Bolton v Stange
[2001] WASCA 34
•18 JANUARY 2001
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: BOLTON -v- STANGE [2001] WASCA 34
CORAM: TEMPLEMAN J
HEARD: 18 JANUARY 2001
DELIVERED : 18 JANUARY 2001
FILE NO/S: SJA 1189 of 2000
BETWEEN: FRANCIS ROBERT BOLTON
Appellant
AND
INGOLF BRIAN RAINER STANGE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Procedure - Costs - Appeal from decision of Magistrate not to award costs to successful defendant - Defendant represented by Aboriginal Legal Service of WA Inc - Where accused person is represented by a legal practitioner the Court must assume solicitor and client relationship exists with consequential obligation to pay costs
Official Prosecutions (Defendants Costs) Act 1973 (WA), s 3(2), s 4, s 5
Hudgson v Endrust (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 142, applied
Legislation:
Official Prosecutions (Defendants Costs) Act 1973 (WA)
Justices Act 1902
Result:
Appeal allowed
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr C L J Miocevich
Respondent: Ms J C Pritchard
Solicitors:
Appellant: Aboriginal Legal Service of WA Inc
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Hudgson v Endrust (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 152
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534
Case(s) also cited:
"M" (A Child) v The Queen 13 WAR 306
O'Connel v Noye, unreported; SCt of WA (Lavan SPJ); Library No 2275; 31 January 1977
O'Dea v Fletcher, unreported; SCt of WA (Murray J) ; Library No 920666; 20 November 1992
R v Miller [1983] 3 All ER 186
Small v Walker, unreported; SCt of WA (Smith J); Library No 57771; 29 January 1985
TEMPLEMAN J: This is an appeal from a decision of a Stipendiary Magistrate not to award costs in favour of a successful defendant.
The appellant, Mr Francis Robert Bolton, was charged with unlawful assault and was tried before a Stipendiary Magistrate on 15 March 2000. The charge was dismissed.
At the end of the proceedings the appellant's solicitor sought an order for costs. The appellant was represented by the Aboriginal Legal Service, a fact which apparently resulted in the learned Magistrate deciding not to award costs. In the course of submissions he said:
"Your funding comes from the government. I see it as a fruitless exercise to tell the government to take money out of one pocket and put it in another."
The application was pursued, but the learned Magistrate remained unpersuaded. In his short reasons he said:
"The complaint is dismissed and as to costs I do not believe in the circumstances that an order is warranted. That is a shorthand way of pursuing my previous practice. Until someone tells me it is wrong, it is a practice I intend to follow."
The appellant now appeals from that decision.
The learned Magistrate had a discretion in the matter of costs. That discretion was exercisable under two statutory provisions: s 152 of the Justices Act 1902 and s 5 of the Official Prosecutions (Defendants Costs) Act 1973. Section 5 of that Act provides:
"Subject to this Act, a successful defendant is entitled to his costs."
Costs are defined in s 4 to mean any expenses that:
"(a)are properly incurred by a defendant in an official prosecution; and
(b)are due and payable, or paid, by the defendant to another person or as Court fees."
Section 3(2) provides:
"To the extent of any inconsistency between a provision of this Act and a provision of or under any other Act, the provision which is more favourable to the defendant prevails."
It is common ground between the parties that the Official Prosecutions Act is more favourable to the defendant than the Justices Act and is therefore the governing provision.
In the present case the appellant was represented by the Aboriginal Legal Service. The retainer was governed by cl 42 of the constitution of the Aboriginal Legal Service of WA Inc.
Clause 42 provides that costs incurred by the association in the provision of legal assistance are deemed to be costs incurred by the applicant for that assistance, for the purpose of any application for an order for costs. However, this point did not arise in the present case, because the learned Magistrate did not decline to make an order for costs on the basis that the costs were not due and payable.
Indeed, it would not have been open to the learned Magistrate to inquire into the relationship between the appellant and his legal representative. That is because there is a deemed retainer in the absence of proof of any express agreement that costs will not be paid. In other words, if an accused person is represented by a legal practitioner - from the Aboriginal Legal Service or anywhere else - the Court must assume that the relationship of solicitor and client exists between them with a consequential obligation to pay such costs as may be due.
The authority for this proposition is Hudgson v Endrust (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 152, at 154 where Pincus J said:
"The court will hold in the absence of proof of an express agreement to the contrary that a solicitor who acts upon instructions for a party on the record is taken to be entitled to look to that party for costs even if the instructions have come to the solicitor from another party or from some non-party interested in the litigation."
Furthermore, in Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, the High Court held that courts should make orders for costs without regard to such considerations as whether the relevant party is entitled to or is in receipt of legal aid.
To return to the present case: the appellant was acquitted. He had appeared by a solicitor. Under s 5 of the Official Prosecutions Act he was prima facie entitled to his costs. There were no grounds arising under s 6 of the Act which would have reduced that entitlement: and there was no suggestion of any express agreement that costs would not be payable.
In those circumstances the learned Magistrate should have awarded the appellant his costs. In saying that he was pursuing his previous practice; that is, of not awarding costs in favour of a person whose funding came from the government, the learned Magistrate did not exercise a proper discretion. He took into account a matter which was wholly irrelevant.
In those circumstances it is now appropriate for me to exercise the discretion in his place, that being an option open to me under the Justices Act. I therefore order that the appellant be entitled to his costs of the proceedings and of this appeal.
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