Constitutional Law (Cth)—Duties of Excise—Carriage of goods on road without permit—Fee for permit based on capacity of vehicle and distance of carriage—Refusal to pay fee—Whether fee duty of excise—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict c. 12), s. 90—The State Transport Act of 1960 (Q.), ss. 44, 49—The Transport Laws Validation Act of 1962 (Q.),ss. 3, 4.

Decision

June 6.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment:-
The substance of the principal defence raised unsuccessfully by the appellants to charges of committing and aiding and abetting the commission of an offence under s. 49 of The State Transport Act of 1960 (Q.) (hereinafter called "the Act")-viz. the appellant Turner's use on a Queensland road of a vehicle to carry goods without a permit under s. 39 of the Act - was that the only reason for Turner's not having the necessary permit to use the vehicle as he did (to carry his wool from Goondibilla Station, Goondiwindi, to Dalgetys' wool store, Brisbane, for sale) was that the fee of @20 4s. 2d. demanded from him for the permit - the maximum fee - was a duty of excise which, upon constitutional grounds (The Constitution, s. 90), he refused and was justified in refusing to pay. Turner was charged as principal and the other appellants as accessories with offences under s. 49 of the Act. The magistrate, who heard the charges together, having rejected the foregoing defence and a further defence that The Transport Laws Validation Act of 1962 (Q.) had failed to validate the Act, found the offences proved and convicted all the appellants. Turner was fined @20 and, pursuant to s. 52 of the Act, was also ordered to pay the permit fee determined by the Commissioner for Transport, viz. @40 8s. 4d., being twice the maximum fee payable under s. 44. The other appellants were each fined @20. The appellants were also ordered to pay costs. Appeals brought to this Court as of right were heard together. For the appellants the points already referred to were argued and, for Turner, it was further argued that the fee of @40 8s. 4d. which he had been ordered to pay was itself a duty of excise. Although reference to ss. 2, 5, 12, 39, 41, 44, 49, 51 and 52 of the Act and to ss. 3 and 4 of The Transport Laws Validation Act of 1962 is necessary, it is not proposed to set them out in this judgment. (at p269)

2. If the fee which Turner refused to pay were a duty of excise, then, either because the exaction was beyond the authority of the Commissioner under the Act, or the Act, in so far as it authorized the exaction, was itself ultra vires by reason of s. 90 of the Constitution, an appropriate declaration of right could, in properly constituted proceedings, be obtained;…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bolton v Madsen

Details

AGLC: Bolton v Madsen [1963] HCA 16
Case: [1963] HCA 16
Decision Date: 6 June 1963

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the dispute between Bolton and Madsen. The case concerned the interpretation and application of certain provisions within the *Workers' Compensation Act 1926* (NSW) and the *Industrial Arbitration Act 1940* (NSW) in relation to an employee's entitlement to compensation.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the respondent, Madsen, was entitled to compensation for an injury sustained during the course of his employment, and whether the appellant, Bolton, was liable to pay such compensation. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope of employment and the causal connection between the employment and the injury, as well as the interplay between the two legislative regimes.

The Court's reasoning focused on the established principles of workers' compensation law, particularly the requirement for an injury to arise out of or in the course of employment. The judges analysed the factual circumstances to ascertain whether Madsen's actions at the time of his injury were incidental to his employment duties. They considered the nature of the work performed and the employer's control over the employee's activities. The Court applied the legal tests for determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for an employee's injury, taking into account the relevant statutory provisions.

The High Court ultimately found in favour of the respondent, Madsen, holding that he was entitled to compensation. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

Orders