FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd (No 2)
[2011] FCA 1313
Citation: Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1313 Parties: BIRDON PTY LTD (ABN 59 002 810 255) v HOUBEN MARINE PTY LTD (ACN 14 002 623 396), PHILLIP DAVENPORT and ADJUDICATE TODAY PTY LTD (ABN 39 109 605 021) File number: NSD 667 of 2011 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 27 October 2011 Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS – application for interim injunctions under s 234 of the Australian Consumer Law restraining further progress of adjudication process under Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) – plaintiff alleged first defendant conveyed representations that were misleading or deceptive contrary to s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law – whether prima facie case – strength of prima facie case – balance of convenience – relevance of plaintiff’s application for special leave to appeal to High Court of Australia – whether damages are an adequate remedy – sufficient likelihood of success to justify preservation of status quo
Held: application for interim injunctions granted
Legislation: Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 234
Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) ss 23(2), 25, 32
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 applied
Birdon Pty Ltd v Houben Marine Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1217 cited
Bitannia Pty Limited v Parkline Constructions Pty Limited (2006) 67 NSWLR 9 applied
Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 consideredJennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd [No. 1] (1986) 161 CLR 681 applied
Paringa Mining & Exploration Co plc v North Flinders Mines Limited (1988) 165 CLR 452 cited
RJ Neller Building Pty Limited v Ainsworth [2009] 1 Qd R 390 citedDate of hearing: 27 October 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr AW Street SC with Mr AK Fleknoe-Brown Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Hicksons Lawyers Counsel for the First Defendant: Mr EGH Cox Solicitor for the First Defendant: Piper Alderman Counsel for the Second and Third Defendants: The second and third defendants did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
IN ADMIRALTY
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 667 of 2011
BETWEEN: BIRDON PTY LTD (ABN 59 002 810 255)
PlaintiffAND: HOUBEN MARINE PTY LTD (ACN 14 002 623 396)
First DefendantPHILLIP DAVENPORT
Second DefendantADJUDICATE TODAY PTY LTD (ABN 39 109 605 021)
Third Defendant
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 OCTOBER 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
Upon the plaintiff by its senior counsel giving to the Court:
(a) the usual undertaking as to damages;
(b)an undertaking that the plaintiff will prosecute its application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia and, if leave be granted, any appeal, with all reasonable expedition; and
(c)an undertaking that on or before…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1313
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles for granting interim injunctions, noting that a plaintiff need not show a higher than 50% probability of success but must demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success to justify preserving the status quo. The court concluded that Birdon had made out a prima facie case, considering the nature of the rights asserted and the practical consequences. Birdon's application for special leave to appeal to the High Court and the potential delay in the trial were factors considered, but the court found that the potential prejudice to Birdon outweighed the inconvenience to Houben Marine. Therefore, the court granted interim injunctions, requiring Birdon to proceed with its appeal and to provide a measure of security for damages. Birdon also needed to commit to expediting the proceedings up to and including the trial.
The court ordered that the interlocutory injunctions previously made were to be vacated and new injunctions were to be granted, restraining the defendants from proceeding with the adjudication process. The hearing was fixed for 12 March 2012, with directions scheduled for 28 October 2011. Birdon was required to pay $200,000 into court or provide a bank guarantee by 1 November 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to the answer to question 5 given by the Full Court on 13 October 2011, the interlocutory injunctions as made on 20 May 2011, and extended and varied on 14 June 2011 and on 17 June 2011, be vacated.
2. The first defendant, by itself, its servants and agents, be restrained from proceeding with any application or process concerning the backhoe dredge Ain Dschalut under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW).
3. The first defendant, by itself, its servants and agents, be restrained from seeking any adjudication certificate under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) concerning the backhoe dredge Ain Dschalut and/or the vessel Hopper 139.
4. The first defendant, by itself, its servants and agents, be restrained from serving or filing or otherwise pursuing any adjudication certificate issued under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) for or relating to invoices concerning the backhoe dredge Ain Dschalut and/or the Hopper Barge 139.
5. The first defendant, by itself, its servants and agents, be restrained from making any fresh application under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) for or relating to invoices concerning the backhoe dredge Ain Dschalut and/or the Hopper Barge 139.
6. The second defendant be restrained from proceeding with any adjudication process in relation to the adjudication application made by the first defendant relating to the payment claims by the first defendant relating to the backhoe dredge Ain Dschalut and/or the Hopper Barge 139.
7. The third defendant be restrained from referring to any adjudicator the adjudication made by the first defendant relating to the payment claims by the first defendant relating to the backhoe dredge Ain Dschalut and/or the Hopper Barge 139.
8. The proceedings be fixed for hearing commencing on 12 March 2012.
9. The proceedings be listed for directions on 28 October 2011 at 2 p.m.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application for interim injunctions under s 234 of the Law. The court considered the plaintiff's application for relief based on the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct of the first defendant. The application followed a previous decision where interlocutory injunctions were made on 20 May 2011, extended and varied on 14 June 2011 and again on 17 June 2011. The Full Court had answered specific questions on 13 October 2011, leading to the current application for the remaking of the interlocutory injunctions.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In effect, Birdon claimed that it is not liable for any further amounts of hire at all and that the true contract between the parties effectively came to an end when the dredge was returned to Homebush Bay in July 2010. Alternatively, Birdon sought relief on the basis that it was misled by Houben Marine’s conduct in contravention of s 18 to believe that the contract either provided, as the first representations suggested, for the three month period of hire, or alternatively, that the contract had, in fact, been accepted to be at an end as asserted in the second representations.CONSIDERATION (a) Should an interim injunction be granted under s 234 of the Law? It is convenient to deal first with the claim for an interim injunction under s 234 of the Australian Consumer Law. That section provides that if an application for an injunction is made under s 232, the Court may, if it considers desirable, grant an interim injunction pending the determination of that application. There is no dispute that Birdon is entitled to bring its application for relief under s 234. The test applicable for the grant of an interlocutory injunction has been subject to some debate between the parties. As noted above, the test is set out in the organising principles identified in the reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ in O’Neill 227 CLR at 81-82 [65], namely:‘The relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd ((1968) 118 CLR 618). This Court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ) said that on such applications the court addresses itself to two main inquiries and continued ((1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622-623):“The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ... The second inquiry is ... whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted.”By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument ((1968) 118 CLR 618 at 620). With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal ((1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622):“How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks.”’