[2018] TASSC 43
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Boland v Clarence City Council [2018] TASSC 43
PARTIES: BOLAND, Christopher John
v
CLARENCE CITY COUNCIL
HAND, Marc
FILE NO: 1268/2018
DECISION
APPEALED FROM: C Boland v Clarence City Council [2018] TASRMPAT 4
DELIVERED ON: 25 September 2018
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 7 August 2018
JUDGMENT OF: Blow CJ
CATCHWORDS:
Environment and Planning – Environmental planning – Development control – Control of particular matters – Residential – Dwellings and houses – Meaning of "adjoining lots" and "adjoining buildings".
Auckland Lai v Warringah Shire Council (1985) 58 LGRA 276; Hornsby Shire Council v Malcolm (1986) 60 LGRA 429; Break O'Day Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal [2009] TASSC 59, 19 Tas R 94, followed.
Aust Dig Environment and Planning [165]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: A C Wood
First Respondent: A Walker
Second Respondent: No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant: C J Boland
First Respondent: Dobson Mitchell Allport
Second Respondent: A Beeson
Judgment Number: [2018] TASSC 43
Number of paragraphs: 42
Serial No 43/2018
File No 1268/2018
CHRISTOPHER BOLAND v CLARENCE CITY COUNCIL and MARC HAND
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BLOW CJ
25 September 2018
This is an appeal from a decision of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal ("the tribunal") constituted by the chairperson, Ms M Duvnjak, and two other members. The appellant, Mr Boland, owns a property at Cremorne, about 27Km from the Hobart CBD. The property is on the corner of Cremorne Avenue and Frederick Henry Parade. It is within the municipal area of the Clarence City Council ("the council"). The appellant applied to the council for a planning permit under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 ("the LUPA Act") for the construction of a four-storey building containing five dwellings. The Council refused his application. He appealed to the tribunal, but it dismissed his appeal: C Boland v Clarence City Council [2018] TASRMPAT 4. This is an appeal from that decision. By virtue of s 25(1) of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal TribunalAct 1993, an appeal of this nature can succeed only if the tribunal has erred in law.
In his notice of appeal, the appellant named the tribunal as a respondent to this appeal. That was not appropriate. Where there is a right of appeal from a decision of a court or tribunal, it is inconsistent with the role of the court or tribunal appealed from for it to be a party to the litigation. I therefore ordered at the start of the hearing that the tribunal be removed as a respondent to the appeal. The position is different in proceedings under the Judicial Review Act 2000 and in applications for relief in the nature of prerogative relief, but this is not such a case. The only appropriate respondents in this case were the other parties to the proceedings before the tribunal. The council was represented at the hearing of this appeal…
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- Case
- [2018] TASSC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining the precise meaning of "adjoining lots" and "adjoining buildings" within the context of the relevant planning regulations. This required the court to interpret the statutory provisions and consider whether Mr. Boland's proposed building complied with the required setbacks. The case hinged on whether the existing structures on the adjacent council-owned lot could be classified as "adjoining buildings" for the purposes of the regulations.
In its decision, the court examined the ordinary meaning of the terms in question, considering the dictionary definitions and the contextual usage within the planning regulations. The court found that the existing structures on the adjacent lot did not constitute "adjoining buildings" as they did not form part of a continuous building or structure. Consequently, the court concluded that the proposed construction did not breach the setback requirements, and the applicant's application for development approval was granted. The council's appeal against the decision was dismissed.
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