FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BIW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2017] FCA 1606
Appeal from: BIW17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1857 File number: WAD 424 of 2017 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 14 November 2017 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 45AA
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.08F
Cases cited: BIW17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1857
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 14 November 2017 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms T Jonker Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice ORDERS
WAD 424 of 2017 BETWEEN: BIW17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 NOVEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant’s claim for Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 15 March 2017 that, in substance, refused the appellant’s claim to a protection visa: BIW17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1857.
The Tribunal set aside the Minister’s delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa and substituted a decision to refuse to grant the appellant a temporary protection (class XD) visa. That was because the delegate made his decision under review on 16 December 2014, which was the date on which reg 2.08F of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) came into effect for the purposes of s 45AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Relevantly, the Tribunal found, as the delegate had, that the appellant had made a valid application for the protection (class XA) visa but, by force of s 45AA and reg 2.08F, that application was treated as always having been a valid application for a temporary protection (class XD) visa instead of one for a permanent protection visa. In substance, therefore, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, albeit that the legislation had substituted one form of protection visa for another.
Background
The appellant originally claimed that he was entitled to protection when he arrived in Australia at his entry interview as an irregular maritime arrival conducted on 4 April 2013, based on his being a Catholic…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1606
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test in considering the appellant's claims for protection and had given compelling reasons for its conclusion that there was no real chance that the appellant would be persecuted for reasons of his involvement in his religious activities in the past in Vietnam, or his practice of religion more generally were he to return there, then, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly considered the data breach and the visit by the Vietnamese police to the detention centre, and that there was no evidence to suggest that those circumstances would result in the appellant being exposed to a risk of persecutory harm by the Vietnamese authorities. The court also found that there was no foundation for a conclusion that the Tribunal's decision was affected by apprehended or actual bias.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs. The court found that the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test and had given compelling reasons for its conclusion that there was no real chance that the appellant would be persecuted for reasons of his involvement in his religious activities in the past in Vietnam, or his practice of religion more generally were he to return there, then, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court also found that there was no error of law in the Tribunal's consideration of the data breach and the visit by the Vietnamese police to the detention centre, and that there was no foundation for a conclusion that the Tribunal's decision was affected by apprehended or actual bias.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant asked me to grant an adjournment of the appeal so that he could have a better chance to formulate his arguments, which I refused. He said that he wanted to search for a lawyer, but gave no explanation of any attempts he had made to obtain one beforehand. He said that he was confused, and although he had prepared everything properly for today, he was not able to go on to make out his case. I was satisfied that, first, the appellant had had sufficient notice of the hearing of the appeal today to formulate his case, so as to be able to put it forward, secondly, no useful purpose would be served in granting an adjournment, and, thirdly, that it was not in the interests of justice to do so. In fact, he did make coherent and lucid submissions, and I am satisfied that he has had a fair opportunity to put his case.Consideration Having read the material in the appeal papers, I am satisfied that the trial judge did not make any error in his consideration of the appellant’s case as put to him, and that his Honour was correct, for the reasons that he gave, in dismissing the application below. In my opinion, there is no substance in the first and third grounds in the notice of appeal. It is plain beyond argument that the Tribunal did apply the real chance test. It referred to what McHugh J had held in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 430. There, his Honour said that it was not a necessary element of the concept of persecution that an individual be the subject of a series of acts, and that a single act of oppression could suffice, provided that that act can be seen as part of a course of systematic conduct directed for a Convention reason against that person as an individual or as a member of a class, or so that he or she could be seen as being persecuted for the purposes of the Convention. The Tribunal considered the individual circumstances of the appellant, as put forward in the context in which he sought to make his claim. It gave compelling reasons for its ultimate conclusion that there was no real chance that he would be persecuted for reasons of his involvement in his religious activities in the past in Vietnam, or his practice of religion more generally were he to return there, then, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is apparent that the Tribunal applied correctly the real chance test at all points of its consideration of each of the appellant’s claims to fear persecution by reason of his religion, actual or imputed political opinion, the concerns he had about the visit by the Vietnamese police to his detention centre, and the data breach, both individually and collectively. Accordingly, grounds 1 and 3 in the notice of appeal fail. The second ground concerned the specific way in which the Tribunal dealt with the data breach. The Tribunal recorded the appellant’s representative’s submission, based on the KPMG and Privacy Commissioner reports to which the delegate had referred in his decision. She argued that the published information in the data breach comprised each asylum seeker’s full name, gender, citizenship, date of birth, the period for which he or she had been in immigration detention, the location, boat arrival details, and reasons why he or she was deemed to be unlawful. On that basis, the representative contended that the appellant had a sur place claim on the basis of a well-founded fear that the Vietnamese authorities had had access to this information. She further submitted that the Vietnamese officials who had visited his detention centre in August 2014 had been from the A18 police, and that he was at risk as a result of that circumstance.