Bomford v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   BOMFORD -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2014] WASCA 43

CORAM:   BUSS JA

MAZZA JA
HALL J

HEARD:   17 SEPTEMBER 2013

DELIVERED          :   27 FEBRUARY 2014

FILE NO/S:   CACR 252 of 2012

BETWEEN:   ADAM RONALD BOMFORD

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :SCOTT DCJ

File No  :IND 1550 of 2011

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Manufacture of a prohibited drug - Aiding and abetting - Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury in relation to aiding and abetting - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(3), s 30(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 7(b), s 7(c)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(b)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Ms M R Barone

Respondent:     Ms A L Forrester

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Marilyn Loveday

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v The Queen [2012] HCA 14; (2012) 246 CLR 92

Bomford v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 153

Demirok v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 20

Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473

R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618

Reeves v The Queen [2013] HCA 57

Scafetta v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 209

Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81; (2005) 224 CLR 300

  1. BUSS JA:  I agree with Mazza JA, for the reasons he gives, that the appellant's ground of appeal against conviction fails and that the appeal should be dismissed.

  2. I also agree with Mazza JA that, even if the appellant had made out the ground of appeal, the 'proviso' in s 30(4) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) should be applied. I will state my own reasons in relation to the application of s 30(4).

  3. The background facts and circumstances are set out in Mazza JA's reasons and need not be repeated.

  4. Section 30(3) of the Criminal Appeals Act provides that this court must allow an appeal against conviction by an offender if, in its opinion:

    (a)the verdict of guilty on which the conviction is based should be set aside because, having regard to the evidence, it is unreasonable or cannot be supported;

    (b)the conviction should be set aside because of a wrong decision on a question of law by the judge; or

    (c)there was a miscarriage of justice.

  5. However, by s 30(4), despite s 30(3), even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the offender, this court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that 'no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred'.

  6. In Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v The Queen [2012] HCA 14; (2012) 246 CLR 92, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ reiterated that an appellate court must undertake the task of…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASCA 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Bomford v The State of Western Australia, the appellant, Mr. Bomford, appealed against his conviction for manufacturing a prohibited drug and for aiding and abetting in contravention of the relevant statutory provisions. The matter was heard in the Court of Appeal. The central issue for determination was whether the trial judge misdirected the jury concerning the legal principles of aiding and abetting. This misdirection, if established, could potentially necessitate the setting aside of Mr. Bomford's conviction.

The court examined the applicable legal principles, notably those derived from the case of Weiss v The Queen, to determine if the jury's verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence. The court undertook its own independent assessment of the evidence, including the appellant's police interview, where he denied any involvement in the alleged offence. The jury's rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statements was a critical factor in the court's evaluation. The court had to determine whether the trial judge's direction to the jury was legally sound and whether this affected the outcome of the trial. The court had to consider whether a miscarriage of justice had occurred and whether the appeal should be allowed under the provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA).

After conducting a thorough review of the evidence and legal principles, the court concluded that the trial judge did not misdirect the jury. The court found that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and that there was no miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and Mr. Bomford's conviction was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The relevant statutory provisions are s 30(3) and (4) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) which read:30. Appeal against conviction, decision on(3)The Court of Appeal must allow the appeal if in its opinion -(a)the verdict of guilty on which the conviction is based should be set aside because, having regard to the evidence, it is unreasonable or cannot be supported; or(b)the conviction should be set aside because of a wrong decision on a question of law by the judge; or(c)there was a miscarriage of justice.(4)Despite subsection (3), even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the offender, the Court of Appeal may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. The leading case in respect of the application of the proviso is Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81; (2005) 224 CLR 300. The following statements of principle emerge from Weiss:1.Any consideration of the proviso is not to be undertaken by attempting to predict what a jury (whether the jury at trial or some theoretical future jury) would or might do. The task is to decide whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred [35].2.In performing this task, three things must not be obscured:(a)'the appellate court must itself decide whether a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred';(b)the task is an objective one 'to be performed with whatever are the advantages and disadvantages of deciding an appeal on the record of the trial; it is not an exercise in speculation or prediction'; and(c)'the standard of proof of criminal guilt is beyond reasonable doubt' [39]; and3.The manner in which the task is to be undertaken is the same as when an appellate court is called upon to decide 'whether the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence'. In other words:[T]he appellate court must make its own independent assessment of the evidence and determine whether, making due allowance for the 'natural limitations' that exist in the case of an appellate court proceeding wholly or substantially on the record, the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty of the offence on which the jury returned its verdict of guilty [41]. In Weiss, the High Court noted that there may be cases where it would be proper to allow an appeal and order a new trial, even though the appellate court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt; for example, cases 'where there has been a significant denial of procedural fairness at trial' [45] or where the 'errors or miscarriages of justice occurring in the course of a criminal trial may amount to such a serious breach of the presuppositions of the trial as to deny the application of [the proviso]' [46]. I have undertaken my own assessment of the record of the trial. This court is not at any material disadvantage in its assessment of the evidence when compared to the jury. The appellant did not give evidence, although the jury had before it (as does this court) the DVD recording of the appellant's interview with the police in which he denied any involvement in the alleged offence. The jury, by its verdict, must necessarily have rejected the appellant's exculpatory statements. The verdict and the implication from it are matters to which this court is entitled to have regard.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established