including the date upon which Gull executed the Deed and RFSA (19 February 2002) and the conduct of BP and Gull post 3 August 2000.’The written submission then set out relevant facts said to support a finding in terms of the six propositions.OBJECTIONS ON GROUND OF TRIAL HISTORY

Decision

Reasons for decision

My view therefore is that the plain meaning of the words in issue in cl 81 is clear and no ambiguity or alternative susceptibilities of meaning properly arise. On a reading of Codelfa that would preclude reference to surrounding circumstances. In any event, if there was such reference, the first line of evidence relied on for the applicant that there was a mutuality in the desire to preserve a level playing field, it would arguably not lead to a different result to that which I have arrived at. The second line of evidence, if not precluded by the rule relating to admissibility of evidence subsequent to contract, would not be determinative because the method of charging employed from time to time does not preclude acceptability of other methods of charging. CONCLUSION For these reasons I consider the applicant’s second further amended application should be dismissed and the amended cross-claim allowed in part.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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