Bierton v Higgins - [1961] HCA 41

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ. (THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE FULLAGAR died at Melbourne before judgment in this appeal was delivered.)

BIERTON v. HIGGINS

(1961) 106 CLR 127

31 July 1961

Statutes

Statutes—Interpretation—Sub-section authorizing proclamation prohibiting absolutely or permitting to extent prescribed removal of peanuts from any place—Ancillary to sub-section creating powers designed to prevent spread of disease from diseased peanuts—Proclamation permitting removal of peanuts from grower's premises only for purpose of delivery of same to Peanut Board for grading—Proclamation not authorized by sub-section—Peanuts subject of inter-State trade not affected by proclamation if otherwise valid—Reading-down provision—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 92—The Peanut Industry Protection and Preservation Act of 1939 (Q), ss. 2*, 6**.

Decision

July 31.
The following written judgment was delivered:-
DIXON C.J., KITTO, TAYLOR AND WINDEYER JJ. On 15th November 1960 the appellant, who was a peanut grower in the State of Queensland, was convicted before a stipendiary magistrate of an offence against the provisions of The Peanut Industry Protection and Preservation Act of 1939 (Q.). The offence alleged was that the appellant, being a grower of peanuts, removed from his premises at Inverlaw near Kingaroy a quantity of peanuts that had not been graded by the Peanut Marketing Board, otherwise than for the purpose of delivery thereof to the said Board or its authorized agents by the nearest usual and practicable road or railway for grading by the said Board. Apparently the complaint was made pursuant to s. 7(2) of the Act which provides that no person shall remove or cause to be removed from or out of any place or from or out of one portion of any place to any other portion of the same place any peanuts contrary to the Act. The removal was said to be contrary to the Act because by a proclamation made on 27th April 1940, and purporting to have been made under the provisions of s. 6(ii) of the Act, the Governor in Council declared "that the removal from the grower's premises of any peanuts that have not been graded by the Peanut Board is and shall be permitted only for the purpose of delivery thereof to the Peanut Board or its authorized agents by the nearest usual and practicable road or railway for grading by the Board and that the removal from the grower's premises of any peanuts that have not been graded by the Board, except for the purpose aforesaid, is and shall be absolutely prohibited". (at p129)

2. According to the evidence the appellant, on 14th January 1960, entered into a contract with a New South Wales company to sell to it a large quantity of "peanuts in the shell of the seller's (1960) season production grown at Kingaroy". The contract required the peanuts to be matured, of good and sound condition, reasonably free from harvest thrash, sticks, soil and stones and with colour undamaged by rain. Delivery was to be made at the buyer's premises in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bierton v Higgins

Details

AGLC: Bierton v Higgins [1961] HCA 41
Case: [1961] HCA 41
Decision Date: 31 July 1961

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this appeal were Bierton and Higgins. The dispute concerned the interpretation and effect of a deed of settlement and release entered into between the parties. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement and release operated to extinguish all causes of action that the plaintiff, Bierton, had against the defendant, Higgins, including those arising from alleged breaches of contract that occurred after the execution of the deed.

The Court considered the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly in relation to deeds of settlement and release. It was held that the language of the deed, when read as a whole and in its proper context, indicated an intention to release all existing and future claims between the parties. The Court emphasised that the words used in the deed were broad enough to encompass claims that had not yet arisen at the time of its execution, provided they fell within the scope of the general release. The legal principle applied was that clear and unambiguous language in a deed of release will be given its full effect, even if it extends to future claims.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders