Bowes v McCUTCHEON & ANOR

Case [1999] WASCA 173


BOWES -v- McCUTCHEON & ANOR [1999] WASCA 173



SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIACitation No:[1999] WASCA 173
08/09/1999
Case No:SJA:1071/199924 AUGUST 1999
Coram:MILLER J24/08/99
8Judgment Part:1 of 1
Result: Appeal allowed
Order for eligibility for parole
PDF Version
Parties:PHILLIP ARTHUR BOWES
DAVID ANDREW McCUTCHEON
ANNE MARIE DRANSFIELD

Catchwords:

Criminal law
Sentence
Appeal against refusal to order parole eligibility
Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA)
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995

Case References:

R v Maxwell (1998) 102 A Crim R 374
Swain v R (1989) 41 ACrimR 214
Thompson v R (1992) 8 WAR 387
Wongawol v R (1998) 101 ACrimR 350

Nil

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
    IN CRIMINAL
CITATION : BOWES -v- McCUTCHEON & ANOR [1999] WASCA 173 CORAM : MILLER J HEARD : 24 AUGUST 1999 DELIVERED : 24 AUGUST 1999 PUBLISHED : 8 SEPTEMBER 1999 FILE NO/S : SJA 1071 of 1999 BETWEEN : PHILLIP ARTHUR BOWES
    Appellant

    AND

    DAVID ANDREW McCUTCHEON
    First Respondent

    ANNE MARIE DRANSFIELD
    Second Respondent



Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentence - Appeal against refusal to order parole eligibility - Turns on own facts




Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA)


Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995


(Page 2)

Result:

    Appeal allowed
    Order for eligibility for parole

Representation:


Counsel:


    Appellant : Ms V M Williams
    First Respondent : Mr N C Monahan
    Second Respondent : Mr N C Monahan


Solicitors:

    Appellant : Aboriginal Legal Service
    First Respondent : State Crown Solicitor
    Second Respondent : State Crown Solicitor


Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

R v Maxwell (1998) 102 A Crim R 374
Swain v R (1989) 41 ACrimR 214
Thompson v R (1992) 8 WAR 387
Wongawol v R (1998) 101 ACrimR 350

Case(s) also cited:



Nil

(Page 3)

1 MILLER J : On 17 December 1998 the appellant was convicted in the Kellerberrin Court of Petty Sessions on his plea of guilty to an offence under section 49(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974, committed on 18 July 1998 at Doodlakine. At that time the appellant was legally disentitled to hold a driver's licence. The appellant was remanded on bail to appear on 7 January 1999 in the Midland Court of Petty Sessions for sentence.

2 On 7 January 1999 the appellant was further convicted in the Midland Court of Petty Sessions on pleas of guilty of two offences of assault contrary to s 313 of the Criminal Code and an offence contrary to s 317 of the Code. Each of those assaults had been committed on 28 December 1998 at Langford. He was remanded in custody for a pre-sentence report. On 25 February 1999 he appeared in the Midland Court of Petty Sessions and was sentenced by the learned Magistrate for the offences of driving under suspension and assault in the following manner: (1) in relation to the driving under suspension on 18 July 1998 he was sentenced to 15…

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AGLC
Bowes v McCUTCHEON & ANOR [1999] WASCA 173
Case
[1999] WASCA 173
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bowes v McCutcheon & Anor arose in the context of a criminal sentencing dispute. The appellant, Bowes, challenged the refusal of the sentencing judge to order that he be eligible for parole after serving a specified period of his sentence. The respondent, McCutcheon, was one of the judges involved in the original sentencing. The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the refusal to order parole eligibility after a certain period of imprisonment constituted a sentence that was manifestly inadequate or excessive. The court had to consider the principles of sentencing and the discretion available to judges in determining parole eligibility. The appellant argued that the refusal to order eligibility for parole was a form of sentence that should be reviewed by the appellate court, while the respondents contended that such decisions were within the exclusive domain of the original sentencing judge.

In delivering the judgment, the court held that the refusal to order parole eligibility was indeed a sentence that could be reviewed on appeal. The court emphasised that while the original sentencing judge has significant discretion in determining parole eligibility, this does not preclude the appellate court from reviewing the sentence if it is manifestly inadequate or excessive. The court found that the refusal to order parole eligibility after a specified period was a significant part of the appellant's overall sentence and should have been considered by the appellate court. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the court made an order for the appellant's eligibility for parole.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal allowed

Order for eligibility for parole

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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