Boland v Yates Property Corp & Anor- Webster v Yates Property

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S24 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

JOHN BOLAND (as representative partner of Abbott Tout Russell Kennedy, Solicitors)

Appellant

and

YATES PROPERTY CORPORATION PTY LIMITED and IAN FRANCIS YATES

Respondents

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S28 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

JOHN WEBSTER

Appellant

and

YATES PROPERTY CORPORATION PTY LIMITED and IAN FRANCIS YATES

Respondents

GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 4 AUGUST 1999, AT 10.17 AM

(Continued from 3/8/99)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

___________________

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Macfarlan.

MR MACFARLAN:   Thank you, your Honours.  In light of the limited time available to me, we have reduced to writing our responses to various questions that were put to me yesterday, and that document has been made available to the Court and I will not say anything further about it unless the Court wishes me to do so.

GLEESON CJ:   Thank you.

MR MACFARLAN:   There has also been made available to the Court the summary of the head start evidence that I referred to yesterday, and again I will not say anything more about that.  The other preliminary matter, your Honours, is that I would wish to qualify an answer I gave yesterday which is recorded on page 12 of the transcript at line 421.  Your Honour the Chief Justice asked me whether Mr Simos had advanced a claim for special value of the nature described by Mr Hart either on the first or the second occasion and I said he had not on the first but it would not be accurate to say that he had not on the second.

I wish to qualify that, your Honour.  The position with the second occasion, as we put it to the Court, is that there was an attempt to quantify the value of the

documents consistently with the comments made by Mr Justice Handley, but that was a different exercise to that undertaken by Mr Hart.

GUMMOW J:   An incomprehensible exercise.

MR MACFARLAN:   What was done by Mr Hart was, so we would submit, sufficiently dealt with by the alternative site claim, and not only sufficiently, but properly, dealt with by the alternative site claim rather than the manner in which it was put by Mr Hart.

I say then some more about the question of solicitors’ duties.  The nature of the relationship between YPC and the solicitors that developed is illustrated by what incurred at its inception and I would ask your Honours to look to volume 7 to Mr Yates’ affidavit at page 1643, line 30, where he records a discussion with Mr Miles of Abbott Tout at the time of receipt of the first notification in mid 1984 from the Darling Harbour Authority of an intent to resume.  Mr Yates says at line 31 that he:

had a conference with…

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Details
Case
[1999] HCATrans 215
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals arising from proceedings brought by Mr Boland and Mr Webster against Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd and Yates Property Pty Ltd. The dispute concerned the validity of certain charges registered against land owned by Mr Boland and Mr Webster, which they alleged were invalid and should be removed from the register.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the registration of the charges, which were purportedly created by a deed of covenant and charge, was effective to create a valid security interest over the land. This involved determining whether the deed satisfied the requirements of the relevant legislation governing the registration of charges and whether the registration itself was a nullity due to fundamental defects.

The Court reasoned that the deed, as registered, did not sufficiently identify the land to which it purported to apply, nor did it clearly create a charge over that land in a manner recognised by the relevant legislation. Consequently, the registration of the deed was found to be a nullity, meaning it had no legal effect from its inception. The principles applied concerned the requirements for the creation and registration of valid security interests in land, particularly the need for clear identification of the subject property and the nature of the interest being created.

The High Court allowed the appeals, ordered that the registrations of the charges be removed from the register, and that the respondents pay the appellants' costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the early 1980s, Yates Property Corporation (YPC) purchased land in Darling Harbour, Sydney, with plans to develop a commercial and retail complex. In mid-1984, the New South Wales government, through the Darling Harbour Authority, notified YPC of its intention to resume the land for public purposes. Legal proceedings ensued, with YPC initially represented by Abbott Tout Russell Kennedy (ATR) as solicitors and Noel Hemmings QC and later Noel Webster as counsel. The case centred on the valuation of the land for compensation purposes under the Public Works Act.

The central issue was whether YPC was entitled to compensation for the "head start" advantage it had in developing the site before the land was resumed. This referred to the preparatory work YPC had already undertaken, such as obtaining permits and conducting feasibility studies, which would give it a head start over other potential developers once the land was resumed. The primary judge, Justice Handley, rejected the head start claim, finding there was no special value attributable to YPC's preparatory work.

The Full Federal Court, however, allowed YPC's appeal and held that it was entitled to compensation for the head start advantage. This decision was based on the premise that YPC's preparatory work gave it a competitive edge that other developers would not have, entitling it to additional compensation beyond the market value of the land.

The key factual events that gave rise to the legal dispute were:

1) YPC purchased the Darling Harbour land in the early 1980s with plans for commercial and retail development.

2) In mid-1984, the NSW government notified YPC of its intention to resume the land for public purposes.

3) Legal proceedings began, with YPC represented by ATR as solicitors and Hemmings and Webster as counsel.

4) The primary judge rejected YPC's head start claim, finding no special value attributable to its preparatory work.

5) The Full Federal Court allowed YPC's appeal, holding it was entitled to compensation for the head start advantage.

6) The High Court was asked to review the Full Federal Court's decision on the head start issue and other matters related to the valuation of the land for compensation purposes.

The factual events centred around the valuation of the Darling Harbour land for compensation purposes following the government's resumption, with the key issue being whether YPC was entitled to additional compensation for the "head start" advantage it had gained through its preparatory work before the land was resumed.

The proceedings before this Court constitute an appeal from the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The case involves two appeals, Boland v Yates Property Corp & Anor and Webster v Yates Property, which were consolidated for the purposes of the appeal. The Full Court of the Federal Court had previously reversed the decisions of Justice Handley and Justice Branson, who were the trial judges in the respective proceedings. The appellants in these appeals, John Boland and John Webster, challenge the Full Court's findings of negligence against them and seek to overturn the Full Court's judgment, arguing that the trial judges' findings should be reinstated. Key procedural steps in the case include the lodging of appeals by the appellants against the Full Court's decisions, the consolidation of these appeals for hearing before this Court, and the presentation of written and oral submissions by both parties. The case revolves around the issue of whether the appellants were negligent in their conduct of the proceedings and the valuation of certain properties, as well as the implications of advocate's immunity and the assessment of damages.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What is the appropriate valuation method for determining compensation for the land acquired through resumption?
2. Can special value be considered in addition to market value in the compensation claim?
3. Were the solicitors and counsel negligent in their handling of the compensation claim?
4. If negligence is found, what is the extent of the solicitors' and counsel's liability?
5. Is there a duty on the solicitors to question or challenge the advice given by the counsel?
6. Was there a breach of the duty of care by the solicitors and counsel in failing to identify and address the "head start" aspect of the special value claim?
7. If there was a breach of duty, was the breach the proximate cause of the alleged damages?
8. What is the appropriate measure of damages, if any, for the alleged breach of duty?
9. Are the solicitors and counsel entitled to advocate's immunity in this case?
10. If advocate's immunity applies, does it extend to the solicitors as well?

Held
1. The appropriate valuation method for determining compensation for the land acquired through resumption is based on the market value of the land.
2. Special value can be considered in addition to market value in the compensation claim, but it is rare and must be based on a unique attribute of the land.
3. The solicitors and counsel were found negligent in their handling of the compensation claim.
4. The extent of the solicitors' and counsel's liability includes a requirement to pay compensation for the negligence.
5. There was no duty on the solicitors to question or challenge the advice given by the counsel, as the counsel were experts in the field.
6. The solicitors and counsel breached their duty of care by failing to identify and address the "head start" aspect of the special value claim.
7. The breach of duty was found to be the proximate cause of the alleged damages.
8. The appropriate measure of damages for the alleged breach of duty includes compensation for the negligence in the handling of the compensation claim.
9. The solicitors and counsel are not entitled to advocate's immunity in this case due to the nature of their negligence.
10. If advocate's immunity applies, it does not extend to the solicitors as they were found to be negligent in their handling of the compensation claim.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Boland v Yates Property Corp & Anor- Webster v Yates Property, the High Court of Australia addressed several significant legal issues regarding compensation for land acquired through resumption. The Court considered the appropriate valuation method for determining compensation, which was found to be based on the market value of the land, excluding any business value or other non-land attributes. The Court also determined that special value, which is an attribute of the land that provides it with a value over and above its market value, could be considered in the compensation claim if it was a genuine and identifiable characteristic of the land. This was a contentious issue, with the Court ultimately ruling that special value could be factored into the compensation if it was objectively identifiable and not merely speculative.

The Court further examined the negligence of the solicitors and counsel in handling the compensation claim. It found that there was a duty on the solicitors to question or challenge the advice given by the counsel, but this duty was not breached since the counsel were recognized experts in the field and the solicitors reasonably relied on their expertise. The Court held that the solicitors were not negligent in failing to identify and address the "head start" aspect of the special value claim, as this was a complex issue that even the counsel did not identify. Consequently, the Court found that the solicitors' and counsel's failure to identify this aspect was not the proximate cause of the alleged damages.

Regarding the measure of damages, the Court concluded that since there was no breach of duty by the solicitors and counsel, no damages were applicable for the alleged breach of duty. The Court also addressed the issue of advocate's immunity, finding that it applied to both the solicitors and the counsel. This immunity protected them from liability for their actions in the conduct of the proceedings, including their failure to lead certain evidence or arguments. The Court emphasized that the immunity extended to both parties as they shared a similar responsibility in managing the proceedings.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that market value, including special value where objectively identifiable, is the appropriate basis for compensation in land resumption cases. Additionally, the Court established that where expert counsel are involved, solicitors have a duty to rely on their expertise but are not required to second-guess their advice unless it is evidently erroneous. The Court also affirmed the principle of advocate's immunity, extending it to both solicitors and counsel in the context of the conduct of legal proceedings.