CITATION: Blomfield v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 978 HEARING DATE(S): 7 - 16 September 2009
JUDGMENT DATE :
15 September 2009JUDGMENT OF: Harrison J DECISION: Documents admitted CATCHWORDS: EVIDENCE - defamation - admissibility and relevance - facts relevant to facts in issue - facts showing state of mind - credit and credibility - objection to the tender of evidence on the contention that it is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, previous representation and does not qualify as business record - Evidence Act 1995 ss 44, 69 and 135 LEGISLATION CITED: Evidence Act 1995 CATEGORY: Procedural and other rulings CASES CITED: R v Burns [2003] NSWCCA 30; 137 A Crim R 557 PARTIES: Michael Blomfield (Plaintiff)
Nationwide News Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
News Digital Media Pty Ltd (Second Defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 20218 / 2008 COUNSEL: P W J Gray SC with M F Richardson (Plaintiff)
A Leopold SC with D R Sibtain (Defendants)SOLICITORS: Clayton Utz (Plaintiff)
Blake Dawson (Defendants)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
DEFAMATION LISTHARRISON J
15 September 2009
JUDGMENT20218 / 2009 Michael Blomfield v Nationwide News Pty Ltd & News Digital Media Pty Ltd
1 HARRISON J: The plaintiff sought to tender a series of documents that were produced by Ms Dye in response to a subpoena directed to her. They became collectively MFI 21. The defendants objected to the tender of the documents on a number of bases. These were that they are either irrelevant, that their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the defendants and fall to be excluded in accordance with the general discretion in s 135 of the Evidence Act1995 ("the Act"), that their tender is precluded by s 44(1) of the Act or that, where applicable, they do not qualify as business records in accordance with s 69 of the Act.
2 The plaintiff submitted that the documents were relevant to the issue of Ms Dye's state of mind at the time that she went to New York, and her reasons for having done so, having regard to her evidence that she went there to recover from the adverse effects of her treatment at the hands of the plaintiff in the ways that she earlier described. That treatment is in part the subject matter of the publications in respect of which the plaintiff sues. Ms Dye's evidence on this topic was as follows:
"Q. Did you travel somewhere in early 2008?
A. Yes.
Q. About when was that?
A. Late March 2008.
Q. What country did you go to?
A. To the United States of America.
Q. Leaving aside visits to other countries, how long did you stay in the USA for?
A. For the remainder of 2008.
Q. Why did you leave Australia?
A. Because my experience with the Commonwealth Bank was probably, I think, the second most traumatic experience of my life and the Commonwealth Bank's…
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- Case
- [2009] NSWSC 978
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the admissibility and relevance of evidence under the Evidence Act 1995. The plaintiff argued that the evidence was necessary to establish the state of mind of the defendant at the time the allegedly defamatory material was published. The defendant, on the other hand, objected to the tender of evidence on the grounds of irrelevance, unfair prejudice, and the fact that it was not a business record. The court had to determine whether the evidence met the criteria set out in sections 44, 69, and 135 of the Evidence Act 1995.
The court examined the relevance and admissibility of the evidence under the Evidence Act 1995, concluding that the evidence was indeed relevant to the state of mind of the defendant. The court found that the evidence was probative of the state of mind and did not unfairly prejudice the defendant. The court also held that the evidence was admissible as a business record, despite the defendant's contention otherwise. As a result, the court allowed the evidence to be presented to the jury.
The court's decision allowed the evidence to be considered by the jury in determining the case's outcome. The final orders of the court were to admit the evidence in question, thereby permitting the plaintiff to use it in their case against the defendant.
Background
Background to the litigation
Further facts include the plaintiff's efforts to introduce evidence that he claimed would demonstrate the defendant's state of mind at the time of publishing the articles. This evidence was objected to by the defendant on the grounds that it was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and did not qualify as a business record under the Evidence Act 1995. The plaintiff's attempt to present this evidence was part of a broader strategy to show that the articles were published with actual malice, which is a necessary element to prove in a defamation case against a public figure or public interest issue in Australia.
The matter came before the court as a continuation of the legal proceedings between the parties, following an earlier decision where the court had already considered some aspects of the defamation claim. The initial hearing had resulted in an interlocutory ruling on certain evidentiary matters. This subsequent hearing focused on the admissibility of specific evidence tendered by the plaintiff, which the defendant contested. The court had to determine whether the proffered evidence was relevant to the facts in issue, whether it showed the state of mind of the defendant at the time of publication, and whether it was admissible under the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995. The court's decision on these evidentiary issues was pivotal as they would influence the outcome of the defamation claim.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the tendered evidence is relevant to the facts in issue and can be admitted under s 44 of the Evidence Act 1995.
2. Whether the tendered evidence shows the state of mind of the defendant at the time of publication and is therefore admissible under s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995.
3. Whether the tendered evidence qualifies as a business record under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995.
4. Whether the tendered evidence is unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded under the rules of evidence.
Held
1. The court concluded that the tendered evidence was relevant to the facts in issue and could be admitted under s 44 of the Evidence Act 1995.
2. The tendered evidence was found to show the state of mind of the defendant at the time of publication and was thus admissible under s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995.
3. The tendered evidence was held to qualify as a business record under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995.
4. The court determined that the tendered evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and should not be excluded under the rules of evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In assessing the admissibility of the tendered evidence, the court began by examining its relevance to the facts in issue under s 44 of the Evidence Act 1995. The court noted that evidence is relevant if it could logically affect the assessment of any fact in issue in the proceeding. Given the context of the defamation case, the evidence was deemed pertinent to the defendant's state of mind and intentions at the time of publication, thereby satisfying the relevance criterion.
The court then considered whether the tendered evidence showed the state of mind of the defendant under s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995. The court concluded that the evidence did reflect the defendant's state of mind, as it demonstrated their intentions and understanding at the time of the publication. This aspect was crucial in determining the credibility of the defendant's actions and the overall context of the defamatory statement.
Further, the court examined if the tendered evidence qualified as a business record under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995. The evidence was found to meet the criteria of a business record, which includes being made in the ordinary course of business and in the regular duty of a person to make such a record. This finding supported the admissibility of the evidence by establishing its reliability and trustworthiness.
Finally, the court addressed the contention that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and should be excluded. The court found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have. Therefore, the evidence was not excluded on the grounds of unfairness, ensuring its inclusion in the trial to aid in the fair assessment of the defamation claim.
The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the court's application of the statutory provisions under the Evidence Act 1995 to determine the admissibility and relevance of evidence in defamation cases, balancing relevance and prejudicial effect while considering the state of mind and business records. The court's approach ensures that pertinent evidence is not excluded unjustly, facilitating a just resolution of the case.