Boyes v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Boyes v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1096

DAVID E BOYES v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
VID586 OF 2007

JESSUP J
18 JULY 2007
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID586 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

DAVID E BOYES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

JESSUP J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 JULY 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID586 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

DAVID E BOYES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

JESSUP J

DATE:

18 JULY 2007

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application pursuant to O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules. The applicant seeks an extension of time for filing and serving a Notice of Appeal from a judgment of Kenny J given on 10 April 2007 in which her Honour dismissed an application pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (“the Judiciary Act”) with respect to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) given on 24 April 2006. In that decision the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister made on 3 January 2006 to cancel the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”).

  2. Under O 52 r 15(2), the first question is whether there are special reasons such as would enliven the court’s discretion to extend the time for the filing and service of a Notice of Appeal.  The requirement of special reasons was explained by the Full Court in Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195 in the following terms:

    In that context the expression ‘special reasons’ is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is 21 days.  But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case.  Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary.  We do not think the use of the expression ‘for special reasons’ implies something narrower than this.

    Even when special reasons are established pursuant to O 52 r 15(2), the power to grant leave to appeal is discretionary (Howard v The Australian Electoral Commission [2000] FCA 1767 at [7]).

  3. The reasons upon which the applicant relies, and which he contends are special within the terms of O 52 r 15(2), fall into two categories. The first category relates to a departmental review of the decision originally made by the delegate on 3 January 2006. I have been told, without objection, that that review…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1096
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Boyes sought an extension of time to appeal against a decision of the Minister for Immigration & Citizenship. The applicant contended that they had not been notified of the decision in a timely manner, and this lack of notice was due to no fault of their own. The primary legal issue was whether the applicant had provided sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time for the appeal. The court had to determine whether the delay in notification was significant enough to warrant an extension and whether this delay was due to circumstances beyond the applicant’s control.

The court examined the circumstances of the case and found that the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would justify an extension of time. The court emphasised that the onus was on the applicant to prove that the delay was due to factors beyond their control and that they had acted with due diligence. The court concluded that the applicant had not met this burden of proof and that the delay was due to the applicant's own failure to monitor their correspondence. The court further held that the applicant had not shown any prejudice that would warrant an extension of time.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The court also ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the application. This decision underscores the importance of timely monitoring of correspondence and the need for applicants to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to warrant an extension of time in appeal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

JESSUP J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JESSUP J

Full text does not contain this section.