BMW23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

[2024] FedCFamC2G 597

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BMW23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 597  

File number:

SYG 954 of 2023

Judgment of:

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

Date of judgment:

9 July 2024

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – application for extension of time – whether reasonable grounds for 12-month delay – application for a protection visa – leave to file out of time not granted.    

Legislation:

Migration Act 1959 (Cth) ss 5J, 36, 477

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

DZAAD v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110

NAHI v Minister for Immigration& Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Re Commonwealth of Australia: Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347

Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Service and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Division:

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

57

Date of last submission/s:

1 July 2024

Date of hearing:

1 July 2024

Place:

Parramatta

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Appearing in person

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Mr Knuckey,  Mills Oakley

ORDERS

SYG 994 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BMW23

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:	9 JULY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to file the application out of time is refused.

2.The application is dismissed.

3.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,200.00.   

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

INTRODUCTION

1. The applicant is a citizen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and arrived in Australia on 10 July 2017 on a Student Visa (Subclass 500). The Student Visa was cancelled on 19 December 2019.

2. On 9 December 2021, the applicant applied for a Protection Visa (Subclass 866) (“the visa)”. The applicant claimed that he would be subject to honour killings due to his criminal charges for “rape” in Australia, for which he was awaiting trial at the time.

3. On 10 December 2021, the applicant submitted a change of circumstances document stating that since being incarcerated in Australia, five members of his family were murdered in or around March 2020. The murders allegedly occurred due to one of his cousins being in a relationship with a woman while they were not married. The applicant provided copies of a First Information Report (“FIR”) pertaining to this alleged incident.

4. On 21 February 2022, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa as he did not meet s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

5. On 23 February 2022, the applicant sought a review of the decision made by the delegate to refuse to grant the visa to the Administrative Appeal Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).

6. On 19 April 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the grant of a Protection Visa.

7. The applicant now seeks judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal. The applicant is unrepresented. On 23 May 2024, the applicant was referred to the relevant bodies for the arrangement, if possible, of pro-bono representation. These efforts have been unsuccessful. The applicant did not seek an adjournment for this to occur.

8. The Court is not convinced that any adjournment is appropriate. In doing so, the Court notes that the applicant is in immigration detention. This, of itself, is a reason for some expedition in concluding this matter. The applicant was not represented at the Tribunal hearing. The Court is also not satisfied that even if the Court were to adjourn the matter, that it would be possible to arrange pro-bono representation. Pro-bono representation is a scarce resource. It is simply not possible for all those who request it to be provided with such representation.

9. The Court is also mindful of the principles referred to by McHugh J in Re Commonwealth of Australia: Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67 at [15] – [17]. These principles include the history of the matter, and the public interest that requires that there be an end to litigation involving claims for constitutional writs. Further at [17] the High Court noted:

   An applicant’s inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari…. The respondent has a vested right to retain the judgement or decision. Its rights should not be dependant on whether the applicant can at such future time obtain a favourable legal opinion that he or she has an arguable case. In addition, the efficacy of public acts, decisions and judgements cannot be hostage to the applicant’s search for favourable legal advice.

10. In the Court’s view these same principles apply to legal representation. The application to the Court was filed on 8 June 2023. The Tribunal decision dates from 19 April 2022. An extension of time will need to be granted if this matter is to be substantively considered on its merits.

    THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL DECISION

11. At [1] – [8], the Tribunal set out the history of the proceedings. At [9] – [14], it correctly informed itself of the criteria for the granting of a Protection Visa.

12. The applicant’s claims for protection are summarised at [17] – [44]. They are as follows:

    ·He will face an honour killing if he returns to Pakistan due to the criminal charges of sexual assault he faced in Australia;

    ·He is from a very strong religious and political family in Pakistan who will kill him to restore their honour;

    ·Members of his family have been murdered including a cousin in 2013 and an aunt in 2013;

    ·His father was killed in an act of revenge in 2001;

    ·While honour killings are illegal under Pakistani law, there is little to no enforcement and are not reported to the police;

    ·His family members are in senior positions in the army, police, administrative politics, counterterrorism and federal airport police and will influence people to turn a blind eye to the applicant's death;

    ·If he is killed, it will be made to look like an accident; and

    ·He is unable to move to another part of Pakistan or another country like the United Arab Emirates or Afghanistan.

13. The applicant provided further evidence at his Protection Visa interview on 23 December 2021 and made the following claims:

    ·He was charged with sexual assault in Australia and released from prison on 24 November 2021. The trial was scheduled for August 2022;

    ·News articles relating to the applicant's offences were posted on Facebook and the applicant believes that members of his family found out about the criminal charges;

    ·The applicant was unable to provide evidence relating to the news articles posted to Facebook due to not having access to his email account or Facebook account;

    ·He had contacted his uncle in Pakistan seeking financial assistance between $40,000 and $50,000 to pay for a lawyer in Australia. He told his uncle at the time that he needed this money for a lawyer because he was charged for being in a fight;

    ·After the articles were published on Facebook, the applicant only had contact with his mother in Pakistan and claims that no one else in his family would speak to him;

    ·The applicant’s cousin was killed in or around 2010 or 2011 in the United Arab Emirates, because of his marriage to a girl of the Christian faith and stated that under Sharia Islamic Law the penalty was death;

    ·His uncle and family are politically connected, and the applicant's charges would bring shame to the family, and he feared his uncle would kill him.

14. During the Protection Visa interview, it was put to the applicant that the independent country information states that, within Pakistan, charges of rape are rarely prosecuted, and marital rape is not a criminal offence. In response the applicant says it is because people take things into their own hands and no one goes to the police and if they do, they are considered “weak”.

15. On 3 January 2022, the applicant provided documents relating to his uncle's acquittal of murder charges, photographs of various men at a gathering, Australian news articles relating to his arrest and a screenshot stating he could no longer access his Facebook account without further identification.

16. On 6 January 2022, the applicant provided further photographs of injuries sustained by persons he claimed were members of his family during a fight.

17. At a further hearing on 13 April 2022, the applicant gave evidence, with the assistance of an Urdu interpreter. His evidence was that:

    ·His first cousin was killed on the orders of his father between 2010 and 2012 for leaving his wife, and not divorcing her before marrying another woman (CB 185);

    ·Another cousin had been involved in “gang like coercion” against local members of political parties to which he was opposed, and was subsequently killed at the command of his father (CB 186); and

    ·His cousin was killed for “association with a female student” at his school, the applicant provided a photocopy of the original FIR in Urdu and the incident had occurred in March 2020 (CB 187).

18. The Tribunal did not accept that the news stories of the applicant's charges were posted on Facebook and rejected the factual basis of these claims. The Tribunal found the applicant’s relatives had not learned of the true nature and content of the charges against the applicant (CB 190, [53]). Further, the Tribunal found it could not “rely” on the applicant’s claims because the applicant had given inconsistent evidence about why he had not been able to produce evidence of the Facebook post (CB 190, [48]). The Tribunal expressed concern that with the knowledge that the post in question had been deleted two years earlier, the exercise of asking a friend to access the post was “entirely disingenuous” as well as “wholly incongruous” (CB 188, [41]).

19. The Tribunal found that the first FIR provided did not support his claim of his cousin being killed in an honour killing (CB 190, [50]). The Tribunal also did not accept that the other cousin was killed for talking to a woman of the Christian faith (CB 190, [52]). The Tribunal found the applicant was not a reliable witness and gave no weight to the statement made by his sister (CB 190, [53]).

20. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims related to an “individual local criminal act of violence” did not have a nexus with s 5J(1)(a) of the Act (CB 189, [47]). The Tribunal found that the applicant did not face any real chance of persecution for any reason cited in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act. The Tribunal concluded the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act (CB 190, [56]).

21. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims for complementary protection were “essentially” the same as his refugee claims which were “tainted” by a lack of credibility. The Tribunal found the “real risk” test imposed the same standard as the “real chance” test and his refugee claims could “no more succeed” here as complementary protection claims (CB 191, [64]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm (CB 191, [65]). The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

    GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

22. There are three grounds of judicial review relied upon which are set out in an Originating Application filed on 8 June 2023. They are as follows:

    1.The tribunal considered irrelevant information in assessing my claims for protection.

    2.The tribunal gave to (sic) much weight on the internet search about forged documents in Pakistan.

    3.The tribunal did not afford me procedural fairness by sticking on small details and asked me to prove things which in my circumstances can not be proved.

    THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS       

23. The applicant appeared before the Court unrepresented. He did not seek the assistance of an interpreter. The Court was satisfied that the applicant had good English skills and was able to participate in the hearing in a meaningful way and put those matters he wished to emphasise to the Court.

24. Prior to the hearing commencing, the Court ensured that the applicant was in possession of a copy of the relevant Court book and the respondent’s written submissions. The Court also ensured the applicant had access to a pen and paper so he could take notes during the course of the hearing should he so wish to.

25. At the commencement of the hearing, the Court explained it was undertaking judicial review, not merits review and the difference between the two types of review. The Court also explained the procedure by which the hearing would be undertaken. This included consideration of the preliminary question, which was whether leave to extend the time for the application should be granted and how the Court would consider this issue.

26. The applicant provided to the Court a two-page document which the Court will treat as submissions. Attached to that document was a police report together with four photographs of deceased persons, who he claims are his mother and two cousins. He claimed their deaths were recent and happened last month (May 2024). The material clearly postdates the Tribunal decision. It is fresh material that the Court cannot take into account when undertaking judicial review. Accordingly, the Court did not take the report or the photographs as evidence, nor did the Court consider the material in its consideration.

27. In his written document, the applicant outlines his difficulties in obtaining legal representation due to his incarceration, first in a prison following convictions for sexual assault and then in immigration detention. The applicant claimed that he did submit an application for judicial review to the Court via a friend, but it appears there is no record of it. He has no evidence to support that claim. He further states that when he found out there was no record of a previous application, he lodged the application that is now before the Court.

28. The applicant claims the Tribunal ignored the fact that honour killing is commonplace in Pakistan. He further claims that the Tribunal member became “mixed up” as to his evidence about the killing of his cousin. He repeated he fears harm if returned to Pakistan.

29. At the conclusion of the respondent’s oral submissions, the applicant was asked if he wished to state anything in reply. He again stressed the Tribunal made mistakes of fact and that his whole case rests upon incorrect credit findings made against him.

    PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION: APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

30. The applicant had until 24 May 2022 to make an application for judicial review to the Court, however, the application was not lodged until 8 June 2023. The application was thus 380 days outside of the 35-day period prescribed by s 477(1) of the Act.

31. The applicant claims he lodged a previous application within time but is unable to offer any evidence of this previous application.

32. It is the first respondent’s position that the application ought to be dismissed as a result of the applicant’s delay. It is submitted that even if an order is made granting the extension of time for the applicant, the substantive application does not make out any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

33. The decision to grant an extension of time is a discretionary one: (see; DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204 at [28]):

    The Application is brought under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. As the Minister has submitted, r 36.05 confers upon a court a broad discretion whether or not to grant an extension of time. The considerations generally relevant in determining whether an extension of time should be granted are well known. They include the length of the delay, whether the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, whether there is any prejudice to the respondents and the merits of the appeal if an extension is granted (Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348–349 (per Wilcox J); Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 (per Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ); Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] (per Spender, O’Loughlin and Dowsett JJ); Peck v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 810 at [16]–[27] (per Foster J); SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388 at [16]–[25] (per Cowdroy J)).

34. To the above, the Court would add that the greater the delay the more persuasive the explanation for the delay has to be. In considering whether to grant an extension of time, there are no mandatory relevant considerations; (see: Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 (“Tu’uta Katoa”) at [12]):

    On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s 477A(2)(a) and the Court's satisfaction that an order extending time "is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Other than the "interests of the administration of justice", there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the "subject-matter, scope and purpose" of the Act. The focus of s 477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.

    Length of and explanation for delay

35. The applicant has sought to explain the delay in his Initiating Application where he states:

    I had my criminal case ongoing at that time and I was overwhelmed and under lot of stressed (sic) because of that as I have to prepare for trial

    I did not have Immigration Lawyer because of my financial situation.

    I got refused legal aid and had no idea what to do next.

1. The applicant acknowledges that there is no record of a first application made to the Court. His claim of a first application was only made after he received the respondent’s written submissions. The matters set out above are inconsistent with the new claim of an application having been lodged in time. The Court has some difficulty accepting the explanation now given of an application having been submitted in time, but somehow lost.

2. The first respondent submits that the applicant’s delay in commencing these proceedings has not been adequately explained and the proposed substantive judicial review application fails to particularise any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Minister relies on Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 at [38]:

   The delay here is excessive. In general, the longer the delay, the more persuasive the explanation needs to be: Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195. The absence of any satisfactory, let alone persuasive, explanation for the delay would itself be a sufficient basis to refuse Mr Tran’s application for an extension of time.

3. The applicant has not filed any affidavit detailing his claimed contact with “legal aid”. The first respondent submits that it is well established that an inability to obtain legal advice or representation does not, of itself, provide a sufficient explanation for the delay; (see: WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Service and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 at [37]:

   In addition, it is well established that the inability to obtain legal advice or representation does not, of itself, provide a sufficient explanation for delay: Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 [35]; AZS21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 392 [16]. Even so, the applicant did not establish that impecuniosity prevented him from seeking review of the Tribunal’s decision sooner than he did. Importantly, no evidence was given as to the costs of doing so such that it might be demonstrated that commencing proceedings was beyond his means. It is appropriate, as the Minister submitted, to take account of the fact that impecunious litigants often commence applications in this Court for review of decisions of the Tribunal within the period limited by statute.

4. The delay in this case is excessive. Notwithstanding the applicant’s claims, the Court is not satisfied that he lodged an initial application that became lost or was completely unable to access sufficient resources to be able to lodge an application for judicial review with the Court, either within the stipulated 35-day time period or within a reasonable time period thereafter. While the Court accepts the applicant may have been under some stress, due to his circumstances, in the absence of some medical information supportive of this claim, the Court does not accept this completely explains the lengthy delay. This factor mitigates against an extension of time being granted.

   Prejudice

5. The first respondent properly submits that they suffer no prejudice, other than costs, if an extension of time is granted, but the mere absence of prejudice is not a sufficient basis to warrant the grant of an extension of time; (see: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at [349]). The Court considers this factor neutral as regarding the granting of an extension. This leaves the merits of the proposed application.

   Merits of Proposed Substantive Application

6. In considering the merit of the proposed appeal, the Court should consider whether the proposed grounds are “arguable”, “reasonably arguable”, or “sufficiently arguable”, to warrant the grant of an extension of time; (see: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [62]-[63]), approved by the Full Court on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110 at [38]). There will be circumstances where it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic evaluation of the merits as the discretionary power to extend time is broad; (see: Tu'uta Katoa at [18]).

7. Under the heading “Grounds of application”, the proposed substantive application for judicial review pleads three proposed grounds of judicial review.

   Proposed grounds one and two

8. The first and second proposed grounds of judicial review are related and allege that the Tribunal considered irrelevant information in assessing the applicant’s claims for protection, by placing “too much weight” on the “internet search about forged documents in Pakistan”. The Court notes that the proposed grounds lack any real particulars, and they can be described as bare assertions, even taking into account any relevant material in the applicant’s submissions.

9. If grounds of judicial review are not supported by particulars, for that reason alone, they are liable for dismissal; (see: WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35]).

10. The Minister submits that these two proposed grounds are baseless. A delegate for the Minister referred to independent country information relating to the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Pakistan. The delegate had significant concerns with respect to the credibility of the applicant’s claims as well as the genuineness of the supporting documents provided. The Tribunal “drew” the applicant’s attention to the delegate’s findings (at [30]) but did not find that the FIR was fraudulent. The Tribunal relied on the applicant’s own evidence that the police’s data gathering was “arbitrary” and found it could not be “confident in the reliability” of the FIRs or of its relevance to the applicant’s claimed circumstances ([50]). The Minister submits that these two proposed grounds cannot succeed.

11. It is well established that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any, and all claims made by an applicant; (see: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at [451]).

12. Nor does the Tribunal Authority have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out; (see: Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at [348]).

13. It is also well settled that the country information and the weight it gives to that information is a matter for the Tribunal Authority; (see: NAHI v Minister for Immigration& Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10).

14. The applicant’s claims that the Tribunal made errors of fact that impacted on his credit do not stand up to close scrutiny. He claims the Tribunal was in error as to the circumstances surrounding the death of one of his cousins and when it occurred. In the Court’s view the Tribunal properly dealt with these issues and the findings made as to the applicant’s credit were open to it on the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave.

15. In the Court’s view, grounds one and two merely take issue with the factual findings of the Tribunal and amount to no more than vehement disagreement with the conclusions reached. They disclose no jurisdictional error and have no merit.

    Proposed ground three

16. The third proposed ground states that the Tribunal did not afford the applicant procedural fairness by “sticking” on “small details” and requiring the applicant to prove things which “in his circumstances” could not be proved. The Minister submits that the applicant appears to take issue with the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings [64]. While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision-maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146. However, the Tribunal identified several cogent reasons to support its adverse credibility assessment. For example, the Tribunal found the applicant “improvised” evidence [52] and gave inconsistent evidence about the reasons why he was unable to provide evidence of the Facebook post [48]. The Minister submits that this ground is again no more than an “invitation for the Court to cavil with the merits of the Tribunal’s decision”.

17. To the extent that this a complaint about the manner in which the Tribunal hearings were conducted, the applicant has not filed any evidence to support an allegation that the Tribunal’s manner of questioning was binary, such that it prevented him from providing evidence. Rather, the hearing records and the Tribunal’s decision record indicate that the applicant was on notice of the dispositive issues and was given the opportunity to present arguments over lengthy hearings and provide evidence before and after the hearing. It was submitted that the Tribunal was not obliged to accept uncritically all assertions made by the applicant.

18. To the extent that the applicant alleges some failing by the Tribunal to provide him with procedural fairness, this claim has no merit. The applicant was invited to a hearing to give evidence and present arguments. His attention was drawn properly to issues troubling the Tribunal and he was given an opportunity to respond to these concerns. He was able to make submissions both pre and post hearing. The Court is unable to detect any breach by the Tribunal with any procedural fairness requirement contained in the Act for the type of review that was being conducted.

19. As set out above, as regards to the other complaint that the Tribunal was in error by “sticking” on small details requiring him to prove things he could not, this invites the Court to undertake impermissible merits review. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal, being the relevant decision-maker, that the applicant met the criteria for a Protection Visa; (see: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187]). The essence of the applicant’s argument is that he disagrees with the Tribunal’s findings. No jurisdictional error is articulated. Ground three has no merit.

20. A perusal of the decision record does not reveal any unarticulated jurisdictional error.

21. Even at an impressionistic level, none of the proposed grounds of judicial review have merit such that leave to allow an extension of time should be granted.

22. Leave for an extension of time is refused and the matter is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.

Associate:

Dated:        9 July 2024