BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v University of Adelaide - [2008] NSWCA 210

No judgment structure available for this case.

New South Wales

Court of Appeal

CITATION: BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v University of Adelaide [2008] NSWCA 210
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

HEARING DATE(S): 4/3/08

JUDGMENT DATE:
19 September 2008

JUDGMENT OF: Beazley JA at 1; Bell JA at 2; McClellan CJ at CL at 125

DECISION: Appeal and the cross-appeal each dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS: TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – duty of care – foreseeability in 1961 to informed industry player of risk – bystander exposed to asbestos spray at building site for short period - BREACH – whether evidence capable of supporting finding – apportionment – whether unreasonable to allocate 65 per cent to employer with constructive knowledge 35 per cent to subcontractor with actual knowledge - EVIDENCE – expert opinion evidence – admissibility of expert opinion concerning the state of knowledge in 1961 - COSTS – indemnity principle – whether error to order contribution

LEGISLATION CITED: Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW)
Dust Diseases Tribunal Rules
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Harmful Gases, Vapours, Fumes, Mists, Smokes and Dusts Regulation 1945 (Vic)
Health Act 1928 (Vic)
Legal Practitioners Act 1987
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
Wrongs Act 1936 (SA)

CATEGORY: Principal judgment

CASES CITED: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1
Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364
BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Myer Emporium Ltd [2005] NSWCA 305; 3 DDCR 142
BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v The Public Trustee of South Australia [2005] NSWCA 306; 3 DDCR 161
BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Strikwerda [2005] NSWCA 288; DDCR 149
British Fame (Owners) v Macgregor (Owners) [1943] AC 197
Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
James Hardie & Co Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 679
Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080
Julia Farr Services Inc v Hayes [2003] NSWCA 37; 24 NSWCCR 138
Patrick Operations Ltd v Comcare [2006] NSWCA 142; 4 DDCR 234
Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 535
R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45
Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 625
Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill [2006] NSWCA 158; 4 DDCR 1
Seltsam Ltd v Minahan (1966) 13 NSWCCR 410
Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 5) [2007] SASC 285; 98 SASR 136
Wentworth v Rodgers [2006] NSWCA 145; 66 NSWLR 474
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; 146 CLR 40

TEXTS CITED: JD Heydon, Cross of Evidence (Australia: Butterworths, loose-leaf service)
Sir Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London, 2nd ed 1983)

PARTIES: BI (Contracting) Pty Limited (Appellant)
University of Adelaide (Respondent)

FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40403 of 2007

COUNSEL: Mr T G R Parker SC (Appellant)
Mr M J Neil QC / Mr J C Sheller (Respondent)

SOLICITORS: A R Conolly (Appellant)
Thomspon Cooper (Respondent)

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Dust Diseases Tribunal

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 73 of 2003/1

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Kearns J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 5/4/07

CA 40403/07
DDT 73 of 2003/1

BEAZLEY JA
BELL JA
McCLELLAN CJ at CL
Friday 19 September 2008

BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v the University of Adelaide

Judgment

1 BEAZLEY JA: I agree with Bell JA.

2 BELL JA: This is an appeal from the judgment of Kearns J in the Dust Diseases Tribunal (the Tribunal) in favour of the respondent University of Adelaide (the University) on its cross-claim against the appellant, BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd (BIC), for contribution towards the damages awarded against the University in proceedings in negligence brought by the late Professor Derrick Rowley (the principal proceedings).

3 In 1961, Professor Rowley was a member of the staff of the University’s Faculty of Medicine at a time when construction work was being carried out on the Medical School at the Adelaide campus. He inspected the work on an occasion when BIC, a sub-contractor, was fireproofing structural steel beams. The process involved spraying the beams with a mixture consisting of amosite asbestos, chrysotile asbestos, cement and a bonding agent. Many years later, Professor Rowley developed mesothelioma and commenced the principal proceedings, contending that he had contracted the condition as the result of his exposure to asbestos dust on the occasion of the inspection.

4 The principal proceedings came before Ashford J and were determined by the entry of a consent judgment against the University in the amount of $250,000 with costs. Party and party costs were not assessed. On 10 June 2005, the University paid $120,000 by way of compromise of Professor Rowley’s claim in respect of the costs of the proceedings.

5 The contribution proceedings were heard in late 2006. The affidavits filed in the principal proceedings and the transcript of those proceedings were tendered, together with historical evidence, which was received under s 25(3) of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) (the DDT Act). Some of the evidence admitted under s 25(3) is the subject of ground 1 in the Amended Notice of Appeal.

6 In his judgment, delivered on 5 April 2007, the primary judge determined that the University was entitled to 35 per cent contribution from BIC in respect of its liability to Professor Rowley. His Honour deferred making final orders because of an outstanding issue concerning the amount of the costs paid by the University. This issue was determined by judgment delivered on 30 May 2007. The appeal is largely concerned with the earlier judgment and, unless otherwise stated, references to his Honour’s reasons are to the judgment of 5 April 2007.

The evidentiary challenges

7 The University tendered historical and general medical evidence tendered under s 25(3) including evidence given in the principal proceedings and other proceedings by Gordon Stewart, Professor Henderson, Dr Kilpatrick, Dr Leigh, Mr Rodgers and Mr Pickford.

8 Section 25 of the DDT Act provides:

“ 25 Evidence in proceedings before the Tribunal

(2) Except as otherwise provided by this Part or the rules, evidence is not admissible in proceedings before the Tribunal if it would not be admissible in those proceedings by virtue of subsection (1).

(3) Historical evidence and general medical evidence concerning dust exposure and dust diseases which has been admitted in any proceedings before the Tribunal may, with the leave of the Tribunal, be received as evidence in any other proceedings before the Tribunal, whether or not the proceedings are between the same parties.”

9 Ground 1 contends that it was an error to admit the evidence that is “referred to” in paragraphs [60]-[61], [76]-[77], [98]-[105] and [110] of the judgment, and which is characterised as “opinion evidence as to the state of medical knowledge in 1961” because it did not satisfy the requirements of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

10 Mr TGR Parker SC, who appeared for BIC, submitted that the evidence of experts whose expertise had been acquired after 1961 of what was known in 1960 and 1961 based on the literature as it stood at that time was not opinion wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge. In his submission, it was, in reality, evidence of “what people believed in 1960 and 1961”, and this was not a field susceptible of expert opinion (T’cpt 14.21). Evidence of this character is routinely received in proceedings before the Tribunal: see, for example, Julia Farr Services Inc v Hayes [2003] NSWCA 37; 25 NSWCCR 138 per Giles JA at 182 [130]; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill [2006] NSWCA 158; 4 DDCR 1 per Bryson JA at 12 [26]; 22 [56]; 27 [77]-[78]. The point does not appear to have been raised in the earlier cases.

11 Part 3 of the DDT Act contains other novel provisions reflecting the specialised function of the Tribunal. Section 25A permits material obtained by means of discovery or interrogatories in one set of proceedings before the Tribunal to be used with leave in other proceedings between different parties. Section 25B provides that issues of a general nature determined in proceedings before the Tribunal may not be re-litigated or re-argued in other proceedings without leave, whether or not the proceedings are between the same parties. These proceedings were conducted on the basis that the substantive law to be applied was that of South Australia and that the provisions of s 25B did not apply to the proceedings. The correctness of that assumption is not raised by this appeal.

12 The Tribunal is constrained to admit only evidence that would be admissible in the Supreme Court, unless provision is otherwise made in Part 3 or the rules. The Dust Diseases Tribunal Rules made under s 33 do not otherwise provide in any respect that is relevant to the determination of this question. Sub-section 25(3) permits the tender of evidence given in other proceedings before the Tribunal. It was not submitted that, by operation of s 25(3), inadmissible evidence which had been received without objection in other proceedings was admissible over objection in subsequent proceedings.

13 The Evidence Act applies to proceedings in the Supreme Court: s 4.

14 A party dissatisfied with a decision of the Tribunal on a question as to the admission of evidence has a right of appeal under s 32(1) of the DDT Act. This ground complains of error in the admission of the evidence that is “referred to” in the nominated paragraphs of the judgment. Some paragraphs are a summary of the effect of some part of the witnesses’ evidence. Mr Parker did not take the Court to the evidence or to any objection to the admission of any of the material tendered under s 25(3). He submitted that the matter had been approached as one of broad principle. His written submissions at the trial addressed the matter in this way:

DDT Act

5.17.1 Geoffrey Pickford who was only certified in industrial hygiene in 1984 having sat the American Board of Industrial Hygiene examination in 1984,

5.17.2 Alan Rogers who was not in the occupational hygiene industry until the 1970’s,

5.17.3 James Leigh who also was not involved in the occupational physician industry until about 1990,

5.17.4 David Kilpatrick who first became involved with the asbestos hazard industry as part of his work in 1977.” (Black 329.P-330.D)

15 The ruling that is challenged is recorded at [53] of the judgment. This ruling would appear to have been made in response to the above submissions and the objection, which is set out below (the global objection) (Black 12.T-13.L):

“MR PARKER: The difficulty with that, your Honour, is that Professor Henderson by his own admission in the report in 1961 was a first-year medical student. He is not in a position to give evidence about what the state of the medical art was in 1961.

HIS HONOUR: Just as well we do not need experts to give evidence as to the state of the art in 1920. There must be ways of doing it if you are not alive at the time.

So it is perfectly possible to prove the state of knowledge but you cannot do it by calling someone who was not relevantly practising at the time and saying, why do you not go and read all these articles and tell me what you think people should have thought and when one analyses it, it is not entirely clear, with great respect to the professor, but when one analyses it, it seems to us that that is the sort of evidence that he has given.”

16 Before turning to the ruling, it is appropriate to note his Honour’s record of the approach taken to evidentiary issues which arose in the course of the trial (Red 43.X-44.P):

“[12] In the course of the conduct of these proceedings numerous evidentiary questions arose. Senior counsel for both parties took the position that, rather than dealing definitively with each tender as it arose, I could receive all the evidence and make my final ruling on it during the course of these reasons.

17 The ruling is as follows:

Jones v Scully

18 On the appeal, Mr Parker submitted that his Honour’s reliance on Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080 was misplaced. Hely J had been concerned in that case with the admissibility of video recordings and books to prove historical facts in proceedings in which it was contended that an individual had engaged in unlawful conduct by distributing anti-Semitic literature contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The discussion of the admissibility of historical evidence is at 264-265 [82] – [85]. His Honour referred to the dictum of Dixon J in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196 that the courts may use the general facts of history as ascertained from the writings of serious historians and employ the common knowledge of educated persons. The material in Jones was polemical in nature and was not admitted.

19 Mr Parker referred to Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 in support of his contention. That case was concerned with the reservation of a laneway. Young J rejected the evidence of historians concerning traffic in George Street in the 19th Century. His Honour concluded that, while courts may obtain the basal facts of history, such as when a particular war broke out or other matters of record from a reputable history, the analysis of why things happened or how people behaved is not a matter to be proved by the evidence of people who were not present at the time.

20 The issue here is not proof of the general facts of history, but the state of medical knowledge of the dangers of the inhalation of asbestos dust and fibre that was available to informed industry participants (which BIC conceded it was) in 1961. An inference may be drawn from the state of knowledge in this respect as to the foreseeability of the risk of injury to a person exposed to asbestos dust and fibre, a consideration that is relevant to the inquiry at the level of duty and breach.

21 The difficulty in dealing with this ground of appeal is the generality with which the objection was taken at trial and dealt with on appeal. Mr Parker’s objection is distilled in the highlighted passage in [14] above. It moves from a proposition about the means of proving the state of knowledge, to an assertion that an expert cannot give evidence about “what people should have thought”. His Honour ruled that a person whose expertise was acquired after 1961 could give evidence of the state of knowledge in 1961 based upon his or her study. Among the evidence that is challenged under this ground is Dr Leigh’s evidence of the results of the Dreessen study, and of the papers published by Wood and Gloyne, Merewether and Doll (judgment at [98]). This was not evidence of “what people believed” (T’cpt 14.21). Mr Parker acknowledged that the state of medical knowledge at an earlier time may be proved by inferences drawn from the content of reports, journal articles and other documents that were in the public domain at the time. One means of proving the literature is through an expert witness who has conducted a review of the learning within the field of speciality as it stood at the time. The expert is able to explain technical terms and concepts which may not be readily understood by a layperson. Evidence of this character is not opinion. It is evidence of the type that experts commonly give and involves educating the court as to a matter that is beyond its expertise: JD Heydon, Cross of Evidence (Australia: Butterworths, loose-leaf service) at 29-007 [29020].

22 In Mr Parker’s submission, the Court may draw conclusions as to the state of knowledge in a field of speciality, by reference to the literature, without the assistance of an expert. He instanced the Dreessen article as a publication which he suggested could be understood by a layperson. The circumstance that a publication in the field of specialty may be understood without assistance would not be a reason for holding that the evidence of the expert witness through whom it was tendered was not admissible, except perhaps on the ground of relevance.

23 Sir Richard Eggleston in Evidence, Proof and Probability (Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London, 2nd ed 1983) at 153 categorised as the second function of the expert that of librarian:

“The second function of the expert to which we referred above was that of acting as librarian. In many cases the expert does not himself know the answer to the problem from his own study or experience. But being trained in the relevant discipline, he is able to refer to works of authority in which the answer is given. In such a case the expert himself is not generalising, but is making available the fruits of generalisations by other people, either from their own experience or from the experience of others whose writings form part of the literature. The expert witness here is not giving evidence of his own opinion, except to say that in his expert opinion the books to which he is making reference are of sufficient standing to be accepted by the court.”

24 In Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 5) [2007] SASC 285; 98 SASR 136 Gray J gave consideration to a similar question in the context of a claim for damages, following the unlawful retention of an infant Aboriginal child after his admission to hospital in 1957. His Honour considered the admissibility of the evidence of Ms Van Hooff, a psychologist, who in the course of undergraduate and doctoral studies had undertaken extensive literature reviews of the learning associated with childhood trauma (at 283 [690] – 285 [705]). The evidence was led to establish that at the time of the plaintiff’s separation from his natural family, there were published and well-publicised texts identifying the risks associated with such a separation (at [690]). In that case, Ms Van Hooff gave evidence on the voir dire of the tasks involved in searching various databases and undertaking a review of the abstracts of professional publications. The evidence was admitted. His Honour considered the task of identifying relevant and available literature from 50 years ago on matters within the discipline of medicine and psychology gave rise to the need for expertise.

25 Gray J was dealing with the reception of expert evidence at common law. In this respect, he gave consideration to whether Ms Van Hooff’s expertise was part of a field “ a special acquaintance with which by the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court”: R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 at 46-47. In Cross it is observed that it is not entirely clear whether s 79 of the Evidence Act abolishes this requirement (at 29,085 [29165]). It is sufficient to note that the Evidence Act does not deal with the admission of expert opinion on a footing that is more restrictive than the common law.

26 In my opinion, it was not an error to hold that experts who were not qualified in 1961 were able to give evidence of the state of knowledge within their speciality in 1961, based upon a review of the literature as it stood then. Dr Leigh’s evidence, summarised at [98], was not inadmissible on the basis identified in the global objection. No objection appears to have been taken to those parts of the s 25(3) material that were said to contain inadmissible speculation about what informed industry participants “should have thought” or for some other reason. It is necessary to give consideration to the evidence that is the subject of this ground.

27 The first paragraphs identified in the ground are [60] and [61]. These relate to the evidence of Gordon Stewart. Mr Stewart worked with the Victorian Department of Health as an industrial hygiene officer in the years before 1961 and much of his evidence was of his observations and understanding at that time. The paragraphs of the judgment which concern Mr Stewart’s evidence are set out below:

“[60] By 1961, Mr Stewart was of the view that:

· if dusts could be seen in the atmosphere of a workplace, that was an indication it could be a risk to persons exposed (Exhibit CX 84, 89.30, 93.29);

· the absence of visible dust did not necessarily indicate there was no risk (Exhibit CX 84, 93.30);

· asbestos was an extremely dangerous dust; its effects could be progressive and lethal (Exhibit CX84, 91.23). He did acknowledge that his view may not have been correct (Exhibit CX 84, 107.39);

· if dust exceeded the standards, then ameliorating responses were required. If the dust could be life threatening, the exposure had to be minimised and this applied particularly to dusts such as asbestos that could be cumulative in their effect (Exhibit CX 84, 93.47);

· if a workplace did not meet the criteria for exposure level it was unsatisfactory whatever the length of time that failure to meet the criteria lasted (Exhibit CX 84, 102.32);

· in circumstances similar to those prevailing when Professor Rowley was exposed, Mr Stewart, if he had the authority, would have instructed that the site be cleared of persons not directly involved in the operation (Exhibit CX 84, 104.39). He gave evidence to similar effect at Exhibit CX 84, T. 117.10-31);

· it was never the view that there was a body of thought that asbestos was not dangerous to a worker so long as he was not exposed to high levels of dust over a long period of time (Exhibit CX 84, 107.03);

· the standard used in the 1945 Regulations was not a standard that would guarantee that one would not get sick (T. 130.06).

[61] Before 1961, Mr Stewart did not have a view as to what level of exposure would have eliminated health risks from asbestos. He agreed that he did not have the scientific expertise to form an opinion as to what was a safe level of exposure. The conclusion put to him does not necessarily follow and that is that as he did not have the expertise to form an opinion as to a safe level of exposure, therefore, he could not form an opinion that a particular level, for example, the Dreessen level, was not safe. It is consistent that Mr Stewart or anybody could have an opinion that exposure above a particular level was not safe, but have no idea at what level exposure was safe. This is because exposure above a particular level may have been determined to be not safe, yet the learning may have been ignorant or undecided as to exposure below that level.” (Red 67.M-69.H)

28 Mr Stewart graduated in science from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology in 1952. He took up employment as a Scientific Officer, Industrial Hygiene, with the Victorian Department of Health in that year and remained in that employment until November 1965.

29 Mr Stewart’s evidence in the principal proceedings included the following:

…

30 His Honour identified Mr Stewart’s sources of knowledge as at 1961 (at [58]):

· the 1945 Victorian Harmful Gasses, Vapours, Fumes and Mists, Smokes and Dusts Regulations;

· the 1956 Declaration under the Victorian Health Act of 1928;

· article by Dr Thomas in The Age newspaper in 1956 and a report by Dr Thomas in 1957;

· generally reading books and industrial health papers though the literature he had read by 1961 on matters related to the Dreessen standard was limited;

· regular discussions with scientific staff, inspectors and medical officers and formal discussions with the department where he worked;

· visits to factories where dusts were present even though such may not have been directed to asbestos dust;

· on his observations on his visits to factories where dusts were present, reporting on those observations, taking laboratory measurements for dust counts of dust in factories he had visited;

· communications with people working in other departments in other States. (Red 66.D-67.D)

31 The reference to the report in The Age newspaper was to an article published in 1956 titled, “Dust becoming bigger hazard in industry more work is affected”. Mr Stewart was aware of the article at the time of its publication, it related directly to his activities and it had been broadly discussed. (Blue 1983.N) The article reinforced a view that he already held as to the potential of inhaled asbestos dust to cause harm to the lungs. (Blue 1983.P)

32 At [59] his Honour found:

“In the mid-1950s if Mr Stewart visited a factory and saw dust in the atmosphere of a workplace, that was an indicator that there could be a risk to persons exposed to that dust. He thought asbestos was capable of producing a very serious pneumoconiosis if inhaled, that it was an extremely dangerous dust and that it could produce asbestosis, a progressive condition which could be lethal. He did not comment at that stage in giving his evidence as to the extent of exposure capable of producing such results.” (Red 67.F-K)

33 In the written submissions filed on BIC’s behalf it was said that the evidence of Mr Stewart referred to at [54]-[61] should have been rejected. (Orange 28.E) This, it will be noted, is a submission in wider terms than the formulation of Ground 1. BIC’s written submission continues:

‘qualifications’

34 The reference in the concluding sentence to Mr Stewart’s evidence of what he would have done had he been in charge of the building site is not identified. It may be a reference to the following evidence given by Mr Stewart in the principal proceedings:

35 At trial, Mr Parker challenged Mr Stewart’s qualifications. (Black 99.N) His Honour rejected the challenge and his ruling in this respect is not the subject of appeal. At trial, Mr Parker’s alternative basis for objecting to the tender of Mr Stewart’s evidence under s 25(3) was that, as it had been given orally, it did not contain Mr Stewart’s acknowledgment that he was bound by the expert witness code. (Black 97.T-99.E) This ground is not the subject of appeal. It is a basis of objection that appears to be inconsistent with the position adopted by BIC in the first instance of the quote at [33] above.

36 In Mr Parker’s written submissions at trial it was acknowledged that unlike Professor Henderson and the other witnesses, Mr Stewart had graduated and was working in 1961. It was submitted that:

“A careful analysis of Mr Stewart’s evidence demonstrates that he was not, however, at any time prior to 1961, part of the group of people who collectively represented Australian expert scientific opinion on the dangers of asbestos. If anyone within the Department of Health was a member of that group, it was Dr Thomas who had medical qualifications and was therefore in a position, as Mr Stewart was not, to evaluate the scientific literature and other evidence in terms of risk.” (Black 330.E-J)

37 The fact that Mr Stewart may not have been a person authorised on behalf of the Victorian Department of Health to express opinions about the risk associated with asbestos does not go to admissibility. Mr Stewart’s evidence of his understanding in the period before 1961 of the risks posed by dust in the workplace atmosphere and of the particular risks associated with the inhalation of asbestos dust was direct evidence from which, with other evidence, it was open to draw a conclusion about the state of knowledge of informed industry participants of the danger of asbestos dust and fibre.

38 It does not appear that his Honour was asked to reject that part of Mr Stewart’s evidence given in the principal proceedings in which he hypothesised about what he would have done in 1961 had he been in charge of the building site at the Adelaide campus. The answer should not have been admitted over objection. In the absence of any indication that the primary judge was asked to rule upon it, I would not uphold the appeal on the ground that it was wrongly admitted.

39 The evidence referred to at [76] was given by Professor Henderson. This was evidence given in the principal proceedings. BIC had been joined as second defendant in the principal proceedings and it was represented by Mr Russell SC in those proceedings until Professor Rowley discontinued against it. Professor Henderson’s evidence was given before the discontinuance and Professor Henderson was cross-examined by Mr Russell. The global objection was taken before Professor Henderson gave evidence on the voir dire in these proceedings. However, Mr Parker had earlier informed his Honour in dealing with the grant of leave under s 25(3) for the tender of the evidence that had been given in the principal proceedings, that:

“As far as the part of the case where my predecessor was present and cross-examined I do not object to leave. There will be some objections as to admissibility but when my predecessor had withdrawn I do raise an issue about the – because in our submission section 25(3) should not be used to put a party who has not been present in a position of having evidence foisted on it which it has not had an opportunity to test. (Black 11.L-M)

40 I will set out the evidence that is the subject of complaint and the preceding paragraph in order to make it intelligible:

“[75] Professor Henderson, in giving evidence in Professor Rowley’s case, apparently agreed with Mr Rundle, then counsel for the University, that 5 mppcf was a safe level of exposure (Exhibit CX 83, T.19).

[76] (a) However, there was an ambiguity in the evidence and it was not clarified (Exhibit CX 83.T.19). The following exchange occurred.

no

yes

41 Professor Henderson’s evidence, that 5 mppfc had not worked out to be a safe exposure standard, would appear to be an opinion that he was qualified to express. His earlier agreement with the cross-examiner that it had been regarded as an exposure standard at the time may not have been an opinion which he was qualified to give in chief. However, in the absence of objection to its reception under s 25(3), it is not necessary to consider the question further.

42 The material referred to at [77] is a summary of evidence given by Dr Kilpatrick, a chartered chemist, hygienist and ergonomist, whose report dated 7 December 1990, prepared for other proceedings, was tendered with the transcript of his evidence given in proceedings before the Tribunal in December 1990. In the 13 years prior to giving evidence in those proceedings, Dr Kilpatrick had worked in the dust/asbestos fibre field. Paragraph [77] is set out below:

“[77] Exhibit CX52 at 465V to 466I, he thought that though a reasonably prudent employer who wished to protect his workers against asbestosis might have felt comfortable if he had adopted a standard below 5 mppcf, the Wagner article might have made some people think.” (Red 74.C-G)

43 Dr Kilpatrick is an occupational hygienist. He holds a doctorate in chemistry from Leeds University and a postgraduate diploma in ergonomics from the Lincoln Institute, Melbourne. Dr Kilpatrick and the staff working under him had conducted many thousands of air-borne asbestos dust measurements. He had researched the literature concerning asbestos and asbestos disease. (Blue 757.H – 758.J) The summary in [77] is of the following evidence given by Dr Kilpatrick in the 1990 proceedings:

“Q. So that a reasonably prudent employer who wished to protect his workmen against asbestosis between 1950 and 1965 consulting whatever material was available would have felt prudently comfortable if he had adopted a standard of less than 5,000,000 parts per cubic foot.

A. I’ll say yes with one qualification, and that is that I would have thought that the Wagner article from 1960, wherein mesothelioma was found in people living around the asbestos mine in South Africa admitting that it didn’t happen for every asbestos mine in South Africa, might have made some people think. (Blue 808.U – 809.I)”

44 Dr Kilpatrick’s evidence comprised many pages of transcript. It covered a number of topics, including the measurement of asbestos dust and fibre. It is not clear that the admission of the evidence under s 25(3) was the subject of any objection other than the global objection. Dr Kilpatrick’s supposition that the Wagner article might have made some people think was objectionable not because he was not in practice in 1961 but because it was speculation.

45 The evidence referred to at [98] - [105] was given by Dr Leigh. This comprised the transcript of evidence given by Dr Leigh in proceedings in March 1997. Dr Leigh is a consultant occupational physician. He had worked for the Joint Coal Board and has treated patients affected by occupational lung diseases. His report dated 1 February 1997 and his curriculum vitae were in evidence in the 1997 proceedings. Neither is in evidence on the appeal. It can be gleaned from reading the transcript that Dr Leigh was born in 1944. Again, it does not appear that any objection, apart from the global objection, was taken to the admission of any part of Dr Leigh’s evidence.

46 The paragraphs identified in the ground are set out below:

“[98] He referred to the Dreessen paper as having some cases of asbestosis with an exposure of less than 5 mppcf (Exhibit CX 69, 152Q). He referred also to a paper in 1934 by Wood & Gloyne with three reported cases of asbestosis with less than a year of exposure (Exhibit CX 69, 162Q). He noted that the 1949 Merewether paper reported a lung cancer risk with asbestosis (Exhibit CX 69, 165G). He commented that the 1955 Doll paper reported three cases of lung cancer without asbestosis (Exhibit CS 69, 165L).

[99] At Exhibit CX 69, 189P, Dr Leigh was asked a lengthy question about the Dreessen paper and whether, on the information available in it, an end-user might be seen to be at risk in 1938 of contracting asbestosis. He gave a lengthy answer, not entirely responsive, but it does seem to imply that there was a risk.

[100] Asbestos has been recognised as a toxic substance since the 19th century (Exhibit CX69, 177P). As at 1947, it was a dictum in the field of occupational hygiene to have the lowest possible exposure to a toxic substance (Exhibit CX 69, 179W).

I am not really implying there how much reduction for mesothelioma would be required because the quantitative aspects of that were only worked out subsequently

I’m not suggesting they should have known that it should be reduced to nothing

[102] The following questions and answers appeared at Exhibit CX 69, 199D-G).

[103] At T.203C-E, the following question and answer appeared.

47 The reference to Dr Leigh’s non-responsive answer at [99] is to an answer to a question in which the cross-examiner sought to obtain his agreement that a manufacturer of asbestos cement sheeting in 1938, who had read the Dreessen article, would have assessed that there was little risk of contracting asbestosis to a person cutting up asbestos fibre sheets. Dr Leigh responded by conjecturing about the inquiries he would have made and the inferences he would have drawn in such a circumstance. (Blue 1349.O – 1350.E) It would have been an error to admit this part of Dr Leigh’s evidence over objection. That would be so regardless of whether Dr Leigh had been in practise in 1938.

48 The evidence that his Honour referred to at [101] and [102] was given in answer to questions in cross-examination in the 1990 proceedings which sought clarification of statements made in his report. As noted, the report is not in evidence. The class of persons whom Dr Leigh considered should have known of the risks of mesothelioma in 1960 is not identified in the oral evidence. His evidence of what executives of James Hardie should have known and his acceptance of the propositions put to him by the cross-examiner ([102]) should not have been received in these proceedings over objection. Dr Leigh’s acceptance as at 1960 that the existence of mesothelioma as a specific entity was not accepted by Professor Willis, the world’s leading cancer authority, nor was its relationship to asbestos appreciated, with the exception of a few deeply involved experts, would seem to be an opinion based upon his review of what the literature revealed as at that date. In my view, the evidence was admissible.

49 The evidence referred to in [104] and [105] is of Allan Rodgers, given in proceedings in 1997, and was admitted under s 25(3). His Honour’s summary is as follows:

“[104] As to the Dreessen standard, it was known in the 1940s and 1950s that measurement devices at the time were unreliable and accordingly dust levels should be kept as low as possible. That was the general premise of occupational hygiene at the time (Exhibit CX 73, 421U).
[105] Mr Rodgers’ approach to worker safety is one that does not necessarily conform with the obligations of a person under a duty of care. He did not agree that obedience to legislation and protecting the health of persons exposed to asbestos might be two entirely different matters (Exhibit CX 73, 445R). I would add here that compliance with legislation or standards is not inconsistent with negligence. Statutory regulations or standards do not supersede a common law obligation - Bux v Slough Metals Limited [1973] 1 WLR 1358.” (Red 82.O – 83.C)

50 In the 1997 proceedings, a statement prepared by Mr Rodgers was in evidence, as was his curriculum vitae. (Blue 1453.E) Neither formed part of the material on the appeal. The transcript records objections and rulings on Mr Rodgers’ statement, which are incomprehensible in the absence of it. Mr Rodgers described himself as a consultant occupational hygienist. (Blue 1452.S) He was a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Medicine at Sydney University and he lectured to occupational hygienists and occupational physicians on topics which included the use of respirators. (Blue 1457.L-P) Mr Rodgers has studied the methods used in the 1940s and the 1950s to measure asbestos in the atmosphere. He described the difficulties associated with various devices that were in use in that period. (Blue 1459.H-O) The unreliability of the devices was well documented in the literature. (Blue 1459.Q) The summary of Mr Rodgers’ evidence at [104] conflates a question and answer. The evidence was (Blue 1459.T-U):

“Q. As well as because of the unreliability of the measurement in the meantime keeping dust as low as possible.

A. That is the general premise of occupational hygiene.”

51 The evidence that is referred to at [110] was given by Geoffrey Claude Pickford in proceedings before the Tribunal in July 1997. His report dated 21 April 1997 and his curriculum vitae were in evidence in those proceedings. Neither forms part of the evidence on the appeal. Paragraph [110] is as follows:

“[110] He [Mr Pickford] agreed that if a substance was known to be dangerous or toxic in 1950, it was a basic tenet of industrial or occupational hygiene to minimise or eliminate the exposure to such a substance.” (Exhibit CX 82, 194H) (Red 84.D-F)

52 In 1997 Mr Pickford was a consultant in occupational hygiene. (Blue 1711.E-F) Mr Pickford gave evidence of his employment with asbestos cement manufacturers. (Blue 1710.W) He commenced working with CSR in 1959 and he had also worked with Wunderlich and with James Hardie. The evidence that is summarised above comprised Mr Pickford’s acceptance of the proposition put to him by the cross-examiner, that if a substance was known to be dangerous or toxic in 1950 it was a basic tenet of industrial or occupational hygiene to minimise or eliminate the exposure to it. (Blue 1711.G-H) Mr Pickford’s evidence was not direct evidence of what he had understood to be the basic tenets of industrial or occupational hygiene in 1950. He was not then an industrial or occupational hygienist. His opinion is this respect was conjecture. It should not have been admitted over objection in these proceedings.

53 I summarise below the material in the paragraphs of the judgment to which BIC complains in this ground, which in my opinion should not have been received over objection:

· A reasonably prudent employer who wished to protect his workers against asbestosis might have felt comfortable if he had adopted a standard below 5 mppcf, the Wagner article might have made some people think. ([77] Red 74.D-G)

· [Dr Leigh] seemed to imply that on the information available in 1938 an end user [cutting up an asbestos sheet] might have been seen to be at risk. ([99] Red 80.V-Y)

· [I]t was a dictum in the field of occupational hygiene to have the lowest possible exposure to a toxic substance. ([100] Red 81.C-E)

· The risk of mesothelioma should have been known in 1960. ([101] Red 81.G-P)

· In 1960 executives of a company in the business of asbestos manufacture ought reasonably to have given the Wagner paper consideration and awaited developments. ([102] Red 81.M-P)

· If a substance was known to be dangerous or toxic in 1950 it was a basic tenet of industrial or occupational hygiene to minimise or eliminate the exposure to such a substance. ([110] Red 84.D-F)

54 His Honour’s findings at [121] concerning the state of the learning as to the dangers of asbestos that was available in 1961 were drawn from his analysis of the literature which was in evidence, and the evidence of the witnesses that was summarised between [54] and [110], much of which is not the subject of objection. It does not appear that any of the findings in [121] were based on the material that is the subject of this ground.

55 In Patrick Operations Ltd v Comcare [2006] NSWCA 142; 4 DDCR 234, this Court considered the scope of its powers in the event error in point of law has been established. Giles JA (with whom Ipp and Tobias JJA concurred) said this (at 249 [56]):

Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

56 I am not satisfied that his Honour was asked to rule or did rule on any of the evidence that is referred to in the nominated paragraphs of the judgment. It follows that in my view ground 1, which complains of error in admitting the evidence, should be rejected. To the extent that his Honour referred to evidence that should not have been admitted, I am satisfied in any event that the material did not affect his findings.

The Victorian statutory instruments

57 In his Honour’s review of the state of knowledge in 1961 of the health risks associated with asbestos, reference was made to the Harmful Gases, Vapours, Fumes, Mists, Smokes and Dusts Regulation 1945 (Vic) (the Regulation), which was published in the Gazette on 7 February 1945. The Regulation provided that an occupier of premises should not allow concentrations in excess of specified amounts in the air in circumstances in which it was likely to be inhaled by persons in the vicinity of the place where the process was being carried on. In the case of asbestos, the specified amount was 5 mppcf. His Honour also had regard to the Declaration of Certain Trades to be Dangerous Trades within the Health Act 1928 (Vic), which was dated 11 July 1956. This declared the trade of asbestos lagging or spraying to be one which, unless preventative measures were adopted, may be dangerous to the health of persons employed in it.

58 Ground 2 complains that it was an error to admit the Victorian statutory instruments. In the written submissions filed on BIC’s behalf, it was contended that the circumstance that an occupation was considered to be a “dangerous trade” because it might be dangerous to the health of persons employed in it was not relevant to the determination of the state of medical knowledge bearing on the perceived risk to a person such as Professor Rowley. The Regulation appears to have been tendered in the course of the re-examination of Mr Stewart. (Black 141.R) The tender was not the subject of objection. It is not clear that the Tribunal was called upon to rule on the admissibility of either of the Victorian statutory instruments. In BIC’s written submissions at trial their relevance was questioned but it was not said that they had been wrongly admitted. (Black 328.M-329.B) This is enough to dispose of the ground. However, since the point was not taken by the University in its written submissions filed after the Amended Notice of Appeal, it is appropriate to address the substance of the complaint that is now made.

59 Relevant to proof of duty and breach was consideration of the state of knowledge of an informed industry participant in 1961 as to the health risks associated with spraying asbestos into the atmosphere. The fact that delegated legislation promulgated in Victoria before 1961 treated asbestos as having the potential to endanger health when present in stated concentrations in the atmosphere was some evidence of the state of knowledge. It did not bear directly on the issue of the foreseeability of risk to a bystander subjected to asbestos spraying for a period of 5 to 10 minutes, but it was not irrelevant in considering the question.

60 Mr Parker pointed out that cl 4(1) of the Regulation appears to have made it an offence to permit a momentary concentration of asbestos in excess of 5 mppcf. He submitted that it was clear that this did not accord with the way the scientific community thought about the matter at the time. (T’cpt 23.30-32) His point was that under the National Health and Medical Research Council’s Schedule of Recommended Concentrations of Atmospheric Contaminants for Occupational Exposures published in 1961 (the NHMRC Standard), the standard for asbestos dust of 5 mppcf was expressed as a guide to levels below which workers may be exposed without adverse effects, in circumstances in which the standard itself contemplated fluctuating exposures not greatly exceeding the schedule limit as permissible. This submission did not address the admissibility of the Regulation, unless it was to contend that it should have been rejected under s 135, or the use made of it limited under s 136. His Honour does not appear to have been asked to consider either course.

Foreseeability of risk of injury – duty of care

61 In the way the appeal was argued, the principal challenge was to his Honour’s finding that BIC owed a duty of care to Professor Rowley. In Mr Parker’s submission, it was not open to conclude that in 1961 it had been foreseeable to BIC that a bystander exposed to asbestos dust and fibre for a period of 5 to 10 minutes was at risk of contracting lung disease. In its Amended Notice of Appeal, BIC expressed its challenge in this way:

“His Honour erred in holding (RJ1 [121]-[134]) that the Appellant owed the Plaintiff a duty of care, in that:

(a) His Honour failed to make a finding essential to the existence of a duty of care; namely, that injury to a person in the circumstances of the Plaintiff, Professor Rowley, was reasonably foreseeable by the Appellant;

(b) to the extent that his Honour did make such a finding, he failed to give adequate reasons for it;
(c) whether or not the evidence referred to in grounds 1 and 2 was admissible, there was no evidence which properly supported such a finding”

62 Since BIC complains of his Honour’s reasoning or, at least, his statement of it, it is appropriate to set out the whole of that section of the judgment which deals with the duty of care:

BIC owed Professor Rowley a duty of care when it conducted its spraying operation in 1961

(a) asbestos was toxic in sufficient quantities;

(b) toxic effects included, but were not limited to, asbestosis, cancer and mesothelioma;

(c) each of those diseases was known to be fatal or potentially fatal;

(d) the effects of exposure to asbestos were not immediate and took many years to develop;

(e) it was known that exposure to a level of 5 mppcf over a sufficiently prolonged period would produce asbestosis and could produce lung cancer. There had been cases of asbestosis at levels below 5 mppcf and where the exposure was less than prolonged;

(f) there were cases of mesothelioma attributed to relatively light exposure to asbestos;

(g) there was no level that was known to be safe;

(h) light exposure to asbestos in certain processes, for example, that described in paragraph 45 was recognised to be hazardous even if the hazard was small;

(i) individuals were known to have different capacities to deal with dust; there were idiosyncratic differences;

(j) further investigation and study were required and were being undertaken;

(k) Dreessen understated the hazard and was marginal in terms of safety. The Dreessen value was a temporary one until better data became available;

(l) dust in the workplace was regarded as bad occupational hygiene. Any dust should be avoided. Exposure should be limited to the minimum practically achievable;

(m) because asbestos was a dangerous dust and fibre, if exposure to it could be avoided, it should be;

(n) the general principle was to eliminate the hazard insofar as humanly possible;

(o) responsible industrial hygienists in 1961 would have recommended against the exposure to asbestos dust in circumstances in which Professor Rowley was exposed;

(a) in 1900, the first fatality from asbestosis was recorded;

(b) in 1933, the Merewether paper noted that exposure to asbestos for less than five years could result in asbestosis, sufficient to cause death;

(c) in 1935, there was the first recorded case of lung cancer;

(d) in 1938, the Dreessen paper reported three doubtful cases of asbestosis where the exposure level was between 2.5 and 4.9 mppcf;

(e) in 1947, there was strong evidence of the link between asbestosis and lung cancer;

(f) in 1950, lung cancer was recognised as a disease of persons working with asbestos;

(g) in 1952, there were two recorded cases of mesothelioma;

(h) by 1955, there had been 61 cases of lung cancer and the association of asbestosis and lung cancer was now beyond reasonable doubt. There were a couple of reported cases of lung cancer without asbestosis;

(i) in 1958, there were three recorded cases of mesothelioma;

(a) it is not in the nature of scientific learning generally that it is frozen and makes no progress;

(b) there was every indication that there would continue to be more scientific learning about the dangers of asbestos. The papers were indicating that further studies were required;

[124] The learning in 1961 as to the dangers associated with asbestos was to the effect that it was known in an established, scientific sense that exposure to asbestos at a sufficient level over a sufficient period would cause lung disease which could include asbestosis, lung cancer or mesothelioma.

[125] If, in 1961, one asked the question “what is the known, established, scientific learning as to the dangers of asbestos?”, one would be likely to obtain the answer in the previous paragraph.

[126] If, in 1961, one were to go a step further and ask another question such as “has the learning expressed any other risk that has not reached the level of known, established, scientific learning?”, the answer would be “yes”.

(a) very recent studies have shown some cases of mesothelioma from relatively light exposure;

(b) how light the exposure needs to be is not known, but it has gradually been getting less over time and further research is being conducted;

(c) at the moment, there is no known safe level;

[128] If, in 1961, the person making the enquiry were then to ask “what should I do?”, the answer would be “it depends”.

The answer would depend on the circumstances of the operation and, if the process had to proceed, the advice would have been at least “to the extent that you can reasonably do it, take steps to avoid people being exposed”. That advice would be especially important as asbestos was known to have potentially fatal consequences and those consequences would not occur for many years. It would be important not to expose persons whilst one waited for many years to see if there were going to be any developments and what those developments might be. It would be too late then to protect those exposed in the meantime. I reject Dr Gandevia’s approach (paragraph 109) as an appropriate one in the circumstances especially in light of Professor Ferguson’s evidence that alarm bells were ringing with the Wagner paper (paragraph 88).

In evaluating what BIC, as a reasonable person, should have done in response to the risk, it is essential to identify the risk that was known at the time. That is, a risk arising from prolonged and heavy exposure to asbestos fibre.

It is true that that submission was in the context of breach of duty rather than existence of duty, but it ties in with a similar submission on the question of existence of duty. This, in effect, defines the question as one confined to particular defined risks. There were other risks at different levels of certainty. The same problem arises with paragraph 8.1 of BIC’s written submission.

[130] In considering whether BIC owed Professor Rowley a duty of care, I am mindful of the need that the duty be one owed by BIC to him and not to others, for example, to its employees - McNeill at [2]-[6].

[131] I am also mindful of the facts that Professor Rowley was a bystander and that his exposure was of short duration. Neither is a disqualifying factor in law or policy as to the existence of a duty of care. They are both factors to be taken into account in considering all the circumstances. Examples of bystander cases include: BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v Myer Emporium Limited (2005) 3DDCR 142; BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v Public Trustee of South Australia (2005) 3DDCR 161; A W Baulderstone Holdings Pty Limited v Bradford Insulation (SA) Pty Limited [2006] NSWDDT 17. Selstam v Minehan (1996) 13NSWCCR 410 is an example of exposure of short duration (four days’ exposure in 1955 - 421A).

Julia Farr Services Inc v Hayes

Foreseeability can turn on knowledge of the dangers of any exposure to asbestos, including the calculus for breach of duty, and is not confined to knowledge of the dangers of exposure to high levels of asbestos or levels of asbestos above any particular standard.

In my view, the question to be asked in this case is not the question in paragraph 125 hereof. If it is, it is not the only question to be asked. In the circumstances of this case, questions of the kind posed in paragraphs 126 to 128 should have been asked. If they had been, information of the kind mentioned in those paragraphs would have been elicited.

[133] I am mindful also that the law in relation to foreseeability does not require foresight of the precise mechanism of injury or of the precise injury. This is well established law and has been applied in many dust diseases cases including, BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v Public Trustee of South Australia at [22]. In that case, it was stated that the state of knowledge in the early years (1964) did not permit one to say that low doses were safe [39]. The same may be said of knowledge in 1961.

63 In my opinion, it is clear from the judgment, read as a whole, that his Honour found that injury to a person in the circumstances of Professor Rowley had been foreseeable by BIC in 1961. His Honour considered that foreseeability of risk of injury in 1961 to a bystander exposed to asbestos dust for a period of short duration was the central issue in the proceedings. This is how he put the matter at the commencement of his reasons:

[10] It is apparent that these proceedings give rise to numerous issues. The issues concern the state of knowledge as to the health risks associated with asbestos in 1961 and also numerous evidentiary issues.

· to give rise to a duty of care, the content of which required the University and BIC to take reasonable steps to prevent Professor Rowley being harmfully exposed to asbestos dust and fibre;

· if the answer to the above point is affirmative, to give rise to a breach of that duty;” (Red 43.H-U)

64 The entire thrust of his Honour’s analysis of Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill [2006] NSWCA 158; (2007) 4 DDCR 1 was the distinction, in the context of foreseeability of risk of injury, between Professor Rowley, a bystander exposed for a short period to high concentrations of asbestos (finding at [36]) in an industrial setting from the circumstances of the respondent in McNeill, an end-user of asbestos cement sheeting. After listing the points of distinction, his Honour went on to state ([119] Red 88.J-K):

“The learning up to 1961 must be looked at in the circumstances of Professor Rowley’s exposure.”

65 His Honour reviewed the evidence relevant to the state of knowledge of informed industry participants in 1961 at [38] – [113]. His findings based on this material are set out at [121]. Those in sub pars (a), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (p) were of particular significance to his conclusion as to the foreseeability by BIC in 1961 of risk of injury to a person in Professor Rowley’s position. He explained his reason for rejecting BIC’s submission that foreseeability of risk of injury in 1961 was confined to persons subject to prolonged and heavy exposure to asbestos fibre at [129]. His comment that there were other risks at different levels of certainty is pertinent to an understanding of his reasons for concluding, in the context of the existence of a duty of care, that risk of injury was foreseeable. In my opinion, his Honour’s reasons fulfilled each of the requirements of an adequate statement of reasons that were set out by Meagher JA in Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at 443-444.

66 Central to this appeal is the contention that the finding of foreseeability of risk of injury was not open. BIC submitted that the finding could not be sustained on the evidence, for reasons which substantially mirror those given by this Court McNeill.

67 The respondent in McNeill was diagnosed with mesothelioma in January 2005. In 1961 he had fixed asbestos cement sheeting to the roof of a rumpus room at his sister’s home. He had worked on this task over two or three days, on each occasion for periods between two and four hours. He cut the asbestos sheets with fibro cutters and a saw. He then drilled holes in them with a hand drill and screwed them onto a wooden frame. At the end of each day’s work, he picked-up broken pieces of sheeting and put them in a rubbish bin. The sheets were dusty (at 7, [13]).

68 Bryson JA (Tobias JA concurring) reviewed the evidence of the known risks of asbestos, concluding (at 33, [101]):

“The reasons which the trial judge gave at [98] and [99] and the course of the judgment generally show that the trial judge conflated all persons exposed to risks of injury associated with inhalation of asbestos dust and fibres, and used the results of this consideration to reach a conclusion about the reasonable foreseeability of a risk of injury to the respondent. In my opinion this was an error in point of law, because the material which the trial judge considered in reaching this conclusion does not provide a basis for concluding that a risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable in relation to a person whose exposure to asbestos was of the extremely low intensity of the respondent’s exposure. Almost all the references to exposure relate to occupational exposure and to continuing situations of exposure, and while they vary greatly in periods of time and intensity, they were all of a completely different and much greater order of intensity than the exposure of the respondent. It is only in the last of the publications reviewed by the trial judge, those of JC Wagner and others in 1959 and 1960, that there was any reference to sufferers from asbestosis or carcinoma other than persons occupationally exposed to asbestos. The conclusion that risk of injury to the respondent, or to a person in the respondent's position, was reasonably foreseeable is not a conclusion which could be reached by reasonable persons finding the facts, on the material which the trial judge considered. The concessions attributed to Mr Pickford do not add anything of substance: most of them have little connection with foreseeability in relation to the class of which the respondent is a member. Indeed, unless the case of the respondent and persons in his circumstances is conflated with cases of altogether different intensity of exposure, there is not in my opinion any material upon which, avoiding hindsight and judging matters from the point of view of the information of which the appellant ought to have been aware in 1961, the trial judge could find that there was any exposure to risk at all.”

“When addressing foreseeability and the existence of a duty of care it is in my opinion an error, and an error of law, to treat the respondent as a member of any class more highly exposed to risk than a class described at a high level of abstraction as home handymen and other low-intensity casual end users who worked on asbestos cement products as handymen, not in an industrial or other controlled situation, not in the course of employment or any like relationship and not for extended periods. The respondent’s exposure in several periods of work which may have totalled in the order of 10 or 12 hours make his exposure very low, even for what is characteristic of this class. As a class, these home handymen had characteristically far less exposure to risk, for a far shorter time, than building or other industrial workers who handle and shape asbestos cement sheeting in employment situations. Publicly available information should be considered with care before deciding that it has relevance to the reasonable foreseeability of risk to a class of persons to which the respondent belonged.”

69 Handley JA agreed with Bryson JA that the evidence in McNeill was not capable of establishing that there was in 1961 a foreseeable risk of injury to a casual, one off, user of asbestos cement sheeting (at 4, [6]).

70 In written submissions, BIC put that “[McNeill] was not distinguishable and his Honour was required to follow that approach”. (Orange 24.N) In McNeill the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was not one within a category that gave rise to a duty of care. It was necessary to consider at a level of abstraction the class of persons to whom risk of injury was foreseeable. The class in McNeill were the end users of a manufactured product, asbestos cement sheeting. The class in this case were bystanders present at a building site at which a process of asbestos spraying was being undertaken. (The University submitted that the relationship between BIC and Professor Rowley was that of “occupier/invitee or sub-licensee – occupier/invitee and giving rise to a recognised duty of care”. (Black 347.L-M). The case was not pleaded against BIC as occupier.) His Honour is not said to have erred in his statement of the principles in McNeill. He was not required to arrive at the same conclusion. This is because in 1961 foreseeability of risk of injury to a person inhaling asbestos dust and fibre which was being sprayed into the atmosphere may be thought to have raised different considerations from the foreseeability of risk of injury to home handymen using asbestos cement sheeting.

71 Mr Parker submitted that the findings in [121] reflected his Honour’s view of what industrial hygienists should have understood of the dangers of asbestos, as distinct from what was understood. Importantly, in his submission, they were findings which related to risk based on occupational or other heavy and continuous exposure. The publication in March 1961 of the NHMRC Standard was prominent in the way Mr Parker put the submission. He contended that it was the best evidence of the state of knowledge of the risks of asbestos in 1961. The recommended maximum concentrations for occupational exposure to asbestos under the standard was 5 mppcf. In the Schedule to the standard it was said that the concentrations:

92 Professor Henderson went on to explain that he relied upon the published figures given by occupational hygienists. (Black 47.D-E) The evidence continued:

Q. That is because you recognise you do not have the qualifications, study and experience to express such an opinion.

MR NEIL: I object. He has just answered that.

HIS HONOUR: I will allow it.

WITNESS: I do not entirely agree. But if he wants to say that Professor Rowley was there for say 15 minutes and exposed to an airborne fibre concentration of 100 fibres per millilitre of air, then I can do a calculation of what it might have been in fibres per millilitre years because that’s a very straightforward situation. But I try not to intrude into that territory. All I tried to indicate is, spraying is known to have generated high peak airborne fibre concentrations.

93 Professor Henderson was at the date of trial the Professor of Anatomical Pathology, Flinders University of South Australia and Senior Consultant in Anatomical Pathology at the Flinders Medical Centre, South Australia. Professor Henderson has extensive experience in the study of asbestos related lung conditions. (Blue 1830 – 1883) He has authored many journal articles on topics associated with mesothelioma and he has been an invited participant at many international conventions which have addressed issues to do with this condition.

94 In BIC’s submissions filed in reply it is said that Professor Henderson lacked demonstrated expertise in the disciplines which would have allowed him to express an opinion on the numerical level of exposure. (Orange 54.F-G). In written submissions at trial BIC contended that Professor Henderson’s opinion of the likely level of Professor Rowley’s exposure to asbestos did not comply with the requirements for opinion evidence explained by Heydon JA in Makita (Australia) Pty Limited v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; 52 NSWLR 705 at 743 [85]. (Black 321.I-W) This objection included that Professor Henderson’s opinion as to the range of airborne fibre concentration was derived from figures contained in a book authored by Dr Tweedale, which contained the results of trials undertaken by Turner & Newall and that these test results had not been independently proved. It was asserted that to the extent Professor Henderson’s opinion was based upon “assumed” or “accepted” facts they ought to have been independently proved. The submissions were critical of the intellectual basis of Professor Henderson’s opinion (Black 322.S-323.R) including of his ignorance of a study conducted by Alan Bell of tests undertaken at an Australian shipyard in 1968. It does not appear that BIC presses these latter Makita objections on the appeal. They are not easy to follow in the absence of detailed assistance as to the evidence to which they refer. I approach 6(a) on the basis that it contends his Honour erred in holding at [152] (Red 104.J-W) that Professor Henderson’s expertise permitted him to express opinions on the matters set out in [154].

95 Professor Henderson refers in his second report to a text, Churg, Pathology of Occupational Lung Disease, 2nd edition, which contains the conversion factors for mppcf to fibres/mL. As I understand the evidence, it is within Professor Henderson’s field of specialised knowledge to know the concentration of particles of asbestos in the atmosphere that may cause lung disease. He has familiarised himself with the results of studies carried out by occupational hygienists who measure particles of asbestos in the atmosphere. Since the evidence was received without objection, it is not necessary to come to a conclusion concerning whether Professor Henderson’s expertise would extend to the expression of opinion that visible dust in the atmosphere indicates a concentration in excess of 5 mppcf. The balance of the summary at [154] does not take the matter further. It is the evidence of Professor Rowley and Mr Caon that is relied upon to establish that visible clouds of dust were present at the building site.

96 In both the second report and his oral evidence, Professor Henderson acknowledged that given the spray comprised a mixture of cement and asbestos the presence of visible dust did not, of itself, establish particles of asbestos in excess of 5 mppcf. This is the issue raised in ground 6(b).

97 Ground 6(b) contends that his Honour’s finding at RJ1 [30] (Red 51.H-L) that Professor Rowley, over the whole period of exposure during the spraying process, was exposed to concentrations of asbestos and dust fibre in the atmosphere well in excess of 5 mppcf was without evidence to “properly support” it. If there were no evidence capable of supporting the finding, this would be an error of law susceptible of correction by this Court.

98 The evidence was that Professor Rowley was present when the spraying was done and that it was “very dusty, I mean there were clouds of dust everywhere” (Red 47. R) Professor Rowley had stood at the bottom of a ladder from which the sprayer was working and his Honour found that he must have been under some spray and dust cloud at that point. It was dusty more or less everywhere to a greater or lesser extent over the whole of the floor. (Red 47.S-X) Clouds of dust went into the air when bags of asbestos were tipped into the back of the asbestos spray machine. (Red 48.C-E) Asbestos dust was visible in the air and resembled snowflakes. (Red 48.F-G) When the bags of asbestos were opened, handfuls of asbestos were put into the machine. This was to be significant because it revealed that, apart from the asbestos spray, which was probably mixed with cement, there was also pure asbestos liberated into the atmosphere. (Red 48.K-L)

99 His Honour referred at [27] and [28] to evidence that if dust is visible in the atmosphere in ambient light, its concentration in the atmosphere is at least 5 mppcf. (Red 50.I-X) In evidence in proceedings in November 1994, Professor Ferguson was asked whether there was any scientific material that indicated that if the dust was visible in the air it was likely to be above the Dreessen standard. He replied, “I think the general answer of that is it is likely to be above the Dreessen standard.” (Blue 860.T-U) In further evidence given by Professor Ferguson in 1997, he was asked whether, if one could see dust in the air under diffused lighting conditions, then the probability was that the dust cloud was over 5 mppcf. He replied, “yes, probably was”. (Blue 1556.G) His Honour referred to further evidence to similar effect from Dr Joseph. He also had regard to Mr Kilpatrick’s experience of the observation of dust in the atmosphere and the conduct of laboratory assessments in this respect.

100 His Honour took into account that the spray was a mixture of asbestos and cement. He referred to the contractual specification in this respect. He was not able to make a finding as to the amount of cement in the mix. He was satisfied that asbestos was “by far the predominant component of the spray mix”. (Red 55.Q) In coming to that conclusion he took into account descriptions in the literature relating to asbestos spraying. Barnes in Asbestos Spraying, an Occupational and Environmental Hazard (CX24; Blue 717-720) described the process of spraying as involving a mix of asbestos with small amounts of mineral and cement powder. In the chapter by Dr Tweedale “Sprayed limpet asbestos: technical, commercial and regulatory aspect” published in Peters GA and Peters BJ (eds) (1999) Asbestos Exposure and Diseases Control: Sourcebook on Asbestos Diseases the specification for asbestos spray was given as 60:40 asbestos to cement. It was open to find that asbestos was the predominant component of the spray. The finding at [30] reflected this circumstance and the findings at (Red 55.U-X):

“… [A]t all times Professor Rowley was standing or moving in dust visible in the atmosphere and also the fact that one of the sources of that dust was pure asbestos liberated into the atmosphere when it was removed from the bag to the machine.”

101 This Court is not authorised to overturn findings of fact, including robust findings. Its function is limited to appeal in point of law. The contention that there was no evidence capable of supporting the factual finding at [30] in my view is not sustained.

Notice of Contention

102 At the commencement of the trial, the University applied for, and was granted, leave to amend its cross-claim by adding as a particular of negligence that the “Dreessen standard” had been breached. His Honour deferred ruling on the application. In his reasons, he recorded that he did not consider prejudice had flowed to BIC from the proposed amendment, and it was allowed. ([8]; Red 42.V-43.C) His Honour’s conclusion did not depend upon this particular of negligence. This is the subject of the University’s Notice of Contention.

103 The University, by Notice of Contention, seeks to have the decision of the primary judge affirmed on the following basis:

1. On the evidence, His Honour found that the exposure to asbestos dust and fibre experienced by Mr Rowley exceeded 5 million particles per cubic foot or the recognised Dreessen standard.

2. The content of the duty of care owed to Professor Rowley by the Appellant included compliance with the Dreessen standard.

3. The breach of the Dreessen standard amounted to a breach of the Appellant’s duty of care.

104 This Court is not authorised to make findings of fact on an appeal from the Tribunal. The University submitted that the determination of its contention did not require the Court to make any finding of fact. In supplementary submissions, it was put that all the Court was required to do was to apply the decision in Seltsam Ltd v Minahan (1996) 13 NSWCCR 410 to the facts found by the primary judge. This submission evidences the same misconception as BIC’s submission that his Honour erred in not making the same finding as was made in O’Neill.

105 In Seltsam v Minahan, the plaintiff was employed by Seltsam, a manufacturer of asbestos, for a short period, perhaps not more than four days, in 1955. Sheller JA (Powell JA agreeing) approached Seltsam’s appeal upon the basis that it had been open to the trial judge to find that in that part of the Seltsam premises where the plaintiff worked the level of 5 mppcf was exceeded during the time of his employment. Certain of the tests carried out by the Health Department had produced results well in excess of the accepted limit. Sheller JA considered that the finding of these levels justified the trial judge’s conclusion that Seltsam had been indifferent to the risks of injury to its employees in the section of its factory in which the plaintiff worked (at 421). Handley JA considered Seltsam’s liability could be properly based on the finding that it was in breach of the Dreessen standard. The plaintiff in that case was employed by Seltsam, if only for a period of days.

106 The study by Dreessen, “A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry”, published by the US Treasury Department Public Health Service, proposed a threshold concentration of asbestos dust, being the highest dust concentration that would not produce pneumoconiosis in originally healthy workmen during their entire working life. In this context it was said that:

“Because clean-cut cases of asbestosis were found only in dust concentrations exceeding 5 million particles per cubic foot, and because they were not found at lower dust concentrations, 5 million particles per cubic foot may be regarded tentatively as the threshold value for asbestos-dust exposure until better data are available.”

107 Mr M J Neil QC, who with Mr Sheller appeared for the University, submitted that no exceptions were stated to the threshold proposed by Dreessen. It followed, so it was said, that exposure on a single occasion to an amount of asbestos dust in excess of 5 mppcf established negligence on BIC’s part without more. I am not persuaded that that is so.

108 The introduction to the Dreessen article states, “When asbestos dust is inhaled daily, year in and year out, a lung disease termed asbestosis may develop”. (Blue 75.L-M) The objectives of the study were stated to be threefold:

“1. to make a medical study of the effects of long-continued inhalation of asbestos dust on the human body;

2. to identify the manufacturing processes that create dust and to recommend practices and, when necessary, equipment that will reduce the dust exposure of workers; and

3. to find out what concentration of asbestos dust can be tolerated without injury to health.” (Blue 76.J-M)

109 I have already noted the introduction to the NHMRC standard at [71] above.

110 The duty that BIC owed to Professor Rowley was a duty to take reasonable care to protect him from physical injury arising out of its spraying operation. The proposition contained in (2) of the University’s contention involves defining the content of the duty in specific terms, which is to invite error for the reasons explained by McHugh J in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540 at 585 [106]:

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt

Neindorf v Junkovic

The Law of Torts

“The first reason identified by Professor Fleming for rejecting the appellant’s approach to the duty issue is compelling. As an element of the tort of negligence, the duty of care is already overworked. It is problematic enough without imposing the additional burden of particularising, in a detailed fashion, all of the specific risks against which defendants must take care.”

111 In my opinion, the failure to comply with the Dreessen standard was a circumstance to be taken into account in deciding whether in all the circumstances BIC breached the duty of care that it owed to Professor Rowley. This is how his Honour approached the issue. The University’s contention should be rejected.

The cross-appeal

112 The University cross-appeals from his Honour’s apportionment of responsibility for Professor Rowley’s injury, as between it and BIC. His Honour assessed the amount of the contribution recoverable from BIC under s 25 of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) as 35 per cent.

113 The principles governing apportionment under the South Australian legislation are the same as those under the New South Wales legislation. It is necessary to compare the culpability and the relevant importance of the acts of each party in causing the damage: Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529 at 532-533. It is not asserted that his Honour misstated the principles but, rather, that his determination was affected by error of the type described in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 505 in that:

(a) His Honour allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or effect him including matters which were not the subject of evidence;

(b) Upon the facts the outcome is unreasonable or plainly unjust.” (Orange 50.H-J)

114 His Honour’s reasons for the apportionment are as follows:

“[157] It is acknowledged that the University is a tortfeasor within the meaning of the section. There was a suggestion that this acknowledgment may have been simply on the basis that there being a judgment against it by consent that conclusion is inevitable. If, by that, it was intended to make an issue of this matter for the purpose of considering the extent of the contribution that should be allowed I would find, in any event, that the University was a tortfeasor. I do not need to express any reasons for that. Enough has been written as to why BIC is a tortfeasor. The University, being Professor Rowley’s employer, is in no better position than BIC.

· BIC had full available knowledge of the dangers of asbestos in 1961. The University did not. Why it did not mystifies me. What was it teaching its medical, engineering and architectural students in 1961? I would have thought a University with a medical school in 1961 would have been teaching its students about mesothelioma and about the Wagner paper. The University’s failing on this point is so far from acceptable standards in my view that it should not benefit from its ignorance;

· BIC was conducting the spraying. The University was not;

· BIC could have taken simple steps to protect Professor Rowley; so too could the University. It could have informed him what was happening and instructed and warned him to stay out of the area. It gets worse from the University’s position because it assured Professor Rowley, wrongly, that the area was safe.

[159] I do not think that the fact that asbestos was specified in the contract is a matter that weighs either way. It was a requirement of a third party, a government body, and if it was thought to be inappropriate, either party could have dealt with it.

[160] BIC argues that one matter that is relevant to a higher causal contribution being allocated to the University is that it was negligent, not only with respect to the spraying exposure, but also with respect to later exposure. I do not accept that the University’s concession as to judgment means that it was negligent in respect of all exposures, nor indeed that there was any exposure after the spraying exposure. The spraying exposure is sufficient, of itself, to explain the concession as to judgment. Further, in the facts as I have found them, though there was opportunity for later exposure, the evidence does not establish it.

115 The complaint this his Honour allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide his determination is directed to the first bullet point of [158]. The University submits that no evidence was before his Honour of the content of the curricula in the medical, engineering and architectural faculties. Mr Neil also submitted that, given that there was no evidence that the University had actual knowledge of the health risks associated with asbestos, it was an error to find that its position was made worse by its assurance to Professor Rowley that the area where the asbestos was being sprayed was safe. This was a reference to Professor Rowley’s evidence that he had been accompanied on the inspection by the University’s architect, Mr Harrison. He had said to Mr Harrison, “this seems a very dusty, dangerous environment, are you sure we’re all right” and Mr Harrison said, “oh, yes, the workmen all around are not wearing masks, it’s a safe kind of asbestos and don’t worry”. (Blue 1917.U-V)

116 Mr Neil submitted that the result was perverse in that BIC, an entity with actual knowledge, bore substantially less liability than the University, which had constructive knowledge only. In the University’s written submissions, reference was made to a number of decisions, including BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Myer Emporium Ltd [2005] NSWCA 305; 3 DDCR 142; BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Strikwerda [2005] NSWCA 288; 3 DDCR 149; BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v The Public Trustee of South Australia (2005) 3 DDCR 161 at [60]; Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649 and Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 626 at 647 [136]-[137], 648 [144].

117 In Podrebersek it was noted that a finding on the question of apportionment is one upon a “question, not of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of weighing different considerations. It involves an individual choice or discretion, as to which there may well be differences of opinion by different minds” (citing British Fame (Owners) v Macgregor (Owners) [1943] AC 197 at 201 (at 532). This caution applies to an appellate court deciding an appeal by way of rehearing. There is the added constraint present here in that the cross-appeal is confined to error in point of law.

118 His Honour’s rhetorical question, “what was it teaching its medical, engineering and architectural students in 1961?” did not involve recourse to material that was not in evidence. His Honour accepted that in 1961 the University did not have actual knowledge of the health risks associated with asbestos. Consistently with this finding, his Honour assumed that the University was not teaching its students of those risks at that time. It was not an error for his Honour to take into account that Professor Rowley had inquired of the University’s architect whether it was safe to remain in the dusty atmosphere of the building site and been reassured that this was safe asbestos.

119 In BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Myer Emporium Ltd, the trial judge took into account that Myer, the plaintiff’s employer, was a department store only peripherally concerned with the building industry, as a consumer of its services and a retailer of hardware products. It had not received any advice from its architects or builder about the dangers of asbestos. In that case, apportionment was in the ratio of 10 per cent to the Myer Emporium and 90 per cent to BIC. The appeal against this determination was dismissed. I do not consider that it was an error for his Honour to have assessed the University’s culpability by reference to the conclusion that, in 1961, it ought to have known of the dangers to health posed by asbestos, particularly since it was in the business of teaching medicine, architecture and engineering. The facts of the present case are significantly removed from those with which the Court was concerned in BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Myer Emporium Ltd.

120 Strikwerda did not involve any analysis of the basis of the apportionment.

121 The reference in the University’s submissions to Higgins v William Inglis and to Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) is with respect to the proposition that in determining apportionment a greater liability will generally attach to a party with knowledge of a danger compared to a party with constructive knowledge. (Orange 50.S-51.C) The reference is to Stein JA in Rolls Royce Industrial Power at 647 [136]-[137]. His Honour in these paragraphs discusses Higgins v William Inglis. The context is the provision in s 5(2) of the 1946 Act that permits the Court to exempt a person from liability to make contribution or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity. In Higgins v William Inglis, the owner of a bull, which had savaged a man at a livestock auction, claimed contribution or indemnity under s 5(2). Taking into account that the owner’s son, when making delivery of the bull to the auctioneers, had made full disclosure of its dangerous tendencies, no responsibility for the ensuing damage attached to the owner and the owner, accordingly, was held to be entitled to recover full indemnity from the auctioneer in respect of the damages that he was liable to pay to the plaintiff. In my opinion, nothing in William Inglis or in Rolls Royce Industrial Power points to legal error in the apportionment made in this case.

122 In BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v The Public Trustee of South Australia [2005] NSWCA 306; 3 DDCR 161, the trial judge apportioned responsibility as between BIC and the plaintiff’s employer in the ratio 75 per cent to BIC and 25 per cent to the employer. In that case, the challenge to the apportionment was advanced on two bases: that the trial judge had (i) wrongly taken into account the moral culpability of the parties and (ii) wrongly given weight to BIC’s actual knowledge, in contrast to the employer’s constructive knowledge. Mason P (with whom Handley and Beazley JJA agreed) held there was no error in the trial judge’s shorthand use of the expression “moral culpability”. His Honour observed that if there were remaining complaints they went no further than cavilling at the particular apportionment awarded (at 177 [61]).

123 His Honour considered the University, as Professor Rowley’s employer, having been well placed to know the risks of asbestos in 1961 and whose architect had, wrongly, allayed Professor Rowley’s concerns, should bear the greater responsibility in the apportionment. I am not satisfied that his determination in this respect involved legal error.

124 For these reasons, I propose that the appeal and the cross-appeal each be dismissed with costs.

125 McCLELLAN CJ at CL: I agree with Bell JA.

**********

26/09/2008 - Name change of solicitor for appellant. Previously Makinson & D'Apice - Paragraph(s) [Coversheet]

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Citations

BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v University of Adelaide [2008] NSWCA 210

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CITATION:	BI (Contracting) Pty Limited v University of Adelaide [2008] NSWCA 210 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
HEARING DATE(S):	4/3/08
JUDGMENT DATE:	19 September 2008
JUDGMENT OF:	Beazley JA at 1; Bell JA at 2; McClellan CJ at CL at 125
DECISION:	Appeal and the cross-appeal each dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:	TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – duty of care – foreseeability in 1961 to informed industry player of risk – bystander exposed to asbestos spray at building site for short period - BREACH – whether evidence capable of supporting finding – apportionment – whether unreasonable to allocate 65 per cent to employer with constructive knowledge 35 per cent to subcontractor with actual knowledge - EVIDENCE – expert opinion evidence – admissibility of expert opinion concerning the state of knowledge in 1961 - COSTS – indemnity principle – whether error to order contribution
LEGISLATION CITED:	Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) Dust Diseases Tribunal Rules Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Harmful Gases, Vapours, Fumes, Mists, Smokes and Dusts Regulation 1945 (Vic) Health Act 1928 (Vic) Legal Practitioners Act 1987 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) Wrongs Act 1936 (SA)
CATEGORY:	Principal judgment
CASES CITED:	Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1 Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Myer Emporium Ltd [2005] NSWCA 305; 3 DDCR 142 BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v The Public Trustee of South Australia [2005] NSWCA 306; 3 DDCR 161 BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v Strikwerda [2005] NSWCA 288; DDCR 149 British Fame (Owners) v Macgregor (Owners) [1943] AC 197 Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649 House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 James Hardie & Co Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 679 Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080 Julia Farr Services Inc v Hayes [2003] NSWCA 37; 24 NSWCCR 138 Patrick Operations Ltd v Comcare [2006] NSWCA 142; 4 DDCR 234 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 535 R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 625 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill [2006] NSWCA 158; 4 DDCR 1 Seltsam Ltd v Minahan (1966) 13 NSWCCR 410 Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 5) [2007] SASC 285; 98 SASR 136 Wentworth v Rodgers [2006] NSWCA 145; 66 NSWLR 474 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; 146 CLR 40
TEXTS CITED:	JD Heydon, Cross of Evidence (Australia: Butterworths, loose-leaf service) Sir Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London, 2nd ed 1983)
PARTIES:	BI (Contracting) Pty Limited (Appellant) University of Adelaide (Respondent)
FILE NUMBER(S):	CA 40403 of 2007
COUNSEL:	Mr T G R Parker SC (Appellant) Mr M J Neil QC / Mr J C Sheller (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:	A R Conolly (Appellant) Thomspon Cooper (Respondent)
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:	Dust Diseases Tribunal
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):	73 of 2003/1
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:	Kearns J
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:	5/4/07