FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BLH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1906
Appeal from: BLH16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3599 File number: VID 1633 of 2018 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 12 November 2019 Date of publication of reasons: 18 November 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for protection (Class XA) visa – whether Appellant raised safety of particular aspect of Appellant’s journey home if returned before the Tribunal – claim raised – claim not adequately addressed – appeal allowed
MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for Protection (Class XA) Visa – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 499 – Ministerial Direction No 65 – whether Tribunal obliged to consider Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade country information assessment independently of relevant claim being advanced – no such obligation
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 499 Cases cited: NABEvMinister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs(No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1
NAVK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695
Date of hearing: 12 November 2019 Date of last submissions: 8 November 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellant: Dr McBeth Solicitor for the Appellant: Clothier Anderson & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Symons Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
VID 1633 of 2018 BETWEEN: BLH16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 NOVEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Order 1 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside, and in lieu therefore it be ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be quashed and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law.
3.Order 2 of the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia with respect to costs be vacated, and in lieu thereof the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.
4.The Appellant pay, as costs thrown away, 2/3 of the costs associated with the preparation of the First Respondent’s written submissions responding to the Appellant’s grounds of appeal as originally advanced, and the costs of appearance by First Respondent’s legal representatives at the adjourned hearing on 20 August 2019. The First Respondent otherwise pay the costs of the Appellant in this Court, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)KERR J:
The Appellant is a Pakistani citizen. He is a Shia Muslim, a Pashtun, and a member of the Turi tribe. He arrived at Christmas Island in June 2012. On 26 November 2016 he applied for a Protection…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1906
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the question of whether the appellant sufficiently raised the safety concern about travel beyond the Thal-Parachinar road was nuanced and not straightforward. The court referenced previous cases such as NAVK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs and NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, which established that the Tribunal is not required to consider claims that are not expressly made or do not arise clearly from the material before it. However, the court also acknowledged that the circumstances of each case must be carefully considered. In this instance, the court found that the appellant's concern about travel safety beyond the Thal-Parachinar road was not sufficiently clear or explicit enough for the Tribunal to be obligated to address it. The court held that the appellant's claim needed to either be appreciated by the Tribunal or arise clearly from the material itself.
The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed because the Tribunal had not adequately considered the appellant's safety concern. Consequently, the court quashed the Tribunal's decision and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. The court also ordered that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs, with specific provisions for costs associated with the preparation of written submissions and appearance fees for the first respondent’s legal representatives.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Order 1 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside, and in lieu therefore it be ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be quashed and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law.
3. Order 2 of the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia with respect to costs be vacated, and in lieu thereof the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.
4. The Appellant pay, as costs thrown away, 2/3 of the costs associated with the preparation of the First Respondent’s written submissions responding to the Appellant’s grounds of appeal as originally advanced, and the costs of appearance by First Respondent’s legal representatives at the adjourned hearing on 20 August 2019. The First Respondent otherwise pay the costs of the Appellant in this Court, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Symons submitted for the Minister that notwithstanding those references, the Court should not be satisfied that the issue of potential danger on any roads linking possible points of arrival in Pakistan to the Kurram Agency had been sufficiently identified by the Appellant as to require distinct consideration by the Tribunal. Further, Ms Symons submitted that to the extent such a claim was raised, it was raised only in the context of relocation. ConsiderationGround 1 The question as to whether the issue of the safety of travel beyond the Thal-Parachinar road was sufficiently raised before the Tribunal is finely balanced and not without difficulty. There appears to be no dispute between the parties as to the relevant principles that the Court should apply. They are those as stated in NAVK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 by Allsop CJ in which his Honour discussed the decision of the Full Court of this Court in NABEvMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1 as follows: [15]The Full Court in NABEvMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 263 at [55]–[63] dealt with the question of what claims must be dealt with by the Tribunal to complete its statutorily required task (its jurisdiction) even though they may not be expressly articulated. See also Dranichnikov vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389, 394 [24], 408 [95] and Applicant S395/2002 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112. From NABE I take it that the Tribunal is not required to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it: NABE at [61]. As the Full Court said at [63] much depends on the circumstances. Whatever adverb or adverbial phrase is used to describe the apparentness of the unarticulated claim, it must, it seems to me, either in fact be appreciated by the Tribunal or, if it is not, arise sufficiently from the material as to require a reasonably competent Tribunal in the circumstances to appreciate its existence. A practical and common sense approach to everyday decision-making requires the unarticulated claim to arise tolerably clearly from the material itself, since the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but which have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy. The gravamen of that decision is that the Tribunal is not required to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it. As his Honour Allsop CJ acknowledged, and as the Full Court had concluded at [63], much depends on the circumstances. If it is asserted that a tribunal has failed to take into account a claim that was before it and that has given rise to error, then that claim must sufficiently arise from the material so as to require a reasonably competent tribunal in the circumstances to appreciate its existence. A practical and commonsense approach needs to be applied in that regard.