Blackwood v Adams

Case [2015] ICQ 1


INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Simon Blackwood (Workers’ Compensation Regulator)  v Adams [2015] ICQ 001

PARTIES:

SIMON BLACKWOOD (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGULATOR)
(appellant)
v
MARY ADAMS

(respondent)

CASE NO/S:

C/2014/21

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

29 January 2015

HEARING DATE:

19 August 2014

MEMBER:

Martin J, President

ORDER/S:

1. The appeal is allowed. 

2. The decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission in this matter is set aside.

3. In its place the order is that the appeal filed by the respondent on 22 April 2013 is dismissed and that the decision of 7 March 2013 is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS: 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION – DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS – APPEALS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATED CASES – NATURE AND SCOPE OF APPEAL AND REVIEW – where the respondent claims she sustained a psychological injury as a result of being bullied and harassed in her workplace – where the respondent’s appeal against the rejection of her claim was upheld in the Commission – where the respondent filed a Statement of Stressors in which she listed what she called “the work events that caused my psychological injuries” – whether the Commissioner’s finding that the respondent’s aggravation injury did not arise out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way was not reasonably open on the evidence and on the facts as found by her – whether the Commissioner erred when she enquired whether “unreasonable management action” was the dominant cause of the respondent’s disorder

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32

CASES:

Q-Comp v Hochen (C/2009/47) – Decision
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APPEARANCES:

Mr S P Gray directly instructed by the Regulator for the appellant
Ms L Willson instructed by Parker Simmonds for the respondent

  1. Mary Adams worked for Healthscope Ltd at the Allamanda Private Hospital from August 2006 until 31 August 2011. In the period from July 2008 until she left employment she worked in the central sterilising department (CSD). Her manager in that department was Lance Hippisley. Ms Adams claims that she sustained a psychological injury as a result of being bullied and harassed by Mr Hippisley. Her appeal against the rejection of her claim was upheld in the Commission.

  1. The parties agree that Ms Adams was a worker at the time she sustained her personal injury and that her injury was a psychiatric or psychological injury. In the light of evidence from Ms Adams’ treating psychiatrist, Dr Brown, the Commissioner formed the view, which is not challenged on appeal, that the injury was an aggravation of a pre-existing personal injury. Before the Commissioner, the Regulator accepted that the aggravation injury arose out of or in the course of Ms Adams’ employment and the employment was a significant contributing factor to her injury, but the Regulator contested the events as they were described by Ms Adams.

  1. At the hearing in the Commission the issue which had to be resolved was whether the aggravation injury arose out of or in the course of reasonable management action taken in…

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AGLC
Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Adams [2015] ICQ 1
Case
[2015] ICQ 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Blackwood v Adams, the Court reviewed a decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission concerning a claim for workers' compensation. The respondent, Ms Adams, alleged she sustained a psychological injury due to being bullied and harassed in her workplace. The Commission rejected her claim, but her appeal was subsequently upheld. Ms Adams submitted a Statement of Stressors identifying events she believed caused her injuries. The legal issues before the court involved whether the Commissioner's findings were reasonable and whether she correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003.

The court determined that the Commissioner's conclusion that the respondent's aggravation injury did not arise from reasonable management action was not reasonably open on the evidence. The court noted that the Commissioner appeared to search for a "dominant factor" in determining the cause of the injury, which was an erroneous approach as established in Q-Comp v Hochen. The court also found that the Commissioner erred by allowing section 32(3) of the Act to "prevail" over section 32(5) of the Act. This was significant because the Commissioner had relied on material inconsistent with or not advanced by Ms Adams as the cause of her injury. The court concluded that the Commissioner's decision was flawed as it was not open for her to find that Ms Adams fell within section 32(3) of the Act after finding the distress was caused by conduct within section 32(5).

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the Commission's decision, dismissed the respondent's appeal, and confirmed the original decision of the Commission. The court noted that it would hear the parties on the issue of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission in this matter is set aside.

3. In its place the order is that the appeal filed by the respondent on 22 April 2013 is dismissed and that the decision of 7 March 2013 is confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Under this heading, the appellant argues that in order to have reached the conclusion referred to above, the Commissioner must have searched for a “dominant factor”. I was referred to Q-Comp v Hochen.[2] In that case Hall P said that an enquiry as to whether or not unreasonable management action was the dominant cause of an injury was an erroneous approach. I accept that that is correct. I do not accept, though, that it can be demonstrated that the Commissioner necessarily engaged upon a search for a “dominant factor”. [2] (C/2009/47) – Decision < 3 of the appeal The appellant argues that the Commissioner erred by allowing s 32(3) of the Act to “prevail” over s 32(5) of the Act. This is another way of describing the argument in ground 1 and need not be taken further.ConclusionThe error which has been identified by the appellant which is of signal importance is that the Commissioner relied upon material which was either inconsistent with or not advanced by Ms Adams as the cause of her injury. At [88] of her reasons, the Commissioner said:“I accept that Mr Hippisley’s conduct on 29 and 30 August 2011 caused Ms Adams distress because she found it intimidatory and precipitated her decompensation. However, his actions were found to be reasonable and taken reasonably in the circumstances.”It is in the next paragraph of the Commissioner’s reasons that the error is manifest. The Commissioner describes those actions as having occurred against a backdrop of an uncomfortable and unpleasant work environment. That was not the case before the Commission. Having found that the distress was caused by conduct which came within s 32(5) of the Act and not having accepted virtually all of Ms Adams’ claims concerning other conduct, it was not open for the Commissioner to find that Ms Adams’ fell within s 32(3) of the Act. OrdersThe following orders are made:(a) The appeal is allowed.(b) The decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission in this matter is set aside. (c) In its place the order is that the appeal filed by the respondent on 22 April 2013 is dismissed and that the decision of 7 March 2013 is confirmed.I will hear the parties on costs. The appellant argues that the Commissioner erred by allowing s 32(3) of the Act to “prevail” over s 32(5) of the Act. This is another way of describing the argument in ground 1 and need not be taken further. The error which has been identified by the appellant which is of signal importance is that the Commissioner relied upon material which was either inconsistent with or not advanced by Ms Adams as the cause of her injury. At [88] of her reasons, the Commissioner said: It is in the next paragraph of the Commissioner’s reasons that the error is manifest. The Commissioner describes those actions as having occurred against a backdrop of an uncomfortable and unpleasant work environment. That was not the case before the Commission. Having found that the distress was caused by conduct which came within s 32(5) of the Act and not having accepted virtually all of Ms Adams’ claims concerning other conduct, it was not open for the Commissioner to find that Ms Adams’ fell within s 32(3) of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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