Blake-Dyke v Bayard - [2017] NSWSC 1474

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Blake-Dyke v Bayard [2017] NSWSC 1474
Hearing dates: 13 October 2017
Decision date: 13 October 2017
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: McCallum J
Decision:
Plaintiff’s application to have the particulars of truth struck out refused; plaintiff ordered to pay the defendant's costs of the application, such costs to be assessable forthwith.

Catchwords: DEFAMATION – defences – defence of truth – whether adequate particulars given – matters complained of consisting of emails to a disciplinary body concerning alleged dangerous riding during a polo match
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Andrew Blake-Dyke (plaintiff)
Jeremy Bayard (defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
D R Sibtain (plaintiff)
M Richardson (defendant)
Solicitors:
Hicksons Lawyers (plaintiff)
Goldsmiths Lawyers (defendant)

File Number(s): 2017/162053
Publication restriction: None

Judgment – EX TEMPORE

HER HONOUR: These are proceedings for defamation between two equestrian polo players. The claim follows an incident which occurred on the polo field at the Arunga Tournament on 16 April 2017 during the third chukka of a match between 'Town and Country' and ‘Pondtail Farms' at Windsor Fields.
Following reports by the referees of that match, the parties were called upon to give their accounts of two incidents. In respect of the first, the defendant wrote to the relevant disciplinary body, in short, accusing the plaintiff of having charged at his horse in a manner which the defendant alleged was deliberate and malicious. That email is the first matter complained of in the proceedings. The second incident concerned the defendant's response to the first incident, in particular, the manner in which he confronted the plaintiff after the conclusion of the match. The defendant’s account of that incident is the second matter complained of.
The two emails written by the defendant to the disciplinary body reflect a level of strong feeling on the defendant's part as to the nature of the plaintiff's conduct and may certainly be accepted to have been expressed in robust terms. For example, in the first matter complained of, the defendant described the plaintiff's conduct in the following terms:

As he launched his attack I was leaning to the near-side of my horse, bent down trying to intercept the ball. I was completely exposed and defenceless. Had I not caught a glimpse of the approaching Blake-Dyke at the last second and sat back up, the resulting impact could have been incredibly serious.

In the second email addressing the defendant's post-match conduct, he said that he approached Blake-Dyke and “loudly condemned his actions with words that would have included, but not necessarily been limited to” certain expletives I will not repeat in a judgment. That email continued:

Approximately 5 minutes later I started to walk towards the trucks of my teammates parked at the other side of the field, when I saw Blake-Dyke standing by his utility. I decided he needed to be reminded again of my view of his character – given this is a person of severely limited intelligence and rote learning is proven as the best method…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Blake-Dyke v Bayard

Details

AGLC: Blake-Dyke v Bayard [2017] NSWSC 1474
Case: [2017] NSWSC 1474
Decision Date: 13 October 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Blake-Dyke versus Bayard was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. Blake-Dyke, the plaintiff, initiated legal proceedings against Bayard, the defendant, on the grounds of defamation. The plaintiff alleged that Bayard had made defamatory statements about him through emails sent to a disciplinary body regarding an incident of alleged dangerous riding during a polo match. The defendant argued that the statements were true and, therefore, not defamatory, and that the plaintiff had failed to provide adequate particulars of the defamatory matter.

The central legal issue the court had to address was whether the defendant had effectively defended the defamation claim by asserting the truth of the statements and whether the plaintiff had supplied sufficient particulars of the alleged defamatory matter. The court also needed to determine if the statements made in the emails were defamatory in the first place and if the defence of truth was applicable.

The court found that the defendant had indeed provided an adequate defence by asserting the truth of the statements. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to identify the specific matters complained of with the necessary precision. The court also determined that the matters complained of, which were emails to a disciplinary body, were not defamatory because they were made in good faith and for the protection of the public interest. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim. As a result, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the proceeding.

Orders