Boyes v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Boyes v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 505

IMMIGRATION – review of decision of AAT cancelling applicant’s visa – applicant does not pass character test due to substantial criminal record – whether AAT had no regard to relevant considerations, relied on irrelevant consideration and asked itself wrong question – no error found

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
Epenisa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 80 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 referred to
Lu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 141 FCR 346 referred to
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 61 FLR 354 referred to
Djalic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 292 referred to
Taylor v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 208 referred to
Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 107 FCR 133 distinguished

DAVID ERIC BOYES v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
VID 616 OF 2006

KENNY J
10 APRIL 2007

MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 616 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

DAVID ERIC BOYES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 APRIL 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 616 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

DAVID ERIC BOYES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

10 APRIL 2007

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This proceeding was instituted as an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”) but, pursuant to leave, proceeded as an application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The decision under challenge was the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) given on 24 April 2006 affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent to cancel the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

  2. It is common ground that the applicant, Mr Boyes, is a citizen of New Zealand.  He completed his secondary education and substantially completed a degree in agricultural commerce in that country.  He was married and divorced in New Zealand, and has two adult daughters living there.  Mr Boyes has resided in Australia since 27 January 1996.  He is now in his early fifties.  He has a…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 505
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Boyes v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involves the appellant, Mr Boyes, challenging a decision by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to cancel his visa on character grounds. The delegate found that Mr Boyes did not meet the character test, considering his history of crimes involving deception and the risk of re-offending. The delegate also noted the disruption caused by Mr Boyes's crimes and the expectations of the Australian community. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) upheld the delegate's decision, finding that Mr Boyes had committed serious and continuing criminal conduct, and that the protection of the Australian community was paramount. The Tribunal's decision was based on a detailed analysis of Mr Boyes's criminal history, including convictions in New Zealand, New South Wales, and Victoria.

Mr Boyes appealed the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the Tribunal failed to properly consider relevant facts and misapplied the law. He contended that the Tribunal erred in considering irrelevant material and in failing to distinguish between essential and non-essential facts. Additionally, Mr Boyes argued that the Tribunal should have considered the possible maximum sentence available to the sentencing judge as part of its assessment of the seriousness of his conduct. He also challenged the Tribunal's finding concerning the repugnance of the crime, arguing that the fraud involved was not of the same kind as that referred to in the relevant Direction. Furthermore, Mr Boyes claimed that the Tribunal misapplied observations from a previous case, failing to place the remarks of the sentencing judge in proper context.

The court found that Mr Boyes's appeal did not succeed. The court held that the Tribunal had not erred in its application of the primary considerations or in its consideration of the protection of the Australian community. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the seriousness and nature of Mr Boyes's conduct and that its decision was not vitiated by jurisdictional error. The court also rejected Mr Boyes's argument that there had been a failure to comply with s 499(2A) of the Act, finding that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion under Direction 21. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was sound and that Mr Boyes's appeal should be dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed, and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J (dissent)
The delegate found that Mr Boyes did not pass the character test. The delegate determined that Mr Boyes had demonstrated a continuing history of committing crimes of deception and that the Australian community should be afforded protection against such conduct. The delegate concluded that “great weight” should be given to “the serious and continuing nature of Mr Boyes’s criminal record and its effect on the community”. The delegate “found that he could not ignore Mr Boyes’s consistent pattern of criminal conduct over several years” and “assessed that there is a medium risk that Mr Boyes might re-offend and placed medium weight on his risk of recidivism”. The delegate considered that deterrence was “of moderate importance and overall … placed moderate weight on this consideration”. The delegate gave great weight to the expectations of the Australian community, which he considered favoured cancellation of Mr Boyes’ visa. The delegate also gave substantial weight to the fact that this cancellation and Mr Boyes’ removal from Australia “may cause hardship on the children” to whom Mr Boyes had declared an on-going commitment. After referring to certain other considerations, the delegate said that he “recognised Mr Boyes’s child in Australia, but concluded that the serious and continuing nature of Mr Boyes’s criminal conduct, the disruption his crimes have caused others and the expectations of the Australian community outweighed all other considerations”.The Tribunal’s Decision The Tribunal’s consideration of “protection of the Australian Community” involved a relatively detailed analysis of the material before it, including the sentencing remarks of Judge Wood and the evidence tendered by Mr Boyes. The Tribunal stated that it was satisfied that Mr Boyes:was convicted of 18 offences in New Zealand, being 17 counts of false pretences and 1 count of obtaining credit by fraud. I make that finding as fact and adopt it when exercising the discretion which I am obliged to do under Direction 21. I am also satisfied, and there was no dispute, that the applicant was sentenced to a period of three and a half years to be served concurrently in relation to all of those offences. He served the minimum non-parole period of 15 and a half months.In relation to the New South Wales offences, I am satisfied and find as a fact that the applicant has been convicted of three offences, being possession of goods reasonably suspected as having been stolen, fraudulent misappropriation and possession of stolen property. The first offence resulted in a $500.00 fine, the second offence resulted in compensation of $4040.00 being ordered and the third offence resulted in a sentence of two years and two months with a non-parole period of 10 months.The offences in Victoria amounted to 36 counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception and one count of dishonestly obtaining property by deception. The total sentence on those offences was five years and three months with a non-parole period which, but for this decision, will permit the applicant to become eligible for parole in June this year.…In making the above findings as to the number of charges over which convictions were imposed, I have relied entirely on the evidence of the applicant and upon his interpretation of the records made available by the authorities in New South Wales, Victoria and New Zealand. Some of those records refer to appearances to either extend bail or to adjourn the hearing of proceedings. There was some confusion in the interpretation of those records because it was thought that the number of offences could be calculated by regard to the number of court appearances. To follow that path would of course be an error because regard is only to be had to the total number of convictions and the sentences in examining this part of Direction 21 namely, the seriousness and nature of the appellant’s conduct.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.Consideration On this occasion, I shall not summarise the parties’ submissions. These submissions will appear sufficiently in the following discussion. It suffices to say that essentially Mr Boyes’ case was that the Tribunal had no regard to relevant considerations, relied on irrelevant considerations, and asked itself the wrong question. Referring to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 351, and Lu vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 141 FCR 346 per Black CJ at 360, counsel for Mr Boyes submitted that the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error and that the applicant was entitled to relief. In the alternative, counsel contended that there had been a failure on the Tribunal’s part to comply with s 499(2A) of the Act. Referring to Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 376-377 and 388-390 per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, counsel argued that failure to do what is compelled to be done by s 499(2A) invalidates anything done or purporting to be done under Direction 21. For reasons that appear below, I would reject Mr Boyes’ submission that the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error, as well as his alternative submission that there was a failure on the Tribunal’s part to comply with s 499(2A) of the Act. I set out each of Mr Boyes’ grounds of appeal and consider them in turn. The first set of grounds were as follows:(a) The decision of the Tribunal should be set aside as it erred in applying the primary considerations contained in Part 2 of Direction No 21 particularly in failing to distinguish between essential and non-essential facts found by a sentencing judge and thereby considered irrelevant material.(b) The decision of the Tribunal should be set aside as it erred in misconstruing the requirement contained in Part 2 of Direction No 21, that it consider the protection of the Australian community, by apparently deciding that any consideration of the seriousness of the applicant’s conduct required it to find the same facts as those found by the sentencing judge and thereby considered irrelevant material.(c) The decision of the Tribunal should be set aside as it erred by considering irrelevant material in considering that the protection of the Australian community required it to -(i) adopt the remarks of a sentencing judge;(ii) substitute the remarks of a sentencing judge for the exercise of its own discretion;(iii) consider the remarks of a sentencing judge in a context other than that in which they were made. In the course of argument in relation to these grounds, counsel for Mr Boyes submitted that the Tribunal should have noted that Mr Boyes pleaded guilty to the charges he faced. Further, according to counsel, a “complete examination of the seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct should also involve considering the possible maximum sentence available to the sentencing judge”. The applicant also challenged the Tribunal’s finding concerning the repugnance of the crime, on the basis that the fraud involved in Mr Boyes’ offending was not the same kind of fraud as that referred to in par 2.7(b) of Direction 21. Additionally, so counsel submitted, the Tribunal misapplied certain observation of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234 (“SRT”). The Tribunal failed to place the remarks of the sentencing judge in proper context and treat them as the law required.