Bonnell v Commissioner of Taxation

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bonnell v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCAFC 146

INCOME TAX – judicial review of decision not to remit additional tax – summary dismissal on basis that proceeding had no reasonable prospect of success – whether judgment interlocutory or final – hearing as if on an appeal – whether invalid decision not to remit additional tax invalidates assessment of primary tax contained in same notice – held no 

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 6, 166, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 222A, 226K, 227
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Part IVC

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Mostyn (1987) 18 FCR 260 referred to
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Limited (1995) 183 CLR 168 considered
Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32 referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 referred to

DAVID NEIL BONNELL v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

NSD 1038 of 2008

LINDGREN, EMMETT AND EDMONDS JJ
18 AUGUST 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1038 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

DAVID NEIL BONNELL
Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, EMMETT AND EDMONDS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 AUGUST 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.If and to the extent that the appellant needs leave to appeal from the judgment given on 1 July 2008 in proceedings NSD 1963 of 2006 (the Primary Proceeding), leave to appeal be refused.

2.If and to the extent that the appellant does not need leave to appeal from the judgment referred to in para (1) above, the appeal be dismissed.

3.The respondent’s cross-appeal be dismissed.

4.The respondent’s motion seeking leave to appeal from Order (8) made on 8 February 2008 in the Primary Proceeding be dismissed.

5.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1038 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

DAVID NEIL BONNELL
Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, EMMETT AND EDMONDS JJ

DATE:

18 AUGUST 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LINDGREN AND EDMONDS JJ:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal, or an application for leave to appeal, from an order of the Court made on 1 July 2008 that there be judgment for the respondent against the appellant in relation to the whole of the proceeding.  The order gave effect to the primary judge’s opinion (Bonnell v Commissioner of Taxation (No 5) [2008] FCA 991 at [95]) that the appellant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting claims for relief 1 and 2 in his amended application (see [10] below): see subs 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the Federal Court Act’).

  2. Section…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Bonnell v Commissioner of Taxation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bonnell v Commissioner of Taxation, the appellant, who is the taxpayer, sought to challenge a notice of amended assessment issued by the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation. The notice disallowed a $5 million deduction claimed by the taxpayer for the year of income ended 30 June 1999, and resulted in additional tax, penalty and interest being imposed. The taxpayer contended that the decision not to remit the additional tax was invalid due to alleged procedural flaws and bad faith. The court was required to determine the validity of the notice of amended assessment and whether the decision not to remit the additional tax was made lawfully.

The court found that even if the decision not to remit additional tax was made in bad faith, it would only mean that the $606,250 tax may not be due and payable. The notice of amended assessment remained effective in creating a liability to pay other amounts and was therefore valid to that extent. The court concluded that the taxpayer was not entitled to an order that the notice of amended assessment be set aside in its entirety. The court found no error in the primary judge's dismissal of the proceeding and dismissed the appeal. The court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal and motion for leave to appeal from a prior order.

The court ordered that the appellant's appeal be dismissed and the respondent's cross-appeal and motion be also dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court's decision upheld the validity of the notice of amended assessment and the decision not to remit the additional tax, finding no reasonable prospect of the taxpayer successfully prosecuting the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. If and to the extent that the appellant needs leave to appeal from the judgment given on 1 July 2008 in proceedings NSD 1963 of 2006 (the Primary Proceeding), leave to appeal be refused.

2. If and to the extent that the appellant does not need leave to appeal from the judgment referred to in para (1) above, the appeal be dismissed.

3. The respondent’s cross-appeal be dismissed.

4. The respondent’s motion seeking leave to appeal from Order (8) made on 8 February 2008 in the Primary Proceeding be dismissed.

5. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

There being some doubt as to whether the judgment was interlocutory or final, on 4 July 2008, the appellant filed a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal and on 9 July 2008, the appellant filed a notice of appeal raising twelve grounds. The hearing before this Court proceeded as if on an appeal.BACKGROUND In respect of the year of income ended 30 June 1999, the appellant claimed as an allowable deduction an amount of $5 million. The original assessment proceeded on the basis that the deduction was allowable. On 29 July 2004, the respondent issued a notice of amended assessment disallowing the deduction of $5 million. The notice of amended assessment contained the following relevant particulars:‘Your Amended Taxable Income is $5,936,606Tax on Taxable Income A $2,780,806.82 DR…Understatement Penalty and Interest D $2,106,915.40 DR…The amount at Label D consists of $606,250.00 penalty and $1,500,665.40 interest.’ The additional tax of $606,250.00 was imposed by operation of s 226K of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘the ITAA 1936’). Subsection 227(3) of the ITAA 1936 empowers the respondent to remit, in whole or in part, the additional tax payable by a person under a provision of Part VII of the ITAA 1936 such as s 226K. It appears to be common ground that before issuing the notice of amended assessment, the respondent decided that he would not remit any part of the additional tax imposed under s 226K.RELIEF SOUGHT The amended application filed by the appellant on 26 May 2008 stated:‘This Application is made under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 to contest the validity of a Notice of Amended Assessment for the year of income ended 30 June 1999, which was communicated to the Applicant in a purported Notice of Amended Assessment issued on 29 July 2004.’ The claims for relief in the amended application included, inter alia:‘1. A declaration that the Remission Decision is invalid;2.An order pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 quashing the Notice of Amended Assessment and such consequential orders as this Honourable Court sees fit …’ The amended statement of claim filed the same date repeated those claims for relief. Paragraphs 36 and 37 of the amended statement of claim as filed stated as follows:‘36. In making the Remission Decision, the Respondent:(i)was under an obligation to make it in good faith;(ii)could only make it if and to the extent that it related to the subject mater of the Act; and(iii)could only make it if and to the extent that it was reasonably capable of reference to the powers given to the Respondent under s.227(3).37.In making the Remission Decision, the Respondent:(i)acted arbitrarily and or capriciously and or without any intelligible basis;(ii)failed to have regard to any matter material to whether the power conferred by s.227(3) should be exercised;(iii)failed to adhere to his publicly announced policy in relation to the remission of penalties against participants in CIS fund arrangements;(iv)acted on the assumption that the Applicant was a promoter of CIS fund arrangements;(v)sought to punish the Applicant for the advice which he had given to the Applicant’s clients in connection with implementing CIS fund arrangements;(vi)acted upon a suspicion or belief that the Application had obtained the Ruling improperly;(vii)acted upon an assumption that the Applicant was an associate of First Assistant Commissioner Petroulias.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN, EMMETT AND EDMONDS JJ
Even if the decision not to remit additional tax was not made in good faith, the only consequence would be that the sum of $606,250 may not be due and payable by the Taxpayer. Nevertheless, the Amended Notice is effective, for the purposes of s 204, to create a liability to pay other amounts. It is valid at least to that extent. CONCLUSION The Taxpayer is not entitled to an order that the Amended Notice be set aside in its entirety. As indicated above, the Taxpayer does not seek any lesser relief. Accordingly, it is not necessary to express any view as to whether the Amended Notice could be set aside pro tanto, assuming that the decision not to remit any of the additional tax was made in bad faith by the Commissioner. It follows that there is no reasonable prospect that the Taxpayer can successfully prosecute the proceeding and there was no error on the part of the primary judge in dismissing the proceeding pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act. Since writing the above, I have read the joint reasons of Lindgren and Edmonds JJ in draft form. I agree with their Honours’ conclusions and the reasons for those conclusions. I also agree with the orders proposed by their Honours.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN, EMMETT AND EDMONDS JJ