BKR16 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BKR16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2623
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision by Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirming decision not to grant applicant Safe Haven Enterprise visa; whether IAA failed to consider essential integer of claim for protection – whether IAA actively engaged in assessing risk of harm having regard to findings it had made – whether IAA failed to consider claim arising on the material before it – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H(1), 36(2)(a), 476

Cases cited:

DDK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 353

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16 [2017] FCAFC 188
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and IndigenousAffairs [2004] FCA 1695

Applicant: BKR16
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1473 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 4 August 2017
Date of Last Submission: 4 August 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 21 September 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1473 of 2016

BKR16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant applies for a remedy under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in a relation to a decision made by the second respondent (IAA) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Sub class 790) visa (SHEV).

  2. The applicant claims the IAA made a jurisdictional error in three ways: the IAA failed to consider an essential integer of the applicant’s claims for protection; the IAA failed to consider its own findings when assessing whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution; and the IAA failed to consider a claim that was “clearly evident on the facts”.

  3. To be in a position to consider these claims it will be necessary to set out the applicant’s claims for protection, and the reasons for which the IAA did not accept the applicant’s claims for protection.

Claims for protection

  1. The applicant stated his claims for protection on five occasions – on 10 October 2012 in a “biodata interview” with an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (as the Department of Home Affairs was then known) (Department);[1] on 17 January 2013 at an “Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview” (IMAE Interview);[2] in a statement dated 21 August 2013 which formed part of a purported application…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2623
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirming a decision not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The applicant contended that the IAA had failed to consider an essential element of their claim for protection, specifically whether the IAA had actively assessed the risk of harm in light of its own findings, and whether it had failed to consider a claim that arose from the material before it.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider a claim that was either explicitly made by the applicant or arose clearly from the materials presented to it. The applicant argued that the "Asserted Claim" was either expressly made or evident from the material, while the Minister contended that the IAA was entitled to treat it as a matter on which the applicant did not rely, and therefore, its omission did not constitute jurisdictional error.

The court considered the principles established in cases such as *NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2)* and *NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Indigenous Affairs*. These principles indicate that while a tribunal is not obligated to consider claims not expressly made or clearly arising from the material, its duty extends to reviewing all materials before it. A failure to address a claim that, if resolved favourably, could be dispositive of the review, may constitute a failure of procedural fairness or a failure to conduct the review as required by the Act, thereby amounting to jurisdictional error. The court noted that the apparentness of an unarticulated claim depends on the circumstances, requiring it to be either appreciated by the tribunal or to arise sufficiently from the material to necessitate appreciation by a reasonably competent tribunal. A practical approach suggests that an unarticulated claim must arise tolerably clearly from the material, rather than requiring the tribunal to undertake an independent analytical exercise to discover potential claims.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of BKR16 v Minister for Immigration revolves around the applicant's application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirming a decision not to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The applicant argues that the IAA failed to consider essential aspects of his claim for protection, and that it did not actively engage in assessing the risk of harm despite the findings it had made. The applicant contends that the IAA failed to consider a claim that arose from the material before it, which he argues constitutes a jurisdictional error.

The applicant, BKR16, submitted an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa, which was ultimately rejected by the IAA. In his judicial review application, the applicant asserts that the IAA did not properly consider a specific claim he made, referred to as the Asserted Claim. This claim, according to the applicant, was either explicitly made by him or arose clearly from the material before the IAA. The Minister for Immigration, however, argues that the IAA was not required to consider the Asserted Claim because it was neither expressly included in the applicant's statement that formed part of a purported application for a Protection visa nor in the statutory declaration that formed part of the application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. Furthermore, the Minister submits that the applicant had positively stated to the delegate that he had raised all of his claims, which did not include the Asserted Claim.

The case hinges on whether the Asserted Claim was sufficiently articulated or arose clearly from the material before the IAA, necessitating its consideration. The applicant relies on a passage from the judgment of the Full Federal Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, which states that the Tribunal is not required to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it. The applicant further submits that the principles from the judgment of Allsop J in NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs support his position, as they emphasise that an unarticulated claim must either be appreciated by the Tribunal or arise sufficiently from the material to require a reasonably competent Tribunal in the circumstances to appreciate its existence.

The matter of BKR16 v Minister for Immigration was brought before the court as an application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA), affirming the decision of the Minister for Immigration not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The applicant sought to challenge the IAA’s decision on the basis that it had failed to consider an essential aspect of their claim for protection, specifically whether the IAA had actively engaged in assessing the risk of harm having regard to its findings and whether it had failed to consider a claim that arose on the material before it. The applicant argued that the IAA’s oversight constituted a jurisdictional error.

Prior to this judicial review, the applicant had lodged an application for a Protection visa and a subsequent application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa, neither of which were successful. The IAA’s decision not to grant the visa was affirmed, prompting the applicant to seek judicial review. The applicant relied on the principles established in the Full Federal Court’s judgment in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, asserting that the IAA should have considered a claim that arose from the material before it, even if not expressly articulated by the applicant. The Minister, however, contended that the IAA was not required to consider this claim as it was neither expressly made nor did it arise clearly from the materials presented. This judicial review thus focused on the procedural obligations of the IAA in assessing the visa application, particularly in relation to claims that were implicit in the presented material but not explicitly stated by the applicant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant also relies on the following passage from the judgment of the Full Federal Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) (applicant’s emphasis):[33][61] . . . consistent with the proposition that the Tribunal is not required to consider a case that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it. The Tribunal’s obligation is not limited to procedural fairness in responding to expressly articulated claims but, as is apparent from Dranichnikov, extends to reviewing the delegate’s decision on the basis of all the materials before it . . . .[63] . . . .It is plain enough, in the light of Dranichnikov, that a failure by the Tribunal to deal with a claim raised by the evidence and the contentions before it which, if resolved in one way, would or could be dispositive of the review, can constitute a failure of procedural fairness or a failure to conduct the review required by the Act and thereby a jurisdictional error. It follows that if the Tribunal makes an error of fact in misunderstanding or misconstruing a claim advanced by the applicant and bases its conclusion in whole or in part upon the claim so misunderstood or misconstrued its error is tantamount to a failure to consider the claim and on that basis can constitute jurisdictional error. The same may be true if a claim is raised by the evidence, albeit not expressly by the applicant, and is misunderstood or misconstrued by the Tribunal.[33] [2004] FCAFC 263 In effect, the applicant submits the Asserted Claim was a claim that was explicitly made by the applicant or was a claim that arose from the material that was before the IAA. The Minister, on the other hand, submits the IAA was entitled to treat the Asserted Claim as not being a matter on which the applicant relied in support of a SHEV; and, therefore, it made no jurisdictional error by not considering it. The Minister relies on the applicant’s not having included the Asserted Claim in the statement that formed part of a purported application for a Protection visa, and the statutory declaration that formed part of the application for a SHEV; and the Minister also relies on the applicant’s not being silent, but in having positively stated to the delegate that he had raised all of his claims which did not include the Asserted Claim. The question that arises on ground 3 is whether there was before the IAA a claim to the effect of the Asserted Claim the IAA ought to have considered. The principles for determining that question are not in doubt; and in addition to the passages on which the applicant relies it would be useful to refer to the following passage from the judgment of Allsop J (as his Honour then was) in NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs:[34]From NABE I take it that the Tribunal is not required to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it: NABE at [61]. As the Full Court said at [63] much depends on the circumstances. Whatever adverb or adverbial phrase is used to describe the apparentness of the unarticulated claim, it must, it seems to me, either in fact be appreciated by the Tribunal or, if it is not, arise sufficiently from the material as to require a reasonably competent Tribunal in the circumstances to appreciate its existence. A practical and common sense approach to everyday decision-making requires the unarticulated claim to arise tolerably clearly from the material itself, since the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but which have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy.[34] [2004] FCA 1695, at [15]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) failed to consider an essential integer of the applicant's claim for a Safe Haven Enterprise (SHEV) visa. The court noted that the Tribunal is not obligated to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the material before it. However, if a claim is raised by the evidence and is not expressly articulated by the applicant but arises sufficiently from the material, it must be considered. The court emphasised the necessity for the Tribunal to appreciate the existence of such claims to avoid a failure of procedural fairness or a jurisdictional error. This principle was drawn from the case of NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2), where the Full Federal Court highlighted the importance of the Tribunal assessing claims by reference to all material before it.

The court also considered whether the IAA actively engaged in assessing the risk of harm having regard to the findings it had made. The court underscored the importance of the Tribunal's active engagement in assessing risks, particularly when specific findings are made that relate directly to the risk of harm. The obligation of the Tribunal to meticulously evaluate the risk of harm was highlighted to ensure that the decision-making process aligns with the statutory requirements under the Migration Act.

Furthermore, the court addressed whether the IAA failed to consider a claim that arose on the material before it, and if such a failure constitutes a jurisdictional error. The court referred to the case of NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, where Allsop J (as his Honour then was) outlined that an unarticulated claim must arise sufficiently from the material for the Tribunal to appreciate its existence. This principle was applied to determine whether the IAA's omission to consider a claim that arose from the material constituted a jurisdictional error.

In examining whether the Asserted Claim was explicitly made by the applicant or arose from the material before the IAA, the court noted that the Tribunal's obligation extends to reviewing the delegate's decision based on all the materials before it. The court relied on the principle that if a claim raised by the evidence is misunderstood or misconstrued by the Tribunal, it can constitute a failure to consider the claim and thereby a jurisdictional error. This principle was pivotal in determining whether the IAA should have considered the Asserted Claim.

Lastly, the court evaluated whether the IAA's failure to consider the Asserted Claim, if it existed, amounted to a failure of procedural fairness or a failure to conduct the review required by the Act, thereby constituting a jurisdictional error. The court concluded that if the Tribunal makes an error in misunderstanding or misconstruing a claim advanced by the applicant and bases its conclusion on such an error, it can indeed constitute a jurisdictional error. The court's decision was influenced by the principle that the Tribunal must actively engage in assessing claims and risks based on the material before it to ensure compliance with procedural fairness and statutory requirements.

The ratio decidendi established by the decision is that the Immigration Assessment Authority must consider claims that arise sufficiently from the material before it to avoid a failure of procedural fairness or a jurisdictional error. The court also reaffirmed that the Tribunal is not required to consider claims that are not expressly made or do not arise clearly from the material, but must actively engage in assessing risks and claims based on the evidence presented.