Bhu v State of New South Wales (Hunter New England Local Health District)

CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER
CITATION:	BHU v State of New South Wales (Hunter New England Local Health District) [2024] NSWPIC 506
APPLICANT:	BHU
RESPONDENT:	State of New South Wales (Hunter New England Local Health District)
MEMBER:	Cameron Burge
DATE OF DECISION:	12 September 2024
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; claim for weekly compensation and medical expenses in relation to an alleged psychological injury; applicant employed as a sterilisation technician and suffered pre-existing psychological conditions; applicant alleges she suffered a psychological injury by way of either aggravation or a new condition; respondent denied liability and alleged any injury was wholly or predominantly caused by its reasonable actions with regards to discipline under section 11A; degree of any incapacity for employment in issue; Held – applicant suffered a work injury in the nature of her underlying conditions; no evidence of any non-work related matters which caused the worsening of her condition; the actions in relation to discipline relied on by the respondent were not reasonable in the circumstances; the respondent’s contention that the applicant has capacity for employment is not supported by the evidence; respondent ordered to pay the applicant weekly compensation as alleged together with reasonably necessary medical and treatment expenses.
DETERMINATIONS MADE:	The Commission determines: 1. The applicant suffered an injury in the course of her employment with the respondent with a deemed date of injury of 18 September 2023. 2. The applicant’s injury was not wholly or predominantly caused by the reasonable actions of the respondent with respect to discipline. 3. As a result of the applicant’s injury, she has suffered and continues to suffer total incapacity for employment from 18 September 2023 to date and continuing. 4. At the time of injury, the applicant’s preinjury average weekly earnings were $945.74 per week, subject to periodic indexation. 5. The respondent is to pay the applicant weekly compensation as follows: (a) pursuant to s 36 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, from 18 September 2023 to 30 September 2023 at the rate of $898.46 per week; (b) pursuant to s 36 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, from 1 October 2023 to 18 December 2023 at the rate of $921.50; (c) pursuant to s 37 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, at the rate of $774 per week from 19 December 2023 to 31 March 2023, and (d) pursuant to s 37 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, from 1 April 2024 to date and continuing, at the rate of $788 per week. 6. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s reasonably necessary medical and treatment expenses pursuant to s 60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987. 7. This decision is to be de-identified. A brief statement is attached setting out the Commission’s reasons for the determination.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

The applicant, [BHU], worked as a sterilisation technician for the respondent, Hunter New England Local Health District. She brings proceedings seeking payment of weekly compensation and medical expenses as a result of an alleged psychological injury suffered in the course of her employment with the respondent with a deemed date of injury of 18 September 2023.
Although the deemed date of the alleged injury is not in issue, many of the matters which are said to give rise to it took place in 2022.
The respondent denies liability and alleges the applicant did not suffer a psychological injury in the course of her employment. That denial of liability is set against an agreed background of the applicant having previously suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder and androphobia.
In the alternative, the respondent alleges that if the applicant suffered a psychological injury in the course of her employment, it was wholly or predominantly caused by the respondent’s reasonable actions with respect to discipline.
The applicant’s incapacity for employment is also at issue, however, the rate of her preinjury average weekly earnings (PIAWE) is not in issue, nor is the period of alleged incapacity the subject of the claim.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The parties agree that the following issues remain in dispute:
(a)    whether the applicant suffered a work-related psychological injury;
(b)    if so, whether that injury was wholly or predominantly caused by the respondent’s reasonable actions with regards to discipline, and
(c)    the degree of the applicant’s incapacity for employment.

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION

I am satisfied that the parties to the dispute understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I have used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties to the dispute to a settlement acceptable to all of them. I am satisfied that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to explore settlement and that they have been unable to reach an agreed resolution of the dispute.
The matter was listed for hearing on three occasions, namely 14 May 2024, 28 June 2024 and 1 August 2024. The applicant was represented by Ms Grotte, instructed by Mr Walker. The respondent was represented by Ms Compton, instructed by Mr Merhaba.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The following documents were in evidence before the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) and considered in making this determination:
(a)    Application to Resolve a Dispute (the Application) and attachments;
(b)    Reply and attachments;
(c)    respondent’s Application to Admit Late Documents (AALD) dated 7 May 2024 and attachments;
(d)    applicant’s AALD dated 8 May 2024 and attachments, and
(e)    applicant’s AALD dated 24 June 2024 and attachments.

Oral evidence

There was no oral evidence called at the hearing.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

Whether the applicant suffered a psychological injury

The applicant alleges a number of incidents in 2022 and 2023 were the cause of her injury. The first occurred on 28 February 2022, when the applicant states she was informed by a co-worker, Nathaniel Campbell, that someone had made a complaint against her for working under the influence of either alcohol or drugs, and that he (Mr Campbell) had been asked by Ms Megan Ransom, education officer, to watch the applicant for signs of intoxication.
There is no issue that Mr Campbell told the applicant he had been requested to monitor the applicant to see if she was working under the influence. In his statement dated
24 January 2024, Mr Campbell noted that on or about 25 February 2022, when the applicant arrived to start her night shift, he pulled her aside and said “Listen, I have been approached to monitor you when I work with you in relation to your behaviour, and primarily in regards to whether or not you are under the influence of drugs or alcohol.” Mr Campbell then indicated to the applicant he felt uncomfortable monitoring her and noted he is not qualified to make a diagnosis as to whether the applicant was affected by drugs or alcohol.
Both Mr Campbell and the applicant indicated she immediately offered to take a drug test.
On 1 March 2022, the applicant telephoned her manager, Sue Ison, and told her she was upset her colleagues had been asked to monitor her rather than being approached directly by management to discuss the issue.
On the same day, Mr Campbell was called into a meeting with Ms Ison and asked whether he had spoken to the applicant. According to Mr Campbell, Ms Ison then proceeded to inform him of a number of alleged incidents and allegations raised against the applicant, which will be detailed further in these reasons in the discussion surrounding the defence under s 11A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act)..
On 23 March 2022, the applicant received via email, a letter setting out serious allegations against her, including but not limited to allegations she had stolen the respondent’s property together with medical supplies for the purposes of selling them for financial gain. The full terms of the letter and the allegations made against the applicant are dealt with more fulsomely in the discussion surrounding the defence pursuant to s 11A.
The allegations raised against the applicant were the subject of a lengthy investigation which culminated in her being cleared of any wrongdoing in or about June or July 2022. An allegation that the applicant had claimed excess time at work was, however, substantiated though she was not subjected to any sanction as a result of it.
The applicant also refers to a number of interactions with Ms Ison and Jessica Gately in March and April 2022, including allegations Ms Gately was listening into the applicant’s conversations at work. No statement has been provided by Ms Gately.
As a result of the investigations into her conduct, the applicant was required to work day shifts instead of her usual night shifts. Her uncontested evidence is this heightened her symptoms of androphobia, particularly as she had to work in the presence of a number of males with whom she was not familiar. For example, on 20 June 2022, five tradesmen arrived during the day shift while the applicant was working and proceeded to carry out some work in her area. The applicant alleges she was provided no support in relation to this incident and additionally, Ms Ison told her not to leave her shift early despite the shift supervisor, Mr Campbell, having let everyone leave early on the date in question.
The applicant also alleges she was singled out by Ms Maytom in March 2022 for allegedly being lazy and not carrying out her duties despite the fact she was waiting for a computer to become available, and again in January 2023 when Ms Maytom complained the music which the applicant was playing was too loud. Ms Maytom made a formal complaint about the music instead of simply asking the applicant to turn it down.
The applicant last worked on 13 September 2023, when a courier arrived at her workplace to make a delivery. At that time, the applicant’s leading hand was not present, so she went to accept the delivery. When the applicant walked back into the room, she alleges Ms Maytom was talking about the applicant to Ms Monica Bannerman. Ms Bannerman later told the applicant Ms Maytom had said the applicant was acting suspiciously, despite Ms Bannerman having told Ms Maytom the applicant had left the work area to take the delivery.
According to Ms Bannerman, Ms Maytom apparently asked Ms Bannerman whether the applicant leaves the department frequently during the course of a shift. It is this incident which the applicant alleges triggered memories of the 2022 accusations and conduct towards her and led to her condition worsening to the point where she could no longer work.
The matters which the applicant says gave rise to the aggravation of her underlying condition have not been repeated at length in this portion of these reasons. They will be dealt with more fulsomely when addressing the question of the defence under s 11A. However, the lay and medical evidence in this matter is, in my view, overwhelming. It clearly demonstrates the applicant suffered an injury in the nature of an aggravation to her underlying condition. In so finding, I have had regard to the lay and medical evidence in addressing the cause of the aggravation, not the underlying condition. This approach is consistent with the line of authority stretching back to the High Court’s decision in Federal Broom Company Ltd v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626 (Semlitch).
The medical evidence in this matter, including records of the applicant’s general practitioner (GP) from 18 September 2023 together with the report written by her GP Dr Ng, provide a consistent history of the deterioration in the applicant’s condition. The view is also supported by the applicant’s treating specialists and medico-legal opinion, including that of the respondent’s own independent medical examiner (IME) Dr Mysore.
In his report, Dr Mysore makes it clear that the incidents in the course of the applicant’s employment were the cause of the aggravation to her condition. Indeed, there is no lay or medical evidence put before the Commission which establishes any alternative cause of the deterioration in the applicant’s condition other than the events in her workplace.
Semlitch, and the cases which follow, such as Kelly v Western Institute NSW TAFE Commission [2010] NSWWCCPD 71 and Cant v Catholic Schools Office [2000] NSWCC 37, make it clear there is an aggravation where the symptoms and experience of a disease are accelerated or exacerbated, regardless of whether the underlying pathology of the disease is itself worsened; see also Australian Conveyor Engineering Pty Ltd v Mecha Engineering Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 606.
Although the respondent argued a number of the applicant’s recollections of events said to have caused her aggravation were inaccurate, I have no difficulty accepting the events of which she complained were real. For example, even if the respondent had not asked the applicant’s co-workers to monitor her for signs of intoxication, there is no question she was informed by Mr Campbell that this was the case. As such, this event, to the extent it was causative of the applicant’s deterioration, was plainly a real one.
That observation is not made to assert the example just provided was itself the main contributing factor to the applicant’s injury. Rather, it is illustrative of the applicant’s perception of a real event which contributed to her injury; see Attorney General’s Department v K [2020] NSWWCCPD 76.
There is no evidence to suggest the deterioration in the applicant’s condition was caused by anything other than her employment. The respondent’s own IME concludes the deterioration in the applicant’s condition was primarily caused by work-related factors, as does the applicant’s IME and her treating doctors.
As the authorities make clear, for a worker to succeed in a claim for psychological injury, the employment must be the main contributing factor to the injury, whether it be a frank injury, the onset of a disease or an aggravation to a pre-existing condition. In all cases involving psychological injury, the causative requirement is the same. The authorities also make it clear there can only be one main contributing factor, as opposed to the test in the case of frank physical injuries, namely that of substantial contributing factor of which there may be many.
As noted, in this case, there is no suggestion that anything other than the incidents which took place in the course of the applicant’s employment were causative of her injury. The medical and lay evidence in support of that proposition is overwhelming, and I accept it.
Accordingly, there will be a finding that the applicant suffered an injury by way of aggravation of an underlying psychological condition in the course of her employment with the respondent, as alleged.

The defence under s 11A

Section 11A provides no compensation is payable in respect of a psychological injury if the injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by or on behalf of an employer with respect to (relevantly) discipline.
Section 11A provides a complete defence to a claim for psychological injury, and an employer which seeks to make out the defence carries the onus of establishing it: Pirie v Franklin’s Limited [2001] NSWCC 167.
“Wholly” and “predominantly” are separate concepts and a finding of one or the other needs to be considered. In Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2008] NSWCCPD 130 (Smith), an arbitrator in the former Workers Compensation Commission made a finding the subject injury was “wholly or predominantly” caused by action taken by the respondent employer. Snell ADP (as he then was) said at [62] that the concepts of wholly and predominantly are different, and if such findings were to be made, “it needed to be one or the other.”
The phrase “wholly or predominantly caused” has been held to mean “mainly or principally caused.” The test of causation to be applied is that set out in the oft-cited decision of Kirby P (as he then was) in Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452. What is required is a commonsense evaluation of the entire causal chain.
In HamadvQ Catering Limited [2017] NSWWCCPD 6 (Hamad), the respondent employer was unable, on the available evidence and in the absence of any medical evidence dealing appropriately with the topic, to discharge its onus in proving the worker’s psychological injury resulted wholly or predominantly from its reasonable action.
The effect of the decision in Hamad is that reliance on factual material alone will not always be sufficient to make out a s 11A defence. Where factual evidence is adequate, it is often in cases where there is an allegation of a single event which has given rise to psychological injury. That is not this case. In any event, the respondent does rely on IME evidence in asserting the disciplinary matters upon which it relies with a whole or predominant cause of the applicant’s injury.
It is important to remember that in order to successfully raise a defence pursuant to s 11A, the respondent must not only show the requisite causal connection between its actions and the applicant’s injury, but must also satisfy the Commission that its actions were reasonable.
In considering the meaning of reasonableness, Geraghty J in Irwin v Director General of Education NSWCC 14068/97, 18 June 1998 said:
“The question of reasonableness is one of fact, weighing all the relevant factors. That test is less demanding than the test of necessity, but more demanding than the test of convenience. The test of ‘reasonableness’ is objective and must weigh the rights of employees against the object of employment. Whether an action is reasonable should be attended, in all the circumstances, by questions of fairness.”
His Honour’s approach was supported by Truss CCJ in Ivanisevic v Laudet Pty Ltd (unreported), 24 November 1998, where her Honour said:
“In my view, when considering the concept of reasonable action, the Court is required to have regard not only to the end result, but to the manner in which it was effected.”
These passages were quoted with approval by Foster AJA (Sheller and Santow JJA agreeing) in Commissioner of Police v Minahan [2003] NSWCA 239 (Minahan), where his Honour said:
“I prefer the construction which has been accorded to it in the decisions in the Compensation Court referred to in this judgement and in His Honour’s judgement. The words ‘reasonable action’, in a statute dealing with Workers’ Compensation Rights of employees should be given a broad construction, unfettered by considerations as to whether the employee can or cannot also bring an action of common law against the employer, founded upon a breach of duty of care.” (At [42].)
In Richie v Department of Community Services [1998] 16 NSWCC R 727, Armitage J said:
“It is apparent that the test in this case is an objective one where one must weigh the consequences of the respondent’s conduct against the reasons given for it. It follows, of course, from the objective nature of the test that the evidence given by the applicant as to the perceived unreasonableness of the respondent’s conduct or from the respondent as to the reasonableness of its conduct from its perspective will not be determinative of the issue.”
Reasonableness is judged having regard to fairness appropriate in the circumstances, including what went before or after a particular action: see Burke J in Melder v Ausbowl Pty Ltd [1997] 15 NSWCCR 454. Armitage J in Jackson v Work Directions Australia Pty Ltd [1998] NSWCC 45, stated:
“Only if the employer’s action in all the circumstances was fair could it be said to be reasonable (see also Northern NSW Local Health Network v Heggie [2013] NSWCA 255 (Heggie), where it was held that the reasonableness of a person’s actions is assessed by reference to the circumstances known to that person at the time the action is taken.”

As noted, the test under s 11A, is a two-step one. In relation to the “whole or predominant” element, it is important to distinguish between conduct which is either in the nature of discipline or proposed discipline and that which is ancillary to it or to the circumstances surrounding it.
Given the nature of the matters relied upon by the respondent in this matter, it is appropriate to deal with the issue of reasonableness first.
As noted, the applicant was accused of serious, and indeed criminal misconduct. On 23 March 2022, the applicant received a letter from the respondent outlining the allegations against her. They were:
“1. NSW Police contacted John Hunter Hospital (JHH) executive, on 27 January 2022 to advise that they had raided two separate houses. The searchers identified supplies of Health Share uniforms, JHH scrub uniforms, JHH CSD kits, and nerve block drugs. One of the houses raided was your father’s property and the other house, you have been witnessed as entering. The allegations as they relate to your actions are as follows:
1.1.It is alleged you have supplied the two external parties with property taken from JHH departments;
1.2.It is alleged you have taken property from the JHH without authorisation to do so;
1.3.It is alleged you have misused your employment within CSD to access JHH equipment and pharmaceutical agents;
1.4.It is alleged that the provision of these items to external parties has attracted financial gain.
2. On 25 February 2022, you rang your manager, Sue Ison, to advise you had attended a funeral and were not in a condition to come to work but if you could organise yourself, you would arrive about 10:00 pm. You arrived at 9:15 pm but were witnessed as presenting in an unfit state, slurring your words, behaving erratically and frequently leaving the department. You were seen taking your belongings and left the shift at 1:20 am. However, you signed off as leaving at 5:00 am.
2.1.It is alleged you did not present to work in a fit state to complete your shift;
2.2.It is alleged you have claimed hours worked when you were not present in the workplace.”
It shortly became apparent that the applicant’s father was not one of the people arrested in the police raids. The evidence also discloses the applicant was never questioned by the police, much less charged by them in relation to the matters contained within the letter.
By July of 2022, the applicant had been cleared of any wrongdoing in relation to the illegal supply of hospital property to other persons. She was, however, found to have erroneously completed her timesheet and claimed extra hours. There was no disciplinary action taken against her as a result of that failing.
As noted, the applicant was not questioned by the police in relation to the raids they carried out on various premises. The applicant responded to the allegations by denying them completely.
When the applicant had an interview with the respondent, she states the interview was never documented and a record of the interview was never given to her.
The difficulty with the respondent’s position in this matter is it asserted the applicant was essentially selling narcotics for financial gain, and did so on the basis of, at least in part, the false assumption one of the persons arrested in police raids was the applicant’s father. As the applicant noted in her statement, the respondent had access to her personnel records which showed the person named as one of the accused was in fact not her father. Additionally, the allegation made against the applicant that she was “identified as a link between two properties and work for NSW Health” was not substantiated.
To paraphrase Carl Sagan, serious allegations require serious proof. Photographs of items allegedly seized in the police raids were only provided to the applicant less than 24 hours before her disciplinary meeting. The respondent’s disciplinary policy provides evidence in a misconduct process should be provided with reasonable notice in writing, typically 48 hours in advance in order to give the staff member sufficient time to prepare and respond appropriately.
In an email in May 2022, Ms Sarah Morrison responded to concerns raised by the applicant. That email alleged the respondent had been provided with extensive photographic evidence of seized goods from two separate properties and confirmation:
“…that [the applicant] had attended both properties on a number of occasions. An internal assessment concluded that there was sufficient information to progress with an investigation, ensuring that [the applicant] was given the opportunity to respond both in writing and at interview. Any findings will be based on the available information including [the applicant’s] written and verbal statements.”
That email also alleges the applicant collected one of the accused from the police station and drove him back to his house when he was granted bail. Additionally, the second property which was raided was occupied by a friend of the applicant, whose premises she was witnessed entering on multiple occasions.
The difficulty with the respondent’s position is there seems to have been an attitude taken to the applicant that she was guilty by association. As noted, the police at no time interviewed her, and the respondent does not suggest a family member of hers was one of the accused whose residences were raided. Moreover, notwithstanding the applicant was never interviewed by police, the respondent took until July of 2022 to make its findings in relation to the police matters, at which time the applicant was cleared.
Reasonableness must include the time taken in investigating allegations of misconduct. In this matter, notwithstanding an absence of police action against or interest in the applicant, that investigation took some 12 weeks. During that period, the applicant was required to work on day shifts rather than her preferred night shifts and was also subjected to monitoring by co-workers while the investigation took place.
In my view, the evidence discloses a conflation by the respondent of the police matters with third party evidence said to have been provided to it of the applicant being seen in a distressed state outside of the work place while still dressed in her work uniform and the suggestion she may have been working while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. That is, in circumstances where the applicant’s pre-existing conditions were well known to the respondent, she ceased being treated by it with compassion and was instead as one suspected of criminal conduct.
That suspicion is underlined by the respondent asking the applicant’s unqualified co-workers to monitor her for signs of intoxication in the workplace instead of asking her to take a drug or alcohol test. The respondent’s conduct in my opinion plainly breached the applicant’s privacy and was inappropriate. It is not for coworkers who are unqualified in matters of drug and alcohol practice to be asked to essentially police a colleague.
There was also no evidence provided by the respondent as to how it was alleged the applicant, as a sterilisation technician, would have access to the narcotics which it alleges were found in the possession of the accused persons. This, it goes without saying, is an important matter in considering whether it was appropriate to raise allegations against the applicant and then to maintain them for so long, absent any further evidence.
Additionally, once it became apparent that the accused who said all of the hospital property belonged to his daughter was not the father of the applicant, it would have been reasonable in the circumstances to drop the allegations against her forthwith. It is a disturbing attitude to allege someone is guilty of theft and in dealing narcotics because they have attended a residence at which someone who was later arrested resided.
In the circumstances, even if the disciplinary action taken against the applicant was said to be the whole or predominant cause of the aggravation injury, it was not, in my view, reasonable.
In any event, however, in my view, the cause of the aggravation of the applicant’s condition was multifactorial. There is no question the allegations against the applicant were disciplinary in nature, however, there was other conduct which could not be said to be so. For example, placing a worker with the applicant’s pre-existing issues on shifts where she would be exposed to contact with strange men cannot, in my opinion, be said to be conduct in the nature of discipline. Nor in my opinion is the demeaning conduct of having coworkers monitor and attempt to assess the sobriety of the applicant.
The event which culminated in the applicant ceasing work in September 2023 can also not be said to be disciplinary in nature, and to its credit the respondent does not say it was. I do not find that event to be the predominant cause of the applicant’s injury, however, it was a factor in causing it, and not one which is said to be in the nature of discipline.
In my view, it is the entirety of the matters with which the applicant experienced difficulties in the workplace which caused the aggravation to her injury, and accordingly, I do not find that the action taken by the respondent was the whole or predominant cause of the applicant’s injury.
For these reasons, the defence pursuant to s 11A will fail.

Capacity for employment

The respondent alleges the applicant has capacity for employment, and in doing, so relies on the report of its IME, Dr Mysore. When asked to consider whether the applicant continues to suffer from the effects of a work-related injury, Dr Mysore replied in the affirmative.
Dr Mysore then considered the applicant could return to work “in a graduated manner after her colleagues had been given training in workplace expectations and behaviours”. Dr Mysore indicated such an approach would reflect the extent of the applicant’s current capacity, considering the effects of the alleged injury.
The difficulty with this approach relied on by the respondent is that it is aspirational. It refers to a number of conditions precedent which would be necessary before the applicant could return to work, and there is no suggestion those conditions have been satisfied.
As such, Dr Mysore’s view is not, in my view, persuasive. Instead, I am persuaded by the views of the applicant’s treating doctors and IME to the effect that she was and remains totally incapacitated for employment. That incapacity is, in my view, ongoing consistent with the Certificates of Capacity provided in the matter.
As noted, the applicant’s PIAWE is agreed at $945.74, subject to periodic indexation. The disputed periods, the subject of the claim, are also the subject of mathematical agreement in accordance with the following figures:
(a) s 36 of the 1987 Act, from 18 September 2023 to 30 September 2023 at the rate of $898.46 per week;
(b) s 36 of the 1987 Act, from 1 October 2023 to 18 December 2023 at the rate of $921.50 per week;
(c) s 37 of the 1987 Act from 19 December 2023 to 31 March 2023 at the rate of $774 per week, and
(d) s 37 of the 1987 Act, from 1 April 2024 to date and continuing, at the rate of $788 per week.
In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the medical evidence establishes the applicant is and has been since the date of the deemed injury, totally incapacitated for employment.

The claim for s 60 expenses

The dispute in relation to medical expenses was contested on the same liability grounds as that concerning weekly payments. Given my findings in relation to liability, the s 60s claim will follow the event, and the respondent will be ordered to pay the applicant’s reasonably necessary medical and treatment expenses.
Accordingly, the Commission will make the findings and orders set out on page 1 of the Certificate of Determination.

SUMMARY

For the above reasons, the Commission will make the findings and orders set out in the Certificate of Determination.

[2024] NSWPIC 506

12 September 2024