BLG23 v BLH23, in the matter of BLG23

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BLG23 v BLH23, in the matter of BLG23 [2023] FCA 572  

File number(s): NSD 1121 of 2022
Judgment of: GOODMAN J
Date of judgment: 2 June 2023
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – security for costs of appeal – real risk that the respondent would be unable to recover costs against the appellant – long history of unpaid costs orders – prospects of success not significant – orders made for the provision of security

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by a third party for leave to intervene in the appeal – application refused

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 24, 27, 40, 54

Family Law Act (1975) (Cth), ss 102QB, 117

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 24(1)(d), 27, 56

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 40

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 9.12, 36.32

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth)

Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth)

Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170

Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 62

Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corp (1984) 2 FCR 1

D v P [2020] NSWCA 174

Du Bray v ACW [2020] FCA 1680

Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2012] FCA 992

Goo v Kim [2022] FCA 1562

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Rinehart [2017] FCAFC 170; (2017) 257 FCR 442

House v King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 28; (2013) 296 ALR 479

Jones v Southall & Bourke Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 539

Kordovoulos v Dixon-Hughes [2022] NSWCA 322

Lacey v Attorney General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; (2011) 242 CLR 573

Live Board Holdings Ltd v Cody Live Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 302

Mariconte v Nobarani [2020] FCA 1485

Massalski & Riley (No 3) [2022] FedCFamC1F 562

Massalski & Riley (No 4) [2022] FedCFamC1F 832

Massalski & Riley (No 6) [2022] FedCFamC1F 1029

Massalski & Riley (No 7) [2023] FedCFamC1F 128

Massalski & Riley [2019] FamCA 1013

Massalski & Riley [2021] FamCAFC 116

Massalski & Riley [2022] FedCFamC1F 36; (2022) 65 Fam LR 73

Massalski & Riley [2022] FedCFamC1F 835

Massalski (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 167

Massalski v Riley (No 2) [2021] FamCAFC 152

Massalski v The Owners SP 90255 [2023] NSWSC 23

Mohareb v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 231

Nobarani v Mariconte [2021] FCAFC 96

Nyoni v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2018] FCA 1313

Riley & Massalski [2020] FamCA 389

Roadshow Films v iiNet Ltd [2011] HCA 54; (2011) 248 CLR 37

Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666

Stuart v State of South Australia (Oodnadatta Common Overlap Proceeding) (No 2) [2021] FCA 194

Tait v Bindal People [2002] FCA 322

WAJR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 106; (2004) 204 ALR 624

Ward v Westpac Banking…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 572
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of BLG23 v BLH23, in the matter of BLG23, involved an appeal where BLG23 was required to provide security for BLH23's costs of the appeal, and an application by BLI23 for leave to intervene in the appeal. The court was required to decide the discretion to order security for costs, the amount of such security, and the application for intervention by BLI23.

The court examined the discretion to order security for costs under section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, considering factors such as the prospects of success on the appeal, the risk that a costs order would not be satisfied, the cause of BLG23's impecuniosity, and potential stultification of the appeal. The court also considered BLG23's history of non-payment of costs orders, amounting to approximately $1,000,000. Given these factors, the court concluded that BLG23 should provide security for BLH23's costs of the appeal in the sum of $30,000. The court also dismissed BLI23's application for leave to intervene, finding that the appeal would not affect BLI23's rights in the remaining Victorian Supreme Court proceeding.

The court made orders for BLG23 to provide security for BLH23's costs of the appeal in the sum of $30,000, and stayed the appeal until the security was provided. The court also dismissed BLI23's application for leave to intervene. The appeal was listed for a case management hearing on 30 June 2023.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Until further order:

(a) the appellant be referred to as BLG23;

(b) the first respondent be referred to as BLH23; and

(c) the proposed intervener be referred to as BLI23.

2. Within 21 days of the date of this Order, the appellant give security for the first respondent’s costs of the appeal in the sum of $30,000 to be provided by payment into Court in this proceeding pursuant to r 2.42 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

3. The appeal be stayed until the security for costs has been provided by the appellant pursuant to Order 2.

4. The costs of the first respondent’s interlocutory application filed 17 February 2023 be costs of the appeal.

5. BLI23’s interlocutory application filed 20 March 2023 be dismissed.

6. The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing at 9:30am on 30 June 2023.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

A. INTRODUCTION

[1]

B. BACKGROUND

[7]

Salient facts

[7]

BLG23’s evidence

[61]

C. THE SECURITY FOR COSTS APPLICATION

[65]

The discretion

[66]

Factors informing the exercise of the discretion

[68]

(1) Prospects of success on the appeal

[68]

(2) The risk that a costs order in favour of BLH23 against BLG23 would not be satisfied

[79]

(3) The cause of BLG23’s impecuniosity

[84]

(4) Potential stultification of the appeal

[85]

(5) Does BLH23 already hold security?

[86]

(6) Is the application for security actuated by improper purposes?

[87]

(7) BLG23’s status as a natural person

[89]

(8) The nature of the proceeding

[90]

(9) Other factors

[91]

Conclusion as to the exercise of the discretion

[92]

Quantum of the order for the provision of security for costs

[94]

D. THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

[103]

Introduction

[103]

The solvency issue

[118]

Effect of the appeal upon BLI23’s rights in the remaining Victorian Supreme Court proceeding

[118]

Conclusion

[118]

E. CONCLUSION

[120]

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, BLG23 should provide security for BLH23’s costs of the appeal in the sum of $30,000; and BLI23’s application should be refused.B. BACKGROUNDSalient facts The history, and in particular the litigious history, between BLG23, BLH23 and BLI23 is extensive and the subject of many judgments in various courts and tribunals. The following findings of fact include a summary of that history only in so far as it is relevant to the issues raised on the present applications. The findings set out below are taken from the affidavits of BLH23’s solicitor, Mr Byrnes, made on 15 February and 27 March 2023; the affidavits of BLG23 made on 22 March and 26 April 2023; the affidavit of BLI23 affirmed on 6 March 2023; and various judgments. In 1982, BLG23 married BLI23. They separated in 2002. Subsequently, BLG23 and BLH23 formed a relationship which involved cohabitation from early 2009. Early in their relationship they purchased a property at Ettalong Beach, as tenants in common in equal shares. They caused two units (Lots 1 and 2) to be built on the property. The relationship between BLG23 and BLH23 broke down in 2012. Between 2014 and 2017, BLG23 and BLH23 were involved in various proceedings in the Local Court of New South Wales and the District Court of New South Wales concerning domestic violence orders. A consequence of those proceedings was that BLG23 was ordered to pay BLH23’s costs in an amount which exceeded $60,000 (DVO Costs Orders). BLG23 made a series of applications in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales arising out of the orders made by the Local and District Courts concerning domestic violence orders. The Court of Appeal made various costs orders against BLG23 (NSWCA Costs Orders). On 30 January 2015, BLG23 commenced a proceeding in the (then named) Family Court of Australia against BLH23 for a property adjustment order. In 2017, part of a proceeding which BLG23 had commenced against BLH23 and BLI23 in the Supreme Court of Victoria in 2016 was cross-vested to the Family Court and heard as part of the same Family Court proceeding. I will refer to that part of the Victorian Supreme Court proceeding that was cross‑vested to the Family Court as the transferred Victorian Supreme Court proceeding; and the balance of that proceeding as the remaining Victorian Supreme Court proceeding. On 19 November 2019, judgment was entered in the District Court of New South Wales in favour of BLH23 against BLG23 for $184,166.25 with respect to the NSWCA Costs Orders. Subsequently, BLG23’s salary was the subject of a garnishee order. Pursuant to that order, BLH23 recovered all of the costs due under the DVO Costs Orders and all but $67,638.33 of the $184,166.25 due under the 19 November 2019 District Court judgment. On 24 December 2019, Deputy Chief Justice McClelland made final orders in the Family Court proceeding (Final Family Court Orders): Massalski & Riley [2019] FamCA 1013. Those orders included that: BLG23 and BLH23 were to “expeditiously do all acts and things and sign all documents required to complete the registration of the proposed strata plan and associated dealings” concerning the property; BLG23 was to receive the title to Lot 1; the mortgage secured over Lot 1 was to be discharged, but secured over Lot 2; and BLH23 was to receive the title to Lot 2.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As is apparent from [56] to [59] above, the outstanding costs owed by BLG23 to BLH23, together with interest thereon (and allowing for some reduction for those estimated amounts, which are yet to be assessed) appear likely to be in the order of $1,000,000.BLG23’s evidence Before considering the security for costs application it is appropriate to refer to some features of BLG23’s evidence. BLG23’s evidence on this application comprises two affidavits of 56 and 92 paragraphs respectively. Each affidavit has numerous exhibits or annexures. The evidence includes references to the charging order (see [27(2)] above). However, despite its volume, BLG23’s evidence does not address the following critical evidentiary issues on the security for costs application, namely: (1) matters relevant to her prospects of succeeding on the appeal; (2) the risk that a costs order made against her would not be satisfied, and as part of this, her ability and her willingness to pay such an adverse costs order, and her financial position; (3) her non‑payment of numerous costs orders; and (4) the effect, if any, that an order for the provision of security would have upon her ability to prosecute the appeal. Instead of addressing these issues, BLG23’s evidence sets out various historical matters. Some of those matters are relied upon in support of a submission that the application for security for costs is actuated by an improper purpose. Others of those historical matters are of no relevance to the present application. Many of them have been the subject of arguments unsuccessfully pursued in other courts. BLG23’s failure to address the salient issues cannot be attributed to any naiveté as a self‑represented litigant. As the summary of some of the litigious history between BLG23 and BLH23 set out above demonstrates, BLG23 is not a neophyte. Further, she has had the benefit of defending an application for the provision of security for costs before Appeal Judicial Registrar Cameron and the benefit of his thorough reasons which addressed in detail various factors which inform the exercise of the discretion to make an order for the provision of security for costs (see [32] above). Indeed, as is discussed below, BLG23 identified some such factors in her written submissions on this application.C. THE SECURITY FOR COSTS APPLICATION Against that necessarily lengthy background, I turn to consider BLH23’s application for security for costs.The discretion Section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) provides the Court with a discretion to order (relevantly) an appellant in an appeal under Division 2 of Part III of the FCA Act (as this appeal is) to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against BLG23. The discretion is unfettered but must be exercised judicially; and each application for an order for the provision of security turns on its own facts: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corp (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 3-4 (Sheppard, Morling and Neaves JJ).

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour’s reasons for making the vexatious litigant order included:57.In relation to this court, the proceedings the subject of the main judgment were held to be an abuse of process and failed to satisfy the wife’s duty to achieve the overarching purpose. There, I said130. I refer to my reasons above at [82]–[109], which led to the conclusion the wife has no reasonable prospect of success on her substantive application under s 90SN. For the same reasons, I conclude, like the Full Court, that the wife in truth refuses to accept the outcome of the proceedings before McClelland DCJ and the Full Court. While relying on the discussion above in full, I point in particular to the multiple applications the wife has brought since the final decision of McClelland DCJ. These betray this obdurate refusal, as does her continued and substantial reliance on circumstances which are clearly long past, including the purported claim of Mr K. This is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the wife wants to relitigate issues already finally determined, and the principles of finality and fairness operate to preclude her doing so, even if her claims had any merit, which I have found they do not. 131. But in addition and separately, for the same reasons, I draw the same inference as the Full Court, namely, that the wife’s multiple applications constitute “no more than a strategy which is designed to delay enforcement of the orders mounting up against her as long as possible”. This clearly brings the administration of justice into disrepute and requires dismissal of the wife’s applications as an abuse of process.58.I am satisfied the proceedings the subject of the main judgment were vexatious.59.The wife has been criticised for her failures to accept the principles of finality in Massalski & Riley(No 2) [2021] FamCAFC 152:14. … Clearly the wife had read our reasons for judgment but for whatever reason she is unwilling to accept that the proceedings between her and the husband are a de facto financial cause, that her arguments have failed and principles of finality. It is difficult to come to any view other than the wife’s recently filed s 79A application (or its allied provision under Pt VIIIAB) has no reasonable prospects of success and that it is no more than a strategy which is designed to delay enforcement of the orders mounting up against her as long as possible.60.In her oral submissions, the wife was quite clear that she did not accept the finality of the proceedings in this court. She said:I acknowledge I do not accept the decision of the Family – Family Court because there’s no finality. I was not given an opportunity to transfer a property to my name that would give me financial independence, that would give me a title that is realisable, because the title is not a Torrens title any more and it’s not a strata title. That is the substance of my grievance.…62.Although the wife’s responses to fairly simple questions were somewhat obscure, it is tolerably clear that, despite professing respect for the decision of this court, she is convinced that the orders of this court about property adjustment cannot be accepted, that she deserves a property to give her financial independence, and she intends to continue an attack on the outcome in this court by litigation in various other courts and tribunals.…64.There is no doubt that the wife has frequently instituted proceedings. 65.I am satisfied that the wife is subjectively convinced that all her proceedings are justified, and she has been the victim of deceitful and collusive conduct between the husband and his solicitors. However, over a period of some eight years, the wife has failed to convince anyone else that these convictions are rationally based, let alone reflect a true situation. 66.In the context of these proceedings, the wife’s refusal to accept decisions which have not been in her favour is beyond debate. 67. I am satisfied that:(a)the proceedings in this court the subject of the substantive judgment had no reasonable prospects of success and were an abuse of process;(b)the wife has demonstrated habitual and persistent institution of proceedings which have often and consistently been determined against her;(c)the wife has consistently failed to understand the principle of finality, in a range of different jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court of NSW, the Court of Appeal of NSW, the District Court of NSW, and this court, despite receiving explicit guidance from the Full Court on this question;(d)the wife has persisted in maintaining or instituting proceedings beyond the point where a rational person would have “abandoned the field”;(e)the proceedings instituted in this court, since her failed appeal, have moved from the unlikely to the ridiculous (adopting the phraseology of Perram J); and(f)the wife’s persistent renewal of litigation on issues already adversely determined against her has been found in this court to be a strategy to avoid enforcement of orders against her, and generally pose a risk to the public interest by consuming and wasting the resources of this and other courts in a manner inimical to the administration of justice.68.The evidence makes clear that for some eight years in multiple jurisdictions, the wife has habitually and persistently instituted proceedings which, as demonstrated by the equally persistent and habitual failure of those proceedings, generally lacked reasonable grounds. Clearly, at times the applications were no more than attempts to relitigate adverse outcomes which the wife just refused to accept. Proceedings in this and other courts have been dismissed as abuses of process, with Judge Olsson SC stating in Massalski v Riley & Anor (Unreported, District Court of NSW, 25 February 2022) that “The pleading in the present case is so similar to that of the earlier proceeding that I conclude that [the wife]’s conduct constitutes an abuse of process or alternatively is vexatious and oppressive.”(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established